PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS AND THE CURE OF SOULS: A STUDY OF PROTESTANT PERVERSIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PASTORAL CARE

Dwight Wesley Cumbee

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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A Thesis

Presented to

the Senatus Academicus

The University of St. Andrews

In Application

for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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by

Dwight Wesley Cumbee

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the following thesis is based on the results of research carried out by myself, that it is my own composition, and that it has not been presented previously for a higher degree. The research was undertaken in St. Mary's College of the University of St. Andrews.

Dwight W. Cumbee

CERTIFICATE

I certify that Dwight Wesley Cumbee has fulfilled the requirements of Ordinance No. 16 (St. Andrews) and is qualified to submit the accompanying thesis in application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of St. Andrews.

The Reverend Professor
Edgar P. Dickie
Supervisor of Research

ACADEMIC HISTORY

I was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, on November 28, 1933. Receiving my primary education in the public schools of that city, I completed High School at Scranton Central High School in 1951. In the fall of that year I matriculated at the University of Richmond in Richmond, Virginia.

The University of Richmond granted me the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1955. My major area of study was History, with Religion as a related field. In the fall of 1955 I matriculated at Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Wake Forest, North Carolina.

During my education at Southeastern Seminary, I pursued pastoral studies and received the Bachelor of Divinity degree in June of 1958. I enrolled immediately in a year of Clinical Pastoral Education in the School of Pastoral Care of the North Carolina Baptist Hospital and Bowman-Gray School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, North Carolina. While there I also began studies toward the Master of Theology degree at Southeastern Seminary. During the academic year of 1958-1959, I served as Teaching Fellow in Pastoral Care.

In 1960 I completed the requirements for this degree and was granted the Th. M. in January of 1961. From 1960 until September of 1964 I served as a hospital chaplain in Jacksonville, Florida, and as a pastor in Richmond, Virginia.

In October of 1964, I matriculated at the University of St. Andrews and immediately began my research in St. Mary's College. The thesis now being presented is the record of that research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Research students in Germany often refer to their supervisor as "Doctor-Father." Professor Edgar Primrose Dickie, in the years that I have had the privilege of study with him, has enabled me to understand and appreciate fully the significance of such a term. As my "Doctor-Father" he has guided this research carefully, consistently, and kindly. His thorough and broad scholarship, coupled with infinite patience and natural good humour, have created not only deep respect but joy at all times. With all due regard to the significance of his books on the subject of revelation, it is, however, in personal encounter with Professor Dickie that I have become keenly aware of the truth that personality is the primary medium for Christian revelation. To him and to Mrs. Dickie, who has been more than kind in many ways to my family and myself, we owe an unpayable debt of gratitude.

Other members of the teaching staff of St. Mary's College have given readily and helpfully of their time and advice in the pursuit of this research. For each

scheduled conversation and each spontaneous "coffee hour" dialogue I am sincerely grateful. Also, to the University Library Staff and to the secretaries of St. Mary's College goes my appreciation for their willingness to go beyond their routine responsibilities in seeking to be of assistance.

"Grey St. Andrews by the sea" is a "Royal Burgh" in many ways. I would be ungrateful not to remember the many rich experiences granted to us during our sojourn among the many princely citizens of this "Royal Burgh." To all we are indebted.

One term of study was taken at the Jung-Institute in Zürich. The lecturers there, especially Dr. Peter Walder, willingly shared their time and insight. Also, three prominent European psychotherapists granted me personal interviews and greeted me graciously. To Professor Dr. Viktor E. Frankl of Vienna, Dr. Paul Tournier of Geneva, and Dr. Alphonse Maeder of Zürich I express my deepest appreciation for valuable and meaningful conversation.

Finally, I remember with loving appreciation my wife, who not only typed this thesis in its entirety, but also in every way consistently supported my research endeavors. And to Denise, Sharon, and David (who

learned well to "roll their R's") I am thankful for not allowing me to forget the art of every day family living in the midst of serious academic pursuits.

DEDICATED

TO MY PARENTS AND THOSE OF MY WIFE

WHO HAVE SHOWN TO US

"A MORE EXCELLENT WAY"

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INTRODUCTION

I. THE "ECCLESIOGENIC" NEUROSES

"Every age has its own collective neurosis, . . ." states Viktor Frankl of Vienna.[1] The age of nuclear power and space exploration is no exception. Neurosis, technically, is an "obsolescent term for the activity of the nervous system or of some of its specific parts."[2] It is also described as "a mental disorder ill-defined in character but milder than psychosis."[3] Psychological and psychoanalytical dictionaries of today speak of numerous types of neuroses among which are listed anxiety neurosis, narcissistic neurosis, obsessional neurosis, traumatic neurosis, combat neurosis, analytic neurosis and others.[4] We are told that a "functional disorder" is usually what is meant by neurosis; and that manifes-

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[1]Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1965), p. 204.

[2]Horace B. English and Ava C. English, A Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical Terms (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1958), p. 344.

[3]Ibid. [4]Ibid., p. 345.

tations of neurosis include hysteria, obsessions, fugues, phobias, and anxiety.[5] To the layman the words "nervousness," "nerves," "nervous break-down," and "crack-up" refer to the same general condition that the psychologists, psychotherapists, and psychiatrists describe as some form of neurosis or psychoneurosis. It is obvious that the term "neurosis" is a very general term used in numerous ways to describe a condition that, at least in the view of the one giving the description, is not normal.[6]

Viktor Frankl speaks of a type of neurosis that as yet has not found its way into the psychological and psychotherapeutic dictionaries. This neurosis, called "noögenic" by Frankl, is described with spiritual connotations:

> Noögenic neuroses do not emerge from conflicts between drives and instincts but rather from conflicts between various values; in other words, from moral conflicts or, to speak in a

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[5] Ibid.

[6] The use of the term "normal" itself in psychotherapeutic terminology leaves much to be desired. The definition given by English and English is: "(1) conforming to or not deviating from, the usual or the average or the type or the norm; hence, (2) neither abnormal nor subnormal; not suffering from mental disorder or mental deficiency." Op. cit., p. 349. I remember hearing a Florida psychiatrist comment: "If I ever discovered a 'normal' person, I would try to cure him."

> more general way, from spiritual problems. Among such problems, existential frustration often plays a large role.[7]

There is yet another type of neurosis that is depicted by a term that, like Frankl's "noögenic neurosis," as yet has not been in usage widely or long enough to be placed in the present-day dictionaries. According to Dr. Klaus Thomas of Berlin, there are neuroses that "are frequent and are almost exclusively found as results of upbringing and education by or on behalf of the churches."[8] He refers to this type of neurosis as "ecclesiogenic," stating that this term "has been in medical use throughout Europe since 1955, when Eberhard Schaetzing, M. D., Berlin, first used it."[9] He concludes with the following definition of "ecclesiogenic" neurosis:

> Thus, we call an "ecclesiogenic" neurosis that psychic illness which is caused by the wide-

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[7]Frankl, op. cit., p. 160. For some early Freudian views on neurotic nosogenesis, see A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. John Rickman (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 62-69.

[8]Klaus Thomas, "Ecclesiogenic Neuroses," a paper copyrighted by Ferdinand Enke, publishers, Stuttgart, 1964, p. 2. See, also, "Faith: Healthy v. Neurotic," Time, Atlantic ed., LXXXV(April, 1965), 34-35; "Krank im Glauben," Der Spiegel, NR. 21, 20(Mai 1964), 94-95, 97; and Klaus Thomas, Handbuch der Selbstmordverhutung (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1964).

[9]Ibid.

> spread "tabooizing" education in which the sexual and erotic areas of life are banned from open discussion, but at the same time considered to be immoral, forbidden, or even threatened with punishment.[10]

It appears that Thomas's use of this term is concerned primarily with prudish and unhealthy moralism, especially in respect to sexuality, parading under the guise of "Christian" education, but in reality a perversion of it. It also seems, however, that this term itself is so new and limited in usage that one who plans to use it must define it according to his own specific use of it.[11] This I propose to do. Admittedly the following definition is general--more so than Thomas's--and quite likely leaves much to be desired. But, it is hoped that it will convey the basic thought prompting the use of the words "ecclesiogenic neurosis" in the pages to follow.

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Although I recognize that the definition of "ecclesiogenic neurosis" as given by Klaus Thomas is much more narrow than the definition used in this study, I do not believe that I wholly pervert the medical-technical definition of the same by broadening it as I do. That which I attempt to describe under the classification of "ecclesiogenic neurosis" has much in common with Thomas's nosological definition of it. Another interesting term growing in use in recent years in medical-psychological circles is "iatrogenic" neuroses: neuroses produced or caused by the physician. See, e.g., Donald F. Tweedie, Jr., Logotherapy and the Christian Faith (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1961), p.89; and David M. Spain, The Complications of Modern Medical Practices: A Treatise on Iatrogenic Diseases (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1963), especially chap. 24.

Attention has already been given to some present day interpretations of "neurosis." Almost any good dictionary is helpful, also, in understanding the term "ecclesiogenic." "Ecclesiastical" is defined as "of or relating to a church esp. as a formal and established institution. . . ."[12] "Ecclesiastical" is from the Greek ἐκκλησιάστικος literally translated "of an ἐκκλησία " or "of a church." "-genic" is an adjectival form that is combined with other words and defined as "1: producing: forming ⟨carcinogenic⟩ ⟨acrogenic⟩ 2: produced by: formed from. . . ."[13] The philological significance is apparent. An "ecclesiogenic" neurosis must be a neurosis produced by or derived from the church!

"Ecclesiogenic neurosis" as used in this thesis refers to the alleged neurosis observable in the life of the Protestant Church and her ministry. It also refers to the personal neuroses of individuals whose illness seems to be traced at least in part to "ecclesiogenic" origins. Let it be said quickly and emphatically, however, that this is not an indictment of Christianity in toto, and certainly not Protestantism per se.

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[12]"Ecclesiastical," Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961 ed.) I, 718.

[13]Ibid., p. 946.

Protestantism, which is our chief concern, is not totally ill and suffering from an irreversible malady. I do not believe this to be a tenable position. My thesis is that there are certain trends within Protestantism today that are neurotic--"ecclesiogenically" neurotic. Daniel Jenkins, Chaplain at the University of Sussex, England, has said:

> Judgment begins at the house of God, and the corollary of that fact is that the most searching and comprehensive criticism of any church which understands the teaching of its Lord must always come from within.[14]

It is in the spirit of these words that this research is undertaken. Our concern is with Protestantism alone, and not with Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, or any other non-Protestant branch of the Church. The reason for this is not that the non-Protestant branches of the Church are free of neurotic trends. On the contrary, if comparisons were to be made it might quite successfully be argued that Protestant communions on the whole are less prone to the "ecclesiogenic neuroses" than the non-Protestant churches. However, my main concern and most intimate knowledge is with Protestantism. When speaking of Protestant communions, I refer to those

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[14]Daniel Jenkins, Beyond Religion (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p. 16.

churches and sects that are the historical or spiritual descendants of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. But, let us now return to our discussion of the use of the term "ecclesiogenic neurosis."

In recent years much theological debate has orbited about the phrases "religionless Christianity," "holy worldliness," "God above God," and other like expressions. A small book by the Bishop of Woolwich, John A. T. Robinson, entitled Honest to God, ignited a rather far-reaching discussion on the general theme expressed in the above fragmented thoughts.[15] With a closer perusal it becomes evident that it is really the thought of two modern theologians--one living and one dead--that has been the real basis for the notions considered in Honest to God and the debate that followed. These men are Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. It is also true that Paul Tillich influenced the Bishop of Woolwich considerably; but for our purposes at this point we will consider only Barth and Bonhoeffer.

Bonhoeffer, the German martyr hanged by the Nazis shortly before World War II ended, has left a rich lega-

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[15]See John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God and the Debate (SCM Library ed.; London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963).

cy of theological contributions. It is in his Letters and Papers from Prison that his thoughts concerning "religionless Christianity" and "holy worldliness" are most evident--although, unfortunately, frustratingly incomplete. In these writings of the middle 1940s he makes statements such as:

> I wonder if you will understand me when I say I find something attractive in this theme and the way it is treated in this book [W. F. Otto's The Homeric Gods]. In fact, I find these gods--horribile dictu--less offensive when treated like this than certain brands of Christianity![16]

Jenkins, appraising Bonhoeffer's thought, observes:

> It seeks to abolish much which passes for "the life of the church" but which, in its tired flabbiness, is no more than a quasi-religious conformity to this world which passes away.[17]

He continues by noting that Eberhard Bethge, a man to whom many of Bonhoeffer's prison letters were written, has attempted to define four characteristics of religion in the view of Bonhoeffer:

> First, it is individualistic. The religious man is preoccupied with himself and his interior states in such a way as to forget his neighbor, even though this individualism may take ascetic and apparently self-sacrificial forms. Secondly, it is metaphysical. God is brought in to complete,

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[16]Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1953), p. 150.

[17]Op. cit., p. 38.

> as the supernatural, a fundamentally man-centered view of reality. Thirdly, the religious interest becomes more and more one department of life only. Scientific discovery and other forces push it more and more into insignificant areas of life. And fourthly, the God of religion is a *deus ex machina*, one who comes in from the outside to help his children when they are in trouble. He is not the One at the centre of life, who controls and directs it and meets and sustains us in our strength as well as our weakness.[18]

If Bonhoeffer is here interpreted correctly then his view of the religious situation and religious life of the mid-twentieth century is one coloured, undeniably, with strong negative overtones. Although he probably never would use these terms, are we not near the truth to say that he seems to be describing "neurotic" trends within the religious realm and within the religious man?[19] Is he speaking of an "ecclesiogenic neurosis," but in other terms?

Professor John D. Godsey of Drew University in the United States, in his excellent treatment of Bonhoeffer's theology, has said of Bonhoeffer's thought

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[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

[19] In Bonhoeffer's writings psychotherapists and existential philosophers seem to be the targets of his sharpest attacks. Therefore, it is not likely that he would think of using a term that usually is thought of psychotherapeutically. This attack on psychotherapy is interesting to note especially when it is considered that Bonhoeffer's father was himself a psychiatrist.

concerning the Church and "religionless Christianity":

> One open question, for instance, is what form he thought the church should take in a religionless Christianity. . . . We can be certain of one thing, namely, that the new form would be structured in such a way that the church would most effectively exist for humanity. Conditions that encourage clerical arrogance and ecclesiastical self-interest would have to be eliminated and measures instituted to ensure the church's involvement in the social and political life of the world. . . . The church must learn to live the gospel and not just preach it, for only its example will empower its words. It must be the instrument for proclaiming God's word (in a "non-religious" language!), but beyond that Bonhoeffer believed that the Protestant church had to regain its own peculiar life as an end in itself.[20]

Bonhoeffer has made a number of assertions concerning the Protestant Church. The first is that, at present at least, the Church is not effectively existing for humanity. Secondly, he underlines conditions that encourage clerical arrogance and ecclesiastical self-interest. This is the subject of Monica Furlong's words in Punch as she appraised Honest to God:

> Whatever possible good John Robinson's book had or had not achieved, it quickly became clear what its negative virtue was. It indicated just how deep and how far-reaching was clerical contempt for the layman, how gravely the clergy under-rated his intelligence and understanding. The layman, as shoals of clerical letters unconsciously suggested, ought not to be allowed

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[20]John D. Godsey, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1960), p. 273.

> ideas which may upset or confuse him. Robinson's crime was to show, uncompromisingly, that he believed he must "trust the people"; he could not be bothered with the tedious, over-scrupulous clerical language which never communicated.[21]

Thirdly, Bonhoeffer is asserting that the church is not properly engaged in the social and political life of the world. It is preaching but not sufficiently practising. The gospel is being verbalized but not vivified. Only as it is lived and exemplified will the verbalization become empowered. And this proclamation would best be in a "nonreligious" language. Finally, Bonhoeffer concludes that the Protestant Church has lost "its own peculiar life." Is he saying, in other words, that the "Protestant principle" of which Paul Tillich speaks--justification by grace through faith--is no longer central in twentieth century Protestantism?[22]

I would like to think that if Dietrich Bonhoeffer had lived to complete his theological quest, that which would have emerged would have been a polemic against what I choose to call the "ecclesiogenic neurosis," and not a wholesale assault upon religion in an attempt to replace it with a "religionless Christianity." In the

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[21]Monica Furlong, "The Pundits: The Bishop of Woolwich," Punch, CCXLVI (May 20, 1964), 733.

[22]Infra, p. 128.

light of what he *did* say, however, this could very well be nothing more than wishful thinking.

A second theologian whose work has been part of the genesis for the wide-spread discussion orbiting about *Honest to God*, and whose work has influenced Bonhoeffer considerably, is Karl Barth. In his prodigious *Church Dogmatics* there is a section entitled "The Revelation of God as the Abolition of Religion."[23] There he speaks of religions generally, but including Christianity, as "always fighting for their lives," always being "acutely or chronically sick." Barth believes:

> Religions are continually faced with the choice: either to go with the times, to change as the times change, and in that way relentlessly to deny themselves any claim to truth and certainty; or else to be behind the times, to stick to their once-won forms of doctrine, rite and community and therefore relentlessly to grow old and obsolete and fossilized; or finally, to try to do both together, to be a little liberal and a little conservative, and therefore with the advantages of both options, to have to take over their two-fold disadvantages as well. That is why religions are always fighting for their lives. That is why they are always acutely or chronically sick.[24]

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[23]Karl Barth, *The Doctrine of the Word of God*, trans. G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), Vol. I, 2 of *Church Dogmatics*, pp. 280-361.

[24]*Ibid.*, p. 316. An illustration of "sick" religion is given by Barth in *The Humanity of God* (London: Collins, 1961), p. 39, as he describes an "evangelical theology" that had become "*religionistic*, *anthropocentric*,

Does not this sickness--whether it be acute or chronic at any given time--have strong elements of ecclesiogenic origin? Is not this illness, to which Barth refers, produced at least in part by the choices that the church does make and the by-products of those choices? In this sense then it appears that this acute or chronic sickness ("neurosis"?) is to some degree--we do not attempt to measure the degree--ecclesiogenic!

Barth is convinced that the radical and critical power residing in the grace of God is not finding expression in Christianity today.[25] Speaking in respect of the Church's debate with the non-Christian religions he says, "The Church can never do more harm than when it

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and in this sense humanistic." "What I mean to say is that an external and internal disposition and emotion of man, namely his piety--which might well be Christian piety--had become its object of study and its theme. . . . This was true of evangelical theology in its doctrine of principles, in its presentation of the Christian past and its practical understanding of the Christian present, in its ethics and in that which perhaps was to be regarded as its dogmatics, in the proclamation and instruction of the Church determined by it--above all, however, in its interpretation of the Bible." This fixation on man and his works to the neglect of the deity of God is a characteristic manifestation of "ecclesiogenic neurosis." It is quite clear, however, that evangelical theology has no corner on the "sick religion" market. "Illness" is just as evident, albeit expressed in different symptoms, in theologies of a more liberal persuasion.

[25] Ibid., p. 335.

thinks that it must abandon the apostolic injunction, that grace is sufficient for us."[26] This is true not only in the Church's relationship to non-Christian religions but in every area and facet of the Christian life. Grace is central in Protestantism and must be. Is this, however, the witness of the Protestant Church in this century? Is Protestantism healthily portraying the free grace of God; or, on the contrary, is it ecclesiogenically neurotic? What has happened to the Christian's life and message of grace? Barth continues:

> If man tries to grasp at truth of himself, he tries to grasp at it a priori. But in that case he does not do what he has to do when the truth comes to him. He does not believe. If he did, he would listen; but in religion he talks. If he did he would accept a gift; but in religion he takes something for himself. If he did, he would let God Himself intercede for God: but in religion he ventures to grasp at God. Because it is a grasping, religion is the contradiction of revelation, the concentrated expression of human unbelief, i.e., an attitude and activity which is directly opposed to faith.[27]

Although to describe the Christian religion as a "concentrated expression of human unbelief" seems to be an unduly harsh judgment, the emphasis that Barth is making on the apparent dethronement of the centrality of grace in the proclamation, life, and practice of much modern Protestantism is well founded. He also states:

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[26]Ibid., p. 332. [27]Ibid., pp. 302-03.

> It might become an even more burning question, whether from the very standpoint of its existence as such, of its validity and task in the world, Christianity does not have cause to give a body blow to its own secularism and heathenism, which means--for everything else is secular and heathen--to set its hope wholly and utterly on grace.[28]

There is little doubt that in Barth's thought at this point religion actually gets in the way of true revelation and the grace of God. But, does Barth really mean religion *per se*; or, is he, more correctly, describing negative characteristics that religion often assumes--false trends and currents within the religious life? In regard to modern Protestantism he comments:

> It was and is a characteristic of its theological thinking, . . . that in its great representatives and outstanding tendencies what it has discerned and declared is not the religion of revelation but the revelation of religion.[29]

This is not a compliment! Barth's thesis is that there is unbelief in all religions and Christianity is no exception. In no sense does he see the New Testament as a book of religion. "From first to last it is the proclamation of the justifying and sanctifying grace of God."[30] No stretching of the imagination can find any agreement between this view and that of the biblicists of various denominations who interpret the New Testament

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[28]*Ibid.*, p. 337. [29]*Ibid.*, p. 284. [30]*Ibid.*, p. 312.

first and foremost as a law book. It is also apparent that to Barth the very use of the name of Jesus Christ is another point at which religion expresses unbelief. He writes:

> Because the name describes no less than the creation and Creator of the Christian religion, we cannot act as though it were at our disposal, adding it to our supposedly Christian doctrines as an expository or confirmatory addendum, or even as a critical proviso, conjuring with it in relation to our supposedly Christian enterprizes as with a magic force, interposing it as the pretext and purpose of our supposedly Christian institutions, like a stained-glass window in an otherwise completed Church.[31]

This is less a warning of what <u>might</u> take place and more a penetrating description of what <u>is</u> taking place in various and sundry places, situations and times. Barth speaks pointedly of the ultra-activism of the space age, and reminds us of Frankl and "noögenic neurosis" when he says: "There need be no 'frenzied activity' in an attempt to discover or establish a meaningful life. This way lies only meaninglessness."[32] Again the clear implication is that there are evidences of just this taking place and the realm of religion--yes, Protestant Christianity--is not exempt.

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[31]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 347-48.

[32]Karl Barth, <u>The Doctrine of Reconciliation</u>, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1958), Vol. IV, 2 of <u>Church Dogmatics</u>, p. 749.

Daniel Jenkins speaking of Barth says: "He underlines the truth that the Church's deadliest foes are those of her own household, and that the condition of her faithful obedience to God is that she should achieve genuine self-transcendence."[33] Professor Edgar P. Dickie of St. Andrews balances our perspective, however, with his insightful appraisal:

> Those who have pursued this theme "religionless Christianity" have sometimes forgotten that religion may be, and often is, the inevitable response and the right response, to revelation. Since error arises, not through being religious, but through having confidence in religion instead of having confidence in God, Barth's polemic would be more properly directed against "religiosity."[34]

However confused the notions of "religionless Christianity" and the "abolition of religion" might be they do help us to recognize our continuing need of diagnosing and dealing with neurotic trends that show themselves in various ways. These trends are what I refer to as the "ecclesiogenic neuroses." This thesis is not a plea for the "abolition of religion" or a "religionless Christianity." This is inconceivable.

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[33] ~~Op. cit.~~, p. 16.

[34] Edgar P. Dickie, The Father Everlasting (Wallington, Surrey: The Religious Education Press Ltd., 1964), p. 11.

As Professor Dickie points out:

> We must remember that Bonhoeffer and Barth have worked on a definition of "religion" which is largely influenced by German pietism. English speaking people have a much wider conception of it--and surely a truer one. . . . We employ the term "religion" not only for the private devotions and Christian practice of individual believers but also for that which is happening or that which is being practised every time the Word is read and preached and set forth in the Sacraments; every time a congregation engages in worship and praise. That is, we set religion alongside revelation as the rightful response of obedient man to the call of God.[35]

The use of the term "ecclesiogenic neurosis" is designed to help distinguish that which is not "the rightful response of obedient man" from that which is "the rightful response of obedient man." It is to remind us continually that there is a dual character of religion. Religion may liberate or enslave, it may free from guilt or create guilt, it may be a religion of grace or a religion of vain and frantic striving.

Finally, "ecclesiogenic neurosis" for the purposes of this research must remain a general term somewhat ill-defined. Under the spreading umbrella of this

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[35] Ibid., pp. 11-12. See also John McConnachie, The Barthian Theology and the Man of To-Day (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1933), pp. 30-31; Karl Barth, The Humanity of God (London: Collins, St. James, 1961), pp. 22 and 39; R. Birch Hoyle, The Teaching of Karl Barth (London: SCM Press, 1930), pp. 31 and 70.

term are included negative and neurotic trends and expressions of modern Protestantism. The religiosity that Dickie speaks of is an expression of the "ecclesiogenic neurosis."[36] So is the clericalism that Jenkins defines as a compartmentalized spirituality separated from the rest of the world and in which "decisive power lies in the hands of a self-perpetuating corporation of religious experts."[37] The moralism that Tournier berates as a "deformation of the Christian message, which is a negation of it," and the existential frustration that prompted Frankl's "logotherapy" are all closely related to the "ecclesiogenic neuroses."[38] The activism--not only, but especially on the American scene--is also a primary symptom of this malady. In respect to American religious activism Paul Tillich has asked:

> Is the tremendous trend of activism in the attitude of America today a sufficient guarantee for the fulfillment of the religious obligation? . . . the answer must be "No." Activism as such cannot overcome the law of tragedy, and especially not if it has the character of escapism, the attempt, namely, to escape the feeling of meaninglessness and emptiness with respect to the eternal. And no keen observer of American religious and secular life can overlook this

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[36] Supra, p. 17. [37] Op. cit., p. 78.

[38] Paul Tournier, Guilt and Grace (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 124. Also infra, chap. X.

> hidden element of flight from one's self implied in all kinds of humanitarian and political activities.[39]

Institutionalism and its accompanying "pathology of organizations" of which Peter Drucker speaks;[40] otherworldliness, "churchianity," false secularization, legalism and Pharisaism, depersonalization, and that which is expressed by "psychologism," are all concepts that are caught up in the broad use of our term "ecclesiogenic neurosis."[41] I do not promise that this is all that I mean by these words; but I hope that enough has been said to make comprehensible their use in the following pages. Through the recognition of "ecclesiogenic neuroses" is the hope and ultimate purpose of this thesis; that is, to contribute to the end that the gospel's authentic proclamation of the grace of God will be recovered in freshness and in power in the Protestant Church corporate and in the lives of individuals. It is also my hope that a true and lasting reversal might take place in respect to the ecclesiogenically neurotic trends of our day.

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[39] Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. J. L. Adams (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 185.

[40] Jenkins, op. cit., p. 105.

[41] See Dickie, op. cit., p. 12.

II. THE CURE OF SOULS

The "cure of souls" is a phrase quite common in modern English usage and, therefore, does not need an elaborate and intensive definition. One reason for its familiarity is the growing popularity of pastoral counselling as a modern theological discipline, especially in the United States.[42] This is a discipline that owes much to depth psychology. Another reason for the more common usage of this phrase is the ministry of the hospital chaplain. Led by the example of the pioneering Anton Boisen and Russell Dicks there has been a steady growth in the number of institutions of healing--general, mental, and specialized hospitals--employing upon their staffs especially trained ministers who function daily alongside the members of the other healing professions. In this setting the phrase "cure of souls" has taken on new significance, and understandably so.

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[42]Compare present-day catalogues from several leading theological schools in the United States with catalogues from the same institutions twenty years old and one is readily impressed with the tremendous growth in emphasis on pastoral counselling as a theological discipline.

The Latin "cura" from which the word "cure" is derived means, basically, "care." And as John T. McNeill says, ". . . It is readily applied either to the tasks involved in the care of a person or thing, or to the mental experience of carefulness or solicitude concerning its object."[43] The use of the term "cure of souls" in this research concerns, almost without exception, the tasks involved in the care of persons. Although in most cases it will be referring to the care expressed on the part of a minister toward those composing his "flock," it will also--and properly so in the light of the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers--refer to the mutual care of one person for another in which case one or both may not be ordained ministers.

The "cure of souls" as used in the chapters to follow will also many times have a peculiarly healing aspect to its meaning. It is true that the secular use of the term "cure" almost without exception denotes that of a therapeutic nature. Although, as we have seen, the theological use of the term includes the significance of "care" in a much broader sense, it will have in the great majority of the cases to follow

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[43]John T. McNeill, A History of the Cure of Souls (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1952), p. vii.

definite therapeutic implications and in this sense hold much in common with the meaning of the secular "cure."

It is not my intention to attempt here to define the term "soul" by an exhaustive treatment of the relevant philosophical conceptions. Let it suffice to say that the approach to the use of this word is much more Hebrew-oriented than Greek-oriented. Whereas we owe to the Greeks the view of the soul as distinguished from the body we can thank the Hebrews for a more total view of man. They have taught us to keep body and soul together. Man is not to be compartmentalized into three distinct "geographical" areas that can readily be referred to as mind, body and spirit, or soul. It is a primary concern throughout this research to maintain a view of man in his totality--his wholeness. The "cure of souls" refers to the cure of whole men.[44]

III. A THREE-FOLD PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is three-fold. Our century has witnessed a growing number of negative and non-Christian tendencies within the Christian Church. This in itself, of course, is not unique. Every gen-

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[44] Infra, chapter VI.

eration of the Church faces this problem. The Christian Church in honest reflection is the first to admit imperfection. However, it appears that the Protestant Church of today in many cases is oblivious to the seriousness of the threat posed by the "ecclesiogenic neuroses." Or is it possible that she has consciously chosen to ignore or to deny this sickness hoping that it will run its course and be done, leaving no serious debilitation? As I have already indicated I am not generalizing that Protestantism is mortally ill and nearing what some people feel is a long over-due institutional demise.[45] The absurdity of that seems evident. But, there are certain serious trends observable within Protestantism that ought to be identified and described as clearly as possible and some suggestions made toward remedial action. "Ecclesiogenic neuroses" is the term I have chosen to describe these symptoms of illness. An attempt has been made in this introduction to identify some of these tendencies by name and relate them to the all-inclusive term used for them. In chapters to follow, a serious effort is made to describe the "ecclesiogenic neuroses," for awareness of the malady is essential to any reversal of

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[45] Supra, p. 6.

it. This phenomenon is observable, for example, in the institutional life of the Church, in the various expressions of the ordained and lay ministry at work, and in the relationship of the Church to the World. Not only is an attempt to describe the "ecclesiogenic neuroses" themselves forthcoming, but the by-products of these neuroses--especially as evidenced in the lives of individual persons--are also considered. With a desire to maintain a view of man as a <u>whole</u> person descriptions will be given of the spiritual, emotional and physical implications of these perversions. Therefore, with one key word being "description" a primary purpose of this thesis is to portray the "ecclesiogenic neuroses" as observed in the life of the Church and their effects as witnessed in the lives of people.

The second aspect of the purpose of this study is to make certain general and, when possible, specific therapeutic recommendations for combating the "ecclesiogenic neurosis." This is undeniably ambitious and probably quite presumptous. However, there are some sources that promise aid. Where these sources seem to be appropriate and applicable an effort will be made to bring their aid to bear on the problem. Some of these suggestions are preventive and some remedial, that is,

designed to deal with the already realized neurosis or its by-products.

The third aspect of our purpose is to illustrate and emphasize the critical role of the parish ministry in the therapy required to deal effectively with a neurosis that is ecclesiogenic. There is no one person who is in a more strategic position than the parish minister to deal therapeutically with the problem in all its manifestations in both a preventive and remedial sense. If a true and significant "cure" is to take place, then the source of that balm--at least in large measure--will be the person of the parson. To summarize, this then is the three-fold purpose of the present research: (1) to describe the "ecclesiogenic neuroses"; (2) to make certain general and specific therapeutic and preventive recommendations; and (3) to illustrate and emphasize the critical and strategic role of the parish minister.

The purpose of this research should not be considered outside of the context of its limitations. One limitation to which I have alluded already is the fact that this is a study of Protestantism--The Roman Church and the Eastern Church are not included. Undoubtedly, all branches of the Church share in some manifestations

of the "ecclesiogenic neuroses." Just as surely there are some aspects of the neuroses that are peculiar to a specific branch. Our concern, however, is only Protestantism.

There is also the limitation incurred in having such a broad spectrum of denominations as there are to be found within the Protestant Church. This is a limitation in the sense that in many ways generalities must substitute for specifics. If this research were limited, for example, to Presbyterians or Baptists the opportunity to speak more specifically is obvious. However, there are certain assets to be realized in a study of Protestantism that would not be realized if the study were limited to one or two Protestant denominations. To illustrate, it is quite apparent that the "pathology of organization" is a problem that is not confined to any one Protestant denomination. Therefore, not only will descriptions fit most of the Protestant groups, but any deductions can be expected to be applicable to most of them as well. Also, it cannot be denied that there is a certain amount of cohesiveness and unity to be found in Protestantism despite the ravages of sectarianism. To this fact the present-day and apparently growing ecumenical spirit bears testimony.

A self-imposed limitation is that no attempt is made to define exhaustively the Christian message in Protestantism--justification by grace through faith. This is accepted *a priori*. Aspects of grace are reviewed from a historical point of view; but the purpose of this is to form a point or background of contrast against which the "ecclesiogenic neuroses" of today can be described more accurately.

IV. APPROACH AND PLAN OF STUDY

It is hoped that this research will be characterized throughout in an obvious way by an attitude probably best described as "person-centered." In the entirety of the study the over-riding consideration is meant to be the person and the personal. When this attitude is not expressed in the chapters to follow it is a "sin" of omission and not commission.

In addition to the consultation of as much pertinent literature as possible, the examination and illustrative use of personal case histories is an important method of presentation. While many of these case histories are borrowed from published works of others, some are known personally to me and some are drawn from

unpublished sources. Statistics will also play a limited but significant role in the presentation of the subject.

The plan of study involves four major parts within the context of this Introduction and an Epilogue. Part I provides the background for the description of the "ecclesiogenic neurosis" in Protestantism which is to follow. It emphasizes from an historical perspective the centrality of free grace and the prominence of the personal in Protestantism. Part II is an attempt to describe the "ecclesiogenic neuroses" in twentieth century Protestantism. Its primary purpose is to illustrate as graphically as possible the neuroses as expressed in various forms and to demonstrate the personal implications of the neuroses for the whole person in today's world. In Parts III and IV suggestions and recommendations are provided for dealing with the neuroses. Part III is a study of C. G. Jung, Paul Tournier, and Viktor Frankl--three psychotherapists whose relationship and contributions to the cure of souls are considered significant. The key word here is "remedial." Part IV emphasizes the minister and his task in the light of the "ecclesiogenic neuroses." The key word here is "preventive," although "remedial" is quite

appropriate as well. With these words of introduction and explanation let us now observe the relationship of Jesus to the "ecclesiogenic neurosis" of His day.

PART I. THE "ECCLESIOGENIC NEUROSES" AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH: A HISTORICAL SURVEY

CHAPTER I

JESUS AND THE PHARISEES

The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine the attitude and position of Jesus in respect to moralism and activism as exhibited in the teaching and practice of Pharisaism during His lifetime. This is not a historical study of the Pharisees as a religious-political party. Much has been done in the tracing of the historical development of Pharisaism and that is not my concern.[1] Neither is it my purpose to judge the guilt or innocence of individuals or groups of individuals in respect to the persecution, suffering, and death of Jesus. For centuries this has been a topic of debate and discussion. One of the latest expressions on this subject was issued from the recent Vatican Council meeting in Rome.[2] Nor is this a critical study of the fair-

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[1]See e.g., Louis Finkelstein, The Pharisees (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publ. Soc. of America, 1946), 2 vols.

[2]This public statement affirmed the Roman Catholic Church's position that the Jews as a nation bore no more guilt than Gentiles for the death of Christ.

ness or unfairness, accuracy or undue harshness of the words of condemnation spoken, or said to be spoken, by Jesus to the Pharisees. This, also, has been a popular subject, especially among Jewish scholars.[3] However, it is not included within the scope of this examination. No specific attempt is made to ascertain whether Jesus actually said what He is reported to have said in the Gospels. It is the contention of some scholars that Jesus' words of criticism, often severe criticism, are not really His words, but instead, were ascribed to Him by the authors of the Gospels as the early Church fought for her life against first century Pharisaism. This is left to the realm of "higher criticism." Here the Gospel accounts are accepted as presented.

It is impossible, however, to deal with the attitude of Jesus in respect to Pharisaic moralism and activism without most or all of the above becoming involved in the discussion in some way. The primary and overriding concern of this chapter, nevertheless, is with Jesus' attitude and position in respect to the ecclesiogenic neurosis of His day--Pharisaic moralism and activism.

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[3]See R. Travers Herford, The Pharisees (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1924).

As is evident from what has been stated or implied, the basic premise from which our discussion is launched is that the presence of moralism and activism among the Pharisees was a reality. One who has read the Gospels is well aware of the fact that Jesus and/or the authors of the Gospels recognized it as so. The same basic assumption is adopted here.

I. JESUS AND THE SYSTEM

Joseph Klausner's interpretation of what M. Friedländer has to say on this subject includes the following statement in regard to Jesus' attitude to the Pharisaic system in theory and practice:

> At first he [Jesus] favoured the ceremonial laws if only they were observed with a proper intention; then, he rose in opposition only against insincere Pharisees, the "street-corner Pharisees" . . . . In the later period, however, of Jesus' ministry he tended to set aside the ceremonial laws . . . . And since he perceived more and more clearly the harm caused by Pharisaic literalism, there grew up in him . . . the tendency to replace the system of the ceremonial laws by a more ethical system--the antithesis of the Pharisaic system. . . .[4]

What was the relationship of Jesus to the Pharisaical system? Before this question can be considered

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[4]Joseph Klausner, Jesus of Nazareth, trans. Herbert Danby (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1925), p. 117.

adequately it would seem helpful to recall the condition of this system at the time of Christ. Pharisaism, or the religion taught and practised by the Pharisees and their adherents, was founded upon the authority of the Torah and the interpretations of the scribes of the Pharisees. The attitude of the religious Jew to Torah can be sensed in the words of C. G. Montefiore:

> Study the Law, meditate on the Law, love the Law, rejoice in the Law, and the Law will give you--such was the divine intention in giving it--the strength you require to fulfill it. The Law, being divine, is almost alive! God fills the Law with his Grace.[5]

Immediately one is struck with the sacredness and holiness of the Law in the eyes of the faithful Jew. "The Law, being divine, is almost alive!" If the words of Professor Montefiore accurately describe the attitude of the first century Pharisees it is not at all difficult to give credence to the following appraisal of the system as it experienced deformation:

> Life had therefore no other aim and meaning than the study and fulfillment of the Law. One evil consequence of this "idolatry of the law" was the externalizing of religion. God was conceived of mainly as Lawgiver and Judge. The religious relation

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[5]C. G. Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature and Gospel Teachings (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 174.

> between God and Israel was purely legal; it was founded on a purely legal compact.[6]

This evaluation continues:

> They [the Pharisees] made the law "only a manual of religious etiquette." Their righteousness was thus mere formalism; their righteous man was one who kept the law, written and oral, in an external, but formally correct manner.[7]

The regulations of the Pharisaical system were multitudinous; but it was the duty of the faithful to fulfil them meticulously. The main concern of every true Pharisee was the doing of that which was lawful and the separation of oneself from that which was unlawful, as set down in the Torah and its multiplicity of interpretations. Needless to say these regulations and their minutiae were irksome and casuistical. For example, one might walk 2000 cubits on a Sabbath without being guilty of Sabbath breaking; but if he were to walk one step farther the Sabbath was broken.[8]

This system not only limited the love and the grace of God to one people--the Jews--but even among

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[6]D. Eaton, "Pharisees," A Dictionary of the Bible, ed. James Hastings (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1900), III, 828.

[7]Ibid.

[8]H. D. A. Major, T. W. Manson, C. J. Wright, The Mission and Message of Jesus (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson Ltd., 1937), p. 57.

them God's grace and love were only for those who followed the narrow path indicated by the Torah and the oral law of the rabbis. According to A. T. Robertson this attitude "amounts to a legalistic perversion of religion in Judaism."[9]

Something of a deformation of rabbinic Judaism in the days of Christ is admitted even among scholars whose sympathies lie with the Pharisees and Pharisaism. Klausner, who is certainly not anti-Pharisaical, has said in quoting Josephus:

> They [the Pharisees] take a pride in the scrupulous observance (ἐξακριβώσεις) of the religion of the Fathers and think to themselves that God loves them more than others. (Ant. XVII ii 4)[10]

Then, he adds his own insightful apology:

> In every system, as time goes on, the secondary comes to be regarded as primary and the primary as secondary; the most exalted idea has associated with it disciples who distort it and transform it, and so there is aroused the indignation of the better against the worse disciples and the dispute is not with the system or the teaching but with the fellow partisans who have greatly damaged the system to which they adhere.[11]

It is true that Klausner is not being critical of the system as such, but of the practitioners who have mis-

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[9]A. T. Robertson, The Pharisees and Jesus (London: Duckworth & Co., 1920), p. 129.

[10]Op. cit., p. 213. [11]Ibid.

used it. However, later in the same work he says: "It must . . . be admitted that Pharisaism did . . . contain one serious defect which enabled the more hypocritical to pride themselves in the mere performance of the commandments . . . ."[12] This "defect" was the undue importance placed upon those laws dealing with the man-God relations to the neglect of those laws dealing with the man-man relations.[13] Klausner concludes:

> The Pharisees and the Tannaim--even the earliest of them--did, indeed, "pile up the measure" of the ceremonial laws, and they so overlaid the original nucleus with a multiplicity of detail and minutiae as unwittingly to obscure the divine purpose of these laws.[14]

Although he attempts to defend the system his critique of Pharisaism in the time of Christ is exceedingly close to an open avowal of a deformed system.

What Klausner refuses to say others readily express:

> There were doubtless in our Lord's time many good men among the Pharisees, but the tendency of the whole system was to produce hypocrisy (cf. what is said of proselytes, Mt. 23:15), or, in the case of earnest and sincere souls, self-torture and a sense of estrangement from God (cf. Mt. 11:28ff. . . .).[15]

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[12] Ibid., p. 215. [13] Ibid. [14] Ibid., p. 371.

[15] Eaton, op. cit., p. 829.

The whole system was defective, not simply a few moralistic and hypocritical individuals who gave a bad representation of an innocent system. Rather there was a tendency or trend within the system itself to produce legalistic hypocrisy. This trend included strong moralistic and activistic currents.

It was this deformed Pharisaical system that prompted "the voice of one crying in the wilderness."[16] When John comes upon the scene in the Gospels he is preaching a message of repentance. His ministry "has two distinctive features: it is a clear call to moral renewal and it has a clear reference to the Jewish Messianic hope."[17] It appears that John's effort was a last desperate attempt to make this unworkable system work. He tried to ignite a far-reaching religious and moral reformation. He was concerned with enforcing the law of righteousness from which the system had departed--although, it had paid lip allegiance to it. His was a compelling cry, a cry to <u>be</u> good and repent of what the system had wrought.[18] T. W. Manson believes that this

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[16]Mark 1:3 (A. V.).

[17]T. W. Manson, <u>The Servant-Messiah</u> (Cambridge: University Press, 1953), p. 38.

[18]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 49.

"was the last effort of the traditional Jewish legal religion to vindicate itself by producing changed lives."[19]

However, John's efforts toward reformation were not enough. Following him the Galilean began His work--a work that ultimately turns, not only the Pharisaic system upside down, but the world as well. It is interesting to note, nevertheless, the attempts of some to identify Jesus with the system. It is emphasized by Klausner that Jesus remained faithful to the Torah until his dying day and that He observed the ceremonial laws like a true Pharisaic Jew.[20] Klausner states that:

> The people flocked after the Pharisaic "Rabbi" whose parables were so attractive and who did not insist that men observe all the laws in every detail. He was a "Rabbi" whose "yoke was easy and whose burden was light."[21]

It cannot be denied that Jesus was a teacher, as were many of the Pharisees. It is true that He taught some things that the Pharisees also taught. It is quite likely that, in some ways, his mode of teaching resembled that of the Pharisees. Yet, how does one account for the vast difference in effect produced in each case? R. Travers Herford believes that the difference was due to the difference in personalities, and that the teach-

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[19]Ibid. [20]Op. cit., p. 275. [21]Ibid., p. 276.

ing itself was "of hardly any importance."[22] This, assuredly, leaves much to be desired. Christ might have expounded some Scripture in the same manner as the Pharisees, but to say that the teaching itself was "of hardly any importance" is not a true analysis of the situation. Did, for example, Jesus and the system share the same interpretation of righteousness? A. T. Robertson points out that one of the purposes of the Sermon on the Mount was to delineate the difference between Christ's concept of righteousness and the concept adhered to by the Pharisaical system of his day.[23] He argues that:

> Both Jesus and the rabbis appeal to the Old Testament, but Jesus seizes the moral content and intent, and lifts the ethical standard higher by going into the purposes of the heart, while the rabbis were busy with innuendos and petty punctilios of the fringes of morality.[24]

Klausner contends that the people venerated the Pharisees who were the leaders of Jewish democracy and because of this they also venerated Jesus. To them He was another Pharisee but one who interpreted the Law leniently, therefore appealing to the popular taste.[25]

This alleged veneration of the Pharisees is open to some debate, but that will not be our concern at this

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[22] Op. cit., p. 202. [23] Op. cit., p. 120.

[24] Ibid., p. 121. [25] Op. cit., p. 279.

point. Suffice it to say that in the light of the Gospel narratives there can be little question that the heart of Jesus was with Amos and Hosea, and not the ceremonial law. In fact, on one occasion Jesus actually charges the Pharisees with ignorance of Hosea's words: "For I desired mercy and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings." (Hosea 6:6)[26]

To call Jesus a Pharisee, to identify Him with and make Him an exponent of the system of His day, is a claim that cannot be substantiated. He was in a contrary position to Pharisaism, and was theologically suspect to all those practitioners of this deformation. His was a work of redemption, a personal announcement of the grace of God. If the Law and the system stood in the way of that work, then so much the worse for both.[27] The fact

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[26]Matthew 9:13 (A. V.). Also, see Douglas Jones, "Exposition of Isaiah Chapter One Verses Ten to Seventeen," Scottish Journal of Theology, XVIII (December 1965), 457-71. In this article Professor Jones examines the prophets' criticism of religion and concludes that it is not a wholesale denial of the validity of all religious forms. Instead it is a criticism that distinguishes between religion that "is pleasing to God" [p. 470] and religion that is not. The prophets were not simply seeking to replace ceremonial religious forms in toto with moralistic forms. It is quite possible for both not to be "pleasing to God."

[27]Manson, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

that Jesus was rejected by the scribes and Pharisees is unassailable. That He was rejected because He undermined the authority of the Torah and by so doing posed a serious threat to the religion founded upon it, is, in my opinion, also beyond dispute.[28] Herford writes:

> Pharisaism and Christianity faced each other in an opposition which was fundamentally irreconcilable, and the disturbing cause which created the opposition was Jesus.[29]

Fasting played an important part in the Pharisaical system. On a certain occasion Jesus was asked why his disciples did not fast while the Pharisees and the disciples of John fasted often.[30] His answer makes it clear that fasting as an institutional practice was not a part of His Gospel. What moral and spiritual needs are met by fasting? In fact, is it not quite possible that fasting as a religious institution, if insisted on, will have negative effects rather than positive? H. D. A. Major asserts that "the Messianic Mission of Jesus, with its Gospel of freedom and joyousness, finds

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[28]See R. Travers Herford, Pharisaism: Its Aim and Its Method (London: Williams & Norgate, 1912), p. 143.

[29]Herford, The Pharisees, p. 201.

[30]Mark 2:18-22; Matthew 9:14-17; Luke 5:33-39.

no place for institutional fasting."[31] To choose freely and humbly fasting out of a spirit of gratitude and self-discipline is one matter; merely to perform an institutional and ceremonial requirement is another thing.

Religious ablutions were also a part of this system. On another occasion scribes and Pharisees, some from Jerusalem, rebuked Christ for not insisting that His disciples abide by the tradition of the elders and wash their hands before eating.[32] The disciples--these "Amme ha-aretz" or disreputable "sinners," as the Pharisees thought of them--were lacking in orthodox piety because they neglected this important religious obligation. Jesus' reply was a stinging rebuttal that elucidated their fastidious concern for the minutiae of the man-made tradition to the utter neglect of real "heart religion"--the "weightier matter."

The Pharisaic system also encompassed a legalistic observance of the Sabbath. Sabbath-keeping was of ultimate concern to the moralists and activists who were obsessed with superficial observances. The Gospels

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[31]Major, Manson, and Wright, op. cit., p. 55. See, also, Kenneth Cragg's discussion of Ramadan in The Dome and the Rock (London: S·P·C·K, 1964), pp. 27 ff.

[32]Matthew 15: 1 ff; Mark 7: 1 ff.

report on several occasions Jesus' less than meticulous observance of the Sabbath-keeping rules and regulations.[33] He not only healed on the Sabbath, but defended, as well, such a mundane act as His disciples performed in the plucking and eating of corn on that day.[34]

To say that Jesus' criticism of Pharisaism was in reality only a criticism of individual Pharisees who were poor representatives of Pharisaism is to beg the issue. There is no doubt that He recognized that there were Pharisees that were "not far from the Kingdom of God."[35] Neither is there doubt that His stern and harsh rebuke was of the system--a way of life that was branded with self-righteous moralism and hollow activism. The system itself was mortally ill; and within its outer, white-washed, legalistic walls were death and corruption. His attitude toward it was <u>strongly</u> negative and His position was definitely contrary.

II. JESUS AND THE PHARISAIC PRACTITIONERS

If the above describes for us the attitude and response of Jesus to the Pharisaical system, what was

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[33]Matthew 12:1ff; John 9:1ff. [34]Matthew 12:1ff.

[35]Mark 12:34 (A. V.).

his relationship to the practitioners of this system--the Pharisees themselves? Recognizing the difficulty involved in separating the Pharisees from the system they created let us note what Principal Matthew Black of St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, has said in regard to the main characteristic of the Pharisees:

> The main characteristic of the Pharisees was their legalism or legalistic rigorism. . . . What gave this system of Jewish legalism its force and influence was the rigorism of . . . the actual observance of their tradition. It was their scrupulous adherence to their legalistic traditions which created the Pharisaic ethos, and which has given rise to the modern use of the name Pharisee as a self-righteous formalist.[36]

Principal Black defends the picture of the Pharisees as seen through the eyes of the authors of the Gospels as he continues:

> . . . And the picture of the Pharisees in the gospels as strict legalists, observing all the minutiae of their elaborate legal tradition, including their ritualistic ordinances, is in keeping with all we know about them from other sources.[37]

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[36] Matthew Black, "Pharisees," The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, ed. G. A. Buttrick (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), III, 776.

[37] Ibid., p. 778. See, also, Edgar P. Dickie, "The Third Gospel: A Hidden Source," The Expository Times, XLVI (Oct. 1934 - Sept. 1935), 326-30. In this article Professor Dickie makes the intriguing suggestion that there was a Gospel source among the Pharisees. He points to evidence that Luke, in the writing of his Gospel, drew from an anti-Christian Pharisaical source.

Others are of the same opinion claiming that to the Pharisee the study of the Law and the scrupulous regard for its requirements were the chief goals of his piety. "As the interpreters and guardians of the Law, they set up 'hedges' for its preservation, and defend the minutiae of its application to everyday conduct."[38]

The influence of the Pharisees upon Judaism was immense. In fact, Pharisaism and Judaism were almost synonymous. Manson believes that the total number connected with the movement as members or adherents at the time of Christ was approximately 25,000 with most of them concentrated in Jerusalem.[39] The encounters of Jesus with the Pharisees as recorded in the Gospels are numerous. These encounters are often characterized by Christ's vehement denunciation of their empty practices. However, there are those who remind us that all of the Pharisees certainly were not equally hypocritical and fanatically moralistic and formalistic. F. C. Burkitt believes that:

> They were often poor, were generally unworldly; they were pious in the good sense, they loved God,

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[38]H. S. Nash and S. S. Cohon, "Pharisees," Dictionary of the Bible (rev. ed.; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), p. 761.

[39]Op. cit., n. p. 11.

> their Father in heaven, and were as a body animated with the feelings that inspired the 119th Psalm.[40]

These words tend to be a little too generous, perhaps, but they do remind us of Pharisees such as Nicodemus and others that must have been found within the ranks of those that heard the words of Christ.

During the years of Christ's ministry there were two Pharisaic academies in Jerusalem, the schools of Hillel and Shammai. These two competitive groups of Pharisees were often involved in controversy. The followers of Hillel adopted a more liberal position and those of Shammai a more rigorist one. It has been suggested that the harsh "woes" in Matthew 23 that roll down upon the Pharisees from Jesus like claps of thunder were actually directed at the Shammai Pharisees and not the disciples of Hillel.[41] Reference is made within the Gospels to disagreements among the Pharisees themselves in respect to Jesus and His teaching.[42] It would seem logical that these differences could be attributed to the differing views held by these two schools of

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[40]F. C. Burkitt, "Jews and the 'Pharisees'," Journal of Theological Studies, XXVIII (1927), p. 392.

[41]Asher Finkel, The Pharisees and the Teacher of Nazareth (Leiden/Koln: E. J. Brill, 1964), p. 134.

[42]John 10:19-21, 12:42.

Pharisaism. However, there is not anything said in the Gospels themselves that distinguishes between the disciples of Shammai and those of Hillel. Nowhere is it explicit that Christ was addressing the followers of Shammai alone.

What were the basic tenets embraced by these practitioners of the Pharisaical system? Manson suggests four:

> 1. The Pharisees believed in a divine purpose in history. The whole course of events is overruled by divine providence in accordance with a divine purpose.
> 2. They believed in a future life where men are rewarded or punished according to their behaviour in this.
> 3. They had a developed angelology and demonology.
> 4. They recognized Scripture plus Tradition as the supreme religious authority.[43]

It is, of course, in the interpretation and implementation of the fourth statement above that their moralism and activism becomes dominant. On an initial appraisal there is certainly little in any of these tenets that gives great offense.

That the Pharisees themselves recognized that there were among them practitioners that did not express the best of Pharisaism is evidenced in the Talmud where

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[43] Op. cit., pp. 17-18.

seven types of Pharisees are enumerated. Only one, or possibly two, in this typology can be thought of as a positive or constructive representative of Torah: (1) the "hunchback" Pharisee; (2) the "bookkeeping" Pharisee; (3) the "knocker or borrower" Pharisee; (4) the "pestle-like" Pharisee; (5) the "what-is-my-obligation-and-I-will-do-it" Pharisee; (6) the Pharisee who is one "from love"; and (7) the Pharisee who is one "from fear."[44] The Mishna and the Baraita say some very hard words about the hypocritical and extremist Pharisees.[45]

One constant point of conflict between Jesus and the Pharisees was His refusal to separate Himself from the "Amme ha-aretz"--the disreputable classes, the "sinners" in the eyes of the "righteous" religionists. Many times the Pharisees asked, "How is it that he eateth and drinketh with publicans and sinners?"[46] It must be remembered that Judaism at this time was extremely "religious," i.e. superficially concerned with religious observances. The standards of judgment were strictly legalistic. Outside of the different religious organizations, which included the Pharisees, was a sub-stratum of careless,

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[44]Klausner, op. cit., p. 214.

[45]Ibid., p. 213. [46]Mark 2:16 (A. V.).

classless, non-practising Jews. These people were referred to, contemptuously, by the "pious" as "the people of the earth"--the "Amme ha-aretz." The moralistic Pharisees avoided them like a plague. Jesus, however, was causing constant scandal by going out and coming in among them.[47] His answer to the Pharisaic charges of "unclean" was: "They that are whole have no need of the physician, but they that are sick. I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance."[48] Manson says:

> But the Mission of Jesus--and of his Apostles--is directed first of all to those whom nobody wants, because they are no good to anybody. It is an offer of help to the foolish and helpless, not an appeal for the support of the wise and strong.[49]

This, it seems, very few of the Pharisees were able to comprehend. It did not fit with their tradition, practice, and psychology. They were too steeped in their own moralism to see the depth of truth in what Jesus was doing and saying. Is it any wonder that He spoke of them as being "blind guides"?[50]

Klausner argues that Jesus did not understand the Pharisees, that He did not apprehend their positive

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[47]Major, Manson & Wright, op. cit., p. 54.

[48]Mark 2:17 (A. V.). [49]Op. cit., pp. 59-60.

[50]Matthew 23:16 (A. V.).

side.[51] On the contrary the opposite is true. They were consciously or unconsciously blind to the mission and message of Christ. They "were guilty of placing ablutions before love, technicalities before equity, the ceremonial before the moral, law before life."[52] Robertson sees Jesus as condemning the Pharisees for: (1) spiritual blindness, (2) formalism, (3) prejudice, (4) traditionalism, (5) hypocrisy, (6) blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, and (7) rejection of God in rejecting Jesus.[53] According to the Gospels Jesus consistently opposed the Pharisees who had overlaid the faith with their ritualistic accretions and their exaggerated respect for the ceremonial. The teaching of Jesus ranged above the activistic observance of ceremonial laws. In His ethical teaching He was truly the antithesis of Judaism. What was the reaction of the Pharisees to this teaching of Jesus? Herford in speaking of the attitude of the Pharisees says:

> It was a repugnance toward teaching . . . ; it was a shrinking fear of a teacher who, with holy and good words and deeds, seemed yet to be leading them away from the only ideal they could recognize.[54]

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[51] Op. cit., p. 414.

[52] Robertson, op. cit., p. 137. [53] Ibid., pp. iiiff.

[54] Herford, Pharisaism: Its Aim and Its Method, p. 140.

The "only ideal they could recognize" was the Torah and the Tradition---the system. The attitude that Jesus expressed towards the Pharisees in Matthew 9:13 when He spoke to them the common rabbinical formula "go ye and learn" was altogether too much for them. The fact that Jesus used this as a rabbi to rabbis carried with it force and sting that could not be endured. The gap between Jesus and His concern for persons and high ethics and the Pharisees and their moralism and activism was rapidly widening. Herford maintains:

> And although Christians may say it was "blindness" on the part of the Pharisees, they are not justified in saying that it was also "hardness of heart," which made them shrink from Jesus.[55]

Whether it was blindness, hardness of heart, or both is not to be debated here. But, let us remember that "shrink from Jesus" the Pharisees did. They lashed out at Him as well. They called Him mad and said He was beside Himself. They hounded Him from place to place, challenging Him and attempting time and again to disprove and dishonour Him and His teaching. They in turn were branded as "bigoted formalists, hair-splitting legalists and crafty hypocrites," that knew not the meaning of love, the value of persons, or true spirituality.[56] In

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[55] Ibid., p. 141. [56] Nash and Cohon, op. cit., p. 761.

the record of the Gospels there can be no question that Jesus not only rejected the Pharisaical system but sternly rebuked the practitioners as well. He was in direct conflict with them.

There is no chapter of Scripture that illustrates Jesus' relationship to the Pharisees more vividly than Matthew 23. In this His last address to the crowds He clearly enunciates the basic clash between the Pharisees and Himself. The first twelve verses seem to be a warning to His listeners. Then follow the seven "Woes" directed at the scribes and Pharisees. His warning to the crowd includes the admonition not to imitate the lives of these practitioners of the system. His penetrating charge is that they <u>say</u> what the will of God is but do not bother to <u>do</u> it. F. V. Filson says ". . . Jesus demanded full obedience to the will of God; but . . . He had sympathy and compassion, and put the emphasis not on meticulous detail but on grateful willing obedience."[57] His use of "Woe" expresses a burning condemnation; and the unmistakable implication is that His words express God's attitude towards these Jewish reli-

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[57]Floyd V. Filson, <u>A Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Matthew</u> (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1960), p. 243.

gionists.[58] Christ's attack on the Pharisees is not for their meticulous fulfillment of the minutiae of the tradition. He does not condemn attention to those matters, although to Him they are really of little significance. What was important was that weightier matters be kept central. His attack is based on the Pharisees' neglect of the greater essential matters--justice, mercy, faithfulness--while elevating moralistic and activistic perversion of the Law to prominence. As Filson observes:

> Spiritual health and the ability to give spiritual leadership depend on a sense of proportion which keeps the important things central and never lets anxious attention to lesser detail crowd them out.[59]

In the estimation of Jesus, the Pharisees and their spiritual leadership were "sick"--their sense of proportion was fatally out of balance. Matthew 23 reflects the deep, irreparable, cleavage between Jesus and these Jewish leaders. They rejected and opposed Jesus and stood in the way of others responding to His mission and message. He could not be indifferent to their rejection. In the light of all we know about Jesus, however, we are assured that, as the "Woes" rolled from His lips in stern and uncompromising tones, He loved the sinner--even the

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[58] Ibid., p. 244. [59] Ibid., p. 246.

"righteous," "blind," sinner to whom He spoke. But one cannot say that Jesus and the Pharisees were friends.

III. "DOING" AND "BEING"

The Gospels indict the Pharisees for their "saying" but not "doing." In another sense is it not just as true that they bore the guilt of "doing" and not "being"? Among the more progressive religious leaders in our day there has been a changing emphasis that bears promise. This emphasis has been from the concept of "What must I do?" to "What must I know?" to "What must I say?" to "What must I be?". This is true despite the fact that modern activism depicts a fixation at the "doing" level. In the day of the Pharisee, however, the prevailing concept was best expressed in "What must I do?".

> The theory of that religion [Torah], when put into practice, necessarily involved the doing of many acts in a particular way. Even actions in themselves of little or no importance became important when the Torah directed a specific way of doing them. They were done as a fulfillment of the will of God upon that particular point; and His will was not fulfilled unless there was, on the part of the agent, the conscious intention of serving Him. The mere opus operatum was worthless.[60]

It was the widespread perverting pressure of the "mere opus operatum" that Jesus so soundly condemned. Matthew

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[60]Herford, Pharisaism: Its Aim and Its Method, pp. 165-66.

Black reminds us that ". . . in Christ's day the prophetic demands, 'the greater things of the law' were buried beneath a mass of petty Pharisaic regulations."[61] The "doing" was not sinful in itself; but the "doing" without the "being" was sin.

It is Klausner's opinion that:

> In his teaching, Jesus endeavored to stress the inner significance of the laws of Scripture, of which the ceremonial laws were but a cloak.
> Hence he stood in opposition to the majority of the Pharisees and their followers who made the external act the main object and the underlying intention only a secondary matter; and he did not reject even the publicans and sinners if only he found in them whole-hearted faith and penitence.[62]

At least, in the case of the publicans and sinners, they were not hypocritically cloaking their lack of "being" by professing to be "doing." For the majority of the Pharisees, however, it was "doing" and not "being."

This "doing" but not "being" is that practice and spiritual condition which draws the full wrath of Jesus' righteous indignation. This moralistic hypocrisy and activistic emptiness is the acme of degenerated religiosity. Jesus clearly recognized what the practitioners of the Pharisaical system did not. A person is more--or less--than his acts and "even other than his

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[61] Op. cit., p. 775. [62] Op. cit., pp. 91-92.

acts."[63] What a person *does* is no infallible testimony of what a person *is*. "Doing" and "being" are not to be equated--they are not synonymous. It is an ever-present temptation to judge a man's character by moralistic and activistic criteria; to judge his "being" by his "doing." It was this mental attitude, this way of thinking, this emphasis, that Jesus so steadfastly opposed. Pharisaism was wholly oriented to the *doing* of God's will, as they found it in the Torah and its interpretations. As a result, in the words of Robertson:

> The Pharisees applied their interpretation of the ceremonial law to the Sabbath, to meals, to ablutions, to travel, to trade, to dealings with Gentiles, to relations with the 'Am-ha-'arets, to tithing, to everything. All this led to that externalism and professionalism in religious service that Jesus condemned so severely.[64]

IV. THE THEME OF JESUS' MESSAGE

The conflict between Jesus and the Pharisees was in reality a battle between two diametrically opposed concepts of religion. Supreme authority for the practitioners of the system rested in Torah. Ultimate authority for Jesus was personal. Herford believes:

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[63] Montefiore, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[64] *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

> The conflict was unequal, because it was one in which an Idea was matched against a Person. The idea of Torah was sublime. . . . But it was an idea, mediated in the consciousness of those who held it. Jesus was a living soul, with the spiritual force of a tremendous personality; and against him the idea of the Torah could not prevail.[65]

The truth of this was simply beyond comprehension for the majority of the Pharisees. This is evident in the case of Nicodemus. This learned rabbi is incredulous and uncomprehending in the presence of Christ. It seems that the message of Christ, depicting God's love and grace, does not penetrate to his inner being. The fact that Pharisaism is inadequate is not grasped. The person and work of Jesus is not understood, even by one who appears to be seeking, honestly and sincerely. Barrett says that Nicodemus, of all men, ought to have understood. His own authority, the Old Testament, bears witness to the theme of Jesus' message.[66] But, the poignant account of this encounter in John's Gospel makes it clear that he did not comprehend. Why not? Could it be that the moralistic and activistic accretions in Pharisaism which overlay the Old Testament religion had smothered

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[65]Herford, Pharisaism: Its Aim and Its Method, pp. 167-68.

[66]C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St. John (London: S P C K, 1955), p. 176.

his ability to gain insight? It is, of course, sheer speculation to contend that Nicodemus never did understand or respond positively to the message and mission of Jesus. In John 7:50 and 19:39 there seem to be indications of something more than simple piety. The point is, however, that the Gospel account of the night encounter clearly suggests a lack of comprehension on the part of Nicodemus, at least at that time.

What was the attitude of Jesus towards what has come to be known as Pharisaism? What was His position and His teaching in respect to this deformation of positive and constructive Old Testament Judaism? Does it not come to this: the majority of the Pharisees were so taken up with "doing" that they had sadly neglected "being"? This was diametrically opposed to the mission and message of Christ, and the personification of God's grace in Christ. Therefore, Jesus openly attacked the system and its practitioners while at the same time in His own way and opinion He remained faithful to the Law of God. But there was a real qualitative difference between the piety of Jesus and the piosity of the Pharisees. In naming the Law of God the rabbis put the emphasis on "Law," while Jesus put it on "God."[67] The

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[67]Burkitt, op. cit., p. 397.

rabbis subscribed to a meticulous legalism that became to them a matter of spiritual life and death. Christ held forth "inner righteousness" in the spirit of Amos and Hosea; but beyond that, a demand for a deep, personal spirituality that was permeated with compassionate love. Nowhere is this more evident than in the contrast between the attitudes of Jesus and the Pharisees and their system toward the "sinner" of the day, the "Amme-ha-aretz." As Manson has said:

> The sympathy of Jesus with the outcasts and failures of life--the actualization of the merciful redemptive love of God--has as an immediate corollary the principle that the warfare of the kingdom of God is not against the moral down and outs--they, after all, are the victims of evil--but against those forces, without and within, that keep them down and out. . . . Jesus saw clearly in the first century the thing that many of us in the twentieth still do not realize at all adequately: that the evil-doer may be, and often is, the victim of forces that seem to lie outside his own control altogether.[68]

One of the most accurate appraisals and highest compli-

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[68] Op. cit., p. 68. Manson could be interpreted at this point as indicating that man is manipulated by forces--the psychoanalyst might add "drives" and "instincts"--that are beyond his control. This implies a loss of personal responsibility on man's part. If this type of interpretation is given to these words we would do well to heed the balancing effect of Frankl's perspective in which man is seen as being responsible and capable of meaningful decision in any situation. (See Chapter X).

ments that the Pharisees unknowingly paid to Jesus was to refer to Him as "friend of publicans and sinners."[69]

The theme of Jesus' message in the face of Pharisaic traditionalism was that personality superseded the Law. The love of man for God and man for man could never be subservient to the minutiae of a rigorist but mis-guided system. The power of tradition is a tremendous power in every age. In the age of the Pharisees, Jesus stood in direct contrast to the moralism and activism of this entrenched tradition. It is undoubtedly true that "Christianity, in all its forms, is a religion founded on personality, one in which the central feature is a Person."[70] That Person is God in Christ.

It has been the primary purpose of this discussion to note the attitude and position of Christ in respect to the moralistic and activistic currents so dominant in the Pharisaism of the first century. It is an idle and unrealized hope to think that Christ's encounter with these forces was a once-and-for-all conflict. In the history of Christianity these trends rise time and again. A. T. Robertson speaking of the "seven varieties

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[69]Matthew 11:19 (A. V.))

[70]Herford, Pharisaism: Its Aim and Its Method, p.171.

of Pharisees" has said in his description of the "ever-reckoning" or "compounding" Pharisee:

> He is anxious to have his few sins deducted from his many virtues and leave a clean balance-sheet. One is reminded of the Roman Catholic system for buying one out of purgatory and the whole system of indulgences. Pharisaism made a large contribution to Roman Catholic doctrine and life."[71]

But, before we observe the ecclesiogenic neuroses of the medieval period let us take cognizance of the Apostle Paul's duel with the perversion of His day, the Judaizing mentality.

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[71] Op. cit., p. 26.

CHAPTER II

PAUL AND THE JUDAIZERS

Legalism is a mental state, not a philosophy of life. Jesus attacked legalistic perversion (based on the Mosaic Law) as it was expressed in Pharisaism. Paul followed Jesus in this "collision course" with the perverted Law; and the Apostle's struggle against legalism is best viewed in his relationship to the Judaizing mentality. All legalists were not Jews--Pharisaic Jews or Judaic-Christians. Many of the Gentile cults of Paul's day were legalistic as well. The concept of having to do something to gain the proper relationship with God was not limited to Judaism. However, it is in the Judaizing mode of thought at war with the Pauline gospel that we see the legalistic mentality in one of its clearest expressions.

If all legalists were not Jews it was true, also, that all Jews were not legalists. The idea of grace was not entirely foreign to Judaism. H. A. A. Kennedy reminds us that "the very possession of the Law was re-

garded as a gift of the Divine grace."[1] The prophetic spirit and the words of the psalmists also testify to the Jewish acknowledgment of grace.[2] ". . . Legalism was not the essential foundation of Old Testament religion, but rather a phase of its development."[3] It was a pronounced phase to be sure. The legalistic mentality was of such strength in the Judaism of Paul's day that when some Jews were converted to Christianity they brought with them a mode of thought that almost made invalid the life, teachings, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. It was true, also, that "to minds disciplined by a legal system, the fresh and, in many aspects, revolutionary interpretation . . . given by Jesus . . . might well appear the promulgation of a new Law . . . ."[4] The Judaizing mentality made men first and foremost ethicists. And it is but a very short step from ethicist to lawmaker--a step that is taken too often.

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[1] H. A. A. Kennedy, The Theology of the Epistles (London: Duckworth and Co., 1919), p. 41. Also, cf., ante quotation from Montefiore, p. 35.

[2] See Psalm 119:77, 149.

[3] Kennedy, op. cit., p. 45.

[4] Ibid., p. 242.

Was Christianity to be ". . . cramped in its action by the accoutrements of legalism"?[5] Was it to be but another sect of Judaism trading an initially apparent dynamic for the "security" of the Law? What of salvation and righteousness and justification? Was their source in works or in the grace of God? These were some of the issues at stake when Paul and the representatives of the Judaizing mentality met. These stakes were high. As G. S. Duncan has observed: "When legalism invades the domain of evangelical religion, the alternatives for the latter are to decree expulsion or to accept corruption."[6] The acceptance of the corruption of his gospel, for Paul, was unthinkable. Legalism could not be tolerated. The Law was to pass away. "For Christ ends the Law and brings righteousness for everyone who has faith." (Romans 10:4). If this were not the case, then, in Paul's thinking, the death note already had been sounded for the gospel of grace he was preaching.

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[5]James Stewart, A Man in Christ (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1936), p. 118.

[6]George S. Duncan, The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1934), p. 151.

I. THE JUDAIZERS

It is not my purpose to approach this observation of Paul's relationship to the Judaizing Christians from an exegetical or even basically expositional direction. Even though exegesis and exposition are not primary they cannot help but be of critical importance. However, this chapter is meant to be more of a psychological interpretation of the Judaizers, Paul, and their relationship.

The Judaizing Christians against whom Paul penned the epistle to the Galatians were most likely Jews from Jerusalem who had been converted to Christianity. Lightfoot believes them to be former Pharisees.[7] Munck, on the other hand, disagrees and concludes, in fact, that they were not even Jews but were Gentile-Christians.[8] And yet others believe that they were really Gnostics and not Judaizers.[9] Most of the evidence, however, in-

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[7]J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1902), p. 112.

[8]Johannes Munck, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959), chap. iv.

[9]See Walter Schmithals, Paulus und die Gnostiker (in Theologische Forschung; Hamburg-Bergstedt: Herbert Reich. Evangelischer Verlag Gmb H, 1965).

dicates that they were Jewish-Christians from Jerusalem. Galatians, II Corinthians, Romans, and Acts contain most of the biblical literature that gives us insight into Paul's conflict with these "false brethren" (Galatians 2:4).

The Judaizers argued that it was sin to abandon the Law, and attacked Paul's apostolic credentials. Their apparent goal was to draw the churches that were Pauline in origin to a gospel that claimed the necessity of the Law for righteousness and salvation. Ernest Burton interprets Paul as charging that they joined the Christian community in order to make it legalistic. The implication is that non-legalistic views were either generally held or at least tolerated prior to their arrival.[10] The conflict between Paul and his gospel of grace and these ultra-legalists and their gospel of Law was radical. Although Romans is considerably more mild we see in Galatians the severity of Paul's counter-attack and the intensity of his response to this threat. This testifies to the critical danger to the gospel of grace that he foresaw in the Judaistic mentality. Duncan has

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[10]Ernest De Witt Burton, The Epistle to the Galatians, "The International Critical Commentary" (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1921), pp. 83-84.

said:

> The orthodox Jewish position, carried forward by the Judaizing party into the Church, was that the Law was given by God for men to keep, and that righteousness (i.e. justification or acceptance by God) was accorded to those who kept it. What Christ does on this view is to help men to keep the Law.[11]

Paul's logical conclusion was that if righteousness comes in this manner then the death and work of Christ on the Cross was useless. "If righteousness comes by Law, then Christ died for nothing." (Galatians 2:21b).

For the Judaizers, judgement became, or actually continued to be, the supreme function of God. The standard of judgement was an unattainable code of 613 precepts. The imperatives, "Thou shalt!" and "Thou shalt not!" were of the utmost importance. In the Judaizing mentality there was a compulsive pre-occupation with cleanliness--physical and ritual. To eat with "unclean" Gentiles was forbidden. This could lead to partaking inadvertently of "unclean" food. The observance of feast days and fasts was also of the highest importance. Circumcision was a necessity for Jew and Gentile alike. In Galatia as at Antioch the polemics swirled about the question as to the necessity of circumcision for salvation.

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[11] Op. cit., p. 75.

". . . It had become a fixed dogma of Judaism," comments Kennedy, "that the Divine inauguration of the new Messianic epoch depended on the faithfulness of the people to their obligations."[12] What were these "obligations" if not the Law in all of its expressions? Could it be that the Judaizing Christians' insistence on the observance of the Law was due, at least in part, to a continued belief in this fixed dogma of orthodox Judaism? Paul was preaching independence from the Law. Was this not only a serious peril to morality but also actual treachery to the Divine revelation?[13] But, what more, the Judaizers reasoned, could be expected from a false apostle whose alleged call was so abnormal? Their attack upon Paul was personal.[14] In response Paul described his attackers as "servants of Satan who have disguised themselves as servants of righteousness." They are "false apostles," "deceitful workmen," "falsifiers of God's word," and "violent slanderers of the

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[12] Op. cit., pp. 31-32.

[13] Ibid., p. 64. Cf. with the Parable of the Prodigal Son. Did this teaching seem like ἀνομία ? Also, see Edgar P. Dickie, "The Third Gospel: A Hidden Source," The Expository Times, XLVI (Oct. 1934- Sept. 1935), 326-30.

[14] See II Cor. 4:2-5; 10:1,10,13,15; 11:6,21.

Church."[15] Luther in his commentary on Galatians says:

> With these words he [Paul] vehemently chargeth the false prophets and all merit-mongers, that they pervert all together; for they make of the law grace, and of grace the law; of Moses Christ, and of Christ Moses. For they teach, that besides Christ, and all the righteousness of Christ, the observance of the law is necessary to justification. And thus we see, that by their intolerable perverseness, they make the law Christ; for by this means they attribute that to the law, which properly belongeth unto Christ.[16]

The perverse confusion that Luther depicts describes quite accurately what could be expected of the gospel of the Judaizers sown in the Pauline churches. These were Jewish Christians, members of the Christian fellowship. They were probably from the Jerusalem church where James and Peter were in leadership positions. They were supposed to have been converts to the Christian way from orthodox Judaism or, possibly, Gentile heathenism. How is this pre-occupation with the Law explained? How did they reconcile their profession of faith in the risen Christ, their submission to Him as Lord, and their acceptance of Him as Saviour, with

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[15]H. J. Schoeps, Paul: The Theology of the Apostle in the Light of Jewish Religious History (London: Lutterworth Press, 1961), p. 80.

[16]Martin Luther, A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (London: printed for B. Blake, No. 13, Bell Yard, Lincoln's Inn, 1833), p. 104.

their reinstatement of the Law to a position of leadership? Was not the gospel of grace that which was preached to them? Is this not what Peter and the others preached as well? Is it possible that they were not really converts at all? Paul said that they came to "spy" upon the Galatians' "liberty." Were they truly "spies" sent in by hostile groups, such as the Pharisaic Jews, to sow dissension in the fellowship?[17] Or, on the other hand, is it possible that all of the non-Pauline churches were as the Judaizing Christians? Maybe it was Paul who was out of step and his gospel as "heretical" as they claimed. Or, was it simply a matter of the Judaizers never really having left the Law even though they had "converted"? How much room was there for the Law within the early church? Could there be "peaceful co-existence"? Was it possible for there to be salvation through Christ and the Law? Were the teachings of Jesus to be viewed as more laws to be observed by the truly righteous?

The gospel that Paul preached was essentially spiritual, personal, and anti-legalist, for this was the nature of his new relationship to God in Christ.

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[17]See Galatians 2:4ff.

If this were true for Paul, should it not have been true for others as well? Should not they too ". . . pass into a sphere in which legalism in any shape or form no longer holds sway"?[18] For centuries circumcision, taboos, ceremonial cleansings and kosher observances had kept the Jew different and faithful.[19] Was it too much to expect the Law to be replaced by a doctrine of free grace in a matter of months or even years?

There is another direction that deserves probing. Admittedly, there is a certain appeal to Jewish legalism. In Robert Davidson's review of Marcel Simon's Verus Israel he observes that "within the Church, the appeal of Jewish legalism was met by attempts to weave into the framework of the Church's faith a Christian legalism."[20] What type of mind would prefer the demands of the Law to the free grace of God through the atoning work of Christ? The Judaizing mentality did. Psychologically, obedience to the Law was far easier, in a

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[18]Duncan, op. cit., p. 151.

[19]See Raymond T. Stamm, "Exegesis of Galatians," Interpreter's Bible (New York: Abingdon Press, 1955), Vol. X, p. 478.

[20]Robert Davidson, Review of Verus Israel, by Marcel Simon, New Testament Studies, XI (January, 1965), 182.

sense, than the demands of true Christian discipleship. It was much less demanding to substitute observances of piety for the far more difficult task of Christ-like living. "Abstention from pork and rabbits was easier than justice and mercy and honoring father and mother."[21] It was a blind spot in the thinking of the Judaizers that prevented them from realizing that, in the words of Karl Barth, "man's own willing and running (9:16) [Romans] can only damn him."[22] Paul's gospel was rooted in a spontaneous spiritual life based on a personal encounter. For the Judaizers it was far more simple to keep commandments than to relate dynamically and personally to God in Christ. This obedience to the Law was a convenient screen or wall behind which a man could hide in order to escape the searching and searing sense of conscience stimulated by interpersonal contact with the risen, living Lord.

Could it be that the Judaizing mentality simply could not stand the freedom that was to be found in Christ? If this was the case, it would explain the seemingly frantic attempt to reinstate their "security,"

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[21]Stamm, op. cit., p. 480.

[22]Karl Barth, A Shorter Commentary on Romans (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1959), p. 123.

the Law, in the developing Christian Church. The religious temperament exemplified in the Judaizers would find more "security" in an external and ritualistic system. The doing of superficial trivia by people with certain emotional traits can compensate for a sense of failure and insecurity. For the Judaizers this became the denial of the efficacy of grace and the embracing of works and ritual, not as the fruit of righteousness, but as the mode of salvation. It is the refusal to accept the free grace of God and, instead, becomes a neurotic clawing after righteousness. As Barth says:

> . . . The queer saint who is led astray by sin and endeavors to put his hands on God's grace is in fact a man rent in two . . . . Whichever of the two he may be, he is not the man who achieves that which, all too boldly, he has undertaken! And it is certain that in the split of this double existence between desire and achievement he is a man who is doomed to death! For what is death if it is not this split life?[23]

Is this to say that the Judaizers who challenged Paul were simply led astray by their past and their own psychological conditioning? Were they sincere and honest men, but misguided? When Paul speaks of the "dogs," "evil-workers," and "concision" (Phil. 3:2) he was not

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[23]Ibid., pp. 86-87.

being charitable to some ill-informed teachers.[24] The whole tone of Galatians is not that of a kind correction of some misguided brethren. We cannot honestly eliminate what appears to be Paul's conviction that there was insincerity and destructiveness in the midst of the Judaizing that was being waged in the churches. And in the light of this, we do well to note Professor E. P. Dickie's comment:

> In coming to seek and to save the lost Jesus did not pass by those who were earnestly striving . . . . It is not man's justice that stands in his way, but his pretending to have justice when he knows that he has not; not man's righteousness that hinders his salvation, but his confidence in his own righteousness.[25]

It was not earnest striving that Jesus or Paul deplored. Rather, it was insincere striving in an attempt to pretend one was what one was not, and really knew one could never be. It was hypocrisy and self-righteousness covered over with a legalistic veneer that created the ever-lasting barrier between God and man. In studying Paul's account of his encounter with the Judaizing men-

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[24]In Phil. 3:2, Paul's warning could refer either to Judaizing Christians or non-Christian Jews. See Ernest F. Scott, "Exegesis of Philippians," The Interpreter's Bible, Vol. XI, pp. 73-74.

[25]Edgar P. Dickie, God is Light (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), p. 95.

tality we cannot conclude that there was not the guilt of insincerity and self-righteousness present. Does this mean, however, that it was conscious and not unconscious? What was pre-meditated insincerity and self-righteousness, and what was spontaneous, almost instinctual, defensiveness against the gospel of grace that seemed to threaten everything they had ever known? The Judaizers could not relinquish the way of the Law. They could not accept, as Bultmann says, that ". . . its direction is wrong, for, it is the way that is supposed to lead to 'one's own righteousness.' (Rom. 10:3 cf. Phil. 3:9)."[26] As much as they might have wanted πνεῦμα they could not give up χράμμα. For the Hebrew mind salvation came only through obedience; and repentance was something man ought to do. For Paul it was something man could do only because Christ had made it possible.[27] It seems as if the Judaizers were compelled not to allow God's revealed grace to be grace. For them there could be no sola fide. It is possible

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[26]Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. Kendrick Grobel (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1952), Vol. I, pp. 266-67.

[27]T. W. Manson, "Jesus, Paul and the Law," Law and Religion, Vol. III: Judaism and Christianity, ed. Erwin I. J. Rosenthal (London: The Sheldon Press, 1938), p. 138.

that the Judaizing mentality was just too Hebrew to allow it to be Christian. It is also possible that Paul himself dimly realized that this was something basically unconscious--even as Kierkegaard centuries later seemed to be "feeling after" the idea of guilt hidden in the unconscious.

The Judaizing mode of thought was not limited to the lesser known legalists that challenged Paul's gospel at Antioch and in Galatia. Evidences of this type of thinking are traceable, to some degree, to the "pillars" of the Jerusalem Church, James and Peter. Johannes Munck, speaking of James, states: "But in the main, scholars still regard him as Paul's opponent, as a righteous Jew who enjoyed great prestige among the Jews."[28] In Munck's footnote to this statement he substantiates his view of James as a legalist by referring to quotations from Knox, Lietzmann, and Goguel.

Peter's wavering in Antioch on the question of table fellowship with the Gentile-Christians (Gal.2:11ff) probably can be understood best in the light of his personality. It is not difficult to comprehend this apparent temerity before the Judaizers when it is remembered that

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[28] Op. cit., p. 111.

this was the same man who was ready zealously to defend his Lord with the sword in the Garden of Gethsemane and then, only hours later, denied thrice even being acquainted with Him. In Antioch, as in his vision of the unclean food (Acts 10), it was his own legalism that was the foremost subject. The Judaizing issue pitted this type of legalistic thinking and doing against the anti-legalistic gospel of grace being proclaimed by Paul.

II. PAUL'S RESPONSE

The Judaizers actually challenged Paul on two fronts. First of all they denied the validity of his call to be an apostle of the Lord Jesus Christ. Secondly, they claimed that the gospel he preached was a heretical message. Our primary concern is with the second challenge which was a serious attempt to reclaim the primacy of the Law in the young Christian communities. Paul's response to this challenge was swift, scathing, and apparently successful.

Auguste Sabatier has said:

> This state of inspiration as a common and permanent privilege, this transference of the principle and motive of the religious life from the exterior domain of institutions to the conscience, is the vital point of the Paulinian antithesis between the Old and the New Covenants, between the religion of

> the Letter and the religion of the Spirit. The first made only trembling slaves; the second makes full-grown men, free men, and "sons of God."[29]

The Judaizing mentality was not ready to "cut the apron strings" from "Mother Law." On the other hand, Paul's theology was that of a man growing, stretching, "reaching out for that which lies ahead" and "pressing towards the goal" (Phil. 3:13-14). Whatever it was that he fully meant by ἐν Χριστῷ had led him to the conclusion that circumcision, fasts and feasts, clean and unclean meats, were all irrelevant in the gospel that he understood he was commissioned to preach. It is true that Paul had Timothy circumcised (Acts 16:3), that he himself had his head shaved in respect to a vow at Cenchreae (Acts 18:18), and that he underwent ritual purification in Jerusalem (Acts 21:24). The point that he makes, however, in I Corinthians 9:19ff. was that he was free not to do these things! He was not compelled, internally or externally, but chose out of the freedom of his own conscience, liberated by Christ, to observe these rites--irrelevant as they might be to him personally. To the Judaizers table fellowship with Gentile Christians

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[29]Auguste Sabatier, The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit (London: Williams and Norgate, 1904), p. 308.

was sin. To Paul this mentality was perverse in the extreme; and it was much more of a heinous sin for one Christian to refuse to enter into fellowship with another.

Schoeps reminds us that Paul "had a militant disposition."[30] He was militant and zealous in his persecution and oppression of those who proclaimed the Christian message before his Damascus road experience. Paul, the missionary-statesman, when he had been summoned by the risen Lord to be his apostle, had not lost this fire. He was still Paul the zealot--the tenacious, aggressive, militant and capable personality--now heading in another direction. He had a new goal, a new allegiance, a new obsession. H. A. A. Kennedy, speaking of the transformation of Paul's religious life has written:

> Almost immediately he would become aware that the old suspicion and fear of God as task-master and judge had vanished; and an amazing vision of His heart, which seemed too good to be true, had begun to flash upon his soul.[31]

Paul had been freed from the soul-destroying literalism of the Law (II Cor. 3:6); freed from the γράμμα to the πνεῦμα; freed from the realm of the impossible obedience to the realm of the spontaneity

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[30] Op. cit., p. 87. [31] Op. cit., p. 92.

of the spirit and dynamic discipleship; freed to be a slave of Christ; freed in order to forgive and love instead of judge and condemn. Paul's gospel had room for consideration for one's brother. But, as Bultmann observes, "consideration for one's brother does not mean dependence upon his judgment . . . . Christian freedom is freedom from all human conventions and norms of value."[32] The gospel that Paul preached was a proclamation of a personal and spiritual relationship to God and an ethical attitude towards man that was planted in a living fellowship with the Spirit of God. This left little room for ecclesiastical rules and statutes with their tendency to formulate a superficial and brittle veneer of self-righteousness. "Religion is not then, for him, static, but fluid, in constant evolution under the influence of men's understanding of the experience of the race."[33]

In Paul's new relationship with God there is no suggestion of quid pro quo. For him religion was a right attitude to God; and the Judaizing Christians who challenged his gospel did not share this attitude. The

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[32]Bultmann, op. cit., p. 343.

[33]Burton, op. cit., p. lxi.

severity of his response to them was not the "lashing out" which is based so often in personal insecurity. Instead, it was the stringent defense of what he interpreted as an invaluable personal revelation of God. Christ was not sent to revise or reform or supplement the Law, or even to show men how to fulfil it. These things, if they happened, were by-products. He came to bring men into that relationship with God "which is man's true life and peace."[34] Paul's theology was conversion theology. It was a theology built around the factual experience of ". . . men turning from one religion to another, from one status to another, from one allegiance to another, from one hope to another."[35] This was Paul's personal experience; and to follow logically his argument, which in a sense is quite existential, the Judaizing mentality was the mentality of men who had not become "men turning."

The phrase "justification by grace through faith" bears within it the nucleus of Paul's gospel and his answer to the legalists and their pre-occupation with

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[34]T. W. Manson, On Paul and John, ed. Matthew Black (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p. 40.

[35]Ibid., p. 12.

the Law.[36] In essence the Judaizers were arguing for the reinstatement of the Mosaic Law as the means of salvation. Righteousness as ethical salvation could only be realized in obedience to the Law. To Paul, however, righteousness was not ethical perfection or moral correctness. His concept is best understood in the sense of God making righteous the unrighteous (Rom. 4:5). The initiative is with God. As Bultmann expresses it, God "rightwises" sinful man.[37] This was the work of Christ on the Cross. God's verdict has absolved man of sin. He has not been absolved by his own merit in fulfilling the unfulfillable Law. C. K. Barrett adds:

> . . . The Law, though good, is misused if treated as a means of attaining righteousness . . . . It is proper to seek righteousness, that is, a proper relation with God; and the law itself is a good thing. But to seek righteousness by means of works done in obedience to the law, may produce at most human righteousness, not God's.[38]

What Paul meant by "just" and what the Judaizers meant by the same term were two different things. For

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[36]See Rom. 3:21-26 for Paul's statement of the doctrine of justification. It is a full and careful restatement of Rom. 1:17.

[37]Op. cit., p. 276.

[38]C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1957), p. 193.

the legalistic mind the man who was "just" was the man who was obedient to the letter of the Law, the man who by his own efforts had secured merit and, therefore, had laid a claim on God's recognition. In Pauline thought the just man was the man who was in the right relationship with God. This relationship could never be won by man. He could only accept it or reject it. And if he accepted it, ". . . it must be accepted in the certainty that God treats the bad man as if he had never been away."[39] Bultmann goes even further to say that man in this relationship with God is not just "treated" by God as if he were just and righteous, but actually becomes just and righteous because God has absolved him from his sin and guilt--God has "rightwised" him.[40] Therefore, in the Pauline sense, to be justified means that the sinner is accepted, acquitted, saved, set right with God--and all of this in spite of his sin. To the Judaizers this was heresy. If this were true, then their view of justification was null and void. The Law could no longer be a way of salvation. There seemed to be a battle for the mind, the codified against the

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[39]William Barclay, The Mind of St. Paul (London: Collins, 1958), p. 79.

[40]Op. cit., p. 276.

dynamic--new rules of life versus new life.[41] It was the cold, calculating, logic of legalism against the paradoxical promise of the personal relationship.

The psychological value of Paul's doctrine of justification is noteworthy. Not only does this theological perspective greatly enhance man's understanding of the nature of God, but it also carries with it a strong psychological impetus for man in his battle with sin. Paul saw man as involved in a great cosmic drama--a drama that superceded a simple interest in good works. His position was not antinomian but based in another dimension. C. H. Dodd has observed:

> It is a matter of common experience among men that a wrongdoer can best be helped to better ways if someone can be found for whose opinion he has the highest respect, and who will treat him, not as the hopeless wastrel he may have been, but as the decent citizen he has it in him to become. This was how Jesus treated the publicans and sinners (see especially Luke xix. 1-10). If a sinner can believe that God treats him in that way, his battle against sin is half won.[42]

For the Judaizing psychology, to accept God treating man in this way, seemed an impossibility. A modern example of this utter refusal to accept the graciousness of

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[41]Manson, "Jesus, Paul and the Law," Law and Religion, p. 127.

[42]C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932), p. 53.

God is that of a young Korean War veteran who in battle had killed five of the enemy. Now, according to the pastoral counsellor who reported this case, the man insists that he must be punished by God for "murder." He says, "I know that God is supposed to be grace and love and all of that but He just can't let this go. He will punish me, I know. I just don't know what he is waiting for."

Grace was the sine qua non of Paul's gospel and was his means to being "rightwised." There are five primary ideas behind the Apostle's conception of grace. (1) There is the undeserved generosity of God. (2) There is an inexhaustible abundance in the grace of God--nothing else is needed. (There is no need for Christ and the observance of the Law for salvation. It is the whole argument of Romans and Galatians that grace and works are mutually exclusive.) (3) We are not just saved by grace but we are also called by grace. (4) Grace is the power that enables the Christian to meet adequately the demands of everyday life. (5) The obligation of grace is not a legal obligation but one of love.[43]

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[43]Barclay, op. cit., p. 157ff. For a Catholic perspective see Karl Adam, The Spirit of Catholicism, trans. Dom Justin McCann (rev. ed.; London: Sheed and Ward, 1934), chap. xi. Here the author says in part:

For Paul, hope, faith, and even love were not any more significant than grace. Whereas Paul had discovered out of his own personal experience of disillusionment and defeat that ". . . moralism, which is obedience to precepts and rules, cannot give direction to a man's life," the Judaizers had not come to the recognition of this truth.[44]

Faith, in Pauline thought, is man's response to God's justifying or "rightwising" grace. Needless to say, faith to Paul was much more than intellectual assent. Dodd defines faith as ". . . the attitude of pure receptivity in which the soul appropriates what God has

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"His [the redeemed man's] acts, because animated by the breath of Christ's love, are of value for salvation, are meritorious acts. . . . The Catholic agrees with St. Paul and emphatically denies that man with his natural powers can in the least degree merit eternal salvation. There is no such thing as natural merit, but there is merit by grace . . . . So the eternal life becomes, as St. Paul expresses it, a wage and a reward. But when I say that, I am really saying that it is the grace and power of Christ. For it is that alone which gives my activity value in the sight of God. So in my activities it is the grace of Christ, and not any power of mine, that is expressed and is rewarded." p. 210.

[44]O. F. Blackwelder, "Exposition of Galatians," The Interpreter's Bible, Vol. X, p. 472. See, also, Schoeps (op. cit., p. 184), who says that Romans 7 ". . . is intended to describe the crisis of the legalistic attitude as experienced subjectively by Paul."

done."[45] And as Barclay observes: "For Paul faith is always faith in a person."[46] The legalistic thought of the Judaizing Christians had not made this transition from faith in obedience to the Law to faith in the Person of Christ, from an attitude of willing and doing to an "attitude of pure receptivity." The role of faith in the Pauline sense is basically a feminine role--the attitude of receptivity. It is not at all incongruous, then, for Paul to refer to the Church as the "Bride of Christ," or for him to pen the words "Christ in you, the hope of glory." (Col. 1:27b)

Paul's doctrine of justification by grace through faith carries with it, however, two inherent dangers. The first is that "salvation may be purchased by the coinage of faith."[47] Faith may take the place of the works of the Law as a saving act; thus, man still earns his salvation--not by doing but by believing. In this sense there is little difference between doing and believing. The second danger is the danger that man's role of receptivity will become so pronounced that he will have nothing at all to do with his own justifica-

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[45] Op. cit., p. 56. [46] Op. cit., p. 133.

[47] Manson, On Paul and John, p. 63.

tion, therefore, becoming nothing more than a "right-wised" robot. It is readily apparent that these two dangers exist at the opposite extremes of the spectrum. Is there a safeguard? Manson suggests that first of all it must be recognized that the "whole business is personal."[48] The acceptance of this would put the Judaizers at a disadvantage initially, for their mode of thought was legalistic and not personal. Secondly, although Manson reasserts the view that "God gives and man takes," he also says that "all that man can do--and it is the only thing that nobody else, whether man or God, can do for him--is to take what God gives."[49] In this "taking," then, faith does not remain totally passive but becomes healthily active. This must be something of what Paul meant when he spoke of justification by grace through faith. Aspects of "ἐν Χριστῷ" are also better understood in this same context. This was the heart of Paul's response to the Judaizers.

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[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid. Not only does man "take what God gives" he also responds to the giving of God in a spirit of thankfulness. See Karl Barth, The Heidelberg Catechism for Today, trans. Shirley C. Guthrie, Jr. (London: The Epworth Press, 1964), pp. 138-40.

III. THE JUDAIZING TENDENCY

For the Judaizers the religion of Israel and Christian discipleship did not incorporate that spirit that is made manifest in the Prophets and Psalms. It was instead a sterile legalism proclaiming salvation through the Law. Paul, not distinguishing between essential and non-essential elements in the Law, is anti-Law. For him, ". . . the Law as a unity is bound up with belief that salvation is secured through deeds of obedience which merit reward."[50] He even seems to contradict his basic view that the Torah is from God (Rom.7: 12, 14) when he appropriates the gnostic proposition that it was given by subordinate angel-powers (Gal.3:19).[51] However, he quotes from the Old Testament sentiments with which he is in firm agreement. "Look at Abraham," he says (Gal. 3:6), and then proceeds to make a strong case for the Promise as opposed to the Law. Whereas the Judaizers, in their systematic theology, were quite willing to leave room for Jesus as the helper to fulfil the Law, Paul was "dead to the Law" (Gal. 2:19) as

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[50] James Moffatt, Grace in the New Testament (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1931), p. 242.

[51] See Bultmann, op. cit., p. 174.

Christ had put an end to it. The purpose of the Law was not soteriological in any sense. It could only impart a consciousness of sin (Rom. 3:20, 4:15) and act as a stimulus to sin (Rom. 7:8) which would precipitate the necessary crisis more quickly. "For Paul the Law is an interim dispensation."[52] For his opponents it could not be "interim." About the best Paul could say for the Law was that it acted as a tutor instructing us untill Christ's coming (Gal. 3:24). The Judaizers taught the continued validity of the Law. Paul pronounced it as a failure and claimed that only πίστις Χριστοῦ compensated for that failure. To continue pleading the validity of the Law denies the saving significance of the death of Christ and rejects and nullifies God's gift of grace.[53] The Judaizing mentality still thought in terms of a legal contract with God. Paul accepted the promise of a gift. The legalists could perceive of Jesus only as another lawgiver, not as a gift-giver or a forgiver.[54] C. K. Barrett observes that although ". . . in Paul, the 'abolition' of the law is not a

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[52]Manson, On Paul and John, p. 20.

[53]Schoeps, op. cit., p. 193.

[54]Luther, op. cit., p. 96.

complete negation . . ." it is still true that "the way forward must be a way beyond religion, and beyond morals."[55]

Did the Church take the "way forward"? The answer is both "yes" and "no." It seems that Paul's defence of his gospel was successful. But who will deny that to this day there remains within the Christian Church the legalistic mentality of the Judaizers?

Kennedy says that although Paul won the battle against the Law as a prerequisite to salvation, in the following generation "the demand for definite guidance in the details of practical life brought in a new legalism . . . ."[56] Barrett comments that:

> The history of the second century is enough to show how easily and how quickly these perversions [the solidifying and hardening of Paul's mobile and dynamic thought] can take place; and the whole of Church History stands as a witness to the Church's permanent need of the Jewish Doctor of the Gentiles."[57]

Dodd adds his observation:

> Moreover, although the Jewish Law is a matter of indifference to us, yet the legalist conception of religion is by no means obsolete. In our time, as

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[55]C. K. Barrett, From First Adam to Last (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1962), pp. 53, 63.

[56]Op. cit., p. 10.

[57]Barrett, From First Adam to Last, p. 119.

> in Paul's, it besets the minds of many Christian people, and often gives a distorted view of the Christian religion to the general public. Paul's trenchant dealing with it, his persuasive exposition of Christianity as a free life of the spirit, are still worth our consideration.[58]

James Stewart warns, also, that ". . . the spirit of legalism--which was really the thing Paul was concerned about--is by no means extinct."[59] And Karl Barth, speaking of and from the realm of the theologians, queries: "What of the danger of the eternally skeptical-critical theologian who is ever and again suspiciously questioning, because fundamentally always legalistic and therefore in the main morosely gloomy"?[60] Also, Bonhoeffer, writing from prison, has said:

> The Pauline question whether circumcision is a condition of justification is today, I consider, the question whether religion is a condition of salvation. Freedom from circumcision is at the same time freedom from religion. I often ask myself why a Christian instinct frequently draws me more to the religionless than to the religious . . . .[61]

It seems obvious that the legalistic mentality did not fade with Paul's victory over the challenging

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[58] Op. cit., p. xxxiv. [59] Op. cit., p. 84.

[60] Karl Barth, The Humanity of God (London: Collins, St. James, 1961), p. 62.

[61] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1953), pp. 123-124.

Judaizing Christians. Can, in fact, a psychological state or certain type of mentality be once and for all expelled? Recognition and control, suppression or sublimation of legalistic tendencies is one thing, while total expulsion is another. It can be argued that Paul, himself, displayed traits of legalism in his own ministry.[62] Within human nature there appears to be a certain inherent proclivity towards legalism that works against the dynamic, fluid, liberating gospel that Paul preached. This weakness is apparent in personal life and in the corporate life of the Church. It was pronounced in Paul's day and is markedly apparent--if in a more subtle and sophisticated form--in the present day. Legalism with its collaborators of moralism and activism often creeps in ". . . as an ally to the gospel, until under its influence even the gospel becomes--what the Law had become . . . ."[63]

Luther vividly describes the penetrating persistence of the legalistic compulsion when, speaking of Galatians 2:20, he says:

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[62]See Kennedy, op. cit., p. 8, for discussion of this point in respect to Paul's influence on the organizational formation of the early church, etc.

[63]Duncan, op. cit., p. liii.

> For I myself, even in this great light of the gospel, wherein I have been so long exercised, have much ado to hold this definition of Christ which Paul here giveth: so deeply hath the doctrine and pestilent opinion that Christ is a lawgiver, entered even as it were oil into my bones.[64]

He, then, quite optimistically concludes:

> Ye young men therefore are in this case much more happy than we that are old. For ye are not infected with these pernicious errors, wherein I have been so misled and so drowned even from my youth, that at the very hearing of the name of Christ my heart hath trembled and quaked from fear; for I was persuaded that he was a severe judge.[65]

Contrary to Luther's optimism the "infection" has not been eliminated. If legalism can be described, in the words of James Stewart, as (1) "redemption by human effort," and as (2) having a "tendency to impart a mercenary spirit into religion," and as (3) having a "fondness for negatives," then it can be demonstrated that Christendom today is not free from this neurotic trait.[66] Duncan has warned:

> The law of the Christian Church may become as great a burden and a tyranny as the law of the Jewish Church, and even the churches of the Reformation must constantly ask themselves whether much that they ordain in the sacred name of religion does not reflect a state of servitude rather than of sonship.[67]

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[64] Op. cit., p.134. [65] Ibid.

[66] Op. cit., p. 84ff. [67] Op. cit., p. liv.

The Judaizing tendency lives on having continued throughout the history of the Church. Moffatt has said that ". . . any deep argument upon the grace of God comes back before long to Paul . . . ."[68] The truth of this statement is evident in Luther's rediscovery of Paul and dependence upon Paul's gospel in his confrontation with the medieval legalism of the Church of Rome.

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[68] Op. cit., p. 402.

CHAPTER III

LUTHER AND THE ROMANISTS

It has been said that:

> The process of religion may remain abortive or outlive itself in stagnant institutions--in which case it can and must be associated with neurosis and psychosis, with self-restriction and self-delusion, with hypocrisy and stupid moralism.[1]

These words--a possible description of Pharisaism or the Judaizing mentality--speak of the religious situation and condition of the Church in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The Church of this period was a massive institution with its vast mechanistic, organizational character irrepressibly evident. "Growth in Church organization is inevitable and desirable, but not every development is suited to the genius of Christianity, and none can escape criticism in virtue of its mere existence."[2] Organized religion is never without its dangers. As John Oman states: ". . . Most

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[1]Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1959), p. 258.

[2]H. G. Wood, "Puritanism," Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings, X (1918), 512.

of what Jesus says to the scribes and Pharisees applies to the dangers of outward organized religion at all times."[3]

Christianity in Luther's day was active. Its activism, however, became both a symptom and a cause of the Church's malady. Luther was to declare that "the righteousness of works and hypocrisy are the most mischievous diseases born in us, and not easily expelled, especially when they are confirmed and settled upon us by use and practice . . . ."[4]

I. THE CONDITION OF THE CHURCH

The best word to describe the condition of the Church in the fifteenth century is "sick." Her symptoms were evident on every side. H. Daniel-Rops, speaking of this period, says "it is a morbid, feverish epoch, in which the noblest spiritual impulses turn all too easily to neurosis."[5] Deformed piety, superstition,

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[3]John Oman, Grace and Personality (2nd rev. ed.; Cambridge: University Press, 1919), p. 171.

[4]Martin Luther, The Table Talk of Martin Luther, trans. and ed. William Hazlitt (London: H. G. Bohn, York St., Covent Garden, 1857), pp. 154-55.

[5]H. Daniel-Rops, The Protestant Reformation, trans. Audrey Butler (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1961), p. 107.

and pathological exaltation were so interwoven that it was almost impossible to distinguish them. Even the Catholic historians concur that "by and large William James' phrase, 'a theopathic state,' is an apt description of this decadent society . . . ."[6] The Miracle Plays, a phenomenon of the time, often were characteristic of the sick religious life. Groups such as the sado-masochistic Flagellants demonstrate that the piety of the day often was hysterical and given to excess.

Superstition and crudity were rampant. In Germany, for example, there were to be found figures of the Virgin with a shutter in the stomach which was made to open revealing the Holy Child in the womb. Statuettes of the crucified Christ displayed a bladder filled with blood which was made to flow realistically through the five wounds. The saints were endowed with supernatural power, often suited to meet particular needs. The crippled called upon St. Pius, while those suffering with gout pleaded for relief from St. Antoninus. Even the individual plagued by urinary retention had his own celestial mediator, St. Damian.[7]

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[6] Ibid., p. 115.

[7] Ibid., pp. 119ff.

The veneration of relics was intense. The contemporary antique collector's fervor is as nothing compared to the feverish accumulation of religious relics by those who were financially able to enter into this "holy" pastime. Frederick the Wise, Luther's protector, was famous for the relics he had brought to Wittenberg:

> There were plenty of them--several thousand--and they were of the most varied kind: they included not only the complete corpses of various saints, nails from the Passion and rods from the Flagellation, but part of the Child Jesus's swaddling-clothes and some wood from His crib, and even a few drops of His Blessed Mother's milk! Large numbers of most valuable indulgences were attached to the veneration of these distinguished treasures.[8]

The matter of indulgences became the precipitating incident for Luther's rebellion. Though not the basic cause of the Reformation by any means this issue was the spark that ignited the conflagration.

Professor Karl Adam has said:

> But because indulgences are based upon truths which are not easy for the rude and uneducated, distortion and abuse are very possible, especially where the people are not well instructed in religion and where Church authority is not vigilant.[9]

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[8] Ibid., p. 276.

[9] Karl Adam, The Spirit of Catholicism, trans. Dom Justin McCann (rev. ed.; London: Sheed and Ward, 1934), p. 139.

Indulgence abuses became common practice. The negligence referred to by Professor Adam, however, was not the only failing of the Church authorities. It was not unusual for preachers of that day to proclaim that through the purchase of indulgences men were in a sense taking out a mortgage on heaven. One of the most popular "jingles" of the day ran:

> Sobald das Geld im Kasten klingt
> Die Seele aus dem Fegfeuer springt![10]

The sale of indulgences became a degenerated financial expedient for the systematic exploitation of Christendom.

The medieval Church had succeeded in mastering and monopolizing the ideological process. Her dogma was formulated, defended and imposed by a powerful, central governing body. Her claim upon the lives of persons was totalitarian and the use of terror to substantiate this claim was accepted practice. Her leadership was perverted. John Oman, speaking in another context, accurately describes the Romanists of the fifteenth century:

> In the same spirit in which they have sought to enclose the Divine mind within dogmas to be imposed from without on the human mind, worldly men, using religion to exalt the visible institution of the

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[10]Daniel-Rops, op. cit., p. 278.

> Church in which they exercise dominion, have sought to formulate the Divine will in systems of casuistry to be imposed as external rules of conduct.[11]

Some seem to believe that the Church of this period was the victim of its environment. It is evident, however, that the Church's role was more than that of a passive victim of cultural phenomena. "The corruption of all too many of her own constituent organs meant that she actually played an active part in the moral degeneration of the period."[12] She was neurotic and she contributed to the neurosis of the day. The ecclesiastics and clergy, while demanding respect and obedience, were blind guides lacking true authority. Their vices included arrogance, avarice, greed, perfidy and immorality. How could they be "pastoral shepherds" and practise the cure of souls?

Furthermore, if Luther were the victim of neurosis as some claim, then in a very real sense his neurosis was ecclesiogenic. "If morality without religion is apt to be slavery to accepted forms, religion without morality is apt to be slavery to accepted formulas."[13]

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[11] Op. cit., p. 240.

[12] Daniel-Rops, op. cit., p. 126.

[13] Oman, op. cit., p. 62.

The Church's infirmity was pronounced in the papal court. One Catholic scholar writes: ". . . No Catholic can but blush with shame at the memory of pontificates like those of Sixtus IV, Innocent VIII, and, above all, of the Borgia pope, Alexander VI."[14] Karl Adam adds:

> An immoral laity, bad priests, bishops and popes--these are the saddest wounds of the Body of the mystical Christ. This is what grieves the earnest Catholic and inspires his sorrowful lamentation, when he sees these wounds and is unable to help.[15]

James Mackinnon, speaking of Alexander VI (Borgia) whose memory is marked by charges of murder, incest and numerous expressions of sensuality, states:

> On the other hand, he displayed an official zeal for the maintenance of "purity of doctrine." He was especially anxious, it seems, ... to prevent anything being printed that was likely to cause scandal to the faith, and he was energetic in repressing the Waldensians and other heretics, who, he gravely regrets, lead very immoral lives! Alexander as a moralist would be a decided hit on the comic stage.[16]

At his death Machiavelli is reported to have declared dryly: "The soul of the glorious Alexander was now borne among the choir of the blessed. Dancing attend-

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[14]Daniel-Rops, op. cit., p. 217. [15]Op. cit., p.250.

[16]James Mackinnon, The Origins of the Reformation (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), p. 275.

ance on him were his three devoted, favourite handmaidens: Cruelty, Simony, and Lechery."[17]

II. THE NEGLECT OF THE CURE OF SOULS

The medieval Church in the condition described above could not provide "spiritual shepherds" who were effective physicians of the soul. The laity expected little and for the most part received nothing in the way of authentic pastoral care. The English poet laureate John Skelton has described in verse in his poem "Colyn Cloute" the lack of and perversion of the cure of souls:

> Alas, for Goddes wyll,
> Why syt ye, prelates, styll,
> And suffer all this yll?
> Ye bysshops of estates
> Shulde open the brode gates
> Of your spirituall charge,
> Lyke lanternes of lyght,
> In the peoples syght. . . .[18]

The empty ritual and hollow practices are depicted:

> Yet take they cure of soules,
> And woteth never what thei rede,
> Paternoster, Ave, nor Crede;
> Construe not worth a whystle
> Nether Gospell nor Pystle;

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[17]Daniel-Rops, op. cit., p. 227.

[18]John Skelton, The Poetical Works of John Skelton, ed. Alexander Dyce (London: Thomas Rodd, Great Newport St., 1843), I, 337-38.

> Theyr mattyns madly sayde,
> Nothynge devoutly prayde. . . .[19]

Decrying the selling of the "grace of the Holy Gost" he sounds the cry of Luther in Old English verse:

> . . . What hath lay men to do
> The gray gose for to sho?
> Lyke houndes of hell,
> They crye and they yell,
> Howe that ye sell
> The grace of the Holy Gost. . . .[20]

Describing the state of the ministry in England Mackinnon, following Thomas Gascoigne, Chancellor of the University of Oxford in 1434, says:

> The bishops with few exceptions are placehunters, hold secular offices as ministers of state and court officials, seldom reside in their dioceses or preach, and otherwise neglect their function. Like bishops, like clergy.[21]

In Scotland he charges that "the clergy engage in secular pursuits and traffic in Church lands to the neglect of the cure of souls."[22]

On the Continent the situation was the same. The French curé of this period:

> . . . Usually remained a rustic, drank with his peasant parishioners at the Cabaret, got drunk like them and sometimes quarrelled on festival and fair days, was the father of numerous bastards, and saw no inconsistency in thus getting drunk and begetting children like any other peasant. . . . Far

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[19] Ibid., p. 320. [20] Ibid., p. 318.

[21] Op. cit., p. 425. [22] Ibid., p. 429.

> too frequently the curé was far from being an example to his flock.[23]

A mocking little prayer that seems to have been the delight of all Paris and depicts the anti-clericalism of the day was Molinet's:

> Prions Dieu que Les Jacobins
> Puissent manager Les Augustins,
> Et que Les Carmes soient pendus
> Des Cordes des Freres menus![24]

It was out of the milieu of this demented age, moulded and aggravated by a severely neurotic ecclesiastical institution, perpetuating ecclesiogenic neuroses instead of practising the cure of souls that Luther's call to arms was to sound:

> Therefore let us rouse ourselves, fellow-Germans, and fear God more than man, that we be not answerable for all the poor souls that are so miserably lost through the wicked, devilish government of the Romanists. . . .[25]

III. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE REFORMATION

The Protestant Reformation was a complex phenomenon arising from several diverse sources. Mackinnon speaks of political, economic, social, constitutional,

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[23]Ibid., p. 423. [24]Daniel-Rops, Op. cit., p. 127.

[25]Martin Luther, "To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation," First Principles of the Reformation, ed. Henry Wace and C. A. Buchheim (London: John Murray, Albemarle St., 1883), p. 31.

intellectual, moral and religious factors.[26] Luther's indictment of the papacy on economic grounds (the indulgence controversy) won for him far more support than his berating of Rome on theological issues. This was especially true initially. The Church was closely identified with the feudal system, and there was social unrest culminating in the bloody Peasant's War which even Luther could not control.

However, in the early days this desire for social reform was allied to the movement for religious reform. The masses appealed for their natural rights and for their rights as Christians. Luther's treatise "On Christian Liberty" expressed, at least in part, that desire that filled the breast of every peasant. It is not insignificant that Luther often referred to his own peasant heritage.

Freedom became the dominant theme and, in turn, evoked a critical spirit that exposed to the probing of reforming criticism the institutions, systems and doctrines of the day. The Bible became an open book. It has been said that the "Reformation was the culmination of the individualist tendency. . . ."[27] The individ-

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[26] Op. cit., chap. xxiv. [27] Mackinnon, op. cit., p. 415.

ualist tendency which in turn contributes to a separatist spirit is naturally aggressively hostile to the secularized ecclesiastical form of religion. This spirit powerfully influenced Luther in his search for the gracious God. The freedom that he discovered as a gift of the free grace of God he desired to share with others. His recorded words, therefore, often convey a deep and sincere concern for the cure of souls.[28]

In a certain sense the Reformation was ego revolution.[29] The Church, through systematic and terroristic exploitation of medieval man, had so stunted man's concept of himself that the freedom that came to be realized as a result of the Reformation resulted in the rediscovery of personhood. This freedom included knowledge of God as a loving and gracious Heavenly Father in place of the concept of a stern and vindictive judge. It encouraged man to recognize his own inherent potentiality and God-given value. Only as man responds positively in a spirit of true humility before the One who has brought him into being does he see his own potential and value in the proper light.

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[28]See "An Introductory Letter to Archbishop Albert of Magdeburg and Mentz," First Principles of the Reformation, pp. 3-4.

[29]See Erikson, op. cit., p. 187.

Erasmus contributed significantly to the ego-freeing revolt which Luther was to ignite; and Christian humanism helped to chart the course that soon was to be set by Luther and the other Reformers.[30] The neurotic state of the late medieval Church could lead in only one direction--and in that direction lay the purging Reformation.

It is characteristic of the ecclesiogenic neuroses of any age that they identify truth with an institution and infallibility with a successful organization's directives. This is an unsound foundation; for when the winds of change and reform blow, the structure is shaken and totters. In the second decade of the sixteenth century the winds of reform assumed gale force. Without the right man for the time, however, Romanism might have weathered the storm. In Bohemia in Huss's time, in England in Wycliffe's time, and in Italy in Savonarola's time, the structure had been shaken but had not fallen. However, in Saxon Germany in 1517 the storm that could not be silenced broke forth. The monk from Wittenberg was to make the Reformation complete as a religious

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[30]See Thomas M. Lindsay, A History of the Reformation (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1906), I, 253.

movement. In so doing he created the promise of an effective prescription for the cure of the medieval ecclesiogenic neurosis. On the other hand:

> If it may be said that Luther made the Reformation as a religious movement, it may also be said, with no little force, that the factors operating towards it in the late mediaeval Church materially contributed to the making of Luther.[31]

IV. LUTHER AND JUSTIFICATION

Luther is, of course, but one of the spiritual giants generally referred to as "the Reformers." I have chosen to discuss Luther rather than Calvin or Zwingli for several reasons. In point of time he was "the father" of the Reformation. Calvin, Zwingli and the others owe much to their predecessor from Wittenberg. Calvin, for one, readily admits this debt. On one occasion he remarked that "if he [Luther] called me the Devil I would always pay him reverence as the servant and messenger of God."[32] It can also be said that while Calvin was anti-pagan in his Reformation stance Luther is more anti-Judaic and anti-legalism. The

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[31]Mackinnon, op. cit., p. 405.

[32]J. S. Whale, The Protestant Tradition (Cambridge: University Press, 1959), p. 127.

Reformation was largely a matter of grace versus legalism. That perverted spirituality and neurotic way of life that eventually drove Luther in search of the God of grace is kin in many ways to the spirit of the Judaizers that evoked the ire of the Apostle Paul, and the Pharisaical attitude of heart that prompted the righteous wrath of Jesus.

Luther was a child of his age--an age plagued by ecclesiogenic neurosis. Erikson observes:

> The fact that Luther took upon himself the latent sadness of his age and the spiritual problems of its theology marks him as a member of an ideological, maybe even somewhat neurotic, minority.[33]

For any minority to assume neurotic traits is not an uncommon phenomenon. Minority groups of today--racial, national, and religious--bear testimony to the veracity of this observation. Yet again in reference to the environmental influence on Luther, Erikson comments:

> In depicting the identity struggle of a young great man I am not as concerned with the validity of the dogmas which laid claim to him, or of the philosophies which influenced his systematic thought, as I am with the spiritual and intellectual milieu which the isms of his time--and these isms <u>had</u> to be religious--offered to his passionate search.[34]

Luther's early concept of the nature of God--a concept influenced largely by the medieval Church--is

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[33]<u>Op. cit.</u>, p. 124. [34]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 19.

highly significant in understanding his personal conflict and his contribution to the direction of the Reformation. One feels in reading Luther's description of the Israelites at Sinai, for example, that he is here describing the God he, himself, worshipped in fear and trembling before he met the God of grace: "For they feared that God would suddenly strike among them, holding him merely for a devil, a hangman, and a tormentor, who did nothing but fret and fume."[35] He continues:

> Together with the Law, Satan torments the conscience by picturing Christ before our eyes, as an angry and stern judge, saying: God is an enemy to sinners, for he is a just God; thou art a sinner, therefore God is thy enemy.[36]

After his encounter with the God of grace he reflected on the negative influence of the institution that had contributed to his ecclesiogenic neurosis saying:

> . . . Christ dwells among us, provided, that is, that we believe in Him, and are reciprocally and mutually one the Christ of the other, doing to our neighbor as Christ does to us. But now, in the doctrine of men, we are taught only to seek after merits, rewards, and things which are already ours,

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[35] The Table Talk of Martin Luther, p. 124.

[36] Ibid., pp. 134-35.

> and we have made of Christ a taskmaster far more severe than Moses.[37]

There were two primary sources that provided Luther with this perverted concept of God: (1) the medieval Church, and (2) his own parental family. Speaking of the Church's demand for satisfaction for sin Luther writes:

> But men's consciences are most wretchedly tortured by scruples at this point. One runs hither, another thither; one to Rome, another into a convent, another to some other place; one scourges himself with vigils and fasting. . . .[38]

His entire attack on the Church's doctrines of works and merits is powerful testimony to the pressure exerted upon him by these negative teachings of pathological religion.

On the other hand Erikson suggests that it was the harshness of Luther's father "in his attempts to drive temper out of his children" that led to Luther's warped concept of God.[39] Gordon Rupp seems to concur when he says that "the thought of the severity of God, of Christ as judge, he had learned from his childhood,

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[37]"On Christian Liberty," First Principles of the Reformation, p. 128.

[38]"The Babylonish Captivity of the Church," ibid., pp. 212-13.

[39]Op. cit., p. 54.

and perhaps the sombre mood was reinforced by the strictness of the home."[40]

In a sermon Luther, himself, is alleged to have remarked:

> When such a fear is inbred in a man as a child, it will only with great difficulty be uprooted as long as he lives, for he who trembled at every word of his father or mother, for the rest of his life is afraid of a rustling leaf.[41]

The pastoral counsellor is well aware of numerous situations in which there seems to be a definite corollary between deep-seated conflicts with an earthly father and a poor relationship with the Heavenly Father. It appears to be markedly more difficult to feel emotions of warmth, love and respect for the Heavenly Father when one has experienced only the opposite from the male parent.

Luther, from all indications, suffered from neurosis. Erikson, in his psychoanalytic study of Young Man Luther, writes:

> I intend to demonstrate that Luther's redefinition of man's condition--while part and parcel of his theology--has striking configurational parallels with inner dynamic shifts like those which clini-

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[40]Gordon Rupp, Luther's Progress to the Diet of Worms, 1521 (London: SCM Press, 1951), p. 34.

[41]Ibid., p. 34.

> cians recognize in the recovery of individuals from psychic distress. In brief, I will try to indicate that Luther, in laying the foundation for a "religiosity for the adult man" displayed the attributes of his own hard-won adulthood; his renaissance of faith portrays a vigorous recovery of his own ego-initiative.[42]

Mackinnon suggests that "temperamentally, he seems to have been high-strung, emotional, sensitive, quick-tempered, impetuous, imaginative, impressionable, . . .one of those intensive natures which . . . live at high pressure."[43] He also refers to ". . . the abnormal element which undoubtedly entered into his religious experience."[44] This, however, is not to say that Luther's inner conflict which culminated in his doctrine of justification by grace through faith was nothing more than a neurotic state.

> This conflict was certainly far more than a case of disordered nerves. It was specifically religious, and any explanation of it that ignores the whole personality of Luther--the moral and mental as well as the temperamental mould of the man--is one-sided and misleading.[45]

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[42] Op. cit., p. 200. Any psychoanalytic study of a historical figure carries serious limitations. This work, however, is worthy of consideration.

[43] James Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1925), I, 98.

[44] Ibid., p. 100.

[45] Ibid., p. 101.

Erikson adds that "to be justified became his stumbling-block as a believer, his obsession as a neurotic sufferer, and his preoccupation as a theologian."[46]

Luther's neurosis was strongly ecclesiogenic. But, in the revelation of the grace of God he found the cure not only for his own suffering but, also, for the perverted religion of his day. Few men have given more genuine expression ". . . to these experiences which are on the borderline between the psychological and the theological than Luther, who gleaned from these experiences a religious gain formulated in theological terms."[47] Luther's illumination came as Paul's words, "the just shall live by faith" (Rom. 1:17), became irrepressibly alive to him. He had discovered that grace, "the operation of love," is "God's gracious personal relationship to his children."[48]

Luther's awareness of the grace of God became the healing balm for his ecclesiogenic neurosis as his

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[46]Op. cit., p. 141.

[47]Ibid., p. 250. Also, for another experience on "the borderline between the psychological and the theological," see Anton T. Boisen, Out of the Depths (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960).

[48]Oman, op. cit., pp. 38, 167-68.

concept of God underwent radical change. This is most evident in his thought concerning grace and works, the gospel and the law. The works and merits proclaimed by the Romanists drew his wrath:

> All manner of religion, where people serve God without his Word and command, is simply idolatry, and the more holy and spiritual such a religion seems, the more hurtful and venomous it is; for it leads people away from the faith of Christ, and makes them rely and depend upon their own strength, works, and righteousness.[49]

Luther, himself, had attempted frustratingly to earn his relationship with God. He was led away from "the faith of Christ" by the concept of God implanted and cultivated in him by the influences of the seemingly "holy" and "spiritual." However, he learned existentially and experientially that to be justified by works is an impossibility. The identification of salvation by works with idolatry was quickly made by Luther when the free grace of God was revealed to him. He insists:

> But if a man takes in hand a work or a service out of his own devotion, as he thinks good, thereby to appease God's anger, or to attain forgiveness of sins, everlasting life, and salvation . . . then I say flatly, he honours and worships an idol in his heart. . . .[50]

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[49]The Table Talk of Martin Luther, p. 69.

[50]Ibid., p. 70.

Once he had learned in his own experience that he could expect from God comfort, help and forgiveness instead of harsh and relentless judgement, Luther joyfully cried:

> O! How excellent and comfortable a gospel is that, in which our Saviour Christ shows what a loving heart he bears toward us poor sinners, who are able to do nothing at all for ourselves to our salvation.[51]

Luther's new theology, however, did not totally abolish the law and works. It placed them in the proper perspective. Both "the voice of the law" and "the word of Grace" were needed; but for far too long the only word heard had been "the voice of the law."[52] Emil Brunner's interpretation at this point is helpful:

> To quote again a word of Luther: "It is not good works that make a good man, but a good man who does good works"; that is, first the man and then his works; first the stand and power and then the leap; first the pure blood and then the healthy body; first the heart and then the acts. The change of heart,

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[51] Ibid., p. 122.

[52] "On Christian Liberty," First Principles of the Reformation, p. 124. Roland Bainton suggests that law instead of gospel was proclaimed by the medieval Church because the Christianized pagans could not grasp justification by faith: "The ethical demands of the gospel were laid with emphasis upon unbridled peoples. . . . Not only were penalties imposed on earth but punishments and rewards offered in the life to come. The Pauline doctrine of justification by faith apart from works was too precarious a word to commit to these undisciplined hordes." "The Ministry in the Middle Ages," The Ministry in Historical Perspectives, ed. H. Richard Niebuhr and Daniel D. Williams (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 93.

> which takes place through faith--I repeat, through real faith and not counterfeit--is the supreme ethical fact without which one can hardly think or speak of ethics, goodness, or good will.[53]

The battle between grace and works is really an issue to decide whether one's trust is to be in God or in oneself. The counterfeit faith to which Brunner refers is that perversion which, in this battle, casts its lot <u>against</u> God and <u>with</u> demented, self-centered man.

An important by-product of recognizing and accepting the free grace of God is the lifting of the ecclesiogenic neurosis. The Protestant Reformation took up the cry of justification by grace through faith alone, and through it held forth the promise of a faith to come that was to be freed from the neuroses of the past.

V. AN INCOMPLETE RECOVERY

The promise of a neurotic-free faith was, unfortunately, short-lived; for the recovery from the ecclesiogenic neurosis that Luther's experience of grace had promised proved to be an incomplete recovery. The battle had been won during the Reformation but not the war. The patient was improved but not cured completely.

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[53]Emil Brunner, <u>The Theology of Crisis</u> (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 77.

Brunner's description is relevant:

> The enemy of God and the good has not been vanquished, but has retreated and entrenched himself at the centre of man's being; the decisive battle has not yet been fought, the battle which was fought between Jesus and the Pharisees, between Paul and the Judaizers, between Luther and the Romanists--the battle between God and the selfish will of man, between grace and self-righteousness.[54]

The Westminster divines recognized the incompleteness of the Reformation when they spoke of ". . . a further and more perfect reformation than as yet hath been attained. . . ."[55] And R. Gregor Smith grants that the Reformation had succeeded in the breaking of ecclesiastical bonds; but he also notes that it failed to avail itself of the full freedom offered by this success.[56] Erikson paints quite a negative picture of the more immediate results of the Reformation when he acidly comments that ". . . the universal reign of faith envisaged in Luther's early teachings turned into an intolerant and cruel, Bible-quoting bigotry such as history had never seen."[57]

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[54] Ibid., p. 74.

[55] The Westminster Confession of Faith (by the Publications Comm. of the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, 1962 reprint), p. 11.

[56] See R. Gregor Smith, The New Man (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1956), pp. 94, 54.

[57] Op. cit., p. 236.

Luther, himself, had definite fears that the light that had broken into the medieval darkness might again be snuffed out. He feared for the security of grace and the gospel.[58] The principle of justification by grace through faith alone, in the noblest hours of the Reformation, had stressed the supreme authority of Scripture, the priesthood of all believers, the rights of the individual apart from ecclesiastical authority, and the liberty of the Christian man and conscience from all ecclesiastical and institutional prescription. The Protestant principle itself, however, underwent deformation. Evidences of this appear in Luther's influence and role in the later years of his life.

Signs of ecclesiogenic neurosis can be identified in the lives of other reformers. John Calvin did more to influence the course of Puritanism than any other one man--even as Calvinism has been a tremendous force in moulding the thinking of Protestants of every persuasion. Yet, neurotic, ecclesiastical symptomotology certainly appears in extreme Puritanism and in ultra-Calvinism which preceded it. Calvin the man had a stern and exact side to his personality. Allan Menzies speaks of the

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[58] The Table Talk of Martin Luther, p. 132.

strict standard that Calvin set for himself and which he tried to get others to accept for themselves.[59] The severe church discipline he advocated at Geneva and Strassburg, plus the infamous execution of Michael Servetus in Geneva in 1555--an act to which Calvin himself was directly related--bear vivid testimony to extremism.[60]

Puritanism is a spiritual descendant of Calvinism. François Wendel, referring to a passage in Calvin's Institutes, observes: "This passage is indeed a surprising one. May it not confirm the opinion of those who think they can see in Calvin the germs of future puritanism"?[61] And H. G. Wood comments:

> Puritan theology was simply Calvinism, ultimately worn thin. . . . It petrified into a series of dogmas, known as the five points of Calvinism, which dealt with election and reprobation, the limited scope of the atonement, total depravity, irresistible grace, and final perseverance.[62]

Is it not, however, the more severe side of Calvinism that is identifiable with English Puritanism? Neverthe-

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[59]Allan Menzies, A Study of Calvin and Other Papers (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1918), pp. 131-32.

[60]Ibid., pp. 167, 177 and 185.

[61]François Wendel, Calvin, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Collins, 1963), p. 276. The passage referred to is III, 14, 18.

[62]Op. cit., p. 513.

less, it is in Puritanism that deformations of the Protestant principle are clearly apparent.

Luther had contrasted man's sin with God's love which established the righteousness of God--the coram Deo. Puritanism, as it developed, contrasted man's sin with God's justice and magnified the glory of God--the gloria Deo.[63] Conscience for the Puritans became a ". . . tremendous and inescapable reality."[64] Moralistic, activistic and legalistic traits such as were found among the Pharisees, the Judaizers and the Romanists are clearly identifiable again in Puritanism. The Reformation had not "gone far enough"; yet one of the most vocal groups urging the pursuit of the Reformation to a more complete ending carried the maturing seeds of ecclesiogenic neurosis.

The law was pronounced dogmatically, and the puritanical emphasis on original sin led to an extreme depreciation of human nature. Their narrow concept of God primarily as righteous judge lacked gladness and joy. Scrupulosity was so prevalent that even such things as

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[63]John F. H. New, Anglican and Puritan (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1964), p. 19.

[64]John T. McNeill, A History of the Cure of Souls (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1952), p. 263.

wedding rings drew their wrath.[65] Activism was the sine qua non of Puritanism. Since God was the great Task-master and man was strictly accountable for effort and non-effort, frantic striving after righteousness again became the order of the day. Also, their concept of spirituality was characterized by a pharisaical sense of separateness.

. . . These characteristics exposed Puritanism to the danger of self-righteousness, and Puritan leaders themselves were aware of this danger:

> Baxter also knows how the Devil "overdoes," and if he cannot pervert the saints by worldliness, seeks to make them more Christian than Christ. Similarly, Walter Marshall says: "That precept of Solomon, Be not righteous overmuch, is very useful and necessary if rightly understood. . . . Overdoing commonly proveth undoing."[66]

If, perchance, "overdoing" does not prove to be "undoing" it very often is identical with "misdoing." And, an excessively moralistic approach to practical Christianity still leads many into an unconscious assumption that they can be "more Christian than Christ."

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[65]See Puritan Manifestoes, ed. W. H. Frere and C. E. Douglas (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1907), p. 27.

[66]Gordon Stevens Wakefield, Puritan Devotion (London: The Epworth Press, 1957), p. 127.

What has happened to the prize of Luther's wrestling--justification by grace through faith? Either a complete circle has been made in Reformation theology as early as 1600, or the revelation of God's grace never penetrated many echelons of Protestants. The view of God and man expounded in Puritanism holds much in common with the Romanist view that pushed Luther towards his ego-revolution. The concept of a stern God cannot be dissociated from a pessimistic view of the nature of man. These two factors contributed to the Puritan's preoccupation with "proving his salvation." Wakefield states that "many writers regard the desire for assurance of salvation as a dangerous mental aberration, responsible for the worst excesses of the narrowest Puritanism."[67]

Despite the hope of the Reformation, Puritanism testifies that the problem of law and gospel is still unreconciled. Grace, perhaps the most eloquent and complex of theological words, is not yet understood; and the ecclesiogenic neuroses are still uncontrolled.

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[67]Op. cit., p. 124.

CHAPTER IV

MOWRER AND THE REFORMATION

Justification by grace alone was the theme of the Protestant Reformation, when a breakthrough from the world of the liturgical and sacramental to the world of the atonement became a reality as the words of the Apostle Paul took on new and exciting dimensions for Martin Luther, Ulrich Zwingli, John Calvin and the other Reformers. Perversions within the Roman Catholic church had provoked, inadvertently, a struggle of titanic proportions in which the "protest-ants" clung to the word "grace" as the key word of their protest. As a result of this struggle Protestantism was born and western Christianity still stands divided in Catholic and Protestant camps.

The centrality in Protestantism of the doctrine of justification by grace through faith is challenged by no careful observer. Despite the fact that this doctrine does not appear fully developed in the Old Testament, few would argue that it is not a specific concep-

tion in the New Testament, especially in the Pauline writings. Paul Tillich says:

> The central principle of Protestantism is the doctrine of justification by grace alone, which means that no individual and no human group can claim a divine dignity for its moral achievements, for its sacramental power, for its sanctity, or for its doctrine. If, consciously or unconsciously, they make such a claim, Protestantism requires that they be challenged by the prophetic protest, which gives God alone absoluteness and sanctity and denies every claim of human pride. This protest against itself on the basis of an experience of God's majesty constitutes the Protestant principle. . . . It implies that there cannot be a sacred system, ecclesiastical or political; that there cannot be a sacred hierarchy with absolute authority; and that there cannot be a truth in human minds which is divine truth in itself.[1]

Although there are few who would challenge the theoretical centrality of "justification by grace through faith" in Protestantism there are those who challenge the validity of this doctrine. One such person is O. Hobart Mowrer, a prominent contemporary psychologist and a Christian churchman. This chapter is concerned with some of the basic views of Professor Mowrer.[2]

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[1]Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. J. L. Adams (London: Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1951), p. 226.

[2]Who's Who in America, XXXIII (1964-65), 1442. Mowrer, who is a Research Professor in Psychology at the Univ. of Illinois, was born in Unionville, Missouri, in 1907. He was awarded the A. B. degree from the Univ. of Missouri in 1929 and received a Ph. D. from Johns Hopkins in 1932. In the academic world he taught as a

The Western world of the twentieth century is a world of converging and diverging forces. Some are ancient while others are relatively young, having within recent years just come to the cognizance of modern Western man. Religion is one of the ancient forces, probably as old as man, at least in some primitive form; and the Christian faith itself, not one of the oldest religions, is, however, almost 2000 years old. There is a much younger force that is a child of this century, and yet in this relatively short time has carved its place, either negatively or positively, in the awareness of twentieth century man. This force is represented by the terms "depth psychology," "psychiatry," and "psychotherapy." The relationship of Protestant Christianity and depth psychology generally--and Freudian psychoanalysis specifically-- has become an interesting

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Fellow at Northwestern, Princeton and Yale, served as an Instructor in psychology on the Memorial Research Staff of the Institute of Human Relations, Yale Univ., and was Assis. Professor and later, Assoc. Professor at Harvard. He is a member of the Amer. Academy of Psychotherapists, the Amer. Assoc. of Univ. Professors, and the Amer. Psychological Foundation. Among his published works are Frustration and Aggression (1939), Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics (1950), Psychotherapy - Theory and Research (1953), Learning Theory and Behaviour (1960), Learning Theory and the Symbolic Processes (1960), The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion (1961), and The New Group Therapy (1964).

and complex phenomenon. The fact that in recent years there has been published a great amount of literature dealing with the relationship of religion and depth psychology, and the fact that inter-disciplinary organizations such as the Academy of Religion and Mental Health of New York have arisen speak of the present dialogue taking place between psychiatry and religion.[3] Of course, when one remembers the relationship of "religion" and "medicine" in primitive cultures and traces this historical relationship to the present day, the modern dialogue is not too surprising. The person of the primitive "shaman" or "medicine man" who functioned both as priest and medical practitioner is illustrative.

Another testimony to the increasing tempo of the religious-psychotherapeutic interaction is the clinical pastoral education movement, especially as seen in the United States and, also, more recently in western Europe and Great Britain.[4] In clinical pastoral education the

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[3]Note the continuous stream of books in this area offered through the Pastoral Psychology Book Club of Manhasset, New York. For further information concerning the Academy of Religion and Mental Health see the Journal of Religion & Health, ed. George C. Anderson, 16 E. 34th St., New York, New York.

[4]The Council for Clinical Training and the Institute of Pastoral Care were the first arms of this movement in the United States.

minister and the doctor meet in close interprofessional contact. The primary meeting ground of the two disciplines is the patient himself.

For some years now most of the dialogue between clergymen and psychotherapists has resulted in somewhat guarded, and yet positive, statements as to the contributions of each to the other. Points of conflict have failed to disrupt seriously the conversation, and the interchange between depth psychology and Protestant Christianity continues.

I. A CRITIQUE OF PROTESTANISM

Hobart Mowrer does not agree that all is "sweetness and light" as the dialogue continues between psychiatry and religion. This is best illustrated by his words in the preface to The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion:

> The typical psychiatry-religion book, subtly or boldly, promises "peace of mind" to the reader on the promise that psychiatry is wonderful, religion is wonderful, put them together and you get something better still! More accurately, the situation might be likened to that of two aging lovers who have married, each with the illusion that the other has "resources" which have been implied but, thus far, not concretely exhibited. The thesis of this collection of articles and lectures is that the honeymoon is now coming to an end and that crisis,

not connubial bliss, is the term we need to describe the resulting situation.[5]

From this point of departure Mowrer becomes "no respecter of persons" as he speaks pointedly to the relationship of psychiatry and religion. It is his opinion that the traditional Judeo-Christian faith has been abandoned by Protestantism for the philosophy of Nietzsche and his view that the churches have become the tombs of God, the despair of Kierkegaard who accuses the churches of making a fool of God, the amoral Zen Buddhism, and, more recently, the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud with its advocacy of religion as an illusion.[6]

Certain features of the Protestant Reformation, especially those shaped and expressed by John Calvin, have led to the above mentioned "abandonment," according to Mowrer. Calvin's doctrine of predestination and human helplessness, he believes, prepared the way. He speaks of "the absurdity of the Reformation doctrine of human guilt and divine grace. This . . . places man in

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[5]O. Hobart Mowrer, The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961), p. iii.

[6]See Ibid., p. 241. Mowrer is drawing from Roger L. Shinn, The Existentialist Posture (New York: Assoc. Press, 1959), p. 70.

an intolerable predicament. . . ."[7] This "intolerable predicament," to which Mowrer refers, appears to be man's alleged position of being totally responsible for his sin but completely incapable of doing anything about it. Man cannot in any sense be "good" and be responsible for the good state in any way, because, if he is "good," it is the grace of God that makes him so and naught of his own doing. "The Calvinist doctrine of the guilt of man and the grace of God (or what Tillich calls the Protestant Principle) has been a heresy which has produced despair, anger, and madness," argues Mowrer.[8] Although there probably are very few present-day Protestants who would appraise Calvinism as "heresy," there is most likely a sizable number who would agree that "despair, anger, and madness" seem to be on the increase. The question, of course, is to the accuracy of Mowrer's analysis at this point.

Looking at the sick man of today, the guilt-ridden, the neurotic, Mowrer says the real question he is asking is "What must I do to be saved?" In our day, he claims, two equally misleading answers have been given. The religious approach characterized by the

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[7] Ibid., p. 175. [8] Ibid., p. 181.

preaching of Protestant theology and its doctrine of justification by grace through faith is saying to the "sin-sick": "All you have to do is believe! Just believe and immediately you'll be forgiven." The second misleading answer is characterized by the scientific approach. (Here Mowrer is making direct reference to Freudian psychoanalysis.) Through this approach one deals with his sin, or sickness, by gaining the insight that the sin is not actually real. If it is not real, if it is just a guilt "feeling," the result of an over-active super-ego, then one is "saved" by realizing that he does not need forgiveness. "It is hard to determine which of these doctrines has been the more pernicious," concludes Mowrer.[9] If Mowrer is allowed a correct "diagnosis"--if he is seeing the "sickness" accurately--then his argument sounds logical.

But, he is not done! Accepting the cause of man's search for salvation as being real guilt, not false guilt or a guilt "feeling," he contends that Reformation theology and practice has handled the whole problem of guilt very badly. It is ". . . a natural culmination of four centuries of bumbling, indecision and confusion on this

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[9]Ibid., p. 232.

score."[10] Accurately enough, he admits that:

> Historically the church has been dedicated not to comfort but to change, redemption, rebirth. Ultimately its objective, no less than that of medicine, was to relieve suffering--yea, more, to bring salvation and joy. But it did not flinch from holding that sometimes suffering is the absolute and inescapable precondition for our transformation and redemption.[11]

In his eyes, however, the modern church has veered from its historical tradition. The church today is preaching that "judgment is old-fashioned," has actually become "non-judgmental" and "obligingly eliminated Hell."[12] One would almost believe Mowrer to be calling for a return to the "fire and brimstone" preaching of past days, to the era of Jonathan Edwards and others who were capable through their sermons of making members of a congregation cry out in mortal terror for their fear of God.[13] This is possible, but not probable; although, there seems to be little question in Mowrer's mind that the clergymen of today are far from what they ought to be. "By their narrowness, bigotry, arrogance, sanctimony, false piety, irrealism, supernaturalism, and hypocrisy, several generations of theologians and laymen have

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[10]Ibid., p. 77. [11]Ibid., p. 59. [12]Ibid.

[13]See Jonathan Edwards, Sermons on Various Important Subjects (Boston & Edinburgh: M. Gray, 1785), p.338ff.

given organized religion an exceedingly negative imprint and reputation."[14] It is difficult to disagree with his conclusion that:

> Freud, and the disciples whom he soon attracted, at least walked in the Valley of the Shadow with these unhappy, distraught individuals [those seeking "salvation"] in a way which neither the ordinary physician nor the typical clergyman of the time had been willing to do.[15]

One could ask if there is much difference between the "typical clergyman" of Freud's time and the "typical clergyman" of today. To the above argument Paul Tillich adds his observation that "in depth-psychology there is frequently more awareness of the meaning of grace and, consquently, more effective 'cure of souls' than in the ministry of the church."[16] Mowrer is far from being alone in his criticism of the role of the "typical clergyman" of today. However, this will be dealt with in a later chapter. Let it suffice to say at this point that it is interesting to note the attention being given to the role of the contemporary minister not only by theologians and ministers, but by members of the other "helping professions" as well.[17]

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[14]Mowrer, op. cit., p. 122. [15]Ibid., p. 111.

[16]Tillich, op. cit., p. 149. [17]Infra, chap. VII.

Mowrer quotes Anton Boisen in saying that ". . . the church may once more come into its own and speak no longer as the scribes and Pharisees and interpreters of traditions but with authority of the knowledge of the laws of the life that is eternal."[18] As one reads Mowrer the feeling that is foremost is that the Church of today has missed the path. She has veered off the main road and is now bumping along on an obviously secondary route. Can it be that this psychologist has in mind perversions and deformations of the Protestant Church's modern message--ecclesiogenic neuroses? His theme seems to be that the Protestants have the basic truth, but unfortunately the Reformation has gone astray. The Church is not reaching her potential.

Quite properly Mowrer argues that religion in its most vital form has always been intent on helping individuals that were "lost" regain their sense of peace and freedom by a return to responsible living, integrity and properly motivated concern and compassion for others. In his own words: "This, it seems, is 'therapy' of the most profound variety; and it is perhaps our greatest misfortune that this conception is today accepted and

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[18]Mowrer, op. cit., p. 72.

practiced with so little confidence."[19] He is never any more incisive than when he says that "our generation is one which has been said to have lost its 'faith in God'. Perhaps this loss of faith is related to a misconception of God, which the church itself, in recent centuries, has inadvertently fostered."[20]

It would seem to this observer that much of Mowrer's criticism of Protestantism today is stimulating and valid. But, is there not a serious question about his critique of the doctrine of justification by grace through faith and its "pernicious" effect? Just how valid is his contention that this is "heresy"?

II. MOWRER AND JUSTIFICATION BY GRACE

Mowrer's attack on the doctrine of justification by grace through faith seems to be based on his observation and interpretation of it as proclaimed today. However, is this doctrine what he thinks it to be? Could it be that what Mowrer has seen as a "pernicious" and "heretical" doctrine, "a source of despair, anger and madness," really is what Dietrich Bonhoeffer refers to as "cheap grace," which in reality is no grace at all

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[19] Ibid., p. 31. [20] Ibid., p. 37.

but, rather, an aspect of ecclesiogenic neurosis?[21] Mowrer, himself, cites Dr. Gordon McKay, President of McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago:

> It seems to me that a full understanding of the Pauline concept of salvation requires us to recall that Paul's strong insistence on justification by faith was always coupled with the admonition that we are to work out our salvation with fear and trembling. Every great theological discourse in Paul's writings is followed by a chapter or two on moral teaching.[22]

If man is "saved" by some "namby-pamby" sentimentalism that sees God as something of an over-indulgent grandfather who demands absolutely nothing from man, then Mowrer would be correct. However, Bonhoeffer, in The Cost of Discipleship, would distinguish between such "cheap grace" and "costly grace." "Cheap grace," the deadly enemy of the church, is grace without price, and "sold on the market like cheapjacks' wares." It is grace that is only a doctrine, a principle, a system, nothing more. "Cheap grace" means "the justification of sin without the justification of the sinner." It preaches forgiveness without requiring repentance. We bestow it on ourselves. It is "baptism without church discipline,"

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[21]See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, trans. R. H. Fuller (rev. ed.; London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959), chap. i.

[22]Op. cit., p. 221.

"communion without confession," "absolution without contrition," "grace without discipleship or the Cross." "Cheap grace," disastrous to spiritual lives, according to Bonhoeffer has been "the ruin of more Christians than any commandment of works."[23]

Is this what Mowrer has in mind? He refers to Bonhoeffer and "cheap grace" on a number of occasions, but nowhere seems to make the distinction, as the German martyr does, between "cheap grace" and "costly grace." In Mowrer's apparent blanket condemnation of the "Protestant principle," justification by grace through faith, he "throws the baby out with the bath water." In the words of Bonhoeffer:

> The only man who has the right to say that he is justified by grace alone is the man who has left all to follow Christ. Such a man knows that the call to discipleship is a gift of grace, and that the call is inseparable from the grace."[24]

The gospel that Mowrer preaches in place of the guilt of man and the grace of God seems to be summed up best when he says:

> . . . I believe there is an alternative way of approaching the problem which we should consider very seriously: namely, to assume that there are principles--universal, consistent, knowable principles--in the domain of human personality and social process which transcend "persons," and that we can <u>know</u>

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[23]Bonhoeffer, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 37ff. [24]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 45.

> others and be ourselves, in the ultimate sense, only in terms of these principles.[25]

The idea of principles transcending persons is, of course, not at all new. Jesus, 2000 years ago, said to the principle-worshipping Pharisees: "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath." (Mark 2:27). The concept of the superiority of the personal as expressed, for example, by Buber (I and Thou), Tournier (The Meaning of Persons), John Oman (Grace and Personality), and Richard Niebuhr ("Reformation: Continuing Imperative," The Christian Century, March 2, 1960) is more authentically Christian than that advocated by Mowrer.

Donald F. Krill, an American psychiatric social worker, accurately appraises Mowrer's position:

> His emphasis is always on rule violation and the hiding of such. Mowrer is describing essentially the religion of the Pharisees, one of rules, self-perfection, and social conformity. He is not speaking of sin as described in both Old and New Testaments as giving one's primary devotion, love, and loyalty to a false God. . . . Choosing evil is not merely a matter of rule violation and concealing the act. Sin results from choosing a total life orientation, or commitment, that denies the very essence of human existence. . . ."[26]

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[25] Op. cit., p. 182.

[26] Donald F. Krill, "Psychoanalysts, Mowrer, and the Existentialists," Pastoral Psychology, XVI (October, 1965), p. 32. See, also, the editorial by Seward Hiltner entitled "A New Moralism?," pp. 5-8.

Although, Mowrer's attack on "cheap grace" is valid, his general condemnation of the doctrine of justification by grace through faith is too drastic. His surgery--like that of the caricatured surgeon who removed not only the trusting patient's diseased lung but his heart as well--can prove to be fatal if it includes the elimination of "costly grace" as well as "cheap grace." Also, his argument for "principles which transcend persons" could lead easily into a twentieth century legalism and Pharisaism that would submit the person to the tyranny of the principle. In spite of this, there are gleanings from the philosophy of this psychologist that are well worth further consideration.

III. IMPULSE THEORY OR GUILT THEORY?

The contrast between the positions of Mowrer and Freud in respect to their psychoanalytic theory and practice is pronounced. In neurosis, according to Freud, the individual's instincts have been repressed, especially those of a sexual and aggressive nature. Mowrer counters this view by claiming that it is really the person's <u>conscience</u> not his instincts that has been repressed. The shift is from Freud's impulse theory of neurosis to Mowrer's guilt theory. The neurotic is in

trouble because of what he has actually done not because of what he would like to do but is afraid to do. The person has committed tangible misdeeds which have remained unacknowledged and unredeemed; thus, his anxieties have a realistic social basic and justification. In other words real guilt is the basis and not an over-active super-ego.[27] Mowrer's philosophy summarized and stated in his own words follows:

> The approach is religious in the sense that it accepts the reality of unconfessed and unredeemed sin as central in psychopathology and holds confession and restitution to be commonly necessary for recovery. But it involves a minimal theological emphasis in that it stresses the interpersonal dimension as more crucial for therapeutic movement than the man-God relationship because it is the former that has been most palpably ruptured and can be repaired, in many instances, only by the individual's working hard at modifying and improving his everyday conduct.[28]

The Freudian analyst, alleges Mowrer, is called upon to align himself with and to speak on behalf of the instincts against the over-sensitive conscience in order to un-do repression and allow the encumbered impulses to find freer routes to gratification. Mowrer counters by advocating that the basis of the trouble is not in the "unknown," or the overly sensitive conscience, but in the "untold," the unconfessed guilt. He states:

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[27]Mowrer, op. cit., pp. 83-84, 148. [28]Ibid., p. 220.

> While there is no denying that we sometimes set for ourselves and for others unrealistic aims, yet it now appears that less harm is usually done on this score than when an attempt is made to be deliberately less, morally, than we potentially are.[29]

The view of Anton Boisen is much the same:

> . . . Real evil in mental disorder is not to be found in the conflict but in the sense of isolation and estrangement. It is the fear and guilt which result from the presence in one's life of that which one is afraid to tell. For this reason I do not consider it necessary to lower the conscience threshold [the goal of Freudian therapy] in order to get rid of the conflict. What is needed is forgiveness and restoration to the fellowship of that social something which we call God.[30]

Anticipating the questioning of his guilt theory Mowrer asks: "But what of the person who is more or less chronically over-conscientious: the so-called obsessive-compulsive or the victim of religious scrupulosity? These are certainly driven, tortured people; what is their underlying 'dynamics'"?[31] He answers by proposing a concept of "displaced" guilt which, in its own right, is probably "terribly real" and not the result of spuriously high-standards and an over-demanding super-ego, as

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[29] Ibid., p. 35.

[30] Anton T. Boisen, The Exploration of the Inner World (New York: Harper & Bros., 1936), pp. 267-68. Mowrer, like Boisen, has experienced mental disorder himself and has, in this sense, explored his own "inner world."

[31] Op. cit., p. 226.

Freud might say. Apparently, he is saying here that somewhere else in one's life is a real, festering, poisonous guilt, and that the obsessive-compulsive or scrupulously religious person is simply "displacing" this real guilt and expressing it, for example, in religious scrupulosity.[32]

This guilt theory of Mowrer's, as contrasted with what he refers to as the "impulse theory" of Freud, is worth a much deeper investigation than is possible here. There are, however, two observations that should be made: (1) Is it entirely a matter of "either-or"; or is it not "both-and"? It would seem that the same type of over-statement is made here as in regard to the blanket rejection of justification by grace. Most likely there are situations where some person for some real reason is actually over-conscientious, even as Mowrer's point is well taken that real guilt is often confused with being over-conscientious. (2) This type of over-statement is seen again when the author speaks of Paul Tournier's views as expressed in The Meaning of Persons:

> The emphasis on the relation of man-to-man is, surely, an improvement on Freudian doctrine; but is there not still a serious ambiguity here? The em-

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[32] Ibid.

> phasis as Tournier's phrasing especially suggests, is still upon one's coming to know himself. Don't we, in fact, know ourselves only too well and sicken of this knowledge, yet are loathe to let others know, in the same sense, who we are? I do not mean "others" in the same sense of a professional listener who is paid to keep our secrets, but in Sullivan's sense of the significant ordinary others in our lives: relatives, friends, colleagues, neighbors. Here is where the real "break-through" to community and personal authenticity comes; and anything which falls short of this is, I submit, a pious hope.33

The point of not really letting others know "who we are" is valid. We all to a certain extent remain behind our various "masks." But, Mowrer is flying in the face of clinical evidence when, almost naively, he says we know ourselves only too well. It is true, certainly, that all of us know much about ourselves that makes us "sicken." However, unless Freud's concept of the unconscious is completely worthless, there is still much more personal insight--spiritual and intellectual--to be gained in the lives of most individuals than has been realized already. Can the amount of personal and inter-personal harm wrought--at least in a large measure by ignorance of one's real self, true motivations, and hidden desires --be skimmed over so lightly?

33Ibid., p. 180.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF GUILT AND REDEMPTION

Man's guilt is a very real issue in the philosophy of Mowrer. The reassertion of this is one of his basic contributions. Freud's theory tended to minimize, if not completely abolish, real guilt. With the reality of guilt re-established, however, what form should the therapy take? As we have already seen, Mowrer's appraisal of the traditional Protestant approach, that is, justification by grace through faith, to the solving of man's problem of guilt and sin-sickness is that it has been, and is, woefully inadequate, a failure, and even "pernicious." In his view the place to start therapy or redemption is not in the vertical man-God dimension where one simply urges a guilt-ridden person to acknowledge his sin, confess his guilt, and pray for forgiveness. "Empirically," says Mowrer, "this assumption does not seem to be well borne out."[34] Does Mowrer's observation at this point have merit for contemporary Protestants?

The psychoanalytic approach in dealing with sin-sick, guilty man held out the promise to do what tradi-

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[34] Ibid., p. 220.

tional Protestantism had failed to do, according to Mowrer; that was, to point the way to man's redemption. He goes so far as to say: "It may, in fact, not be too bold to conjecture that the Reformation by its deficiencies and anomalies, actually produced psychoanalysis."[35] Nevertheless, the basic approach in psychotherapy is that it is necessary to work on one's relationship to himself first of all. As he comes to know himself, his relationship to other persons and even to God will improve accordingly. Mowrer dismisses the validity of this approach with a flourish when he claims that ". . . it has been evident for twenty years that classical Freudian psychoanalysis is a therapeutic fiasco. . . ."[36]

What, then, is Mowrer's alternative? If the "Protestant principle" has failed to work man's redemption, and if psychotherapy is nothing but a "fiasco," where lies man's hope? His proposal is that the best hope is in the one avenue remaining--the interpersonal approach. This approach, according to Mowrer, is now attracting a great deal of interest from secular students of the problem. It also holds the greatest promise, in his thinking, of a genuine rapprochement between science and religion in this area.[37]

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[35]Ibid., p. 156. [36]Ibid., p. 158. [37]Ibid., p. 220.

Mowrer's apparent meaning of an "interpersonal" approach includes the basic idea of putting right the relationships between men. He states that ". . . mental illness is a social and moral illness and, in the final analysis, capable of remediation only along social and moral lines."[38] He continues:

> In children openness and integrity have to be taught and experienced first in the context of the family; and when in an adult, there is an inadequacy or failure of character, personal reconstruction seems far more likely to occur in the horizontal than in the purely vertical dimension.[39]

Certainly, Mowrer is not "far from the Kingdom" at this point, although this could imply a contradiction of his emphasis on principles. It seems evident that God has chosen human personality as the primary medium of His revelation of Himself. It seems equally evident that men are "vehicles for transmitting ἀγάπη " to other men from God.[40] Therefore, the "personal reconstruction" of which Mowrer speaks can very well occur in the horizontal dimensions--more than that, probably most often does. This, however, does not mean that the grace of God is not involved. His grace is not uni-dimensional.

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[38]Ibid., p. 91. [39]Ibid., p. 216.

[40]The words "vehicles for transmitting ἀγάπη " are those of Seward Hiltner; The Christian Shepherd (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959), p. 34.

Mowrer's emphasis, though, is well made. Protestantism has most frequently erred on the side of ruling out the place of man in God's designs.[41] Let us add one other word, and this by Professor Edgar P. Dickie of St. Andrews: "The truth about divine grace has to be acted. Its proofs are not syllogisms, but the witness of one heart in touch with another."[42]

V. PROTESTANTISM AND THE CONFESSIONAL

Paul Tillich, whom Mowrer soundly criticizes, has made the following analysis:

> The success of psychoanalysis in Protestant countries has two main reasons: (1) the rigorous moralism which developed in Protestantism after the sacramental grace was taken away and which poisons the personality through repressing vital impulses by moral law and social conventions, and (2) the solitude of the deciding individual, who has to bear responsibility and guilt without the help of confession and the related forgiveness which comes from outside.[43]

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[41]It should be stated, however, that emphases on interpersonal relationships, as well as group therapy and social integration did not originate with Mowrer. These have been accepted psychotherapeutic practices for years.

[42]Edgar P. Dickie, God is Light (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), p. 15.

[43]Op. cit., p. 229.

Although Mowrer and Tillich are at odds about the "success of psychoanalysis"; and, although Tillich's first point in the above quotation implies support for Freud's basic psychoanalytic theory and not for that of Mowrer, it can be said with certainty that Mowrer would applaud Tillich's words concerning the Protestant's having "to bear responsibility and guilt without the help of confession and related forgiveness which comes from outside." Tillich's reference to the "rigorous moralism" which became a characteristic of Protestantism--and a basic characteristic of the ecclesiogenic neurosis--touches upon the heart of this thesis. However, our concern at this specific point is with the reference to confession.

Mowrer urges the Protestant churches of today to return to the practice of confession: "We have tried to ignore and by-pass the very notion of guilt and sin. . . . The gospel of sin and salvation (redemption) is not one of bondage but of liberation, hope and strength. . . ."[44] His perspective, as has already been observed, is that present day Protestantism, especially that of the Calvinistic stripe, has not adequately met the problem of sinful man's dilemma. ". . . Protestant Chris-

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[44] Op. cit., p. 78.

tianity instills in us the capacity to experience guilt but with no personal resource or reliable possibility for alleviating it. . . ."[45]

This psychologist is cognizant of the fact that present-day Protestant pastoral counselling bears within its practice characteristics of the confessional. In his opinion, however, it has two major weaknesses: (1) It is episodic, voluntary and, unfortunately, often belated. There is also missing in it the preventive function that regularly prescribed confession has. (2) Pastoral counselling is now largely patterned on secular psychotherapy with an emphasis on "acceptance" and "insight" and not enough on sin.[46] Neither is he satisfied with a call for confession alone, but argues that confession without expiation is simply not enough. We are again reminded of Bonhoeffer's "cheap grace."

In considering Mowrer's advocacy of a Protestant return to the practice of confession it is quite logical to ask just how "therapeutically sound," both spiritually and emotionally, confession has been in the Roman Catholic Church where it has been carried on as a regularly prescribed function for centuries. He, himself, makes

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[45]Ibid., p. 164. [46]Ibid., p. 78.

three observations at this point: (1) Many Catholics do enjoy unusually good mental health. (2) Some Catholics and their confessors are perfunctory about confession and penance. Psychologically, at least, it is often true that the punishment does not fit the "crime." (3) The Catholic church identifies contrition, confession, and penance as a sacrament, whose central aim is otherworldly salvation rather than mental health or adjustment in this life. Mowrer concludes: "Therefore, Catholicism provides no clear test, either in practice or theory, of what confession and penance can do in a more naturalistic way."[47]

I am not aware of any reliable statistics comparing the mental health enjoyed by Roman Catholics and Protestants. Mowrer does not make reference to any such study. From personal experience it would seem true that "some Catholics and their confessors are perfunctory about confession and penance." In respect to his third point above, although there are probably few Protestants who would claim that contrition, confession, and penance were sacramental, the great majority would see the central aim of "pastoral counselling"--"confession"

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[47]Ibid., p. 108.

or whatever name one may use to designate this function --as much more than just providing "mental health or adjustment in this life." It would be hoped that these would be important by-products of the "confession" or counselling relationship; but the central aim should be that of a redemptive, personal, relationship with God that is not just "other-worldly" but has definite implications for this world.

Mowrer's recommendation for a Protestant return to the confessional in some form is worthy of more consideration. However, there are certain liabilities to this practice which should be deeply scrutinized, especially when thinking of the practice of confession as a "preventive" measure. Alcoholics Anonymous, whom Mowrer commends, holds that it is absolutely necessary for an alcoholic to "hit bottom" before he can "bounce." The concept is that until the alcoholic comes to the point that he himself recognizes the fact that he is desperately in need of help he will not accept real assistance, let alone seek it. Is it not also true that the confessional or pastoral counselling relationship where something really "therapeutic" takes place is the one in which the confessor or counsellee has come to the realization of his own desperate plight? There

seems to be a natural resistance to this realization; and one cannot but wonder just how "preventive" a regularly prescribed confession would be. On the contrary, the question comes to mind whether there might be the possibility of one becoming "immunised" or "inoculated" against the real value of a needed counselling experience by attending the prescribed and regular sessions when, in most of these sessions, no real pressing need would be apparent. Could this be a partial explanation of some of the perfunctoriness found in the Roman Catholic confessional practice?

None of this is to say, however, that there is not a need for a deeper interpersonal relationship among most Protestants. It is quite possible that a serious review of the practice of confession would result in a definite and concrete contribution to the spiritual, emotional, and even physical welfare of the whole person in this fragmented world.

VI. THE RELATIONSHIP OF PROTESTANTISM AND PSYCHIATRY

There is a section in The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion in which Mowrer speaks of "the strange affinity of Protestant Christianity and Freudian Psycho-

analysis."[48] He proceeds to point out how readily Protestantism has assimilated Freudian principles; and, since his opinion of Freudian psychoanalysis is anything but positive, he pleads for a continuation of the Protestant Reformation in order that Protestantism may extricate itself from the "dead end of Freudianism."[49] He goes as far as to say:

> There are many indications . . . that we are now well into a religious reformation comparable in scope and significance to that of four hundred years ago. Institutionalized religion had stagnated. Within the past century, science in general and biological science in particular, threatened its very life. Now religion appears to be recovering and, in that process, has gained new vitality and validity.[50]

In his criticism of this "strange affinity" of Protestant "religion" and Freudian "medicine" he observes that medicine makes a mistake when it attempts to extend the principle of "alleviation of suffering" over into the moral realm, such as in the treatment of personality disorders. Psychoanalysis, in his opinion, promised to "save" man by reducing the "severity" of his conscience. "Unable to make good this promise, analysis is on the wane; and psychiatry is now captivated by the chemical

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[48] Op. cit., pp. 159ff. [49] Ibid., p. 156

[50] Ibid., p. 15.

'tranquilizers.'"[51] These words reflect those of Dr. A. J. Sullivan:

> Modern man is trying to find God in himself. Science with its great power has promised man independence from God. Our present world is seemingly eager to accept science as a way of salvation, but science is not a religion, not even medical science. Yet it is toward medicine that the sick and failing spirit turns. It would seem that science having unwittingly unfrocked the clergy has as unwittingly adorned the physician. We do not wish to argue that this should or should not be, but we must recognize that it has become a measurable trend.[52]

This measurable trend that Sullivan refers to is a complex phenomenon. It cannot be passed off lightly with the superficial advice to "let the minister stay in the realm of the spirit and the doctor practise his medicine." In a scathing critique of psychoanalysis Mowrer quotes Lee C. Steiner, a New York psychologist who warns:

> . . . The ministry makes a tremendous mistake when it swaps what it has for psychoanalytic dressing. Through the ages the ministry has been the force that has at least attempted to keep morality alive. It would be a pity if, in one of the eras of great-

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[51] Ibid., p. 58. Mowrer's antipathy for Freudianism borders on a personal attack on Freud himself. He implies support for the absurd view that Freud actually made a pact with the Devil. See Mowrer, op. cit., pp. 114ff.

[52] Cited by David Cayer in R. K. Young and A. L. Meiburg, Spiritual Therapy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 10.

> est moral crisis, the clergy should suddenly abandon its strength for something that has no validity, no roots and no value. . . . Judaism has endured for almost 6000 years, Christianity for almost 2000. Where will psychoanalysis be even 25 years from now? . . . I predict that it will take its place along with phrenology and mesmerism.[53]

Mowrer's thesis is that a terrible "wedding" has taken place between Protestant Christianity and Freudian psychoanalysis. This has been fostered in large part by the "pernicious" doctrine of justification by grace and Calvin's pre-occupation with predestination and election. Since psychoanalysis is a complete "fiasco" Protestantism today should disengage itself from the present débâcle and continue the reformation in order to be extricated from the dead-end street in which it finds itself. To some degree Mowrer believes that this is already taking place.

This seems to be one of Mowrer's most unfortunate digressions from what is the reality of the present situation. There is no doubt that much more is needed in a sweeping reappraisal of the minister's role and inter-professional relationships.[54] Also, if Steiner's words

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[53] Op. cit., p. 69. This quotation is from a paper read by Steiner to the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Harvard, November, 1958.

[54] Infra, chap. VII.

can be interpreted as a plea from Mowrer for the minister not to become a "jack-leg psychiatrist" and sell his birthright for a mess of psychoanalytic porridge, then let us applaud this worthy admonition. On the other hand, if Mowrer is advocating that medical men, especially psychiatrists, refrain from claiming to be professional theologians and ordained clergymen, let us also say "Amen." I believe, too, there are few who would disagree with Mowrer that the Reformation ought to be a continuing reformation--dynamic and vital. However, the complete rejection of Freudian psychoanalysis that Mowrer seems to make cannot be accepted. It is an inaccurate generalization to imply that psychoanalysis today holds no truth. All truth is of God and there are many who feel some is to be found in psychoanalysis, even orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis. Cannot Protestant Christianity profit from truth that has been discovered in the realm of endeavor of other "helping" disciplines? The institutionalized church has no corner on the truth "market," and most Protestants would be the first to admit this. Some would even go as far as to say: "Despite the many, often valid criticisms of psychoanalysis it abounds in analogies to the Christian

understanding of salvation and its elan, justification by grace."[55]

Let the dialogue between Protestant Christianity and psychoanalysis continue. It is quite possible that constructive understanding, illuminating insight, and spiritual truth will be realized in the distillation of this involvement. To paraphrase Gamaliel: "If this is of God we cannot successfully oppose it. If it is not of God nothing will come of it anyway." (Acts 5: 38-39). Let the dialogue continue, but let it rapidly become a discussion that involves other disciplines as well, not just psychiatry and psychoanalysis but philosophy, sociology, social welfare, and any and all who are concerned with the total wholeness and holiness of man.

Hobart Mowrer is stimulating in the realms of depth psychology and religion and the interrelatedness of these two disciplines. Although one might feel that he has not been careful enough in his treatment of the Protestant doctrine of justification by grace through faith, and that he has over-stated his case against Freudian psychoanalytic theory and practice, it cannot

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55J. Stanley Barlow, "Christian Conceptions of Sin and Justification in the Light of Depth Psychology" (an unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of St. Andrews), p. 402.

be denied that his call for the re-establishment of a healthy Protestant confessional, his emphasis on a sound morality, and his consequent disdain of "cheap grace" are valid and helpful. It is also true that his reminder of the place of real guilt in modern man's life and its relatedness to man's "sickness," as well as his stress on the critical nature of the interpersonal relationship are well-grounded. He sets the stage for a more detailed consideration of the modern ecclesiogenic neuroses.

SUMMARY

The concept of "ecclesiogenic neurosis" is not new, only the terminology. Part I has been an attempt to survey historically several of the basic factors that contribute to this type of neurosis. Rejecting Freud's theory that all religion is illusion and that the best that can be said for it is that for the religious man religion provides a ". . . most powerful protection against the danger of neurosis,"[1] I have attempted to demonstrate that Christianity from the time of Jesus to the present day has had within it expressions of a certain neurotic mentality. These expressions of pathological religion are most often recognized in legalistic, moralistic, and activistic perversions. Trends and traits of this nature within Christianity create a neurosis among individuals that can be measured and described, as Klaus Thomas of Berlin has done, and can be referred to quite accurately as "ecclesiogenic." It should be

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[1]Sigmund Freud, A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. John Rickman (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 208.

emphasized, however, that legalism, moralism, and activism are expressions of pathological religion, and that it is pathological religion, not healthy faith, that creates ecclesiogenic neuroses.

Whereas Freud indicates that religion has been--for the religious man--an illusory escape from neurosis, I am distinguishing between healthy and unhealthy religion, specifically Christianity. And, I am maintaining that pathological Christianity, which is not Christianity at all, is the cause and source of neurosis and not just an escape from it. This is not to say that Christianity alone has within it deformed expressions of an unhealthy faith. In fact, if legalism, moralism, and activism, for example, are accepted as indications of sick religion, then it is readily apparent that there are other "faiths" that are more legalistic, more moralistic, and more activistic than Christianity--and, therefore, can be expected to be more ecclesiogenically neurotic. The relationship of Jesus and the Pharisees demonstrates the legalistic and moralistic deformations that can take place in such a highly ethical religion as Judaism.

Pharisaism, itself, was an expression of religious sickness--ecclesiogenic neurosis. It was a deviation

from the true religion of Israel and the spirit of the Prophets and the Psalmists. It was an unbalanced preoccupation with a system of casuistry in which a man earned his righteousness and thus demonstrated his self-righteousness. It was a perverted system that perpetuated its sickness by demanding obedience from its adherents to rules, rituals, and regulations in order that they might obtain justification and salvation. The call of John the Baptist for men to repent from this perversion was not sufficient to lead to the cure of the malady. Therefore, God in Christ began His work of redemption. He opposed the Pharisaical system and ministered to the sin-sick, neurotic sufferers that were its practitioners and victims. Jesus saw sinful men as "sick" and in need of a "physician" (Matthew 9:12). At the same time, through satire and other means, he attempted to help the self-righteous Pharisees to come to the realization of their own plight. He reasoned with them, set examples before them, rebuked them, chastized them, ridiculed them, but above all, loved them to the end as He attempted to reach them through their deformed self-image. Their spiritual condition was neurotic and they bore the guilt of creating the same neurosis in the lives of those they dominated.

Jesus stood categorically opposed to the external act which was but a mask for the sickness of soul and a characteristic of this pathological religious state. Even while on the Cross He prayed for those blind and perverted practitioners of this sick and neurotic system. The ultimate authority of Christ was personal; but it is a mark of ecclesiogenic neurosis in every age that it does not recognize the personal.

After Jesus had left the continuation of His ministry to the apostles, further expressions of neurotic Christianity are observable in the mentality expressed by the Judaizing Christians. The Apostle Paul, who had correctly grasped the message of Christ and had recognized the ultimate personal authority of his Lord, preached a gospel of justification by grace through faith. However, there arose within the young Church a state of mind and heart that attacked Paul and the gospel he proclaimed. Again the characteristic perversions of Christianity included legalism, moralism, and activism. A serious attempt was made to deform the gospel message of grace and freedom. Paul staunchly took his stand upon his personal experience and continuing relationship with the risen, living Lord. He refused to allow the Judaizing perversion even to share, let alone

replace, the supremacy of the gospel of grace and freedom. The Judaizing mentality refused to accept a truly Person-centered faith and instead advocated the self-righteousness of legalism with its pharisaical moralism and frantic activism. From all indications it seems that Paul was victorious in his encounter with the Judaizers; but as early as the next generation there were again evidences of deformed expressions of unhealthy Christianity.

By the time of the Protestant Reformation the ecclesiogenic neurosis was again pronounced. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries perverted expressions of the faith were evident on every side. The old familiar characteristics of the pathology of this period were evident, but in addition the symptomatology included clericalism, religiosity, otherworldliness, and above all, institutionalism. The sacrifice of the personal and the totalitarian approach of the Roman Church were devastating in their effect upon clergymen as well as laymen. After having come through a personal crisis of his own in which his ecclesiogenic neurosis played a prominent role, Luther led the revolt against the ecclesiogenic neurosis of his day and sounded the call to return to the sane faith of grace and freedom.

He re-discovered through the words of the Apostle Paul (Romans 1:17) the heart of the message proclaimed by Christ. This re-discovery of God's revelation of Himself to man provided Paul with the firm foundation from which the Protestant Reformation was launched.

To a certain extent the Protestant Reformation was a recovery of health for a sick Church; but this recovery was incomplete. Expressions of pathological Christianity persisted; and, in some cases, one set of symptoms simply was exchanged for another. In extreme Puritanism, for example, the ecclesiogenic neurosis was still active. The Reformation held out the promise of spiritual health--a promise that has never been fully realized. Despite obvious limitations, however, deep gratitude is due to the Reformers for the re-emphasis of the Protestant principle, justification by grace through faith. However, there are those today who do not recognize this principle as any sort of a blessing. One such person is the prominent American psychologist O. Hobart Mowrer.

Mowrer's appraisal of the value of the Reformation is much like his negative evaluation of Calvinism. His description of the doctrine of the guilt of man and the grace of God is summed up in one word--"heresy." His

view of the Church's past is critical and his outlook for the future is basically pessimistic with only a few rays of guarded optimism shining through. Mowrer seems to be calling for a return to and an open espousal of salvation by works. In place of what he describes as the "bumbling, indecision and confusion" of Reformation theology he appears to offer the atonement of ". . . the individual's working hard at modifying and improving his everyday conduct." For him, principles transcend persons; and yet at the same time he speaks of the crucialness of the interpersonal dimension.

Mowrer stimulates but still leaves one asking questions that remain unanswered. He seems inclined to deal in generalizations that do not recognize the complexity of the various relationships; and in his zeal he tends to dismiss this or that <u>in toto</u> before extracting truth that often is present although mixed with error. Mowrer's contribution itself is a mixed one, leaving his reader with ambivalent feelings. Whereas Mowrer perceptively identifies much in the way of the incompleteness of the Reformation and the inadequacy of Protestantism, and keenly points to continuing symptoms of pathological Protestantism with its ecclesiogenic neurosis, he is blind to the liabilities and

dangers of much of what he recommends to replace the "bumbling" Reformation theology.

Legalism as a mental state is the breeding ground for moralism and activism--as evidenced in the Pharisaism in Jesus's day, Judaizing in Paul's day, the Roman Church in Luther's day, and extremist Puritanism. Where there is a legalistic approach to Christianity there is a basic insecurity that demands compensation. The compensation very often takes the form of moralism and activism. The attitude of the moralistic personality is summed up in the words of the Pharisee who prayed, "God I thank thee that I am not like other men. . . ." (Luke 18:11 RSV). This is exalted of self through belittlement of others. The moralistic personality is desperately in need of upgrading; so by downgrading others he artificially induces his own elevation. If he has a sense of basic security in God's grace and love there would be no need of self-elevation from false pretences.[2]

Activism as associated with legalism is another expression of self-righteousness. The activist through

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[2]For moralism from another perspective see Alice Meynell's poem "The Newer Vainglory," The Poems of Alice Meynell (complete ed.; London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1923), p. 83. There are, of course, other forms of self-elevation, such as "hero-worship," which are incompatible with the spirit of Christ.

his activism is convinced that he earns his salvation. This is what he rightfully deserves, what God owes him, for his righteousness. He actually usurps the role of God by making himself righteous and refusing to allow God to do it. The activist also is usually an extremely insecure personality, frantically clawing after security and yet never really reaching it because his striving is blocking his way. An analogy is the man caught in quicksand whose desperate and frantic thrashing only hastens his doom; whereas, if he would stop his own efforts long enough he might find salvation from a source outside himself.

The history of the Christian Church testifies to the presence of a gospel that is often deformed by many of those who claim to be following in the steps of Jesus of Nazareth. This deformation of the Christian message is intrinsically neurotic and in turn is the source of neuroses in the lives of many that do not recognize it as such. Healthy Christianity and sick Christianity are too often left undistinguished. The former is forced to witness to the world under the liability of being identified with the latter. Perverted faith, a very poor counterfeit for authentic faith, nevertheless, often passes for it. Fortunately, from time to time there

has been the call to health from sickness, to wholeness from fragmentation, to freedom from neurosis. This call was sounded by Jesus, Paul, Luther and others in most every generation. These have been the real "physicians of the soul." Pathological expressions of false Christianity are persistent, however. Although these expressions often incorporate the triumvirate of legalism, moralism, and activism they also are modified deceptively from generation to generation, expressing subtly or boldly other symptoms of illness such as depersonalization, organizational idolatry, or bibliolatry.

In the middle of this century theological interest has orbitted about the subject of "religionless Christianity." This, basically, is really an attempt to deal with pathological Christianity, although many of those advocating a religionless Christianity do not seem to distinguish healthy faith from unhealthy faith--or even admit the existence of both. The dangers in this type of thinking seem obvious. First of all, how can one ever really arrive at a truly "religionless" Christianity? As desirable as some think it might be, is this not reaching for an impossibility? Can any such attempt culminate in anything more than the exchanging of one form of religious expression for another? And, secondly,

is not this idealistic search actually the result of a faulty initial diagnosis? Jesus, Paul, and Luther did not concentrate on replacing the perversions of their day with a "religionless" faith. They distinguished between that which was true and that which was false, that which was healthy and that which was sick, that which was perversion and deformation and that which was sane and sound. Then, on the basis of that distinction, they emphasized and magnified the true and vigorously attacked and expelled the perverted; or they succeeded in converting the pathological perversion to health and wholeness. To yearn and to seek for "religionless" Christianity is to concede that the "religious" Christianity in our day is not sick but dead. The problem, however, is not expiration but deformation. The answer is not the burial of religion but the curing of the sick. The essential prerequisite for therapy is the recognition of illness. When neurosis is the illness this is the most difficult demand of all.

PART II. THE MODERN PHENOMENON AND THE TOLI.

CHAPTER V

NEUROTIC EXPRESSIONS: THE PHENOMENON

Professor T. F. Torrance of New College, Edinburgh states his conviction that:

> . . . The Church is suffering from a very serious malady: it has become so obsessed with itself and its own consciousness that it is unable to distinguish the objective reality of the Truth and Action of God from its own subjective states. In personal life, of course, this would be a symptom of serious mental disorder and confusion. Can we look upon it in any other light when it concerns the social or religious consciousness or the Church itself? I cannot help but feel that failure to distinguish between objective realities and subjective conditions in modern theology is an alarming sign of irrational and indeed mental disorder in the life and soul of the Church. This . . . indicates that religious man is in desperate need of some kind of deep spiritual psychiatry and therapy.[1]

There are other alarming signs of irrational and mental disturbance in the life and soul of the contemporary Church, signs identified with and in addition to the condition referred to by Professor Torrance. Whereas Part I was concerned primarily with a historical survey

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[1]Thomas F. Torrance, "A New Reformation?", The London Quarterly and Holborn Review, ed. Gordon S. Wakefield, CLXXXIX (London: The Epworth Press, 1964; sixth series, vol. XXXIII), p. 284.

of past expressions of the ecclesiogenic neurosis this chapter and the two which follow will attempt to describe the phenomenon of the modern malady and the toll it is taking on the life and health of twentieth century Protestant man.

There are certain presuppositions with which I begin. The first is that Freud's concept of religion as "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity," and his prophecy "that the abandoning of religion must take place with the fateful inexorability of a process of growth" are basically invalid.[2] Although Freud's contribution to man's understanding of man cannot be overemphasized, and his identification of some religious perversions must be deeply appreciated; the above dogma demands categorical rejection. His antipathy for "obsolete and objectionable expressions" of some forms of Christianity is acceptable; but his rejection of its "fundamental assumptions also" is totally erroneous.[3]

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[2]Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (London: The Hogarth Press Ltd., 1949), pp. 75-76. "While many of Freud's criticisms of religion are valid and should cause us to re-examine the bases of our own religious faith, basically they are a reaction against a particular distortion of the religious culture in which he lived and of his family relationships." Andrew R. Eickhoff, "The Psychodynamics of Freud's Criticism of Religion," Pastoral Psychology, XI (May, 1960), 35.

[3]Ibid., p. 68.

The "new theology," owing much of its origin to Bonhoeffer's phrases "religionless Christianity" and "man come of age," holds many commendable characteristics. However, the "new theologians," quite strong at times on diagnosis, seem to be weak on cure. To claim that modern man has come of age and no longer has need of religion, specifically the Christian religion, is to diagnose incorrectly and to prescribe mistakenly. There is a great deal of difference between becoming "adult" and becoming "mature."[4] Adulthood never guarantees maturity. Contemporary man may be approaching adulthood technically, scientifically, possibly even rationally; but there are few signs of authentic maturation, especially in the spiritual and moral dimensions of life. The immature adult is a common phenomenon. To propose a Christianity without some form, some structure, some religious expression is the height of theological acrobatics.

To say that the Church is suffering from a serious malady or maladies implies that it has the potential of being both healthy and unhealthy. What, then, is today's criterion? Although extremely difficult to

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[4]See Roger Lloyd, The Ferment in the Church (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1964), p. 20.

identify Harry C. Meserve, in describing what he considers a "healthy religious point of view," has given us a good start towards the formulation of an acceptable criterion. Healthy Protestantism should incorporate:

> 1) a world view both bold and reverent;
> 2) a unitive view that holds sacred and secular together;
> 3) a view of human nature that upholds the dignity of the individual;
> 4) an acceptance of variety in faith and custom without intolerance and bigotry;
> 5) a hospitality towards new truth wherever it appears.[5]

Meserve incisively adds that this type of healthy religion emerges not so much through changes in doctrine and organization as through the realization of religion as "intrinsic rather than extrinsic, i. e., . . . it becomes part of man's whole style of life."[6]

Dean Samuel Miller of Harvard Divinity School claims "healthy religion unites existence; an unhealthy one divides it." Unhealthy religion "becomes obsessed with a part in order to avoid the whole." He adds: "The rule of discipline, pushed too far, has eventuated in masochistic flagellation; undue anxiety produces

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[5]Harry C. Meserve, "Healthy and Unhealthy Religion," Journal of Religion and Health, IV (July, 1965), 293.

[6]Ibid., p. 294.

scrupulosity; fear twists God into a devil; pride of orthodoxy produces sadism; paranoid suspicion creates heresy hunters."[7]

The misuse of religion accounts for ecclesiogenic neurosis, and Protestant aberrations have made their contribution. Psychology, also, is often misused in an over-psychologizing of life, for example. It is interesting to note, however, that although attempts have been made for some time to recognize, describe and deal with what I refer to as "ecclesiogenic neurosis," we have yet to even hear the term "psychologenic neurosis."[8] It is to the credit of Christianity that this self-inspection does take place and that attempts are made to heal that which is diseased and to set right that which has gone astray.

The phenomenon that is to be described in the following pages is truly "ecclesiogenic"--that is, having its etiology in the Church itself. It is true that Western culture is not a "picture of health"; but in no

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[7]Samuel H. Miller, "Religion: Healthy and Unhealthy," Journal of Religion and Health, IV (July, 1965), 299-301.

[8]This point was made by Professor Dr. Viktor E. Frankl of Vienna in personal conversation. Its validity is emphasized when such a statement comes not from a theologian but from a psychiatrist.

sense can culture be made a scape-goat for the Church's neurosis. Protestantism has not simply succumbed to cultural infection. It bears the responsibility for its own illness.

This chapter is sub-divided into two sections. The first refers to the "Collective Symptoms" of the modern ecclesiogenic neuroses; the second to the "Personal Symptoms." The distinction is not always readily apparent because of the over-lapping of symptoms in both categories. Meaninglessness as a symptom, for example, is both personal and collective. Most of these symptoms, however, lend themselves to a description as more collectively-oriented or more personally-oriented.

In Part I we have viewed, historically, expressions of the ecclesiogenic neurosis from the days of Jesus' encounter with the Pharisees to Luther's confrontation with the Medieval Church and the subsequent rise of Protestantism. Now let us note the modern phenomenon in Protestantism.

I. THE COLLECTIVE SYMPTOMS

Institutionalism. It is not original to decry the institutionalization of the Church. From Luther to the present day this needed criticism has continued to

take place.[9] Yet institutionalism remains a prominent Protestant aberration, not to mention its notorious role in the history of Roman Catholicism. For this very reason it cannot be ignored.

David L. Edwards speaks of "the Bible's own protests against every tendency to lock God up in an ecclesiastical system." "The present parallel," he continues, "with the corrupt and fundamentally unreal life of the institutional Church on the eve of the Reformation is undeniable."[10] This is but one of the "neurotic deviations" in modern Christianity to which he refers. Paul Tillich has called for Protestantism to appear as "the prophetic spirit" in contrast with "the distortion of humanity and divinity which necessarily is connected with the rise of new systems of authority."[11] A vital distinction between movement and institutionalism is made by H. Richard Niebuhr in such terms as "the kingdom

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[9]Thomas M. Lindsay in A History of the Reformation, Vol. I (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1906), p. 239, says "Luther's speeches at Leipzig [his debate with John Eck] laid the foundation of that modern historical criticism of institutions which has gone so far in our own days."

[10]David L. Edwards, "A New Reformation," The London Quarterly and Holborn Review, op. cit., pp. 261ff.

[11]Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. & ed. James Luther Adams (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1951), pp. 233-34.

of God movement" or "the organic movement of those who have been 'called out' and 'sent'"--terms that he uses to describe what the Church ought to be instead of the petrified institution it much too often is.[12] There is a rhythm of healthy movement and unhealthy institutionalization that is apparent in the history of Protestantism to the present day. The latter appears to be inevitable. The true Church is not an organization, however; but when it assumes predominantly the form of an organization then it is "only a halting place between Christian movements."[13] The characteristic features of the Protestant movement are not inherent in the ecclesiastical institutions of this day. Propheticism is missing and the expression of faith in the sovereignty of God is diluted. In Niebuhr's thought it is in the context of the institutional church that "spiritists" make worship an escape, that "activists" use worship only as an instrument, if at all, and that "sentimentalists" mistake aesthetic or erotic thrills for the love of God. The institution becomes modern Protestant man's prison and workhouse.

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[12]H. Richard Niebuhr, The Kingdom of God in America (Torchbook ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), p. xiv.

[13]Ibid.

Niebuhr continues by describing the ecclesiastical institution's

> lack [of] inner vitality; it is without spontaneity and the power to originate new ideas; it is content with past achievement and more afraid of loss than it is hopeful of new insight or strength; it is on the defensive.[14]

The static character of institutionalized Christianity as contrasted with the dynamism of the early Church or even of the Reformation is only too clear. The defensive attitude of Protestantism is seen in the cultural accommodation of the faith, especially in liberal circles. However, the embracing of radical and authoritarian Fundamentalism very often is another expression of this same defensiveness. Niebuhr's distinction between the "kingdom of God movement" and institutional Protestantism is perceptive and timely.

Edgar P. Dickie recalls the emphasis laid by Karl Barth on the fact that the Church is under judgment:

> Like this world, the Church is under judgment. In it, revelation is turned from the eternal into the temporal. The lightning of Heaven is converted into a domestic slow-combustion stove. Herein is the sin of the Church that it attempts to bring about the kingdom of God through the aesthetic cleverness of its worship. The Church, like religion, is only the way of bringing home to man his fatal sickness.[15]

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[14] Ibid., p. 168.

[15] Edgar P. Dickie, Revelation and Response (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1938), p. 185.

His position resembles Niebuhr's when he says ". . . no institution can embody the whole Christian faith. There will always be a discrepancy between the actual church and the ideal."[16]

No one has explored this discrepancy on a deeper level than Emil Brunner. His distinction between the Ecclesia and the modern Church is consistent and emphatic. He identifies the New Testament Ecclesia as "a body which was certainly not a Church, but a spiritual communion of Persons."[17] "The Church," he maintains, "is a historically evolved form, a vessel of the Ecclesia. . . ."[18] In respect to ecumenicity Brunner states: "To emphasize the need for reunion of the quasi-political church bodies implies an over-valuation of the church as an institution and therefore favours clericalism, the false identification of church and Ecclesia."[19]

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[16]Ibid., p. 123.

[17]Emil Brunner, The Misunderstanding of the Church, trans. Harold Knight (London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), p. 85.

[18]Ibid., p. 117.

[19]Ibid., p. 112. Although admitting the scandal of numerous competing churches Brunner also recognizes the necessity of "a variety of forms of Christian fellowship." The fact that there is diversity of liturgy and other forms by no means precludes unity in Christ. Any obsession with organic union certainly

Brunner's distinction between the Ecclesia and the church holds several important implications. First of all the Ecclesia is recognized as the ideal for which we strive but never fully realize, except in particular instances for limited periods. The institutional church--in reality the organizational means of the Ecclesia--can be, and often is, an actual obstacle between modern man and Jesus Christ. Secondly, Christ's promise of victory and eternal durability was given to the Ecclesia and not to the organizational church; and, therefore, it is entirely possible that the ancient churchly framework might have to be discarded or at least drastically revised in order to proclaim the gospel better and to minister more relevantly to the world. Thirdly, there is need to admit that the change from Ecclesia to institutional church is deformation. Brunner speaks of "this change from a spiritual communion with its utterly personal character into a sacramental collective with its essentially impersonal centre and therefore impersonal structure. . . ."[20] The ideal is totally perverted.

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implies the identification of church and Ecclesia and could lead to the loss of the richness of the Ecclesia. Perhaps the metaphor of the cathedral and side-chapels depicts for us the proper relationship of the various expressions of Christ's Church.

[20] Ibid., p. 77.

This metamorphic deformation has resulted, also, in the living Word of God being deformed into theology and dogma; the Christian fellowship into an institution, and faith into a creed and/or moral code.

It appears, according to Brunner's argument, that claims which are often made by and for the Church can only be made, in reality, by and for the Ecclesia; and that the identification of Church and Ecclesia can lead to catastrophic confusion. The Ecclesia is rooted in the Person of Jesus Christ but the Church is not, necessarily.

This is similar to Augustine's constant dilemma. Augustine loved the Church as the Body of Christ yet criticized it as under judgement. He did not equate the Church with the City of God; although, at times he approaches this equation when he seems to make the Church glow with the greatness of that City. Usually, however, he indicates that the Church falls short of that standard. The Church is the "Communio Sacramentorum" while the "Communio Praedestinatorum" is the human part of the City of God.[21]

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[21]See John H. S. Burleigh, The City of God (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1949), pp. 177-184; and Sir Ernest Barker, "Introduction," The City of God, trans. John Healey (Everyman's Library ed.; London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1945), Vol. I, pp. xxi-xxii.

Brunner's dichotomy of Ecclesia and church renders a valuable service in diagnosing the ever-present malady and pointing towards a possible therapeutic prescription. He would agree, probably, with the sentiments of Tennyson:

> Our little systems have their day;
> They have their day and cease to be:
> They are but broken lights of Thee,
> And Thou, O Lord, art more than they.[22]

Brunner's recognition of the fact that the church itself can create obstacles between man and God leads to the question of so-called "heretical structures."[23] Can there be institutional and organizational church structures that are inherently heretical--structures that do not express God's true relation to man? This seems to be highly probable. If "salvation by organization" has replaced "justification by grace through faith" as modern man's saving vehicle then that which is being witnessed is truly neurosis and heresy--neurosis in the sense of spiritual and emotional perver-

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[22]Alfred Tennyson, "In Memoriam A. H. H.," The Works of Tennyson, ed. Hallam, Lord Tennyson (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1913), p. 247.

[23]See Colin W. Williams, Where in the World? (Office of Publ. and Distribution, Nat. Council of the Churches of Christ in the U. S. A., New York, 1963), pp. 82-83. Also, What in the World?, idem. (London: The Epworth Press, 1965), pp. 90-91.

sion and heresy in the sense of a misrepresentation of God's true relationship to man.[24]

Cyprian's "extra ecclesiam nulla salus" and his view that "he who has not the church as his mother has not God as his Father," as well as the Calvinistic statement in the Westminster Confession of Faith that "there is no ordinary possibility of salvation" out of the visible Church all illustrate the tendency to identify salvation with organization and institution.[25]

Christianity has never been more highly organized than it is today. The Protestant Church, especially in the United States, is the organization church par excellence. A casual look at almost any church calendar will quickly dispel any possible doubts about this.[26]

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[24]Professor James A. Whyte, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews Univ., has made the statement that "salvation by organization is a pet Western failing. The Eastern (Orthodox) Church doesn't think this way. The West developed the papacy. The East never produced this." (Class lecture, Oct. 26, 1964).

[25]See John Macpherson, The Westminster Confession of Faith (Edinburgh: T. &. T. Clark, 1881), pp. 142-43.

[26]One local church known to this writer is illustrative. The church was a surburban church of approximately 500 members on the far edge of a large metropolitan area. It was well organized but not any more than most of her sister congregations and not as much as some. This church was a member of a large Protestant denomination. On the calendar of events of that denomination

The machinery of the local church organization, not to mention inter-church relations, is overwhelming. The words of James Froude nearly one hundred years ago were never more true than they are in respect to modern ecclesiastical structures:

> Search where we will among created things, far as the microscope will allow the eye to pierce, we find organization everywhere. Large forms resolve themselves into parts, but these parts are but organized out of other parts, down so far as we can see into infinity.[27]

In Protestantism today the rung on the "ladder of success" upon which a church rests usually is ascertained, unfortunately, by the efficiency and running condition of the ecclesiastical machinery. This type of success criterion demands hyper-activism. This means that, as Gibson Winter expresses it, "the organization church is a collective rather than a communal form--

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for the year 1964 there were activities scheduled on more than 230 of the 365 days. She was expected to cooperate in some way in the majority of these events. In addition, she was a member of the denominational state organization and was urged to participate in programs and events peculiar to the state organization. The church was also a member of an area group of churches within the state, about 60 in number, which scheduled more than 135 different events in that same year, many of them meetings of at least one week in duration. Finally, of course, this church had, in addition to all of the above, its own particular local program. This example is multiplied ad infinitum.

[27]James Anthony Froude, Calvinism: An Address Delivered at St. Andrews (March 17, 1871), p. 12.

an organization of activists rather than an interpersonal community. . . ."[28]

Luther believed that Tetzel was encouraging the faithful to rest in the false security of their works. Is this not what is being wrought by the compulsive activism in much of modern Protestantism? Brunner expresses his fear that "in her activity the church will depend upon a natural dynamic, upon the impulse and ambition of expansion, and so become a prey to self-reliance and pride."[29] And Gibson Winter states that "it seems reasonable to assume that approximately one-half of the official membership of the churches, possibly as much as two thirds, are religiously tied to an organization rather than personally bound to God or his teachings. . . ."[30] From observation alone this last statement seems unquestionable. It can be argued that church activism, whatever its source, is much more desirable than church lethargy; but there is little qualitative difference. It might be possible to re-direct an errant activism; if not, then lethargy could be the lesser of two evils.

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[28]Gibson Winter, The Suburban Captivity of the Churches (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1961), p.126.

[29]Emil Brunner, The Theology of Crisis (New York, London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 88.

[30]Op. cit., p. 100.

At least a church that is sleeping or dead will not actively create obstacles between God and man, or foster ecclesiogenic neurosis. The dead are not susceptible to sickness.

In addition to the false theological assumption best expressed in the terms "salvation by organization" and "salvation by works," is it not true that there often is conscious or unconscious psychological motivation in the hyper-activity of the churches? The man of today is guilt laden. If he feels no guilt it is not because he is no longer guilty. Rather, it is because repression has taken place. Is it not possible that organizational activities in the churches provide contemporary churchmen with the means of "doing penance" for their unresolved guilt? It well could be that the man or woman who compulsively attends every organizational function of the church, even if it means the neglect of family and great sacrifice of personal time and energy, is dealing superficially with his or her guilt feelings.[31]

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[31]See Winter, op. cit., p. 96. This is not to deny, obviously, that there is constructive activity, and that legitimate needs can be met healthily in corporate and individual endeavors.

In today's mass culture, and mass churches, personal identity is also a serious problem. As the churches become more urban and larger the problem of identity becomes more acute. This is the reason, for example, that in the larger churches adult Bible classes and other sub-divisions of the church often take on characteristics of the whole. They become little churches within the larger church and offer the individual who has been "lost" in the crowd a substitute form of fellowship. Although a certain amount of sub-division and grouping may be necessary and helpful to meet personal needs, it can result in a number of smaller groups carrying on parallel and sometimes competitive functions to the whole. Thus, what was meant to be one whole body and community becomes a splintered fellowship with its members insulated and separated from each other.

As the Protestant churchman searches for identity he often attempts to acquire it through excessive activism and the making of a "name" for himself as the result of his recognized achievements. If he is known for his faithful support of the entire church program, for his generous contributions to the financial support of the church or for the number of "sinners" he has "led to the Lord," then he has successfully achieved an

identity among his fellows and self-esteem. His activism in this sense has helped him to demonstrate his own election and salvation, and at the same time provided him with religious status. This function of activism as a means of acquiring status is not limited to any particular class or type of Protestant congregation. The member of the "blue-collar" sect might actively achieve this type of recognition and identity in the numbers he has "led to the Lord" by explaining to them the "plan of salvation." The more sophisticated "white collar" churchman would achieve the same end by his generous contributions of time and money to the organizational program. Activism is the means in both cases--only the form differs.

As far as the United States is concerned, the Arminian transformation of Calvinism, especially during the frontier days, and the subsequent placing of more and more importance upon man's activity undoubtedly has contributed to the present situation.[32] However, this hyper-activism is not confined now to the western shores of the Atlantic. The Bishop of Woolwich confesses: "As a bishop, I am immersed up to the hilt in the organiza-

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[32]Martin E. Marty, The New Shape of American Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 55.

tion of the Church, and I am made aware how much of it prevents rather than enables the work of the Kingdom."[33] A leading Lutheran theologian states that "Lutheran theology is purportedly anti-Arminian" but then speaks of "its activist dimensions, its success standards. . . ."[34] Brunner testifies to the "radicalism and activism of our modern evolutionary ethics." He observes that the modern Westerner "really believes that, through human activity, the kingdom of God is coming, advancing upon earth. . . ."[35]

The institutionalization of the Church with its organizational and activistic dimensions is a present reality. While many seem to agree that there is serious danger in this condition, few agree as to what is to be done. Some seem to be calling for great changes in theological statement and ecclesiastical structure. Others agree with Harvey Cox that organization is here to stay. What else? "Our task," Cox asserts, "in the age of organization is the recognition and responsible use of power."[36] While the theological debate continues

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[33]John A. T. Robinson, The New Reformation? (London: SCM Press, 1965), p. 96.

[34]Marty, op. cit., p. 57.

[35]The Theology of Crisis, pp. 84-85.

[36]Harvey Cox, The Secular City (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1965), p. 181.

the parish minister and layman feel more and more keenly the affects of this aspect of the ecclesiogenic neurosis.

Introversion. Another collective symptom of the Church's neurosis is its introverted attitude. Winter's charge that the churches are guilty of deserting the central city due to their alignment with the "status panic" is painful. "The tragedy of the organization church," he says, "has been its substitution of survival for ministry."[37] The retreat from an inner-city ministry is but one expression of the neurotic introversion of many of today's Protestant churches. The churches are not identifying themselves with the world--in the proper sense. What is needed is neither cultural accommodation nor radical disengagement. R. Gregor Smith urges the Church "to be able far more thoroughly to identify itself, without reserve, with the studies and work of the world."[38] And John Oman has stated his conviction that:

> The test of a true faith is the extent to which its religion is secular, the extent to which its special religious experiences are tested by the experiences of every day.

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[37] Op. cit., pp. 34 & 37.

[38] R. Gregor Smith, The New Man (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1956), p. 69.

> In the life of Jesus nothing is more conspicuous than His meagre interest in specially sacred doings, and His profound interest in the most ordinary doings of the secular life.[39]

The introverted church is the church suffering from spiritual near-sightedness.[40] Survival rather than ministry has become her preoccupation. This church, though exclusive rather than inclusive, is interested in statistical growth. This, however, is not because of her concern for the welfare of those whom she reaches. On the contrary, her concern is with what they can do for her as she absorbs them. Superficiality, narcissism, and active affability describe her. Oblivious to her own "edifice complex" she refuses to pour out what she has and what she is to a needy and deprived world. Forgetting the lessons of past ages the introverted church of today has lost sight of her own immense possibilities and cannot see past the well-kept and ample lot upon which her buildings stand, and the congenial, homogeneous, conformity of her own peace-loving and con-

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[39]John Oman, Grace and Personality (2d ed. rev.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1919), p. 75.

[40]The term "introversion" was first popularized by Jungian psychology. See C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, trans. H. Godwin Baynes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1923). The term "introverted church" is used by Gibson Winter in The Suburban Captivity of the Churches, pp. 103f.

troversy-shunning "fellowship." Her appeal is only to those who "fit" the accepted image of what a member of this particular church should be. This means that racial, class, economic and educational lines are drawn, if not explicitly then certainly implicitly.

The introverted church is desensitized. The ability to feel deeply with the world and to establish meaningful rapport with those other than the "in-group" has been lost. If this desensitization were observed on the personal level it would surely denote personal neurosis. Does it not as well on the collective level of the church? If the churches are unable to empathize with modern man what hope is there that the contemporary churchman will minister or act as servant or spiritual counsellor on an individual basis? The fate of the introverted church is religious compartmentalization and irrelevance.

Compartmentalized religion is applicable in one area of life but not in another; relevant at times but not all the time. Compartmentalization leads to disintegration. What modern man is, religiously and morally, at home and in suburbia, he does not have to be at work and in the city. The introverted church feeds this spiritual schizophrenia in that her message and ministry

are completely irrelevant to the world. Neither does she challenge her "own" to involvement in meaningful ministry because she is more of a "hotel" or "club" than servant or Ecclesia.[41] It is true that "the Historic Jesus is also the Present Christ, the contemporary of us all."[42] The neurotic church, however, suffering from introversion majors on the past, minors on the future and ignores the present. It seems that in many instances the more irrelevant she is the more popular she is.[43]

The irrelevance of the introverted church is both other-worldly and too much this-worldly. In its

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[41]Almost 100 years ago Alexander B. Bruce, in The Training of the Twelve (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871), described deformed expressions of the churches as resembling "hotels" and "clubs." The "hotel" church was one in which "all kinds of people meet for a short space, sit down together at the same table, then part, neither knowing nor caring anything about each other. . . ."(p.212) The "club" church is composed of those who "care little or nothing for those who are outside the pale of their own communion: They practise brotherly-kindness most exemplarily, but they have no charity . . . they enjoy the comfort of associating with a select number of persons whose opinions, whims, hobbies, and ecclesiastical politics entirely agree with their own. . . ."(p.239) The appropriateness of his observations for the contemporary religious scene is startling.

[42]Dickie, op. cit., p. 152.

[43]See Williams, What in the World?, p. 12.

other-worldly form, with its source usually pietism and Fundamentalism, it attempts to make its members forget the present by pointing to the utopia to come. In this case there is usually a radical cleavage between the church and the world. In H. Richard Niebuhr's thought this is illustrated in the position he identifies as "Christ against Culture."[44] This church is introverted, not in the sense of failing to enlist new people into her organization, (for this she often is quite successful in doing) but in the sense of not speaking to the needs of contemporary man in any meaningful dialogue. Her concern is not with this world but only in preparation for the next.

On the other hand the introverted church which is too much this-worldly (often one of more sophisticated liberal tendencies) expresses its irrelevance by its cultural accommodation. "Culture-Protestantism", or those believing in the "Christ of Culture," holds almost nothing distinctive; and to distinguish it from some charitable secular organization or fraternal fellowship becomes exceedingly difficult.[45] Unless

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[44]H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1952), chap. II.

[45]Ibid., p. 94.

conscious of Him who makes the church distinctive it can only be irrelevant.

Another mark of the introverted church is conformity. This is an ever-present danger in ecumenicity. Just as sure as a multitude of competing, dogmatic churches is a scandal to the good news of the Gospel, so is a self-centered preoccupation with church union, which too often serves as compensation for not being about the task of ministering effectively in and to the world. As long as the basic motivation of ecumenicity is the realization of a foundation of deep unity that must be present among all who confess Jesus Christ as Lord, and the implementation of cooperative ministries, it would appear that the movement is proceeding on the proper path. If, however, this zeal for ecumenicity were to assume far more shallow dimensions and accept as its ultimate goal the simple conformity of the different churches in some super ecclesiastical organization, then such self-centered introversion borders on neurotic sickness. On the denominational or local church level, the group that insists on a rigid conformity to the extent that all individuality and creativity is stifled needs to concern itself more with the task of a meaningful ministry which not only allows but encourages a

variety of approaches. We would do well to remember the different ways Jesus met the needs of the persons with whom he dealt.

Institutionalism, especially in its organizational and activistic expressions, and church introversion accompanied by irrelevance, compartmentalization and conformity are all collective symptoms of the modern ecclesiogenic neurosis. Now in our description of this phenomenon let us turn to the more personal symptoms.

II. THE PERSONAL SYMPTOMS

The symptoms discussed below lend themselves more readily to being described as "personal" rather than "collective." It is not forgotten, however, that the personal is only understood in relationship to that which is also personal--in this sense, then, it becomes communal or collective.

The Drive to Succeed. Western culture has never been more success conscious and neither have the Protestant churches. The drive to succeed can be witnessed on every level of church life. It is true that there continue to be large numbers of apathetic, careless,

uncommitted Christians whose relationship to their churches usually can be measured only by the fact that their names are on church rolls--if only inactive rolls. But, at the same time, there are probably more people today actively striving to be "successful Christians," in some sense, than ever before. In the United States the percentage of church affiliated people has never been higher, and is growing more rapidly than the population. Despite the fact that the Church of England has declined statistically in recent years there exists at the present time a general interest in religion in England and beyond that has not been enjoyed for some years.[46]

The clerical drive to succeed is pronounced at Monday morning ministerial meetings where the stock question is "Have a good day yesterday?". The response, expected to be glowing and impressive, usually is! It is witnessed in the church bulletin or newsletter that lists an item often described as "Spiritual Statistics"

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[46]The Bishop of Woolwich, John A. T. Robinson (The New Reformation?, p. 101, n. 2), notes that: "In the eight years between 1956 and 1962 the baptism figures for the Church of England fell by nearly 12% and for the London area by over 20%." It is also true, however, that more than 750,000 copies of the Bishop's little book, Honest to God, have been sold testifying to an extremely wide public appeal.

which is usually composed of attendance figures, amount of financial income, and number of new members, if any; also, comparative statistics from the same date the previous year, which always seem to be inferior. It is observed on the church page of many local newspapers where the virtue of Christian humility is conspicuous in its absence. It is seen in many denominational publications where much too often the emphasis seems to be upon the number of invitations a certain minister has had to speak at home or abroad with all the visible signs of a successful hearing. The amount that has been expended in redecorating a sanctuary or church hall, or in purchasing a new organ; and the great successes of the latest bazaars, church suppers or financial drives, all described in terms far out of proportion to their basic significance, testify to the obsession with gaining the aura of success.

In the pulpit the drive to succeed does not go unnoticed. It is visible as the preacher berates and verbally flogs the handful of the faithful who do attend the evening worship services on behalf of the many who do not. It is witnessed in the pathetic attempts at self-aggrandizement that proceed from those preachers, threatened by the immensity of their task, who are over-

come with a sense of inadequacy and psychical emasculation. It is never more apparent than when the radical revivalist attempts to manipulate those who attend his preaching. Through threat and promise, tear and shout, and almost any other psychological gimmick he drives toward his goal of recording "decisions" so that the numerical success of the services he conducts cannot be questioned. It is appropriate here to note Dickie's observation that "it is possible for the preacher to come between the convert and God. There may be times when a man's soul is best left alone--with God."[47]

The following sentences of Karl Menninger illustrate the centrality of the success obsession in the thinking of many a man who occupies the pulpit:

> Another minister, this time an Episcopalian, made an enormous success of a large parish on the west coast. Suddenly he "broke down". . . . In his case he was motivated in his religious zeal not so much by a sense of guilt as by an overwhelming ambition to be the best preacher in the world, with the largest congregation and the most effective parish work. He was an exceedingly popular man and at the same time one who did not sacrifice principle in order to achieve popularity; on the other hand, he was very opinionated and aggressive. It was difficult for him to see that building the largest church in his city was not necessarily any evidence of emulating in the most effective way the principles and example of Jesus Christ.[48]

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[47] Op. cit., p. 212.

[48] Karl A. Menninger, The Human Mind (3d ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), p. 471.

The drive to succeed is not absent in the pew. It is witnessed when the business man attempts to transplant questionable business practices into the realm of church life in order to assure the success of the church budget subscription. It is never more apparent than when laymen refuse to accept the challenge of a greater missionary outreach because "the money is needed at home" in order to provide the architectural embellishments that will attract "the kind of new members our church needs." I have already referred to the status-seeking motivation that is often behind much of the compulsive activism found within modern Protestant churches. The drive to succeed is certainly one of the realities of our day.

This obsession with success has resulted in that which Martin Marty refers to as the "packaging" of God in order "to make Him more marketable."[49] The little "packaged deity" assures religious success in that he is understandable and manageable, comforting, and a jolly good fellow.[50] This tremendously enhances his popular appeal and makes success much more likely to be realized by the marketeers of this "packaged deity."

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[49] Op. cit., p. 18. [50] Ibid., pp. 37f.

Marty confirms our suspicions that this neurosis can only be ecclesiogenic when he states:

> This movement towards a packaging of deity is not to be credited to, or blamed on, the environment alone; nor on the "secularists," whom Christians too often make scapegoats and whipping boys. Protestantism itself, in its transformations and acquiescences, helped bring about the change.[51]

The drive to succeed at any price rears its head in a watered-down gospel and in discipleship rarely taken seriously. Dietrich Bonhoeffer has attempted to call the Church back to a realistic recognition of the true cost of Christian discipleship, as have many others.[52] However, neurotic behaviour spawned and fed by the churches themselves is difficult to reverse; and the dubious authenticity of the recent "revival of religion," especially in the United States, remains.

Depersonalization. The depersonalization of modern man is an ecclesiastical as well as cultural phenomenon. This symptom of the ecclesiogenic neurosis is counter to the ethos of the Christian faith in every respect. It is the heart of the Gospel witness that God chose to become man in the Person of Jesus Christ

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[51] Ibid., p. 42.

[52] See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, trans. R. H. Fuller (London: SCM Press, 1959).

and in this Person the Faith is rooted and grounded--not in tradition or ecclesiastical infallibility or even in an inerrant scripture. The life of Jesus was characterized by the personal. His over-riding concern was not the Law but those who either affected the Law or were affected by it; not the traditions of the rabbis but the rabbis themselves; not the sins that were committed but the sinners that committed them. Christianity is inherently personal and inter-personal. When those who claim the name of Christ experience depersonalization in their relationships with man and God, then their religion is in a state contrary to its basic nature. Neurosis and disintegration follow.

If real community and the truly personal is to be found anywhere it should be expected within the churches.[53] But, in reality, is this a fact? Brunner does not think so. "It cannot be said that it is a pure communion of persons. Much rather is it of the essence of this entity, the Church, that it is not only

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[53] I do not mean to imply omission of the vertical relationship. As Prof. Dickie states, in speaking of some writing of John Macmurray: "He presents religion as simply community, mutuality of relations between persons. But this is precisely not religion if the Godward reference is omitted." (Op. cit., p. 86.)

'church' but a thing, an institution."[54] The drive to succeed as well as the importance of the personal is noted in the words of R. Gregor Smith when he says:

> Christian movements should be measured not by their success in collecting scalps--I have never heard that the Church should be a kind of scalp-hunter--but by their relation to the total historical possibilities of Christianity in meeting other people in the place where they are, in all their ambiguity, with an absolute demand for wholeness and love.[55]

Smith, in apparent concert with Brunner, believes that it is the "I-It" relationship which is dominating every sphere of our culture--including the churches. The phenomenon most often observed in our churches is either that of massification and collectivism or individualism and isolation, rather than a true "I-Thou" relation. Why is the troubled parishioner, for example, probably more apt to take his personal problem to the secular marriage counsellor or the psychotherapist rather than the minister?[56] Marty, again warning against

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[54] The Misunderstanding of the Church, p. 15.

[55] Op. cit., p. 85.

[56] Gibson Winter remarks that "the needs for personal help and counselling now tax whole staffs of clergy beyond their limits." (The Suburban Captivity of the Churches, p. 135.) Although undoubtedly true in isolated instances this statement is generally misleading. Contrary to what Winter implies there is considerable evidence that the role of the pastor as a counsellor is

the temptation the churches face of making the secularists scape-goats, confesses that the "churches themselves are guilty of contributing to the depersonalization of man, offering illusory redemption, engaging in directionless or self-directed moralism."[57]

Brunner, Smith, Marty and others are not mistaken in their recognition of the churches' contribution to depersonalization. The ecclesiastical machinery, institutionalism, the emphasis on conformity, the obsession with statistics all help to mould the depersonalized contemporary churchman. Institutional ends and personal goals often clash. When this takes place the personal is usually sacrificed on the altar of institutionalism. The preservation and the growth of the institutional supersedes the claims of the personal. In an obvious

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realized less than almost any other role of the pastor. In research sponsored by the Minister's Life and Casualty Union of Minneapolis, Minn., U. S. A., a scientific sampling of 4000 Protestant ministers distributed throughout the U. S. was taken. This study demonstrated that about one-fifth of the group felt counselling was demanded of them too little. This is especially interesting in a realm that is usually permeated with overdemands. The ministers seemed to express some unhappiness that their church membership did not recognize their ability to perform this function. (Practical Problems of Ministers Today, Minneapolis, Minnesota: Minister's Life and Casualty Union, 1958, 12 pp.). Carl Jung, Viktor Frankl, Paul Tournier and other psychotherapists and theologians seem to concur.

57Op. cit., p. 63.

but pathetic attempt to recreate true Christian fellowship and to fill the vacuum caused by the loss of community many churches have produced a type of secular "togetherness" in various forms and given it a Christian label. The fact that a men's group is called a "Christian Brotherhood" does not necessarily mean that it really is a brotherhood or Christian. Neither is there any assurance that a "Church" bazaar is any different from any other bazaar simply because it is designated as a "Church" bazaar. Ice cream parties, church night suppers, and church-sponsored bridge parties are poor substitutes for the New Testament koinonia. Yet, they are attempts--although sterile ones--to cope with the problem of depersonalization. Elton Trueblood states that "real fellowship is so rare and so precious that it is like dynamite in any human situation."[58] It is too often true that today's churches are introverted collectives rather than extroverted communities.

The compartmentalization of life and religion, and the rapid transformation of our society from agricultural to industrial and from rural to urban adds to the depersonalization. The mobility that characterizes

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[58]Elton Trueblood, The Predicament of Modern Man (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 101.

this age--in one large Protestant denomination the average pastoral tenure has been estimated to be only two and one-half years--and the use of the mass media techniques by the churches, as well as their capitulation to the subtle and high pressure Madison Avenue type of financial program all but completes this depersonalization.

Despite the employment of the most modern techniques of communication by many of the churches, real communication between person and person, pulpit and pew, church and church, and church and world is woefully lacking. Speaking of theology Winter has said: "The theological world is caught in the deepest kind of crisis and difficulty specifically in hermeneutics --a crisis which has thus far been largely concealed from the laity through silence in the churches and preoccupation with organizational activities." He concludes: "The breakdown of communication between theology and the contemporary world is almost total. . . ."[59]

The modern minister is plagued with the problem of interpersonal communication to an extent that has

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[59]Gibson Winter, "Education for the Ministry," On the Battle Lines, ed. Malcom Boyd (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1964), pp. 164-165.

not been known in the past. The loss of symbolism as a potent means of communicating spiritual truth, and Protestantism's corresponding elevation of verbalization to the point of attempting to do what only the symbolic can do, are extremely important in understanding this breakdown of communication and its resulting contribution to depersonalization. There is yet another factor--the minister's self-image. Although we will discuss this at some length in a following chapter it is extremely pertinent at this point in our discussion.

The Protestant minister has certainly been taught to think of himself as a "proclaimer," as a minister not only of the Word but of words. The layman has accepted and confirmed this master role for the minister.[60] The minister has so identified himself with this role that he has the dangerous difficulty of separating his real self from the role. He too often accepts the delusion of omniscience and speaks authoritatively in realms where he has neither authority nor comprehension. Through his preoccupation with speaking the modern

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[60]An example of this can be seen in the fact that a minister rarely attends a layman's meeting--especially, but not only, a church meeting--in which he is not called upon to "have a word to say." He might be totally uninformed as to the immediate business or subject that is before the group, but still he is expected to "speak a word."

Protestant minister has sadly neglected the art of listening--to the utter ruin of true interpersonal communication. In order to speak meaningfully one must know how to listen. The impossibility of responding relevantly without first listening is obvious. Tillich, speaking of love, says: "It is its first task to listen."[61] Even love that is scoffed at as "selfishness for two" is significant because it is for two! God forbid that we should be so loveless to be insensitive to the ministry of listening. The present neglect of this ministry has contributed heavily to the process of depersonalization.

Despite the fact that theologians such as Harvey Cox do not accept depersonalization as something entirely negative I see absolutely nothing positive about it.[62] Depersonalization to any extent is a deformation of the "I-Thou" relation and a present symptom of the ecclesiogenic neurosis.

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[61]Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954), p. 84.

[62]Op. cit., pp. 41ff. Harvey Cox suggests that present day anonymity has positive aspects. He also recommends adding an "I-you" category to Buber's dichotomy of "I-Thou" and "I-It". Buber's dichotomy instead of Cox's trichotomy seems more accurate and quite sufficient.

Meaninglessness. Another symptom, and in a sense a result of depersonalization, is the phenomenon of meaninglessness. John Oman has sagely advised:

> Only by finding a blessed and endless purpose in this life, can we have a triumphant hope larger than this life can contain.
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> . . . . . .
>
> We should not be reconciled to God because we believe in another life, but we should believe in another life because, being reconciled to God, we find a meaning in life which is ever expanding and a purpose death cannot end.[62]

Buber is convinced that "meeting with God does not come to man in order that he may concern himself with God, but in order that he may confirm that there is meaning in the world."[63] Without purpose there can be no triumphant hope. Without meaning there is nothing but the empty void. It is in man's meeting with God and his fellow man in the "I-Thou" relation that meaning is actualized. The testimony of observers today, Tillich and other theologians, and Frankl and other psychotherapists point time and again to the meaninglessness in the life of modern man--secular as well as churchman.

The frustration of meaninglessness is seen in the already discerned frantic activism of the organiza-

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[62] Op. cit., pp. 289-290.

[63] Martin Buber, I and Thou (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937), p. 115.

tional church. The search for self-identity and meaning are also closely akin. Winter comments: "However trivial middle-class religious life may seem, the fundamental thrust is a desperate search for meaning, fulness, purpose, true identity, and freedom from conformist enslavement."[64] This neurotic symptom is not confined to any particular race, class or geographical location. It is to be found not only among deprived Negroes but also among privileged whites; not just in the blighted inner city but also in blossoming suburbia. Meaninglessness results for some when they are frustrated for one reason or another in their attempt to stay on the activist treadmill. For others it takes place in the very midst of their frantic attempts to do something in life that will provide meaning.

The frustration of meaninglessness is seen in the confused attempt of the Protestant minister to identify his master role in the modern church and world. What is he to be--preacher, teacher, counsellor, administrator, promoter, financier, public relations man, civil

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[64] The Suburban Captivity of the Churches, p. 79. For psychotherapeutic points of view in respect to meaninglessness see Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., rev. ed., 1965). Also, Carl G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. Dell & Baynes (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., A Harvest Book, 1933).

rights leader, or one of the myriad of other roles into which he is cast? If he attempts to assume all he arrives at meaninglessness via the road of frustration in not being able to perform with any degree of efficiency in any role. If he assumes one or two roles and rejects the others he is led to meaninglessness via the path of ecclesiastical pressure to conform--and the expectations of his congregation. If he rejects all of the traditional roles he experiences meaninglessness ultimately as he succumbs to the neurotic pressures of isolation. He seems to gravitate towards this symptom regardless of his approach to the problem.

Marty provides us with illustrative material for the point under discussion. In speaking of "the tragedy of racial tension in the South" of the United States he says, "[this] has provided many clergymen with a new opportunity to witness to the offense and healing of the Christian Good News."[65] The implication of Marty's statement, whether intentional or not, is that many clergymen were in need of "a new opportunity to witness." If this is so, why is it so? Are we to believe that the clergymen from the North that actively participate

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[65] Op. cit., p. 116.

in the Civil Rights marches and demonstrations in the South are deprived of valid opportunities to witness in the North? In spite of desegregation in the North to some degree for many years, no authentic integration has taken place there, either. The Negro and other racial minorities in the ghettos of New York, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia and other cities testify to this and cry out for a critically needed ministry. What, then, is the explanation for the feverish involvement of many northern clergymen in the Civil Rights movements in the South? Without questioning the validity of such movements, nor the wholesomeness of a ministry that is directed toward the realization of the equality of man and the elimination of racial prejudice, the examination of personal motivation proves interesting and pertinent. Could it be that many persons victimized by meaninglessness in their own environment because of inability to grapple successfully with their personal role problems and the even more frustratingly complex social problems of their own areas, have grasped hold of the Civil Rights movement in the South as a means towards realizing some degree of personal meaning and identity? For the clergymen, has it also been a mode of personal compensation for not experiencing a more numerically successful ministry

such as has been experienced by many churches in the southern "Bible Belt"? Meaninglessness and motivation, both conscious and unconscious, are not unrelated.

Grant A. Morrill, speaking of suburbanites who get healthily involved in the life of the Church (but certainly it is applicable to clergymen as well) has said:

> As they discover their ministry, the life of grace that is theirs, they begin to discover themselves on ever deeper levels. They find that he who loses his life in ministry finds it; that he who offers himself in Christ's name, finds himself accepted of Him and empowered of Him to begin to be a whole person.[66]

Morrill in two sentences has touched upon four subjects of critical importance. They are (1) the concept of ministry, (2) the concept of grace, (3) the concept of the deeper self and (4) the concept of the whole person. Each of these is dealt with in the context of this study.

Let us, however, make one additional observation in respect to meaninglessness. One of the criticisms leveled at psychoanalysis specifically, and depth psychology in general, is that it can degenerate into a morbid, introverted, self-centeredness. This is a true danger. However, at the other end of the spectrum is

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[66]Grant A. Morrill, "Suburbia--Conformity or Creative Ministry," On the Battle Lines, op. cit., p. 79.

the equally dangerous possibility that man, and in this case modern Protestant man--both layman and minister--will live a life of complex interpersonal relationships without any type of healthy personal introspection. Not to question from time to time on a deeper level one's own motivations, not to probe occasionally one's apparently inexplicable personal feelings, not to attempt to understand one's follow-man in a dimension of depth, is to run the risk of failing to discover meaning that is there to be discovered. For a Christian to run such an unnecessary risk in the age of meaninglessness raises the question of irresponsible stewardship of life.

Moralistic legalism. The presence of moralistic and legalistic currents in Protestant thought and life did not cease with Puritanism nor with the Victorian epoch. Freud, writing in 1928, said that "religion consists of certain dogmas, assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality, which tell one something that one has not oneself discovered and which claim that one should give them credence."[67] Although Freud's overall view of religion is unbalanced, that which he describes above is truly existent in the

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[67]*Op. cit.*, p. 43.

sixties as well as the twenties--a type of moralistic and legalistic perversion.

In the context of this age, characterized by man's search for meaning, Professor Dickie warns of dangers:

> . . . Even as the direct search for happiness defeats itself, so the quest of goodness, for its own sake and for nothing more, results, not in real goodness at all, but in Pharisaism. . . . In seeking to be orthodox, to believe aright, to be invulnerable in faith, we may lose the real faith. . . .[68]

This warning is apropos to modern Protestant man, who in the midst of his drive to succeed and search for meaning, is especially vulnerable to the subtle danger of slipping into the slough of moralistic legalism.

Brunner, as he draws a sharp distinction between the Ecclesia and the churches, submits that the institutional character of the churches is most evident in their legalistic natures:

> The truth is that in proportion as the Christian body ceases to be a spiritual unity, a Koinonia in the primitive sense, the fine suppleness proper to a spiritual structure must give place to the coarser character of an organizational legalistic structure.[69]

Bonhoeffer, who is probably as relevant to the present theological scene as any of today's theologians

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[68]Edgar P. Dickie, God is Light (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1953), p. 8.

[69]The Misunderstanding of the Church, pp. 91 and 107.

writes, appropriately: "The real trouble is that the pure word of Jesus has been overlaid with so much human ballast--burdensome rules and regulations, false hopes and consolations--that it has become extremely difficult to make a genuine decision for Christ."[70] Martin Marty states that "involvement in the busy-busy activities of the parish life becomes the measure of the ethical, and an inverted moralism results. In all this the moralistic message of many a pulpit is of no help."[71] And Elton Trueblood speaks of our "cut-flower civilization," suffering from a severance from "sustaining roots," which is the hallmark of moralistic religion. He adds that "moralizing cannot stand against a burning faith, even when that faith is an evil and perverted one."[72]

One of the greatest weaknesses of the churches is not merely that they include many individuals who have not really experienced the divine encounter, but that they fail to include many who have. These are individuals who refuse to identify themselves with such moralistic-legalistic religious organizations, and express their faith in basically negative and invalid ways.

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[70] Op. cit., p. 29. [71] Op. cit., p. 152.

[72] Op. cit., pp. 59-60, and 64.

Tillich charges that the gospel has been "transformed into a multiplicity of laws, partly doctrinal and partly ethical," and that the "message of grace has largely been lost. . . ." He makes it relevantly personal when he says: "Grace as the power of accepting the person who is unacceptable, and of healing the person who is mortally sick has disappeared behind the preaching of the religious and moral law."[73] This "graceless moralism" thwarts the realization of personhood in the sense that it has the wrong concept about the essence of morality. The actual "moral imperative" is to be a "person," and not to act in obedience to an external law. An "antimoral act is not the transgression of one or several precisely circumscribed commands, but an act that contradicts the self-realization of the person as a person and drives toward disintegration."[74]

The ecclesiogenic nature of moralistic legalism has been identified by Principal Oman who claims that the Church is often "inveighed into the service of organized compulsion and becomes the most eager and success-

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[73]Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond, "Religious Perspectives," Vol. IX, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 13-14.

[74]Ibid., p. 20.

ful advocate of mental pupilage and moral subjection."[75] He refers to "organizations of persons who, through special operations of omnipotence, have a special relation to God, the possession of which by newcomers must be investigated."[76] The acidity of these words testifies to concern for the prostituted spirit of grace. Preoccupation with merit, the resulting moralism, and the hollow striving of consciously pious persons, amplify the ecclesiogenic nature of the modern problem.

"I believe that it is an aberration of faith as well as of reason to absolutize the finite, . . ." states H. Richard Niebuhr.[77] The absolutizing of the finite is that which takes place in the moralistic-legalistic perversion. In this deformation the symptoms and results of sin are emphasized, while the root of the problem often is ignored. This was observed, for the most part, in that which Niebuhr refers to as the "Christ against Culture" position. Augustine, Tertullian, Tolstoy, and, on the American scene, various perverters of Jonathan Edward's conversionism into shabby revivalism and Pelagian theurgisms, are all historical

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[75] Op. cit., p. 175. [76] Ibid., p. 165.

[77] Christ and Culture, p. 14.

illustrations of this symptom of the ecclesiogenic neurosis.[78] The refusal to recognize relativity, the compulsion to dogmatize, and the confounding of finite statements with the infinite Christ characterize moralistic legalism.

The Fundamentalists and right-wing radicals who occupy the "Christ against Culture" position are not, however, the only legalists in the Christian camp. The "Christ of Culture" advocates, those of the more liberal persuasion, also "incline to the side of law in dealing with the polarity of law and grace." They seem to think that "by obedience to the laws of God and of reason, speculative and practical, . . . they are able to achieve the high destiny of knowers of the Truth and citizens of the Kingdom."[79]

The moralistic-legalistic symptom also is witnessed in fatalism, biblicism, degenerate revivalism, religiosity and other-worldliness. In many instances

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[78]Ibid., pp. 219-220, 64-65, & 76. In respect to Augustine, Niebuhr says: "He often tends to substitute the Christian religion--a cultural achievement--for Christ. . . . Hence also, faith in Augustine tends to be reduced to obedient assent to the Church's teachings, which is doubtless very important in Christian culture but nevertheless is no substitute for immediate confidence in God." (p. 217) Cf. supra p. 185.

[79]Ibid., p. 121.

this is a reaction to the threat of a liberalism which seems to advocate that "a God without wrath brought man without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross."[80] On deeper reflection, however, it becomes evident that, just as healthy evangelicalism and healthy liberalism hold much in common, the unhealthy expressions of both lines of thought have similarities that cannot be denied. Moralistic legalism is not the sole possession of any one theological position or religious group or denomination.

Almost invariably there is present in the moralistic and legalistic environment a Pharisaism blind to its own sin. In fact, it has become, as Monica Furlong phrases it,

> . . . customary for the Church and for Christians to fire away in a hit and miss manner at contemporary morals and attitudes, repeatedly ignoring the way Christians have abrogated their responsibility and by their lack of charity, knowledge, culture and compassion have hastened the disintegration of society.[81]

Arrogance and smugness are attitudes which cultivate the soil from which this perversion springs.

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[80]H. Richard Niebuhr, The Kingdom of God in America, p. 193.

[81]Monica Furlong, With Love to the Church (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965), p. 20.

The realm of sex is especially prone to the moralistic-legalistic deformation. The following is illustrative. On one occasion a pastor was invited to present a paper on the topic "A Christian Interpretation of Sex" to a ministers' conference. The paper was well received and the group unanimously urged that it be printed in the state denominational paper. The editor, after some weeks of delay, replied to the request stating that although the paper was "well done" he and his board felt it should not be printed because it was concerned with a topic that they felt "should be left alone." "The less said about sex the better," was his answer. Not only does this speak of moralism but it testifies pointedly to obscurantist irrelevance.

The attitude of the churches to the homosexual is also illustrative. Historically the morality of the churches in this relation has been characterized by an attitude of vehement condemnation. They have viewed the homosexual as one to be feared, ostracized, legislated against and castigated.[82] For the most part

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[82]According to Dr. Jolande Jacobi of the C. G. Jung Institute, Zürich, there are six nations in the world where laws against homosexuality exist. All but one of these nations are Western and the majority of them are Protestant. These countries are Great Britain, the U. S., Germany, Ireland, Hungary and the Soviet

there is general ignorance on the part of the churches in respect to the nature of the problem; and the moralistic attitude, instead of bringing redemptive hope to those suffering with this perversion, contributes more to the personal disintegration and isolation of the individual than any other one source.

"It may be true, as Jung and others have noticed, that religion is a specific against neurosis, but it is by no means an infallible specific, and it can breed neuroses of its own."[83]

Union. Dr. Jacobi states in this connection: "To a large extent society has taken over the morals of the churches." (Lecture, May 14, 1965, at the Jung Institute.)

[83]Furlong, op. cit., p. 62.

CHAPTER VI

THE WHOLE PERSON: THE TOLL

John G. McKenzie, although convinced that "the wrong type of religion can be a breeding place for neurosis," has said: "A neurosis means that the personality is divided against itself. Religion unifies. . . ."[1] The subject of the division and unity of personality and its relationship to religion is the concern of this chapter. If "the typical sickness of our epoch is neurosis"[2] and, if the proposition that many neuroses are ecclesiogenic is to be understood properly, then a serious attempt must be made to understand man in his wholeness.

The concept of the whole person has received growing attention in the last three decades despite the fact that this is the age of mechanization, technology and specialization. The present renewal of concern in

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[1]John G. McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Religion (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1951), p. 166.

[2]Paul Tournier, The Whole Person in a Broken World, trans. John and Helen Doberstein (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 11.

wholeness is sorely needed because of contemporary man's depersonalization, compartmentalization and fragmentation. The toll of the ecclesiogenic neuroses is felt by the whole person. His suffering is not limited to the physical, spiritual, or psychical--alone or individually. It is total and inter-related.

"If I were a minister," comments Karl Menninger, "I would study with the psychiatrist some of these instances in which religion has seemed to do harm rather than good for the individual; I should study them without prejudice and without fear."[3] In this spirit let us attempt to understand the whole person who often experiences brokenness and disintegration in his encounter with the ecclesiogenic neuroses.

I. THE CONCEPT OF THE WHOLE PERSON

The concept of man's wholeness is not new. It can be traced to the Hebrew view of man in the Old Testament, beginning with the Creation accounts in which man is central. He is aware of his dependence upon his Creator and, yet, is conscious of his worth and the dignity of human personality. The constitution of this

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[3]Karl A. Menninger, The Human Mind (3d ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), p. 466.

creaturely, yet valuable, personality.

> . . . is essentially that of a body animated by a breath-soul (Gen. ii.7). . . . Man is made in the image of God (Gen. i.26; cf. v.3), i.e. he has a physical form like that of God, however different be his substance ("flesh" and not "spirit," Isa. xxxi.3; cf. Jer. xvii.5). This physical form, however, is not set in contrast with psychical attributes (as by ourselves); the whole animated body, whether bones and flesh, or the peripheral and central organs, have psychical and therefore moral qualities, by a sort of diffused consciousness.[4]

Hebrew man did not visualize a disintegration of his wholeness even after death. Sheol was the habitat, not of souls or spirits, but of the ghostly replicas of whole men. Their inability to conceive of real life divorced from a body of flesh and blood led the Hebrews to the formulation of a doctrine of bodily resurrection as early as Old Testament times. This is evident in Isaiah 24-27 and in Daniel 12.[5]

In the Old Testament, man is thought of as a psycho-physical organism that is related as a whole to God and other men. He is an animated body, not an incarnated soul. There are many parts forming this whole-

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[4]H. Wheeler Robinson, "The Characteristic Doctrines," Record and Revelation, ed. H. Wheeler Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 331.

[5]Ibid., p. 333.

ness, but the organism is a unity or totality.[6] These various parts of man do not contrast. Instead, they are different aspects of one vital personality.

> The Hebrew regarded the soul as almost physical and the physical parts as having psychical functions, so that, whatever activity a man was engaged in, the predominant aspect, be it soul, heart, face or hand, represented the whole person and included the other aspects.[7]

In Hebrew psychology the presupposition of man's wholeness meant that distinctions were not explicitly made between emotional, spiritual, mental or physical. Whatever the thought, word, or deed the whole man was involved. Job, for example, illustrated the suffering of body and soul together. "But his flesh upon him shall have pain, and his soul within him shall mourn." (Job 14:22)

The Hebrew concept of the whole person was not shared, however, by the Greeks. There seem to be two major strands in the pre-Platonic Greek view of man. The first, that of Homer, appears to glorify the living man while showing little interest in the soul. The second is that of Orphism, which taught that the soul,

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[6]N. W. Porteous, "Man, Nature of, in the O. T.," The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, ed. George A. Buttrick, III (1962), 242-243.

[7]W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1956), p. 85.

a divine creation, was encumbered with and imprisoned in the body. This thinking, quite naturally, led to a glorification of the soul and a depreciation of the body which had a tendency to soil and sully the soul.

Plato, influenced by Orphic theology, promulgated a view of man as a soul-body duality. He believed in the immortality of the soul which was religious, ethical, and intellectual. The "mind," in Plato's thought, was but one aspect of the soul--which was tripartite.

> . . . That with which the soul reasons, we shall call the rational part; the second, that with which it loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and flutters round the other desires, we shall call the irrational and desiring part. . . . Is there likewise in the soul also this third element of spiritedness? . . .[8]

Plato's dualism of body and soul is particularly evident in the Phaedo, and the familiar σῶμα—σῆμα theme runs throughout. The body was a lower form of creation identified with the realm of visible things. The soul was identified with the realm of ideas. The union of the body and the soul is really the imprisonment of the latter by the former.[9] Although Socrates,

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[8]The Republic of Plato, trans. A. D. Lindsay (London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1907), pp. 146-48. (Bk. IV, 439-41)

[9]Some scholars, however, argue that Plato was not a dualist. See, e.g., John Wild, Plato's Theory of Man (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1946), p. 141.

Hippocrates, Paracelsus, Aristotle, and even Plato himself refer at times to a concern for wholeness, it remains true that Greek thought was basically responsible for the dichotomy of body and soul--a dichotomy that has strongly influenced Christian thought down through the centuries.

Contrary to the popular view, the Christian concept of man, when properly understood, has been much more Hebrew than Greek. Jesus seems to have assumed the traditional Jewish view that man is a unity, despite the fact that his teaching at times implies that the "soul" belongs to a higher order than the body.[10] His three-fold ministry presents the strongest testimony to his concept of man as a whole person. In the gospels the ministry of Jesus to man takes the forms of preaching, teaching, and healing. And throughout the New Testament records He is identified time and again as the Preacher, Teacher, and Healer. If man in his whole-

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[10] In Matt. 10:28 and Luke 12:4, we note statements that can be interpreted as pointing to a Greek-influenced view of the nature of man held by Jesus. Taken as a whole, however, the weight of N. T. evidence indicates that Jesus' view is essentially that of the O. T. S. V. McCasland concurs: ". . . On the whole, his [Jesus'] views are essentially those of the Old Testament." ("Man, Nature of, In the N. T.," The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, op. cit., p. 246.)

ness expresses himself in mind, body, and spirit, then the ministry of Jesus, as a whole ministry to the whole man, comes more clearly into focus. His associations of healing and forgiveness, sickness and sin, indicate his concern for the whole person and not any one expression.

Paul, a "depth psychologist" in his own right, maintained a view of man that stressed his wholeness.[11] His psychology was basically synthetic, as the Hebrew, and not dichotomous, as the Greek. Stacey, in his emphasis of the Apostle's concept of man as a whole person, goes as far as to state that "every word in Paul refers to the whole man."[12] In respect to the nature of man he places Paul firmly in the Hebrew tradition.

Emil Brunner distinguishes the Greek and Christian views of the nature of man in his worthy Christian anthropology, Man in Revolt:

> The soul which after death ascends up to heaven, that is, after its severance from the body, is that Platonic element which has penetrated most deeply

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[11]S. V. McCasland says Paul "succeeded in penetrating deep recesses of personality. Picturesquely, but also profoundly, and quite unintentionally, he was the first great introspective psychologist. The school of depth psychology has been powerfully influenced by his insights." (Op. cit., p. 248).

[12]Op. cit., p. 222.

> into the faith of the Church--and not only into its theology; even today it is the predominating metaphysic. If, on the contrary, we start from the Biblical idea of personality, then the question: dichotomy versus trichotomy becomes pointless. The same human being who has been created by God has physical, psychical and spiritual functions, which as such are absolutely distinguishable, but which cannot be distinguished metaphysically. There is no anima immortalis, but only a personality, destined by God for eternity, a person who is body-soul-spirit, who dies as a whole, and is raised as a whole.[13]

The term "heart" which is used with incomparable significance in the Bible symbolizes man as a whole person. Heart and not head is the Biblical center of personality. The whole man incorporates the realm of the unconscious. Sin, sickness and resulting personality division penetrate to the deepest levels. On the other hand the health and holiness of the personality do not exclude these levels. The body is a God-given means of expressing the spiritual and actualizing the will. Work and act springing from the spirit are mediated through the psyche and accomplished by means of the body.

Although Brunner recognizes that "the impossibility of understanding man's constitution is an integral part of the creaturely character of human existence; ..."

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[13]Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon (London: R. T. S - Lutterworth Press, 1st publ. in Eng. in 1939), pp. 362-63.

he does affirm that "the Bible teaches that which springs naturally from the idea of personality; that the physical, mental and spiritual elements are absolutely interwoven with one another."[14] And yet, the whole man is not just the totality of these elements or different functions--he is more than the sum of his parts. He is a "living functional whole."[15]

In summary, we affirm that the concept of the whole person arises from a Judeo-Christian source. Greek philosophy, especially in the form of the Platonic dualism of body and soul, has penetrated deeply into the Christian view and is contrary to this concept of wholeness. There is a great difference between the immortality of the soul (Greek) and the resurrection of the whole person (Christian). When correctly understood we see man as a unity with various expressions or functions. Terminology at this point can become confusing, but for our purposes we shall refer to man in his wholeness as "soul," (we commonly speak of a person as "a good soul") and to his expressions or functions as "body," "mind," and "spirit."

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[14] Ibid., pp. 375 & 378 (footnote).

[15] Ibid., p. 379.

II. MEDICINE AND CHRISTIANITY

Keeping in mind the Judeo-Christian view of the nature of man as a whole person, let us now consider the relationship of modern medicine and Christianity. Historically, religion and medicine, the minister and the doctor have held much in common--as illustrated in the primitive "Shaman" or "Medicine Man" who was both a religious and medical personage. From this common source the streams of medicine and religion for many years flowed intermingled. Then divisions in this "togetherness" began to appear. In 529 the Emperor Justinian, at the insistence of the Church, closed the medical schools of Athens and Alexandria. Six centuries later, in 1163, at a time when many monks were acting as surgeons, the Church passed a law preventing the shedding of blood. The object was to prevent a monk from accidentally being responsible for the death of a "patient"--a mortal sin in the eyes of the Church. By 1215 Pope Innocent III condemned surgery and all priests who practised it. And in 1300 Pope Boniface VIII decreed that a human body could not be dissected. Although, not really intended to be anti-medical, the result of these

decrees on medical knowledge was devastating. The cleavage was complete.[16]

In spite of the distinctiveness of contemporary medicine and religion there is still a strong element of the ancient cohesiveness that tends to draw them together. Some of the more bizarre forms and expressions of this deep-felt oneness are the radical "faith-healers" and those sects that tend to discredit modern secular medicine as they practise their own type of "Christian healing." It is doubtful that medicine and ministry can ever really sever the common bond that identifies them one with the other. If found to be possible it seems not to be desirable. Dr. Henri Bon has said:

> In short, medicine has broken away from the priesthood, but has not been able to cast off the spirit which united it with it in the past. Medicine cannot help being a priesthood; it has the duties and the dignity of a priesthood, and that is why theol-

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[16]For a full treatment of this historical perspective see Charles F. Kemp, Physicians of the Soul (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), and Carl H. Scherzer, The Church and Healing (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950). These ecclesiogenic obstacles in the path of medical advance ironically remind us of the various cultural and religious obstructions that hindered the Christian missionaries, especially in the early years of modern world missions. Cf. the obstacles in the way of the work of Alexander Duff in India. See George Smith, The Life of Alexander Duff, D. D., LL. D., 2 vols. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1879).

> ogy holds, and must hold, such an important place in medical literature.[17]

Long before Bon another physician, Sir Thomas Browne, in his classic, Religio Medici, had written:

> I never hear the Toll of a passing Bell, though in my mirth, without my prayers and best wishes for the departing spirit; I cannot go to cure the body of my patient, but I forget my profession, and call unto God for his soul. . . .[18]

The common spirit found within medicine and Christianity continues to maintain a basic spiritual unity that cannot be denied even in the modern day of mechanical and specialized medicine. The tie that binds physician and minister is poetically expressed by Kelley Barnett:

> Across the patient's bed we face each other; you in your white coat, a stethoscope in your hand; I in my black coat with a prayerbook in my hand. At

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[17]Cited by Paul Tournier, The Healing of Persons, trans. Edwin Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 213. Bon's reference to theology in medical literature (and vice versa) seems to be borne out with a perusal of book titles in contemporary medical and theological literature. The following are illustrative: A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible; Modern Man in Search of a Soul; The Individual and His Religion; Psychoanalysis and Religion; The Leaven of Love; Our Inner Conflicts (all by physicians or psychotherapists); and Spiritual Therapy; Soul and Psyche; The Family and Mental Illness; The Art of Ministering to the Sick; Religion and Health; Morals and Medicine; Psychology, Religion & Healing (by ministers).

[18]Sir Thomas Browne, The Religio Medici & Other Writings of Sir Thomas Browne ("Everyman's Library," ed. Ernest Rhys; London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1906), p. 75.

> the beginning we were one, since the beginning we have always been together, unavoidably related, and when you are true to the oath of medicine and I true to the ordination vows, the center of interest has been, is and must always be in the man on the bed, your patient, my parishioner, God's creation. And if we work in unity together, the patient will come to see, to know, to love the Father God who through us, in us, by us, and in spite of us, remains the Ultimate One Who . . . "healeth all our diseases and forgiveth all our iniquities."[19]

This is not to imply, however, that medicine and Christianity are one and the same. In a certain sense "medicine cannot help being a priesthood" and Christianity has an inherent desire to heal, but their goals are not identical. McKenzie reminds us that "there is a fundamental difference between the Healing of Minds [for example] and the Care of Souls. . . ."[20] And Thurneysen speaks of an "immediate goal" and an "ultimate goal," which I choose to identify as liberation from ill health and reconciliation with God respectively.[21] There are physicians who seek not only the immediate goal of the restoration of physical and emotional health, but also the ultimate goal of reconciliation between their patient

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[19]Cited by R. K. Young and A. L. Meiburg, Spiritual Therapy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 163.

[20]Op. cit., p. 7.

[21]Eduard Thurneysen, A Theology of Pastoral Care, trans. Jack A. Worthington & Thomas Wieser (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1st Eng. ed., 1962), p. 329.

and God. On the other hand the minister in his work towards the ultimate goal should never ignore the immediate goals of physical and emotional health. To do so is to deny the concept of wholeness. For the minister of pastoral care, however, to confuse immediate and ultimate goals in such a way that he seems to be concerned only with physical and/or mental health is a grave error. This, too, denies wholeness and must be guarded against.

Those medical men of today whose approach to medicine is "comprehensive" are giving far weightier consideration to the role of religion in the total health or unhealth of the whole person. They are recognizing the fact that forgiveness holds almost as much meaning in the physical and emotional dimensions as it does in the spiritual, and they are witnessing the healing and integrating power of love as it is felt by man.

Conversely, many of today's ministers gratefully accept the contributions of medicine and psychology to their understanding of human nature. Psychology as an adjunct to pastoral care is a fitting and proper relation. Clergymen who deny the contributions of the psychological and psychiatrical research and literature to their own ministry do an injustice to those to whom they minister and to their own calling as "minister."

Some of the most valuable contributions of modern medicine to both physician and minister are to be found in the field of psychosomatic medicine. This relatively new approach to medicine concurs with the Judeo-Christian view of the nature of man and has opened new horizons of ministry.

Weiss and English state that the term "psychosomatic" was first used by a German psychiatrist named Heinroth as long ago as 1818. However, it did not come into common usage until about 1935 when Flanders Dunbar reintroduced it.[22]

> The term psychosomatic indicates a method of approach to general medical problems, that is, the simultaneous application of physiological and psychological techniques to the study of illness in an effort to make a definitive diagnosis and in preparation for comprehensive medical care. We also apply the term in a more limited sense to a specific affection, indicating that the disorder is one which can be understood only when psychological as well as physiological factors are taken into consideration (Halliday).[23]

The extent of the psychosomatic illnesses is notable. It is claimed that about one-third of the

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[22]Edward Weiss and O. Spurgeon English, Psychosomatic Medicine (3d ed.; Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1957), p. 3. See also H. Flanders Dunbar, Mind and Body: Psychosomatic Medicine (New York: Random House, Inc., 1947); and Franz Alexander, Psychosomatic Medicine (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1950).

[23]Ibid.

patients with chronic illness who consult a physician "do not have any definite bodily disease to account for their illness. These are the so-called purely 'functional' problems of medical practice."[24] Another one-third have symptoms that are "in part dependent upon emotional factors" although organic findings are present. The remaining one-third can be identified as having diseases that are wholly physical. However, even among these diseases there are those that probably have a psychic factor of great importance, not only in their etiology but also in their management.[25] Individual physicians of high reputation have been known to estimate the number of their patients with "functional" problems to be in excess of 50% rather than 33%.

The more sophisticated exponents of the psychosomatic approach to medicine affirm that the "either-or" concept--either functional or organic--in diagnosis should be replaced by the "both-and" concept in which the predominant idea is how much of the problem is emotional and how much physical, and just how they are related. This implies modern medicine's growing concern with man as a whole person--the Judeo-Christian view of man's nature. However, that which is only implied be-

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[24] Ibid., pp. 4-5. [25] Ibid., p. 5.

comes explicit when physicians begin to speak of "getting to know the patient as a human being rather than as a mere medical case."[26] Or, when they say: "We try . . . to promote the patient's emotional development so that no longer does he have to find the answer to his problems through illness."[27]

Psychosomatic medicine, as its very name indicates, is concerned basically with mind-body relations, relations of the "psyche" and the "soma." If we think of the unity of the whole person in terms of his three expressions, we realize that concern with the physical and the emotional does not complete the whole man--the spiritual dimension has been omitted. Despite the unwillingness at times to give due recognition to the importance of the spiritual dimension and the relevancy of the spiritual to total health, there are indications in the medical field that this reticence is breaking down. Even those physicians most "scientifically-oriented" are more prone today to admit the over-all significance of love, forgiveness, and the sense of security that are fundamental contributions of healthy religion.[28]

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[26]Ibid., p. 11. [27]Ibid., p. 12.

[28]Even the authors of Psychosomatic Medicine who, unquestionably, are writing from a strict scientific

Other physicians of a less anti-metaphysical stance are more generous when, for example, they comment on the role of the minister:

> . . . The medically oriented and trained clergyman is assuming his right and proper place as a member of the healing team. As a consultant for the sick and failing spirit he performs a function as necessary and valuable as that of other specialists called upon to add to a patient's understanding and comfort.[29]

There are still other men of medicine to whom the spiritual dimension of man in his wholeness is of critical importance. Although far apart as to their respective definitions of that which is "spiritual," who can deny that Carl Jung and Paul Tournier, for example, have been primarily concerned with the whole person as a spiritual creation?

What is the relation of the concept of man's wholeness being rediscovered by theology, medicine and other disciplines, to the ecclesiogenic neuroses? Thurneysen speaks of illness as the "reflection of sin" and

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point of view find it possible to say: ". . . We should bear in mind that love has a beneficial effect upon disturbances of emotional origin. Hence, when conflicts produced by guilt, hostility and sexuality produce pain and suffering, contact with a religious force may do much to bring relief." (p. 155)

[29]Statement by David Cayer, M. D. in the Foreward to Young and Meiburg's Spiritual Therapy, p. 10. Cayer is Professor of Internal Medicine, Bowman-Gray School of Medicine of Wake Forest College, Winston-Salem, N. C., U. S. A.

"healing as forgiveness." He indicates that all sickness points to our sin-sickness.[30] One must be careful at this point to understand that Thurneysen is speaking of man's infirmities as being the result of mankind's basic estrangement from God. He is not saying, for example, that a particular infant's illness is due to his sin and that God is punishing him accordingly. The infant's illness is due to his membership in the race of man, which has been estranged from God from the "Eden Affair" to the present moment, and his habitat in a world where nature itself is involved in the "fall." This is not to deny, however, the reality of sickness as a result of sin in a more particular sense. A man, by riotous living, may dissipate body, mind, and spirit and reap a harvest of total illness. In both cases, but in different ways, illness is the "reflection of

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[30]Op. cit., p. 236f. Thurneysen's position in respect to sin and illness appears to be extreme. The proposition that sin produces illness is not always reversible. Individual man experiences illness for which he bears no responsibility at all. One position on the problem of "fallen matter" is that the whole creation and not just man is involved in the "fall"; and because of this, such aspects of life as sickness and calamities in nature exist--although seemingly contradictory to the nature of God revealed in Christ. This view, which appears to be Augustinian, seems to be advocated by Thurneysen. Cf. H. H. Farmer, The World and God (London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1935), ch. xvi and pp. 280-82.

sin." Neither should we assume that the absence of symptoms testifies to the absense of sin. Some of the most fatal illnesses are symptom free. Man is born in sin, lives in sin and dies in sin. Theologically speaking, total health is not the absence of sin and its symptoms--this is an impossibility. Total health is the forgiveness of sin--nothing more and nothing less. This means, paradoxically, that "health" can be experienced in the midst of a mortal illness. On the other hand, it is also true that forgiveness in the spiritual dimension often restores physical and emotional well-being.

The task of the church is definitely therapeutic in the sense indicated above. Those who say that the churches' ministry is to "preach the Word" and not to be concerned with the total health of the whole person do not accurately understand what it means to "preach the Word." The Word proclaims forgiveness, and forgiveness is healing, and this healing is the healing of man in his wholeness. The critical question is not whether or not the churches should be engaged in a healing ministry. This is beyond debate. The critical question is how successfully and faithfully are the churches involved in their healing ministry. Is their ministry successfully contributing to the healing of contemporary

man in his wholeness? Does the churches' influence contribute to the total health and integration of the whole person in a broken and sick world? This is the critical test for today's Christianity. The ecclesiogenic neuroses suggest that the test is not being passed.

III. THE CHURCHES AND THE ILLNESS OF THE WHOLE PERSON

A famous poet has written: "Health . . . is Holiness. What if Holiness be Health? Two sides of one truth. In their coordination and embrace resides the rounded answer."[31] What is the relationship of health and holiness? Is health holiness and holiness health? Whatever fine points might be argued it certainly is true that holiness--true holiness-- is not hostile to health. Is it too much to claim that holiness promotes health? The same poet has said that "sanctity is medicinal, Holiness a healer. . . ."[32] If holiness promotes health it is total health, health for the whole person--body, mind and spirit.

Luther, writing in 1531 to a friend, identifies health with holiness:

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[31]Francis Thompson, "Health and Holiness," The Works of Francis Thompson Volume III: Prose (London: Burns and Oates Ltd., 1913), p. 281.

[32]Ibid.

> But lay aside these fancies, which have made you think you had many serious illnesses. I have to contend with these fancied ailments also, for our adversary the devil winds himself about us, not only to devour our souls, but to martyr our bodies with tormenting thoughts. Knowing well that the health of our soul depends very much on that of the body... [33]

Could it not be true, also, that the health of the body depends very much on the health of our soul? When man is ill in any one of his dimensions he suffers in all. The task of the Church, therefore, includes the proclamation of forgiveness and the promotion of holiness--in its most healthy sense. There are, however, many instances when this function is not actualized--and even perverted. The churches, instead of proclaiming forgiveness through the free grace of God and promoting the health of holiness among men, have been guilty of creating a climate in which certain types of disease are bred. The specific derangements of which I speak--the ecclesiogenic neuroses--are the responsibility of the churches either in the sense that they actively have created them or at least have perpetuated them. Protestantism, when deformed with moralistic-legalistic expressions, is one source of sickness.[34] As Tournier puts it: "There

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[33]Martin Luther, The Letters of Martin Luther, select. and trans. Margaret A. Currie (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1908), p. 267.

[34]McKenzie, op. cit., pp. 151-156.

are illnesses which are not caused by a lesion but by an idea."[35] We could add that such illnesses affect the whole person.

One of Freud's most important contributions, especially to those concerned with the practice of healthy religion, is his recognition of the harmful effects of the super-ego in its extreme forms. McKenzie refers to the prohibitive conscience which creates "many character-structures of a morbid kind."[36] A source for super-egos and prohibitive consciences in their most extreme state has been the churches. Parents, influenced by moralistic-legalistic emphases in the churches, have contributed to the creation and perpetuation of extreme super-egos through the parent-child relation.

One type of ecclesiogenic neurosis, as created by moralistic legalism, is personified in the "perfectionists" and "restrictionists."[37] They are victims of a prohibitive conscience whose religion of law implants fear of wrong-doing rather than love of right-doing. This aberration is a sign of Christian immaturity and, often, a defense reaction against one's own doubts,

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[35] The Whole Person in a Broken World, p. 41.

[36] McKenzie, op. cit., p. 121. [37] Ibid., p. 99.

fears, and scepticism. The scrupulant, such as the young man Luther, for example, is a spiritual invalid suffering from a disease which theologians of the later Middle Ages referred to as pussilanimitas.[38] Another name might be ecclesiogenic neurosis which, in this form, is underlaid by false and morbid guilt feelings.

Morbid Guilt. Much has been written in recent years on the problem of guilt in its theological and psychological perspectives. Paul Tournier and John McKenzie have made notable contributions.[39] Our concern here, however, is not to survey the problem of guilt in its multiple dimensions. Instead, our consideration is of false and morbid guilt.

Let us acknowledge first of all that there is true and healthy guilt as well as false and morbid guilt. There is the true guilt that we all experience before God. No man is free from this guilt, although many succeed in suppressing it--and even repression seems to take place at times. This type of guilt is certainly

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[38]See Karl Heim, Spirit and Truth, trans. Edgar P. Dickie (London: The Lutterworth Press, 1935), p.116f.; also Friedrich Heiler, Der Katholizismus (2d ed.; Munchen: E. Reinhardt, 1923), pp. 261ff.

[39]Paul Tournier, Guilt and Grace (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); and John G. McKenzie, Guilt: Its Meaning and Significance (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,1962).

healthy in the sense that it is real and shows man the need for reconciliation with his Creator. When man recognizes, admits and accepts his true guilt before God and then responds by accepting the acceptance of God, he experiences forgiveness and reconciliation and is enabled to live healthily with this guilt that has been honestly met.

There is, however, another type of guilt--a morbid guilt which is always false and unhealthy and destructive. The negative toll is felt by the whole man. McKenzie queries: "Does Christianity stimulate unhealthy guilt feelings?"[40] The answer and the point of concern is that at times it does! McKenzie observes:

> It is astonishing the number of patients they [psychotherapists] see whose neurosis is traced to something heard in preaching, or something read in supposed devotional books. Dr. Guirdham in his Christ and Freud is emphatic that a good deal of the morbid guilt which comes to the consulting room is due to sheer "clericalism."[41]

Morbid guilt is guilt felt for insignificant deeds, usually beyond one's control, rather than basic attitudes of heart. It is guilt felt for "sins"--not

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[40] Guilt: Its Meaning and Significance, p.124.

[41] Ibid., p. 125. Of course, it is also true that mental illness often clothes itself in religious terms and perhaps breaks out into the open through the pastoral ministration, although not actually being caused by it.

"Sin." Morbid guilt is guilt often created and fostered by the churches--and divorced from forgiveness and redemption. The following is an example that helps to classify the nature of morbid guilt as an ecclesiogenic neurosis. Dr. Klaus Thomas of Berlin states:

> 134 of our patients had as the main symptom, or one of the main symptoms, a desperate and heroic fight against masturbation, which led from one defeat to another. Realizing that their prayers were seemingly unanswered, many of them became completely hopeless and had to fight suicide. With only three exceptions, for all of these patients the exaggerated fight against masturbation was a symptom and result of "ecclesiogenic" neurosis. 60 of them were pastors and other church workers, who regarded this as their chief goal in life: "finally to become pure" and to overcome this vice, which their churches had told them was so terribly sinful.[42]

The churches, too often preoccupied with "convicting of sin," create morbid guilt that continues unresolved and leads to illness--physically, mentally, and spiritually. Psychosomatic illnesses which are based on morbid guilt speak of a desire to punish, a kind of masochism that demands a price for guilt, even if the guilt is false and imaginary. Although, to pay this price might be good psychology--and this is doubtful--

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[42]Klaus Thomas, "Ecclesiogenic Neuroses," a 22-page paper copyrighted by Ferdinand Enke publishers, Stuttgart, Germany, 1964. All rights reserved. p. 12. Guilt because of masturbation can arise in non-religious sources as well, such as fear of disease, sterility, homosexuality, etc.

it is undeniably poor theology as it does away with the concept of justification by grace through faith. Despite the fact that morbid guilt is illegitimate, it too, like real guilt must be dealt with; and the answer for it like the answer for legitimate guilt is to be found in the grace of God. However, true guilt lies with those who create and perpetuate this type of ecclesiogenic neurosis which has no right to exist in the first place.

Repression. Freud has charged, also, that the churches were guilty of contributing to the repression of man's true nature. His solution--to free man from his repressive super-ego--if carried to extremes would be chaotic as well as immoral.[43] Yet, we owe to Freud a sincere debt of gratitude. His empirical observations demonstrated truth even though his solutions to the problems uncovered were inadequate. Christianity in various ways and times has fostered unhealthy repression. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of sex--and Freud's preoccupation with thinking in this area is

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[43]Many claim that Freud did not advocate the elimination of the "super-ego" or even think this possible, and that he did not desire complete freedom for the "id." His ideal, it is said, was "Where 'id' was there let 'ego' be." (Personal communication from Dr. D. C. Moir of St. Mary's College, St. Andrews Univ.).

well known. Klaus Thomas has stated, with similar conviction, from his observations:

> All patients with "ecclesiogenic" neurosis show a striking similarity in the history of their childhood: the parents or grandparents were especially pious; the atmosphere of the parental home showed characteristics of honest, and yet not deep and genuine, Christian faith; mostly the upbringing was strict--among those who later became sadists this upbringing was frequently cruel; all sexual questions were so "tabooized" that the children grew up in great ignorance--information from other children and threats from their parents caused early feelings of anxiety.
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> The whole area of sex was covered with and even identified with the stain of sin. Talk about sex or actions connected with it were severely punished. One of the "positive" aims of education was a so-called "purity" which was equated with the absence of sexual feelings and longings. Thus, the conscience instead of being oriented toward high ethical aims, was now turned towards an unnatural goal. As a consequence the adolescent grew up under the constant pressure of false guilt feelings and was discouraged by permanent failures in his fight against masturbation or other manifestations of natural sexual impulses. The result of such an upbringing is not Christian character, but a serious neurosis, which in medical terms is called "ecclesiogenic."[44]

This type of ecclesiogenic neurosis takes its toll on the whole person, also. Spiritually it results in the perversion and depreciation of the God-given gift of sexuality. Emotionally the sufferer becomes a neurotic cripple, laden with morbid guilt and living a life far inferior to that "abundant life" of which Jesus spoke. Physically, frigidity among women and impotence

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[44] Ibid., p. 7.

among men, as well as the consequent inability to experience natural parenthood are often the consequences of this repressive Christian moralism. In addition, it is quite possible that many other sexual perversions, such as homosexuality and sexual obsessions, can be traced, at least in part, to ecclesiogenic neuroses.

There is also a second type of repression that is due in a large measure to the churches and their teachings and, in this sense, can be termed "ecclesiogenic." Brunner describes this as that repression or evasion of the fact that man is in contradiction--in Sin.[45] Modern man refuses to admit his true guilt before God; repression takes place, and as a result guilt is expelled to the realm of the unconscious. He will not admit to himself, still less to God or anyone else, that he is really suffering from "brokenness." He will not, under any circumstances, allow himself to be convinced of his need of the Christian faith.

But, how can this repression, by any stretching of the imagination, be considered "ecclesiogenic"? Tournier gives us a clue:

> Disgusted by the abuses to which it led, humanity repressed Christianity by which it had so long been

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[45] Op. cit., p. 194.

> dominated. Repressed, but not eliminated. Herein lies, I believe, the essence of the tragedy of modern times. The modern man lives as if Christianity were a negligible hypothesis with no relation to the concrete realities of the world and society. And yet at the bottom of his heart this man remains impregnated with Christianity, so that he lives in a state of perpetual ambivalence with regard to it.[46]

Tournier indicates that modern man's repression of Christianity, if this be the case, is due to his disgust with the "abuses to which it led." Certainly he refers to those types of ecclesiastical disease which have been described in Part I. He must be speaking of the violent excesses of the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation and the Inquisition. But, is that all? What of the moralistic legalism, the pharisaism and scrupulosity, the majoring on minors and minoring on majors, the distortion of the nature of God, the confusing of the ethical with casuistry? What of the propagation of morbid guilt and the denial of natural guilt? Is not this what Tournier has in mind?

We see, then, why even the neurotic repression of true Christianity can be "ecclesiogenic." The churches in proclaiming a perverted and immature faith have been guilty of inoculating modern man against the real thing. Not only that, but the inoculation itself has produced

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[46] The Whole Person in a Broken World, p. 16.

disease. Thus, the unnatural repression of the natural--the repression of true spirituality as a consequence of the proclamation and parading of a false spirituality--culminates in illness for the whole person. Could it be that the meaninglessness and basic anxiety which characterize contemporary man is the price that is being paid for this two-fold repression?

Isolation. Isolation is yet another result of ecclesiogenic neurosis. As the churches withdraw into superficiality and irrelevance modern man is left exposed to the onslaught of the hostile forces in the world of today. The parallel can be made with the predicament of Uriah (II Samuel 11:15), as his comrades withdrew and left him exposed and isolated. Thus, we can speak of contemporary man's "Uriah Syndrome." Man's honest needs are many. He needs love, forgiveness, status, understanding and unity. Church life at its best provides all of these and more. But, as Thurneysen warns, "hand in hand with the collectivization and materialization of modern civilized man, an unprecedented decay of church life had also set in. . . ."[47] The churches, fighting for institutional survival and fran-

[47] Op. cit., p. 85.

tically trying to keep the machinery working smoothly, have failed to meet man's deepest needs. As a result, they have withdrawn and left him isolated on the field of battle. The shield of moralistic legalism that has been left in his hand is not trustworthy, and the sword of activism is defective and deceptive. His danger is mortal--even as was Uriah's.

From the churches modern man sought the grace of God but too often received the religion of law. He pleaded for understanding but even the plea was not understood. He desired spiritual bread and received empty promises. In the churches he hoped for community, companionship, and mutual strengthening and renewal to face the world. His hope died with an affable but meaningless handshake and the sterility of hollow irrelevance.

Contemporary man's "Uriah Syndrome" is illustrated in a case recalled by Paul Tournier:

> Theophile was . . . animated with a genuine faith. Everywhere in religious circles he was esteemed and valued. He was entrusted with spiritual tasks--perhaps more than he could in fact carry. He was admired. Something special was always expected of him. But precisely because he was always set up on a spiritual pedestal, no one gave a thought to helping him, to the difficulties with which he had to contend in secret, or to giving him a chance to talk about his hidden anxieties. He hid them for fear of shaking the faith of those who looked up to him as a leader. He was expected to give, to appear strong, and he himself was given little. In fact,

> despite the Christian ministry he exercised, he lived a life of isolation, enduring moments of terrible anguish in the secrecy of his own chamber.
>
> I was called urgently to him one day: He had tried to kill himself.
>
> I was struck by the contrast between this fine life of Christian service, through which so many others had been led to find in faith the answer to their distress, and that despairing act which betrayed the man's spiritual solitude, and his sense of defeat.
>
> Such contrasts are more frequent than is generally believed. When a person seems strong he is left alone, without help, and is afraid to show his weaknesses. His isolation undermines his powers of resistance. His faith which fortifies others, is insufficient for his solitary battle.[48]

Why was Theophile isolated and solitary? Where was the "communion of the saints," the koinonia? Where was the tender shepherding of the sensitive pastor and the listening ministry of his concerned brethren? Why did he feel it necessary to remain silent about his personal problems? Was it really because he feared "shaking the faith" of others, or was it because of his own "religion of law" which would not condone this "weakness"? Tournier speaks the truth when he tells us that such cases are "more frequent than is generally believed." However, absorbed in their activism and moralism, the churches press feverishly on seemingly oblivious to the despair and danger of the great host of isolated souls. The ecclesiogenic neurosis grows

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[48] The Healing of Persons, p. 282.

like a rapidly spreading carcinoma which threatens the the vitality of the Christian life.

Despair and Rebellion. Dr. Duncan Fraser, Moderator of the Church of Scotland, in an address delivered to the Theological Society of St. Mary's College, spoke of seeing throughout his journeys as Moderator two conditions that accentuate our present dilemma. He referred to: (1) a wide-spread disillusionment. The ministry and the whole church time and again seem to be asking in despair "What is the use?" (2) A deep fear permeates the thinking of many; fear for the Church and the world in the years ahead.[49] Despite the fact that the Moderator concluded his observations by referring to a hope that went beyond this disillusionment and fear, his recognition of the presence of despair among the modern churches is not inaccurate. This despair is nowhere more striking than on the personal level.

The preceding chapter refers to the ascendency of institutionalism, often at the expense of the personal. The religion of law, activism, depersonalization, meaninglessness, moralism, irrelevance and other aspects of the churches' neuroses were identified. On the personal

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[49]This address was given on Nov. 16, 1964.

level this can lead to a pernicious despair. The man who is not a victim of despair is either (1) in meaningful communion with God despite the churches; (2) is not yet sensitive to his plight; or (3) is a rebel.

Consider how false expressions of Christianity contribute to modern man's despair. If he accepts these deformations as true religion he gets involved, accepts the moralisms proclaimed as his own, and in turn proclaims them. He attempts with the utmost zeal to meet the legalistic demands of the religion of law. He steps on the activistic treadmill and finds his niche in the organizational machinery. Time passes. The moralisms are producing a starvation diet. The claims of the law are not fully met despite his every effort. The activism has become meaningless and yet he is firmly enmeshed. The deterioration and disillusionment with this "cut-flower" religion rapidly reaches a point of decision that will not be denied. There are two ways out.

The first is the path of despair. This path often leads to an actual pathological depression for the sincere, but frustrated religious striver. The following case was recounted verbally by Dr. Viktor Frankl of Vienna. One of his patients was a Carmelite Sister afflicted by an endogenous depression. This

type of depression, according to Frankl and most of European psychiatry, is a somatogenic depression. However, the nun reacted to this somatogenic depression by way of a psychogenic depression. She was depressed because of being depressed. Not to be able to overcome the depression on her own was, in her scrupulous thinking, a sign of failure as a Christian and as a Carmelite. Power was lacking in her faith, Frankl, as a doctor, told her that the best Christian is not spared a somatogenic depression. Finally, she accepted this, ceased fighting against the depression and started to view it as an assignment, a challenge from God, another task to fulfill. Through logotherapy (Frankl's own peculiar type of psychotherapy), he was able to deal successfully with the secondary depression--the psychogenic one. But the Sister remained in the hospital because of the somatogenic depression, the result of a 20% decrease in her basic metabolism. Frankl states: "It was clear she was not to be blamed for having a depression, but rather to be praised for having overcome it spiritually this way." However, she was visited one day by a priest who told her: "You should quit the monastery. You are not a good Carmelite because a good Carmelite can never be depressed." Her psychogenic depression reappeared.

The priest had actually added an ecclesiogenic depression to the endocrinologic and endogenous depression. Frankl met with her again and discovered the reason for the relapse. His words to her were:

> It is not true that a Carmelite cannot suffer from such a depression, because she must suffer from an endogenous, somatogenic depression. She cannot help it. But, I would rather think only an ideal Carmelite, an exemplar of the Carmelites, such as you are, is capable of handling and managing and overcoming an endogenous depression, a somatogenic depression, by her spiritual force in the way that you have succeeded in doing.[50]

Although the case of a Catholic nun, the above illustrates a kind of despair that is very real in Protestant circles as well, and not just among the "professional ministry." Spiritual despair with subsequent suffering of the whole person is part of the heavy toll of the ecclesiogenic neuroses.

The second way out that often is taken by the person disillusioned by perversions of the Christian message and spirit--perversions that assume various forms--is the path of rebellion. Brunner refers to:

> . . . the insanity of independence which has got rid of God and cannot help producing insanity, namely, all the substitute gods of a baser or a higher kind, substitutes for that happiness and

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[50]This case was spoken of by Dr. Frankl in a personal interview in Vienna on June 29, 1965. Permission to quote secured.

> peace which spring from being in the truth, all the substitute aims with which the empty soul tries to fill the "aching void."[51]

Kierkegaard's "attack upon Christendom," Nietzsche's "death of God," Bonhoeffer's "religionless Christianity," John A. T. Robinson's "new reformation," and the modern "God is dead" theology are all expressions of a state of rebellion. A description of a recent book begins: "The 27 contributors to this book are Anglican priests who are in revolt. . . ."[52] This rebellion, however, is not found only among the theologians and the professional ministry. In fact, it has arrived among them last of all. Modern man has been in spiritual rebellion for years. What is the rise of secularity and the concurrent decline of the influence of the churches if it is not an indication of rebellion? But this is not the same rebellion that has characterized man's relation to God from the time of the "Eden Affair." In reality this modern revolt is not actually directed towards God and true spirituality. It is directed toward the churches' <u>representation</u> of God and spirituality--a representation that is highly perverted. For the most part, however,

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[51] <u>Op. cit.</u>, pp. 235-236.

[52] From the front cover of <u>On the Battle Lines</u>, ed. Malcom Boyd (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1964).

the "rebels" do not consciously distinguish between the true expressions of the spirit of Christ and those deformations that are counterfeit. However, there comes a day when they experience something which they sense fails to "ring true." Far too often this bears a Christian label or at least receives tacit Christian approval. Therefore, when the point of saturation is reached--when they can stand no more--they revolt and the guns of their rebellion are turned upon Christianity in general, without distinctions being made between healthy and unhealthy, true and perverted expressions.

This type of rebellion against a spurious representation often results in the secularization of man. He turns to that which Thurneysen depicts as "frivolity and freedom from restraint."[53] In this "insanity of independence," to which Brunner refers, he falls victim to repression of the deep unfulfilled need and yearning for Christianity true to the spirit of Christ.[54] Modern man in his rebellion has discarded the wheat with the chaff because he failed initially to recognize the healthy from the deformed. As repression of this crying

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[53]Op. cit., p. 165.

[54]The Whole Person in a Broken World. This idea is part of Tournier's thesis throughout the entire book.

need arising from the depths of his whole being takes place, he experiences meaninglessness, barrenness, and all the subsequent symptoms of the most dangerous of all repressions. Repression, the process in which that which is painful is pushed into the recesses of the unconscious and held there, becomes man's imprisoner. This subjugation of his deep need for the Christian faith gives rise to hostility--hostility directed against himself because he is experiencing the "insanity of independence," and in his frustration can do nothing about it; hostility against the representations of Christianity from which he has severed himself because they have betrayed him. This hostility itself is suppressed, for to vent it would be to destroy his false wholeness. Repression and suppression take a heavy toll, as psychosomatic medicine has vividly demonstrated. In the words of Karen Horney: "Finally, if the repressed hostility takes on the force of a blind fury, it may give rise to all kinds of functional disorders, like headaches or stomach ailments."[55]

Let us recall at this point the symptoms of our age: (1) meaninglessness--recognized by Tillich, Frankl

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[55]Karen Horney, Our Inner Conflicts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1946), p. 58.

and Jung; (2) neurosis--identified by Tournier; and (3) functional illnesses--diagnosed by physicians everywhere. The same man who is in spiritual despair or rebellion is the one who exhibits these symptoms. Are we presuming too much to indicate the strong possibility of a relationship between the spiritual despair, rebellion and hostility, on the one hand, and meaninglessness, neurosis and functional physical complaints on the other?

Basic Anxiety. Everett V. Reneer states:

> Even anxieties which have a non-religious character (i.e., lack of specific ethical and religious tone) should concern us because they may have arisen from ethical or religious conflicts. Consequently, they may be--in fact, generally are--closely connected, both psychologically and therapeutically, with problems of Christianity.[56]

All anxieties may not have a religious character but there is not any anxiety to which the spirit of Christ does not have a healing word to speak. Whether that word is truly spoken, heard or accepted is another matter.

Karen Horney speaks of "basic anxiety" by which she means "the feeling a child has of being isolated

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[56]Everett V. Reneer, "Depth Psychology and Its Bearing on the Cure of Souls," Vol. II; an unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University Library, St. Andrews Univ., pp. 735-736.

and helpless in a potentially hostile world."[57] Without doing serious injustice to Dr. Horney's definition, I would suggest that basic anxiety can be experienced on the adult level, as well. Part of modern man's neurotic existence is discernible as the "Uriah Syndrome" to which I have referred. The result of this isolation is certainly basic anxiety. Man is not capable, in himself alone, of coping with "the principalities and powers not of this world." Either consciously or unconsciously he has a desperate need for the authentic Christian Faith. The churches instead of giving to him the true "bread" of forgiveness, grace, love, power, koinonia, and meaning hold out to him the "stones" of moralism, legalism, activism and the other perverted expressions of the churches' own neuroses. Realizing his isolation and helplessness in the midst of the world's potential hostility he is battered by waves of basic anxiety and clings to anything that promises security--science, humanism, psychoanalysis, and so forth.

Tillich believes that the reason for the rise to epidemic level of mental diseases in Europe and the United States is the failure of Protestantism to meet

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57 Op. cit., p. 41.

the needs of the masses in the realm of religious education. "Protestant education in its reasonable and moralistic attitude" failed to help individuals to "endure the tremendous responsibility of permanently having to decide in intellectual and moral issues."[58] The anxiety experienced as a result of this finally became intolerable, and deterioration and disintegration of the whole person ensued.

The heart of the Christian faith centers in man's acceptance of God's unconditional acceptance of him. Tillich puts it epigrammatically: "It is the accepting of oneself as accepted in spite of one's despair about the meaning of this acceptance."[59] But modern man seems to find this almost impossible. He is anxious to prove his acceptance by intellectual or activistic endeavors--a way without grace, the way of the religion of law. The meaninglessness, however, is not removed and the anxiety is not relieved. He cannot truly love--God, others, or even himself--because he denies the love of God for himself and in so doing denies himself the

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[58]Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. & ed. James Luther Adams (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1951), p. 228.

[59]Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 177ff.

capacity to love. "We love him, because he first loved us" (I John 4:19). His release from anxiety and his basic security are both bound up in his capacity to love. But the very efforts he makes to save himself--efforts often encouraged by the churches--have within them the seeds of destruction, for they tend to serve as an immunization against the security of accepting love. The anxiety, sterility, and conflict rage on unabated.

The price of basic anxiety extracted from the economy of the whole person is indeed high. All of us to some extent have experienced an encounter with anxiety at some time. We have tasted its bitterness. Basic anxiety is felt in the spiritual dimension; emotionally the effects are far-reaching with implications that can lead to personal disaster; physically the price is paid in the form of bodily disease, such as gastro-intestinal difficulties, hypertension and heart problems.

How ironic it is that the churches--at their best and in their most faithful expressions--are messengers of health and wholeness to the sick and afflicted; yet, can become the source of actual illness under the destructive power of ecclesiogenic neuroses!

CHAPTER VII

THE PROTESTANT MINISTER: THE TOLL

The ranks of those who suffer from ecclesiogenic neuroses are not filled only by the laity. The Protestant minister himself is one of the prime victims of the disintegrative forces described in previous chapters. Are there "vocational hazards" that would make him more or less vulnerable to such illness? A more basic question that should be asked is: What is a Protestant minister? What is his role--to himself, before others, before God?

I. THE MINISTER AND HIS ROLE

Role Confusion. "After eighteen years in the ministry I am still looking for an answer to the question, 'What is a minister supposed to be doing?' This may come as a shock to some. Unfortunately for me, it still remains a great mystery. Can anyone please help?"[1]

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[1]W. D. Crombie, "A Cry for Help," Manse Mail, ed. Rev. J. W. Stevenson, D. D. (Pub. by the Comm. on Publicity and Publication of the Church of Scotland, 121 George St., Edinburgh, Oct., 1965), p. 7.

This cry for help from a parish minister is not an isolated instance of one man's personal frustration. It is heard to reverberate throughout Protestant Christendom and has swelled to a chorus of voices critically asking: "Who am I?" "What is my basic task?" "What are the priorities?" "What is my master role?"

H. Richard Niebuhr describes the ministry of today as "the perplexed profession."[2] He claims that neither the ministers nor their schools are guided by a well-defined generally accepted conception of the office of the ministry. When a person enters the profession of law, education, medicine, or art his work is clear-cut. When one enters the ministry, on the other hand, this is not true. "Not a few men today," Niebuhr observes, "experience their dilemma as that of creatures who were born to be free but are everywhere in chains."[3]

Robert S. Michaelsen reminds us that even though preaching is still a central element in twentieth cen-

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[2]H. Richard Niebuhr, The Purpose of the Church and its Ministry (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p.48. Two other works--much earlier but still standard books--in respect to the vocation of the minister are: A. B. Bruce, The Training of the Twelve (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871) and Henry Latham, Pastor Pastorum (Cambridge: Deighton Bell & Co., 1901).

[3]Ibid., p. 53.

tury Protestantism other facets of the ministry are receiving more attention than ever before. Specialization in the ministry is increasing with specialists in religious education, church administration, church music and pastoral care leading the way. Some see specialization as abetting role confusion, while others view it as the answer to the problem. Nevertheless, Michaelsen contends that the presence of ministerial role confusion is a reality. "Who is the minister and what is he doing?", he says, is the question that has put the modern minister in a quandary.[4]

Samuel Blizzard is also convinced that the Protestant minister is facing a very serious dilemma. In a study involving 690 clergymen he seeks to delineate the confusion and frustration among the clergy. The church has a traditional set of norms by which the minister is expected to be guided. However, according to Blizzard, the parishioner also has a set of functional expectations by which the clergyman's professional service is judged. This is the minister's dilemma. He faces basic ambiguities in performing the practitioner roles. The frustra-

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[4]Robert Michaelsen, "The Protestant Ministry in America, 1850 to the Present," The Ministry in Historical Perspectives, eds. H. Richard Niebuhr & Daniel D. Williams (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 287.

tion and anxiety created are intense. In addition, the minister is expected to spend much time in organization and administration. The theological schools for the most part, however, fail to give the ministerial student an adequate theological understanding of this type of work. Thus, the frustration deepens and the anxiety heightens.[5]

Blizzard, in summing up a research report entitled "The Parish Minister's Self-Image of His Master Role" says:

> The lack of relationship between the minister's ideological perspective about himself and his working norms points to implications that require careful study and evaluation. The recruitment of the clergy, the concept of his vocation, the minister's mental health, the professional training of the clergy, and the relationship between the clergy and the parishioners are some of the areas where further research may indicate a need for restructuring the concept of the minister's work in our society.[6]

Samuel Miller speaks of a book of fascinating photographs taken of famous people caught in mid-air in the act of jumping.

> Indeed, in the current search for symbols, I felt I had found one. It looked to me as if the picture

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[5]Samuel W. Blizzard, "The Minister's Dilemma," The Christian Century, LXXIII (April, 1956), 508-10.

[6]Samuel W. Blizzard, "The Parish Minister's Self-Image of His Master Role," Pastoral Psychology, IX (December, 1958), 32.

> of a man caught in mid-air might well be a proper symbol for the contemporary minister. After all, he is up in the air and no one knows quite where he is going to land, not even the minister himself. If any profession has grown confused about itself, its role in the world, it is the ministry. There was a time when the structures of confidence in our culture were religious, and the minister stood on solid ground. Today the structures of confidence are not religious but scientific or social or even commercial, and in this culture the minister has mighty little ground, if any, to stand on. He is caught in the agony of tense confusion, halfway between a world that has largely disappeared and a new world that has not yet found a place for him.[7]

Miller's symbol is powerful. In the midst of this aerial confusion, however, some Protestant clergymen have landed. Unfortunately, the role in which they have found themselves upon landing has not always been the most constructive or satisfying.

Heretical Roles. I do not believe that I am guilty of over-statement when I depict the following as "heretical roles." In each case we see a basic denial of the true function of the minister interpreted in the light of the example of Jesus Christ as recorded in the Scripture. With due respect to the uniqueness of Jesus, He is still the model minister par excellence.

(1) The authoritarian role seems to be accepted by many modern ministers as their master role. Allport

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[7]Samuel H. Miller, The Dilemma of Modern Belief (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 97.

provided us with a description and some understanding of the authoritarian personality.[8] This person, usually subservient to the existing institutions, is conventional, rigidly moralistic, and insists on definiteness--everything is seen as right or wrong, white or black. As Allport says, "There are no shades of grey, no tentativeness, no suspended judgment."[9] The authoritarian clergyman is consumed--usually unconsciously--by a passionate drive for power and status. He is an opportunist who takes advantage, not only of opportunities, but also of persons, in order to meet his need to function authoritatively. In church politics he is a fierce "in-fighter" and is quite insensitive to the feelings or needs of other people. As the "commander-in-chief" of the church organization, he expects and demands obedience even as he in turn is completely subservient to the powers that rule above him in the power structure to which he belongs. From the pulpit he pronounces judgement and proclaims the religion of law; while as a counsellor he exerts moral pressure on the counsellee to accept his answer to the problem as an ipse dixit.

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[8]Gordon W. Allport, "Prejudice: Societal or Personal?," Pastoral Psychology, XIV (May, 1963), 38-42.

[9]Ibid., p. 39.

In Hebrews 13:17 the readers are urged to be obedient to those "that have the rule over you." These "rulers," however, are seen as watching "for your souls" and are held accountable for this "soul care." Brunner says:

> Doubtless the apostles were granted without demur a certain leading influence in all things appertaining to the common life of the communion. But, the paradoxical peculiarity is this: that they never claimed this ascendancy as a formal right accruing to them. . . .[10]

This view of authority is superior to that implied in the following statement:

> This man (sc., the bishop) is your chief and your leader and he is your mighty king. He rules in the place of the Almighty; but let him be honoured by you as God, for the bishop sits for you in the place of God Almighty.[11]

There is a true authority that is natural and proper, and that arises in a wholesome and acceptable manner--totally distinct from the brittle, hollow, "play-acting" authority. The minister, lacking natural

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[10]Emil Brunner, The Misunderstanding of the Church, trans. Harold Knight (London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), p. 32.

[11]T. G. Jalland, "The Doctrine of the Parity of Ministers," citing Didascalia Apostolorum, The Apostolic Ministry, prepared under the direction of K. E. Kirk (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1946), p. 310. See also Auguste Sabatier, The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit (London: Williams & Norgate, 1904).

authority but functioning in an authoritative role, often is a person with serious unconscious repressions. He has not admitted even to himself the presence of his own "shadow" side.[12] His self-insight is almost nil. Adverse criticism, even if constructive, is not accepted. His response would be to rationalize and lash out in a defensive and hostile reaction.

Prejudice is often a characteristic of the authoritarian personality; prejudice against groups that differ--racially, denominationally, theologically. At times, however, he might express "prejudice against prejudice." As Allport reminds us, ". . . we certainly find intemperate and exaggerated love-prejudice just as we find intemperate and exaggerated hate-prejudice."[13] To illustrate, the authoritarian minister might react so strongly to racial hate-prejudice that he swings to the other extreme; and in his passion to communicate love and acceptance for the abused racial group he may actually express intemperance and hostility towards those he considers racially prejudiced.

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[12]See the discussion of the Jungian concept of the "shadow." Infra, pp. 345ff.

[13]Op. cit., p. 40.

The old story concerning the discussion between a philosopher and a theologian is pertinent. The theologian in a vehement diatribe compared the philosopher to a blind man in a dark room looking for a black cat which was not there. "That may be," replied the philosopher, "but as a theologian you assert you have found it." This speaks of the authoritarian minister who in his dogmatism often is struggling to settle an account with an inner authority. But, because of his lack of self-understanding he fights on, apparently oblivious to the fact that his battle is being waged on the wrong front and that his weaponry of dogmatism is not drawn from the arsenal of grace.[14] The "odium theologicum" description often characterizes this type of person.

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[14]In the Church of Scotland the ordinand is asked the following question: "Are not zeal for the glory of God, love to the Lord Jesus Christ, and a desire for the salvation of man, so far as you know your own heart, your great motives and chief inducements to enter into the office of the Holy Ministry?" (Italics mine.) Practice and Procedure in the Church of Scotland, ed. James T. Cox (5th ed.; ed. J. B. Longmuir, Edinburgh: Printed for the Comm. on Gen. Admin. by William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1964), p. 567.

Unfortunately, the knowing of one's "own heart" is an exceedingly difficult task; and much is to be desired in respect to self-understanding. The recognition of the fact that one does not always know his own heart is the first step toward dealing with the problem of unconscious motivations.

(2) The moralizing role is another role into which many ministers have fallen after their mid-air suspension in the thin atmosphere of role confusion. The minister who is primarily a moraliser has much in common with the authoritarian personality. He, too, speaks "with authority," has a tendency to ignore relativity, and almost inevitably proclaims the religion of law, while allowing any traits of grace to atrophy. Tillich has made the observation that:

> . . . The minister often does what no psychoanalyst would do--he may reply to the confession of guilt with moral commands. Such a reaction makes the minister less relevant to the man of our time than the psychotherapist, and consequently, they flee to him away from the minister. . . . Moralistic preaching does not aid people in the situation of despair about themselves; it drives them into deeper despair or into a compromise between their actual being and what they feel they ought to be.[15]

Real communication is rarely found between the moralistic minister and those to whom he would minister. As he supplies superficial moralizations as "answers" for the complex problems of modern man, the latter soon realizes that this "spiritual guide" is no source of

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[15]Paul Tillich, "The Relevance of the Ministry in Our Time and its Theological Foundation," Making the Ministry Relevant, ed. Hans Hofmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), p. 31. This is not to indicate that there is no place for ethically oriented sermons. However, a distinction must be made between negative moralistic preaching and positive ethical preaching.

help at all because he does not comprehend the questions being asked, much less possible solutions. As a result, on the personal level, contemporary man turns to other sources--primarily the psychotherapists--who more and more assume the counselling function that has traditionally belonged to the minister.[16]

On the non-personal group level, however, moralistic, religion of law preaching is often popular. It is popular for the very reason that it is irrelevant. That which is existentially relevant demands more than the observance of a legal code. Moralistic, and usually superficial, preaching does not demand real involvement but encourages a sense of escapism, of other-worldliness; and, therefore, provides a "lighter yoke" which enhances its popularity. It does not press for meaningful decision and action in the dimensions of life that are both complex and essential.

The minister who has accepted this role majors on minors and minors on majors. His sermons inflate petty trivialities into disproportionate problems or "straw men" which he proceeds to dispatch with vehemence. In reality, however, this is a smoke-screen that conceals

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[16]Infra, pp. 510ff.

not only the essential problems but also the inadequacy that is felt by the minister in respect to his inability to deal with the profound predicaments of contemporary man. The ultimate result of moralistic preaching, despite the surface appeal, is a bogging down in the slough of despair, as Tillich has indicated; or an even more serious basic split between what one actually is and does and what he knows he ought to be and do.

The Imitatio Christi is often a favourite concern of the moraliser. However, the attempt to live by the principle of asking always "What would Jesus do?" in specific situations is to begin by asking the wrong question. The question should be "What would Jesus have me to do?" The moralising minister, who attempts to order his life and the life of his congregation by asking the first question, fails to take into account the uniqueness of Jesus particularly, the uniqueness of persons generally, and the unique character of life situations and historical events.[17]

The counterfeit use of religious jargon is also characteristic of the moraliser. He speaks "the lang-

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[17]Cf. Charles M. Sheldon, In His Steps (London: Henry E. Walter Ltd., 1962). Sheldon advocates asking "What would Jesus do?"

uage of Zion," but the words ring hollow and untrue. Bonhoeffer refers to those who talk in religious jargon and says ". . . then I dry up completely and feel somehow oppressed and ill at ease."[18]

Like the authoritarian clergyman, the moraliser has extreme difficulty in facing up to the "shadow" side of his own personality. Repression has taken place; consequently, civil war rages in the deep recesses of his soul. As a result, episodic displays of bitterness, rancour and ill-temper emerge from behind the mask of virtue and uprightness despite all that he can do to keep them smothered. As Professor Gossip has put it: a sharp reply in the Deacons' Court may undo the good of a dozen sermons.

It is obvious that the moralistic and authoritarian clergymen are those who, at least unconsciously, have rejected the doctrine of grace for the religion of law. Tillich claims that the doctrine of justification by grace through faith--the central doctrine of Protestantism--"has been almost completely lost in average

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[18]Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1953), p. 124.

Protestant preaching and teaching."[19] He seems to believe that this is due to the emphasis on a demanding and yet remote concept of God---God whose image is that of a threatening father so well known to Luther. Tillich argues that Protestantism, conspicuously lacking in any female element in the idea of God, needs to move more in the direction of the "image of the embracing and supporting mother," in order to be able to experience anew and with power the significance of "self-giving nearness" as realized in the message of grace and acceptance. He suggests "that psychotherapy and the experiences of pastoral counseling have helped to reintroduce the female element. . . ."[20]

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[19]Paul Tillich, "The Impact of Pastoral Psychology on Theological Thought," Pastoral Psychology, XI (Feb., 1960), 19.

[20]Ibid. See also C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Vol. XI of Collected Works; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 458-470. Here Jung suggests that the Roman Catholic Church's dogma of the Assumptio Mariae, in part, was an important attempt to meet the "need" of a female element in the Godhead. Also see John S. Carroll, The Motherhood of God and Other Sermons (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1925), pp. 1-7.

It would seem that the Roman Catholic dogma of the assumption of the Virgin has gone the wrong way in an attempt to solve this problem. This unscriptural speculation becomes unchristian speculation, also. The truer way is in the direction of enlarging the meaning of Divine Love; and a "Queen of Heaven" is not a prerequisite.

(3) The martyr or suffering servant role is another role often assumed. Carl J. Scherzer sees this as a retreat in order to protect the ego. It is engendered when a minister reaches "the toleration limit in any emotional area."[21] This person seems to be always slightly paranoid. His thinking is expressed in such remarks as: "No matter what I do they (the congregation) do not appreciate it."

The minister in this role finds it almost impossible to delegate responsibility. He prefers to do the task himself, even if it is mowing the church lawn or stoking the furnace. He revels in giving the impression of constant motion---here, there and everywhere. To imply that he has failed to do what needed to be done is to cut him to the heart. But, although extremely sensitive to criticism, he unconsciously thrives on it because it confirms him in the role he has assumed. His fantasy life often is quite pronounced, and "day-dreaming" is his preoccupation. Constitutionally he is weak and suffers bout after bout with illnesses, both imagined and real. Prone to psychosomatic and functional disorders, he is especially liable to produce back com-

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[21]Carl J. Scherzer, "The Pastor Faces His Inner Tensions," Pastoral Psychology, XIII (Mar., 1962), 21.

plaints because he carries the "weight of the world upon his shoulders."

This man works compulsively, refusing to take regular time for recreational pursuits or family life. If at an odd time he should happen to go fishing or play a round of golf, he suffers from strong feelings of guilt and promptly drives himself all the harder to compensate. Overwork becomes an occupational hazard for him because it is an emotional need. Elements of the "martyr or suffering servant role" were evident in the late 1950's in the discussion that revolved around several popular articles written in the United States which claimed that ministers were suffering severely from overwork and never-ending demands.[22] While not rejecting this thesis *in toto*, it does seem that there is a real danger of self-pity that is not wholesome. If a minister does suffer deeply from overwork, it is

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[22]See, e. g., Wesley Shrader, "Why Ministers are Breaking Down," *Life*, XLI (Aug. 20, 1956), 96. Also Blizzard, "The Minister's Dilemma," *op. cit.*

It must be admitted, however, that the vocation of the ministry is demanding--and much more so than some other vocations. Still the responsibility is the minister's of maturely dealing with over-demands. Those who do not attempt to cope with this problem and allow their task to crush them are not acting in a fully responsible way. The minister who practises the best stewardship of his life neither "rusts out" nor "burns out"; he is a "*living* sacrifice."

often due to his own intrinsic problems and inability to handle extrinsic pressures--and not only to the extrinsic pressures themselves.

The minister in the martyr role has lost all zest for life. For him life is routine, serious, and depressing; and he rarely experiences moments of freshness, elation and deep-seated joy. He slowly suffocates in the staleness of his suffering solemnity.

(4) The saviour-role, though similar in many aspects to the martyr or suffering servant role, is yet distinctive. The preoccupation of the minister who adopts this role is with his indispensability. Without him the church will disintegrate completely. Without him the world cannot possibly be saved. God is put at a great disadvantage. He has the tendency to confuse his relationship to God, acting at times in almost a God-role. He is the only "true prophet" in all of Israel; and unless he does the job it will not be done. He, too, speaks authoritatively, as the Word of God has become his words. His zeal is ardent and he is a man obsessed with the role he has assumed.

The "saviour" has no time for that which he considers to be "trivial"; even though his "trivia" might include family, friends, and those numerous persons and things that tend to give a wholesome balance to life.

He, too, drives himself compulsively because the "time is short." There is always an ethereal air of unreality and otherworldliness surrounding him. In spite of this, he is particularly susceptible to the charms of success. If he does not "succeed," he has destroyed his self-image; because a "saviour" must "save" otherwise he has no reason for existence. Very often the pressure to succeed produces tension and anxiety whose only remedy is success. Thus, the vicious circle is created and the minister in the "saviour role" presses on relentlessly to the brink of personal and vocational disaster.

Underneath the mask of ego-centricity and self-importance more often than not dwells an extremely timid true self, suffering immensely from the pangs of pronounced feelings of insecurity and worthlessness--in need of the grace of the true Saviour.

(5) The executive role is one of the most characteristic ministerial roles of this age. Samuel Miller describes the clergyman who has adopted this role:

> He has hit upon the smooth executive type in a time when churches have become big institutions in need of management. Large congregations, big plants, large budgets--all have conspired to transform the man of God into a big operator. It is true that he

> loses for the most part the abilities of priest or prophet in the process, but even so the "church" thrives.[23]

In this role the minister has found his identity by identifying himself with the modern secular business executive, and runs the church as the successful executive runs his business. The goal is to keep the organization functioning properly applying oil and pressure alternately as needed. The budget must grow and secular financial advisors are employed. The buildings must be as practically arranged as the office buildings upon which they are copied. The membership of the church must expand in order to fulfill the success image.

The executive-type minister is all business. He has a tight schedule to meet and the less distractions the better. He presides at organizational meetings in the spirit of the chairman of the board. Reports, figures, goals, quotas, dictation, calendars of events are all a part of his everyday routine. As Miller indicates, this type of minister does not speak prophetically because his way of life and thinking are foreign to the prophetic spirit. He is not sought out for counsel

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[23] Op. cit., p. 96. Cf. Erich Fromm's "Marketing Orientation" in Man For Himself (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1949), pp. 67-82.

because he is "too busy." He is not even the "pastoral-director" (H. R. Niebuhr) because the pastoral dimension of his role has been smothered by the directorial aspects.

(6) The psychotherapeutic role is one of the fastest growing heretical roles. This is illustrated by the minister who has confused Christian shepherding or the cure of souls with psychoanalysis or some other form of psychotherapy. This is the man suffering from a "psychologenic neurosis" (Frankl). He is constantly "psychologizing," offering amateur psychiatry in place of the gospel of God's grace. He does not speak the language of Zion as the moralizer; but in its place he employs foreign psychological jargon.

It is not that he has failed to appropriate positive contributions from the psychotherapists; on the contrary, he has become so enamoured with psychotherapy that he has taken it in toto as "gospel" and made it the standard for his ministry. His probing into the inner lives of his parishioners is often a sadistic attempt to feed his own needs which, not infrequently, results in great personal harm to those under his care. The clergyman who assumes this heretical role has failed completely to recognize the unique and distinctive aspects of the pastoral function.

Responsible theological education which is interested in the valid contributions of psychotherapy to theology and pastoral care has warned consistently of the danger of slipping into the role of "amateur psychiatrists." In spite of these warnings many members of the "perplexed profession" (H. R. Niebuhr), in their frustration of not being able to identify accurately the role and the task of the minister, have assumed the role of the "ordained psychotherapist."

The above mentioned roles do not by any means exhaust the list of heretical roles being "tried on" by the minister of today in his frantic search for identity. But, it could very well be that it is because the ministry is reflected in the above counterfeit images that Protestantism is experiencing a serious need for an increase in the number of candidates for the ministry.[24] Churches are pastorless in increasing numbers because of the lack of available ministers. The linking of charges or merging of congregations is only a holding action at the very best; and, at the worst, a sign of capitulation. The problem of role

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[24]E. g., see "The Church of Scotland, Report of the Comm. on Educ. for the Ministry," May, 1965. This problem, not peculiar to the Church of Scotland by any means, is wide-spread, affecting all branches of Protestantism.

confusion and its toll has reached critical proportions. The modern minister cannot stay suspended in air--as in Miller's symbol--but must come down. If, however, he is not alighting on "firm ground" and within images that have the power to seize the imagination and express the true potentialities of the man who ministers in the name of Jesus Christ, then the Christian ministry cannot be expected to draw to it men who will offer themselves to the service of God in the vocation of minister.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to attempt to define precisely what the true role of the minister in today's world should be. However, there are certain observations and suggestions that I do presume to make. The first is this: all of the above role descriptions share one thing in common--that is, the serious absence of self-understanding. Socrates' admonition to "know thyself" has gone unheeded. A minister who lacks self-understanding has great potential for wrecking havoc as he functions as pastor. The possession of such insight, which is more than just intellectual recognition of problems, would help to remove barriers that now stand in the path of real communication between the church and the world. It also would provide a stronger basis for a spirit of true ecumenicity. But, most important of all, it would serve as an invaluable aid in assisting

the minister as a person to recognize his true condition before and proper relation to the Lord of his life. If this, of all relationships, is not understood, what hope is there that the "man of God" can lead others into their proper relationship with God? "Physician heal thyself"! Self-understanding is not a "cure-all" for the besetting ills of the contemporary pastor; but, it can provide a substantial foundation upon which to build.

Finally, the minister's self-image is critically important in the fuzzy realm of role confusion. "Of one thing we need to be reminded, that some responsibility for building a given self-image rests with the person whose image it is."[25] The healthy minister is first of all honest with himself. He takes into account his weaknesses as well as his strengths, his liabilities as well as his assets. He knows that he is capable of both success and failure and that under certain conditions and circumstances he is more liable to experience one or the other. There is very little difference between how he sees himself and how he really is. The man with a healthy self-image does not suffer from acute

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[25]Roy W. Fairchild, "Psychological Aspects of the Minister's Task," Pastoral Psychology, XI (Nov., 1960), 19.

identity problems. As Fairchild says, "He is not always doubting who he is."[26] He does not consistently act contrary to his feelings and self-image. To do so leads to anxiety, guilt and splintering. Self-understanding and a healthy self-image are first steps on the road that leads towards a sound solution to the critical problem of ministerial role confusion.

If the modern Protestant minister is not sure of his own identity, and is enmeshed in the present day phenomenon of multiplying ecclesiogenic neuroses, one would expect a heavy toll to be taken on his total health. Some say this is true while others deny it. What are the facts concerning the health of ministers? Are they more prone to the ravages of illness than non-ministers? Since they are so closely involved with different expressions of ecclesiogenic neuroses, to what extent are they victims of these neuroses themselves? Was Shrader right? Are ministers "breaking down"?

II. THE MINISTER'S HEALTH

Studies in Berlin. Dr. Klaus Thomas states:

> Among the first thousand neurotics in our suicide prevention center we counted 389 "ecclesiogenically

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[26] Ibid., p. 18.

> ill," that is, 39%. If we compare the vocations, we find among the 186 neurotic pastors 170 "ecclesiogenic neuroses," (90%), meanwhile among the rest of the 814 people of all other professions 219 (27%) suffered from an "ecclesiogenic neurosis."27

On the basis of the above sample one could claim that the "ecclesiogenic neuroses" to which Thomas refers are a vocational disease. (It must be kept in mind that Thomas uses the term "ecclesiogenic neurosis" in a more strictly medical and technical sense than I do.)

According to Thomas's studies there is also a correlation between ecclesiogenic neuroses and suicide. But, there is an interesting phenomenon observed at this point. Among non-ministers the danger of suicide as a result of ecclesiogenic illness was high. More than 90% of those he studied suffering from sexual problems were in danger of suicide because of "ecclesiogenic neuroses." (Among 4500 patients of non-clergy professions the percentage in danger of suicide was 45%.) However, only 19% of the ecclesiogenically ill pastors and other church workers were in danger of suicide. His conclusion is that pastors on the average are in deeper despair than others who seek advice; but despite

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27Klaus Thomas, "Ecclesiogenic Neuroses," (a paper copyrighted by Ferdinand Enke publishers, Stuttgart, Germany, 1964. All rights reserved.) p. 3. Dr. Thomas of Berlin has served recently as a psychiatric consultant in St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C.

this they far less frequently consider suicide as a solution.[28] This agrees with other statistics that indicate that the lowest rates of suicide are among clergymen.[29]

Thomas is convinced that ecclesiogenic neuroses, which are highly "contagious" in the sense that they often are passed from parent to child through direct and indirect educational processes, cause or influence many other emotional conflicts in the lives of ministers. As an example, he refers to marital difficulties due to the sexual frigidity of the minister's wife. This frigidity, in his opinion, is "practically always caused by an 'ecclesiogenic' neurosis."[30] The "Saviour Complex" to which I have referred is a result of the lack of Christian self-love, in Thomas's thought; and is perpetuated by perfectionistic tendencies arising in the minister and encouraged by the expectations of the con-

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[28] Ibid.

[29] "Clergymen Low on Suicide," Pastoral Psychology, IX (Dec., 1958), 58.

[30] Op. cit., p. 6. Also, John Charles Wynn, assoc. professor of Christian educ. at Colgate Rochester Divinity School comments: "Observers are able to delineate a long list of situations underlying the unrest evidenced in clergy homes, some of them frightfully bizarre." "Pastors Have Family Problems Too," Pastoral Psychology, XI (Sept., 1960), 8.

gregation. Institutional difficulties, guilt, and overwork, are all related to the ecclesiogenic neuroses.[31]

However, the most serious problem for ministers, according to these studies by this Berlin psychiatrist-minister, are in the sexual field. Here Thomas makes the assertion that the pastor's knowledge of sexual matters is wholly inadequate and, as a result, he cannot reach solutions for his own problems in this area, much less counsel others.[32]

Patients observed by Thomas who were suffering from ecclesiogenic neuroses demonstrated certain general characteristics to which I have referred already.[33] The sexual area was especially prone to perversion. Thomas states:

> The so-called "Christian" education, which is honestly and sincerely meant, especially as given in German Church Schools, condemns three out of four girls to failure later in marriage through frigidity. . . . Responsible Christian parents who know these facts, do not send their daughters to Church Schools and hope that their sons will not marry a girl with such a "Christian" education.[34]

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid. Thomas claims that research by Dr. Gelolo McHugh of Duke University, Durham, N. C., supports this assertion.

[33] Supra, p. 254.

[34] Ibid., p. 8.

The propagation of ecclesiogenic neuroses by ill-informed clerical counsellors is described:

> I never saw damage because of masturbation, but some hundred times I did see lasting and grave damage caused by church counselors who discouraged and frustrated the adolescents. . . . Among our male adolescents masturbation conflicts were the main reason for their suicidal tendencies.[35]

Sexual compulsions were not uncommon among the ministers and other church workers who came to Thomas for medical assistance. He observed that "the most common and most uniform of these compulsions is that of uttering strongly obscene words instead of liturgical expressions."[36] Many of these compulsions, however, were of even a more bizarre nature.

As a result of these Berlin studies Klaus Thomas concludes that we are facing illness in patients and ignorance in their educators, but not necessarily guilt. The most serious indictment that he makes--which does imply guilt--is that those suffering from ecclesiogenic neuroses, ministers or laymen, are not finding assistance or even a healthy understanding in the churches. His judgement is specific when he writes:

> Whoever knows of the hundreds and hundreds of homosexuals who are brought to prison each year as a consequence of their Church education; and whoever

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[35]Ibid., pp. 12-13. [36]Ibid., p. 13.

> knows of the other hundreds who go the way of suicide as a consequence of their contact with the gospel of life, that man must discover where and how the infallible word of God has been twisted.[37]

There is no doubt that, in the opinion of this psychiatrist-minister, the modern clergyman's health is seriously affected by the ecclesiogenic neuroses. Even if Thomas is guilty of over-statement, or if the mores of the society from which his patients came and of the Church in Germany are more inhibitive than in other countries, there remains more than sufficient substance to his studies to warrant serious consideration of his basic conclusions.

Studies in North Carolina. Within the last decade there have been other studies concerning the health of ministers. Most of these have been concerned primarily with his mental health. However, in 1959-1960, research was conducted at the North Carolina Baptist Hospital, Winston-Salem, North Carolina that was directed toward an understanding of the health problems of the minister as a whole person. This was a comparative study of the health problems of 1039 ministers and 1039 laymen based on the medical case histories of these

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[37]Ibid., p. 14.

individuals as composed by the examining physician. The medical histories are to be found in the Medical Records Library of the above mentioned hospital.[38]

Mental illnesses usually are divided into three categories: (1) Psychoses, (2) Psychoneurotic Disorders, and (3) Disorders of Character, Behaviour and Intelligence. Psychoses are mental diseases of the most serious nature, such as schizophrenia and manic-depressive reactions. Psychoneurotic disorders, considered less severe than psychoses, are illnesses illustrated by anxiety reactions and psychoneuroses involving somatic complaints. Disorders of character, behaviour and intelligence, also considered severe illnesses, are abnormalities such as alcoholism and immature personalities.[39]

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[38]This research project was conducted by myself under the supervision of Dr. Richard K. Young, Dir. of the Dept. of Pastoral Care of the North Carolina Baptist Hospital, and Dr. A. L. Meiburg, his associate in charge of research. Ultimately it was presented as a thesis to the faculty of Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Theology at that institution. It is an unpublished dissertation to be found in the Library of the above Seminary at Wake Forest, N. C.; and is entitled "The Minister's Health: A Comparative Study of the Health Problems of 1039 Ministers and 1039 Laymen Examined at the N. C. Baptist Hospital."

[39]See Richard J. Plunkett and Adaline C. Hayden (eds.), Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations, publ. for the American Med. Assoc. (New York: The Blakiston Co., 1952).

In the North Carolina research 125 of the 1039 laymen had diagnoses by the examining physician that placed them in the "mental illness" category. At the same time 207 of the 1039 ministers examined were diagnosed as having some form of "mental illness." The following chart displays the distribution of these figures in a comparative manner.[40]

CLASSIFICATION OF THE DIAGNOSIS	LAYMEN No.	LAYMEN %	MINISTERS No.	MINISTERS %
I. Psychoses	11	8.8	4	1.9
II. Psychoneurotic Disorders	99	79.2	195	94.2
III. Disorders of Character, Behaviour and Intelligence	15	12	8	3.8
	125	100%	207	99.9

As a result of the above comparison the following general observations seem to be in order: (1) Psychoneurotic disorders were found with much greater frequency among the ministers than among the laymen. Of the 195 ministerial diagnoses classified by the examining physician as psychoneurotic 134 were anxiety states or reactions.[41] (2) Psychoses and disorders of character, behaviour and intelligence seemed to be more pronounced among the laymen. The minister, therefore, appeared more prone to the less severe mental disturbances,

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[40]Cumbee, op. cit., p. 40. [41]Ibid., p. 41.

especially anxiety reactions, but less susceptible to the more severe mental disorders.[42]

A second aspect of the North Carolina study moved from the category of mental illness to physical expressions of illness. This was a comparison of psychosomatic diagnoses with other diagnoses generally considered more organic. Among the psychosomatic diagnoses were peptic ulcer, allergic rhinitis (hay fever), exogenous obesity, pylorospasm and irritability of colon. In the diagnoses generally considered as having little, if any, emotional content were congenital malformations, prostatitis and hyperplasia of prostate, calculi of kidney and ureter, arteriosclerotic heart disease, and herniated nucleus pulposus.

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[42]One suggested explanation for the minister's apparent tendency to be more prone to psychoneurosis is that his vocation exposes him to stresses that are not often present in the experience of the non-cleric, e.g. the strain of every-day pastoral care in which the pastor really "takes to heart" the suffering and problems of his parishioners. Tradition has it that the essayist Montaigne, when asked to serve as mayor of the city of Bordeaux, replied that he would take the affairs of the city on his hands but not on his heart. The Christian minister cannot make that clear-cut distinction. A possible explanation for the lower occurrence of severe mental illness among the ministers is because of their higher educational level that would make it more likely for them to "catch something earlier" and seek help before it developed into a full blown psychosis.

As one might expect, there was very little difference noted in the comparison of ministerial and lay diagnoses when the more organic or "mechanical" diagnoses were considered. In no case did the difference exceed 1.1%. However, when the more psychosomatic and functional diagnoses were examined there was a remarkable distinction found in the frequency of occurrence. In every case more ministers exhibited psychosomatic complaints than laymen and differences were as high as 4.9%. For example, 2.5% of the laymen in the total research population were diagnosed as suffering from "exogenous obesity" while 7.4% of the ministers studied were diagnosed the same.[43] Weiss and English have stated their professional opinion that:

> Either sex may use the eating process to allay anxiety or to gratify pleasure cravings which should be satisfied in other ways, as for instance through a better sexual and social adjustment. A nagging intolerable sensation in the epigastrium often referred to as "nervous hunger" is symbolic of the emptiness of the emotional life. The effort to fill this void with food instead of emotional sustenance is a frequent cause of obesity.[44]

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[43]Cumbee, op. cit., p. 43.

[44]Edward Weiss and O. Spurgeon English, Psychosomatic Medicine (3d ed., Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1957), p. 350. On the other hand, the adage "Laugh and grow fat" cannot be ignored. Are there not people whose relaxed temperament finds expression in fun and food? Also, the loss of appetite through emotional stress is well known.

Irritability of the colon was more than twice as common in the ministerial group. "Diarrhea as a sympton of nervousness has been recognized for centuries. . . from the very first it has been known that the emotions had something to do with mucous colitis (the irritable colon syndrome)."[45] Anxiety, resentment and guilt are closely related to this syndrome.[46]

Occurrence of the peptic ulcer was five to three more prominent with the ministers studied. Emotional factors and nervous tension are widely known to be associated with the development of the peptic ulcer.

Allergic rhinitis, commonly called hay fever, occurred at a rate more than three times higher in the ministerial population of the North Carolina research. Weiss and English have reported an experimental study which indicates the role of emotions in allergic rhinitis:

> . . . The intensity of hay-fever coryza is enhanced if the nasal mucous membranes are assaulted by pollen in a setting of conflict and anxiety. They (the authors of this study) concluded that the character of the mucous membranes' response in the hay-fever syndrome appears to depend not only on the intensity of the nasal hyperfunction produced by the exposure of "sensitive" individuals to pollen, but on the magnitude and duration of the hyperemia, hypersecretion and swelling in the nasal chambers provoked by other threats and assaults to bodily integrity. Of

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[45] Ibid., p. 273. [46] Ibid.

> major importance among these etiologic factors is a life setting engendering conflict and anxiety.[47]

Two of the most important observations of this research are the higher occurrences of anxiety reactions and psychosomatic illnesses among the ministers. This could be interpreted as an argument for certain vocation-illness relationships.

The medical records studied made specific mention of a relationship between the patient's illness and his work in the cases of 105 ministers and 153 laymen. Three major types of vocation-illness relationships appeared: (1) injuries suffered at work, (2) illnesses which necessitated vocational rehabilitation, and (3) illnesses in which the tension of the patient's vocation was important. In the first case not a single minister of this sub-group of 105 was "injured at work" while 90 or 58.8% of the lay sub-group of 153 were injured. Physical injuries, of course, are much more apt to be experienced by persons working with tools and machinery than by those working with words, ideas and people. The occupational hazard of having a Jenny Geddes in the congregation ready with a stool to throw at the preacher is seldom incurred today. As far as illnesses which

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[47] Ibid., p. 489.

necessitated vocational rehabilitation is concerned the percentage of comparison was laymen 20.2% and ministers 6.6%. Again, physical demands might be a logical explanation for the difference noted. A man, for example, dependent on physical strength in a task that demanded the same would, at least with increasing age if for no other reason, be more likely to need vocational rehabilitation than another whose task was not as demanding of physical strength. Many of the laymen studied were "blue collar" workers and not all professional people.[48]

The final category of vocation-illness relationships which was identified as "illnesses in which the tension of the patient's occupation was important" provides interesting information. This category was subdivided into: (a) overwork and (b) illnesses with other emotional implications involving the patient's occupation. "Overwork" as a diagnosis or description by the examining physician appeared as an important factor. While only 6.6% of the laymen observed in this sub-group suffered from "overwork," more than five times this number, 30.4%, of the ministers had health problems involving "overwork."[49]

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[48]Cumbee, op. cit., pp. 47-50.

[49]Ibid., p. 50. It is highly possible that the

An example of a case history that illustrates the ministerial problem of "overwork" as viewed by an examining physician is that of a thirty-eight year-old minister. In the medical history the physician wrote:

> He sleeps restlessly. He gets to bed between 12 and 1 and is up at 7. He seldom takes any time off during the week. He admits that he worries a good deal and he takes other people's cares seriously. His sympathetic nature has resulted in his doing a great deal of pastoral counseling, and he feels the responsibility of each individual who consults him.[50]

In this case the tentative diagnosis was "tension state and fatigue from overwork." The physician's prescription was more time for recreation and the reading of William Osler's book, A Way of Life (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937). The following is an excerpt of a subsequent letter from the doctor to the patient:

> I am very happy to be able to report to you that the X-ray of your gallbladder and of the stomach and duodenum both showed nothing abnormal. This strengthens the tentative diagnosis of tension from too long application of your nose to the grindstone. I hope you will take to heart the little sermon that I preached to you and will be as kind to yourself as you are to your many friends.[51]

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overwork problems in the ministry are shared to some degree by other professional people whose day's work is not defined so clearly; and who are prone "to take work home." The non-professional "blue collar" workmen would not be as susceptible to this problem. A subsequent study of the health problems of ministers as compared with those of other professionals would be welcomed.

[50]Cited by Cumbee, ibid., pp.50-51. [51]Ibid.

The second sub-division of this final category of vocation-illness relationships was concerned with illnesses or diagnoses other than "overwork" with emotional implications involving the patient's occupation. Again, the differential between the ministers and laymen studied was almost five times, laymen 14.3% and ministers 62.8%. An example of a minister in this category was a pastor who suffered from a "dull aching left chest pain for which no organic cause could be discovered." The pastor referred to an upsetting church problem and the physician noted that the pain was probably the result of tension. Another illustration is that of an evangelist who was described by a specialist in internal medicine as having "a fairly common piedmont and mountain syndrome in an evangelist who really exhorts. . . . His concept of religion is emotional and so is he."[52]

This North Carolina research, like that of the Berlin research of Dr. Klaus Thomas, seems to indicate that the health of today's ministers should be a point of serious concern, and that further study of the problem should be encouraged.

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[52]Cited by Cumbee, ibid., pp. 52-53.

The Continuing Discussion. There are many differing opinions concerning the health problems of ministers. While numerous observers would tend to agree with the implications of the Berlin and North Carolina studies there are those who do not.[53] This in itself indicates the need for a continuing discussion concerning this problem and more extensive research. However, on the basis of the above mentioned studies--which statistically were not insignificant--there are certain implications that need to be pursued.

First of all, both of these studies indicate a relationship between the health problems of ministers and their vocations. There is not sufficient evidence to say unreservedly that the ministerial vocation produces neuroses or other manifestations of illness. On

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[53]For other views on this subject, both assenting and dissenting, see E. Gartly Jaco, The Social Epidemiology of Mental Disorders (Russell Sage Foundation, 1960); Margaretta K. Bowers, Conflicts of the Clergy (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1963); Wayne Oates (ed.), The Minister's Own Mental Health (Channel Press, 1961); Pastoral Psychology, IX (May, 1958)--most of this issue has been included in Oates, op. cit.; James E. Dittes, "Facts and Fantasy in (the Minister's) Mental Health," Pastoral Psychology, X (Mar., 1959), 15-24; Wesley Shrader, "Why Ministers are Breaking Down," Life, XLI (Aug., 20, 1956), 95-104; Paul Waitman Hoon, "Building Up Breaking Down Parsons," The Christian Century, LXXIV (Nov. 6, 1957), 1313-1314.

Unfortunately, most of these works concentrate on mental health to the neglect of physical implications and the health of the minister as a whole person.

the contrary there are those, such as Viktor Frankl and Paul Tournier, who believe that when neurosis is involved it is more often found as the cause of a man's entering the ministry and less often as a result of his having entered the ministry. Both of these physicians indicate that many people who are neurotic enter professions such as that of the ministry or psychotherapy; and as they help to meet the needs of other people through this medium they meet many of their own needs.[54] At the same time both acknowledge the fact that perversions of the Christian message and its proclamation do contribute to the illness of persons. The "heretical structures" of the churches today, the role-confusion of the minister and his subsequent assumption of heretical roles, as well as the atrophy of the concept of grace have contributed heavily to illness of the whole person. One of the most seriously affected victims is the minister himself.

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[54]Personal communication from Professor Viktor E. Frankl of Vienna and Dr. Paul Tournier of Geneva. If time proves this theory to be valid, then the churches must consider giving greater attention to the problem of the "selection" of men for the ministry. For further discussion of neurosis and its relation to religion and personality, see Edgar P. Dickie, Revelation and Response (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1938), p. 33f.; also B. H. Streeter, Reality (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1929), p. 276f.

There is evidence that overwork is a health problem for the modern minister.[55] This is probably due to both internal and external sources. An ill-defined self-image and concept of his master role could lead undoubtedly to such a splintering of his functions that he ends up attempting tasks that under any circumstances cannot be conceived of as rightfully his. The immediate result is overwork; but the ultimate result over an extended period of time is frustration, anxiety, and illness. The root of the problem in this case is within the minister himself. He is confused, perplexed and facing a personal dilemma. Without self-understanding, comprehension of his basic task as a minister, understanding of the complex problems of today's secular culture, and a clearly defined doctrine of the nature of the Church--as well as personal integrity and strength--the contemporary minister cannot hope to deal successfully with his intrinsic difficulties.

Also, there are complications that arise out of the matrix of external pressures and expectations.

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[55]In addition to the N. C. research, see S. W. Blizzard, "The Minister's Dilemma," The Christian Century, LXXIII (April, 1956), 508-10; and Practical Problems of Ministers Today (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Minister's Life & Casualty Union, 1958), 12 pp.

Shrader argues that the reason for the poor health of ministers "lies principally in the fact that the minister's role, as conceived by members of church congregations, has become impossible. It is a role that no human being, not even one of the Twelve Apostles, could adequately fill."[56] His thesis is not to be ignored. There are external pressures felt by the minister--pressures that tend to push him towards a state of overwork. His task inherently is one that is never completed. Add to that unreasonable expectations of congregations who are not any more sure just what their pastor is supposed to be doing with his time than he is himself, and one has all the ingredients necessary to produce a perpetual condition of overwork. The increasing complexities of the modern culture, as well as a widespread misunderstanding of the nature of the church, also contribute to the minister's dilemma.

The Berlin and North Carolina studies both point to the presence of anxiety in unusually large amounts among ministers. Why this anxiety? Is its source role conflict? Does it arise out of the overwork problem? Or, on the other hand, is overwork a product of anxiety?

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[56] Op. cit., p. 96.

Could it be the problem of relevance and communication, and the fact that many clergymen are becoming more keenly aware of the increasing difficulty in "reaching" the world of today? Is it the result of perversions of Christian education? Or is the anxiety demonstrated inherent in the man himself--even before he became a minister? Certainly not all anxiety is detrimental. It can serve a constructive function. But, which does and which does not? Is the difference qualitative or quantitative? These are important questions, and the need to keep them before us is critical--critical for the minister personally and the churches collectively. The answers--and there must be more than one--will not be simple and clear cut. Most likely the apparent high rate of ministerial anxiety is the result of several inter-relating factors. If this is so, then it is quite possible that most of these factors are strongly moulded by ecclesiogenic influences.

The heavy weight of anxiety as experienced by many Protestant clergymen today seems to be reflected in the rate of occurrence of psychosomatic and functional illnesses among these ministers. This is especially evident in the North Carolina research. The irritable colon syndrome and the pylorospasm--both

appearing more frequently among the health problems of ministers than those of laymen according to the study noted--are associated with feelings of anxiety, resentment and guilt.[57] In fact, most of the examples of psychosomatic illnesses referred to above are associated with anxiety and emotional tension.

In spite of the acknowledged limitations of the above studies, they seem to indicate the following conclusions: (1) The Protestant minister of today, when compared with non-ministers, demonstrates health problems that are peculiar, at least in the high rate of occurrence, to his profession.

(2) The most pronounced examples of these health problems are anxiety and psychosomatic and functional illnesses which, for the most part, are anxiety-related.

(3) There appears to be an illness-vocation relationship; and in a sense it can be said that his work has contributed to his illness.

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[57]Weiss & English, op. cit., p. 273. Unfortunately, I am not aware of pertinent studies comparing the health problems of the clergy and another professional group. One obvious weakness of the N. C. research is that the preponderance of the laymen studied were non-professional, i. e. they were mostly "blue collar" workers who did not share the same type of professional demands as the ministers. It is possible that anxiety and emotional tension would appear within another professional group, such as doctors and business executives, at a rate of occurrence similar to that found among ministers.

(4) In this sense, then, the modern minister, perhaps more than anyone else, is a victim of ecclesiogenic neuroses--neuroses that affect the whole person.

The good news of the gospel of Jesus Christ does not create illness; and the Church functioning in its true role as the medium of reconciliation between God and man is not an agent of disease. The grace of God is the source of freedom and wholeness, not of slavery and incapacitation. It is only when the good news of Christ is perverted, when the Church undergoes deformation, and when the grace of God is mutilated and rejected that they become sources of ecclesiogenic neurosis. This has taken place, and no one feels the toll more than the Protestant minister.

> In a culture like our own, who will label the spurious gospels of our time as poison if the minister has neither the insight nor the courage to do so? We need desperately to know the difference between the Christian faith and . . . glib heresies. . . ."[58]

The minister today too often is "more like the man called Legion than a priest of the all high God."[59]

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[58]S. H. Miller, "Pastoral Experience and Theological Training: The Implications of Depth Psychology for Christian Theology," Making the Ministry Relevant, ed. Hans Hofmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), p. 71.

[59]Ibid., p. 70.

SUMMARY

Just as evidences of ecclesiogenic neuroses can be traced throughout the history of Christianity, so is the phenomenon apparent in the present day. There are alarming signs of degeneracy and neurotic behaviour in many aspects of the life of contemporary Protestantism. Expressions of these perversions are observed in both collective and personal manifestations. To recognize this fact, however, is not to accept the hostility toward religion of Freud and others. On the contrary, as one differentiates between true and false, healthy and sick, whole and deformed expressions of the Faith, testimony is made to the matchless value of the proclamation of the grace of God that has survived the aberrations that have threatened it in every generation. Some of these deformations of the Christian message are peculiar to the modern era, while others are "heresies" long known to the Faith. The ability and willingness to distinguish the true from the false and the healthy from the neurotic in the life of the Church is a mark of vitality and spiritual acumen. Only as accurate and

perceptive diagnoses are made, however, can the physician (the Church) heal herself, or more accurately, allow herself to be healed by the balm of the gracious God whose handmaid she is.

Collective symptoms of the modern deformation include the ancient ecclesiastical problem of institutionalism. H. Richard Niebuhr calls attention to a rhythm of healthy movement and unhealthy institutionalization that is observable in the history of the Church. The present day seems to belong to a period ruled by the institution; and the churches, lacking inner vitality, are on the defensive. The Church, always under judgement herself, seems not to recognize this and, instead, tends to equate her modern organizational structure with the Ecclesia. This is a confusing and deadly equation, and no one has warned against it more steadfastly than Emil Brunner, who goes as far as to say that often the Church as organization and institution has actually become an obstacle between modern man and Jesus Christ.

Part of the institutional perversion is the shallow activism rampant in many quarters of modern Protestantism. The churches in their promotion of this type of religiosity are in danger of finding themselves in the unsavory position of encouraging the churchman of

today to rest in a false security. He becomes an adherent to organizational "salvation," rather than a disciple of the Lord Jesus Christ.

As the institutional church grows more massive, as the activism accelerates, and as the Ecclesia and the ecclesiastical organization become more hopelessly confused the preservation of personal identity becomes an increasingly difficult task. The churches, more and more conscious of the success criterion of numerical growth, become giant collectives of lost people, still seeking a personal identity that already should be theirs as Christians. (When a man authentically states "I am Christ's!" then he has found his true identity.) The rapid urbanization of the churches and the accompanying personal anonymity compound the problem.

A second primary symptom of the Church's neurosis in the collective dimension is her introverted attitude. Instead of penetrating the secular world with a relevant gospel of the grace of God, the churches have retreated to the suburbs where they can exist comfortably, although irrelevantly. They have become desensitized and, subsequently, find it exceedingly difficult to feel the pulse of the world in which they exist. The religion of introversion is compartmentalized. Its realm, usually,

is limited to that of Sunday morning in the house of worship; and beyond these bounds it seldom ventures. It is not known in the realms of business, family life or recreation.

In the midst of her introversion, the modern Church expresses herself in both other-worldliness and this-worldliness. She is either radically opposed to the secular world or radically accommodated to it. In both cases the emphasis is on conformity. Institutionalism, especially in its organizational and activistic expressions, church introversion accompanied by irrelevance, compartmentalization, and conformity are all collective symptoms of the modern malady.

In the personal dimension, wide-spread symptoms that also indicate Protestant deformations of the Christian message are noted. None is more pronounced than the phenomenon which can be described as "the-drive-to-succeed." Never have the churches and churchmen been more success conscious. Ministers and laymen alike have succumbed to the charms of success. Numbers and size--"jumboism"--are the gods of this day. Humility has been sacrificed and the mundane made sacred. The drive-to-succeed has resulted in that which Martin Marty refers to as the "packaging" of God. God has been

moulded and remoulded in order to present him to the world in such a light that He will be more readily marketable. After all, if He is more marketable, then religious success is more likely. He must be given "popular sales appeal."

A contemporary cultural phenomenon also observable in the churches is the depersonalization of modern man. This perversion--counter to the ethos of the Christian faith in every respect--is not present in Protestant church life simply as an overflow of Western culture. Institutional Protestantism actively creates the climate in which depersonalization breeds. Brunner, R. Gregor Smith, and Martin Marty all point to the supplanting of the "I-Thou" relationship with that of the "I-It" in the churches themselves.

A by-product of depersonalization is the deep sense of meaninglessness being experienced, not only by modern secular man, but by today's churchmen as well. The frustration of this rapidly growing spiritual carcinoma is witnessed in the frantic activism and search for identity already alluded to. Emptiness and a spiritual vacuum are deeply felt in both lay and clerical ranks.

Moralism and legalism, problems in the day of Jesus, are still in our midst. Today, just as they were

then, they have become barriers separating man from God. The religion of law rules; and in its reign grace is incarcerated.

The result and toll of these multiplying perversions are felt by the whole person. But what is a "whole person"? The Hebrew view of man saw him in his wholeness--a unit of mind, body and spirit. This concept, however, was not shared by the Greeks. Plato, strongly influenced by Orphic theology, promulgated a view of man as a soul-body duality. Man was basically an incarnated soul. Jesus and Paul, both, appear to have assumed the Hebrew view of man as a whole person, and for the most part so does the New Testament. In recent years the theology expounded by Emil Brunner has stressed the whole person concept. Despite all this, however, the Greek dichotomy of body and soul has penetrated deeply into Christian thought; and it is open to debate whether more churchmen today are basically Greek or Hebrew-Christian in their doctrine of man.

The relationship of medicine and religion contributes to our understanding of man in his wholeness. Historically, this relationship has been exceedingly close. This was especially true in primitive days when the religious and medical personage were often one and

the same. In the medieval period, however, separation and divergence took place, with medicine and religion following distinct courses. In more recent years a rapprochement has been realized that has re-affirmed a common spirit shared by medicine and religion. Psychosomatic medicine, in particular, has done much to illustrate this relationship. The comprehensive approach to medicine emphasizes the whole person concept and, thus, places critical stress upon the healing force of authentic Faith. Conversely, the ministry of today is deeply indebted to medicine generally and medical psychology in particular for contributions to knowledge that increase the effectiveness of the minister in his practice of the cure of souls. Despite the ties that bind medicine and religion to each other, there is still a qualitative difference in their goals. A fundamental difference exists between the healing of bodies and minds and the cure of souls. There is the immediate goal of liberation from physical and mental disease, and the ultimate goal of the reconciliation of the whole man with God. Total health--the proper concern of the Church-- is not the absence of Sin and its symptoms; it is the forgiveness of Sin.

Health and Holiness are intrinsically related.

Both, in their deepest meaning, are the proper concern of the Church. When man as a whole person is ill--in mind, body, or spirit--he suffers in all. The churches, however, because of their perversions, have been guilty of creating a climate in which illness of the whole man is fostered. Protestant religion of law--moral legalism--a way of thinking in which the super-ego or prohibitive conscience is expressed in extreme forms is illustrative. This can lead to the difficult problem of morbid guilt--guilt that is false and does not lead to repentance and forgiveness. The church preoccupied with "convicting of sin," divorced from the grace of God that forgives, fosters morbid guilt--which in turn contributes to whole person illness.

Repression and isolation, both aspects of the Protestant deformation, also create total health problems for modern man. Freud's empirical observations in respect to repression were valid. The churches have been guilty of encouraging unhealthy repression in the lives of many churchmen, as seen, for example, in the depreciation of the God-given gift of sexuality. But, this has been the contribution of a deformed concept of the Faith, and not Christianity in its true and healthy expression. The denial of man's basic need of the

Church and religion, because of the negative effects of perverse expressions of Christianity, is another result of such distortions of the Faith.

Isolation is both a resultant and a causal factor in ecclesiogenic neuroses. Modern man suffers with a "Uriah syndrome," that is, the churches, because of their irrelevance and inability to communicate effectively, have withdrawn and left modern man in an isolated and exposed position. His sense of danger in a potentially hostile world creates debilitating anxiety from which he suffers intensely.

As a result of the various expressions of the Protestant deformation, the fate of many churchmen is either despair or rebellion. The growing phenomenon of meaninglessness illustrates the despair being experienced in massive measure. If the churchman turns rebel he disassociates himself from anything "Christian" and worships at some new altar. In both despair and rebellion he suffers illness as a whole person. All of the above mentioned phenomena prepare the way for the widespread experience of deep anxiety. Tillich suggests that the high level of mental disease in the Protestant West is due to the failure of Protestantism to meet the needs of the masses in the realm of religious education.

At least part of the explanation for the presence of intense anxiety is that modern Protestant man has spurned justification by grace through faith, and in its place has substituted a religion of law whose demands he has subsequently failed to meet. Consequently, he becomes anxious. The exorbitant cost of this anxiety is extracted from the economy of the whole person.

The Protestant minister is deeply enmeshed in the various experiences of the modern deformation and suffering acutely from his involvement. He is a member of the "perplexed profession." Role confusion characterizes his dilemma, and in his attempt to discover his own master role he plunges into various "heretical roles" that are not true to the calling of a Christian minister. In part, he assumes these false roles as a result of his own inner confusion and lack of self-understanding, and as a result of external pressures, such as the expectations of his congregation and the ecclesiastical organization of which he is a part.

The Protestant clergyman of today often attempts to function primarily as an authoritative personality. In this role he pledges allegiance to existing institutions and speaks ex cathedra in his own congregation and among his peers. His weaponry of dogmatism is not drawn from the arsenal of grace.

Another heretical role is that of the moraliser, in which the minister finds it almost impossible to communicate effectively with contemporary man. His language and thought patterns are those of the 18th and 19th centuries. Grace is atrophied and Christianity takes on a shallow and superficial character. Trivialities are inflated far out of proportion and the critically important is ignored. From the personal point of view the minister in this role is usually a person who refuses to admit the reality of a "shadow" side (Jung) to his own personality.

The martyr or suffering servant role often is assumed by men who have reached the toleration limit in some emotional area. These men cannot delegate responsibility, work compulsively, live a generally zestless existence, and suffer from psychosomatic and functional disorders. While extremely sensitive to criticism they actually thrive upon it, for it confirms them in their chosen role. The saviour-role, though similar to the martyr or suffering servant role, is not identical. In this role, the minister conceives of himself--consciously or unconsciously--as indispensable. The success of God's kingdom depends upon his success. His words have become the Word. Beneath this "saviour" mask, however, there

often dwells a very timid person suffering intensely from strong feelings of personal inferiority.

One of the "heretical roles" peculiar to this epoch is the executive role assumed by clergymen who are enamoured by the ways and means of big business. Caught up in this spirit they see the church only as an organization--a corporation. This minister is the "smooth operator" who builds a church into a thriving big business. In so doing his pastoral and prophetic functions often go lacking, but the "church" thrives!

Another false role of recent origin is the psychotherapeutic role. The minister who plays this part has confused the Christian cure of souls with secular psychotherapy. In place of the gospel of God's grace he offers amateur psychiatry. This man has failed completely to recognize the unique and distinctive aspects of the pastoral function. For all practical purposes he has left the "ministry," figuratively speaking, in order to practise psychotherapy.

In the midst of role confusion and "heretical roles," two essential ingredients for the health of the ministry and the Church are absent--self-understanding and a clear-cut self-image.

What does this augur for the health of today's

minister? In studies of the minister's health conducted in Berlin and in North Carolina there were indications that Protestant ministers were more prone to that which Dr. Klaus Thomas calls "ecclesiogenic neuroses." They were also more likely to be victims of anxiety and tension state and psychosomatic and functional illnesses. The Berlin studies indicated a high rate of sexual difficulties among ministers and religious workers, apparently because of a repressive type of "Christian" education. They also pointed to a high incidence of despair and depression among the clergy. However, the ministers did not seem to view suicide as a solution to this despair. Thomas indicts the churches not only for creating "ecclesiogenic neuroses," but also for their refusal to provide help and healing to those victims isolated in the midst of their desperate need.

The North Carolina studies indicated that in some areas of illness ministers are more susceptible to certain types of ailments than laymen, and that there is a correlation between their vocation and illnesses. Anxiety neuroses, psychosomatic illnesses, and overwork problems, as well as illnesses in which the tension of the patient's occupation was important were all observed at a higher rate of occurrence among the clergy than

among the laity. The problem of overwork has both its intrinsic and its extrinsic aspects. To some extent it develops out of the inner and often unconscious problems of the minister himself. However, it also has an etiology traceable to pressures and expectations lying within the congregation served by a pastor, and the ecclesiastical organization to which he and the church he serves belong.

The Protestant Church, functioning in its true role, is a medium of God's grace and proclaims reconciliation and forgiveness. When, however, it experiences deformation and its message becomes perverted, then it has the potential for becoming an agent for disease. There are serious contemporary indications that this potentiality has become a reality. Present day neurotic expressions of a false Protestant message seem to be affecting the total health of modern man, and especially the minister.

PART III. THE CURE OF SOULS: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE PSYCHOTHERAPISTS

CHAPTER VIII

CARL G. JUNG: ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

With the death of Carl G. Jung of Zürich on June 6, 1961, the most significant epoch in the history of psychology came to a close. Jung was the last of the three "fathers" of modern depth psychology. These psychological pioneers, Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler and Carl Jung, with their development of "psychoanalysis," "individual psychology," and "analytical psychology," respectively, have made an indelible mark on the history of mankind's search for knowledge.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the contributions of C. G. Jung and relate them with their conclusions to the problem of the ecclesiogenic neuroses and the cure of souls. One who is familiar with the extent of Jung's work readily recognizes the difficulty of adequately considering it in a few pages. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the following will prove to be constructive in our attempt to heed the critical call to the cure of souls.

Why Jung and not Freud or Adler? There are several reasons. Freud's relationship to religion has been well known for decades. His Future of an Illusion speaks pointedly and plainly. Despite the paradoxical and ironic fact that more clergymen are enamoured by Freudian psychoanalysis than any other psychological theory, the truth remains that Freud's position was consistently anti-religious. This is not to say that psychoanalysis has not made creative contributions to pastoral care and man's understanding of man; but it has done this in spite of its anti-religious posture and not because of it. On the other hand, Jung's relationship to religion, for the most part, is basically positive.

Jung, also, goes beyond Freud while not neglecting his old master's valuable discoveries. He often balances some of Freud's more one-sided presuppositions and conclusions. Finally, in comparison with Freud's views, those of Jung have received relatively little wide-spread serious attention, and certainly are worthy of more.

Why Jung and not Adler? Jung himself thought that Adler's psychology was far better received by the clergy than any other, including his own. Our consider-

ation of Jung rather than Adler is a choice influenced by chronology and longevity. Whereas Adler died almost thirty years ago (1937), Jung's death did not take place until 1961, and he was creatively productive, literally to within ten days of his death.[1] Therefore, Jung's works have the advantage of carrying with them more of the influence of recent history. Especially for a psychology of the Jungian type, this is not at all unimportant.

I. JUNGIAN THEORY AND THERAPY

Analytical psychology, as Jung's psychology is known, is a psychology of the unconscious. The reality and importance of the unconscious underlies the totality of Jung's thought. Jolande Jacobi, one of Jung's closest associates, has commented on the critical importance of the unconscious.

> In the psyche of modern man the conscious side has been overemphasized; consequently the repressed, dammed-up, unconscious side threatens to burst forth and inundate the conscious mind. That is why the need to integrate the unconscious into the psyche as a whole has become a specifically Western and

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[1]Jung's contributions to Man and His Symbols by C. G. Jung et al. (London: Aldus Books in association with W. H. Allen, 1964), were completed just ten days before his death.

> modern problem, crucial not only for the individual but for whole peoples as well.[2]

Jung, himself, attacked rationalism and doctrinairism, which tends to deny the significance of the unconscious, when commenting on life after death:

> Critical rationalism has apparently eliminated, along with so many other mythic conceptions, the idea of life after death. This could only have happened because nowadays most people identify themselves almost exclusively with their consciousness, and imagine that they are only what they know about themselves. Yet anyone with even a smattering of psychology can see how limited this knowledge is. Rationalism and doctrinairism are the disease of our time; they pretend to have all the answers.[3]

Elsewhere he has said, "yet we know the immensities of space better then we know our own depths, where--even though we do not understand it--we can listen directly to the throb of creation itself."[4]

Acknowledgement of the importance of the unconscious does not depend upon a thorough and complete

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[2]Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, trans. Ralph Manheim (6th ed.; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 79.

[3]C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, record. & ed. Aniela Jaffé, trans. Richard & Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon Books, Random House, 1961), p. 300.

[4]C. G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, Vol. VIII: The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, trans. R. F. C. Hull (18 vols.; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 380. From this point on all references to The Collected Works of C. G. Jung and the vol. number will be abbreviated "CW VIII," etc.

knowledge of it, nor upon any accurate systematization. The Jungian approach is often criticized for its lack of scientific system in presenting psychic material. Invariably these critics will be reminded that only a very superficial systematization is possible when one is dealing with that which is dynamic, irrational, and hyper-emotional. Jung believes that "in the unconscious, one is unfortunately in the same situation as in a moon-lit landscape: All the contents are blurred and merge into one another, and one never knows exactly what or where anything is, or where one thing begins and ends."[5]

For Freud the unconscious was the cesspool of our repressions--that which contained nothing but the rubbish and filth of our emotional existence. It was totally negative. For Jung the contents of the unconscious can be negative; but they can also be positive and neutral. The fact that he attributes positive aspects to the unconscious is of great importance in his psychology. Hans Schäer punctuates this significance when he states "the unconscious is the seat of original religious experience."[6] It is Schäer's opinion that

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[5]Man and His Symbols, p. 173.

[6]Hans Schäer, Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology, trans. R. F. C. Hull (New York: Bollingen Series XXI, Pantheon Books, 1950), p. 47.

"when the conscious mind has lost its bearings, the advance into the unconscious can often bring about a new and meaningful direction of personality."[7] The unconscious contributes constructively to personal meaning in life. In respect to one's Weltanschauung, for example, analytical psychology insists that it is imperative to recognize "that there exist certain unconscious contents which make demands that cannot be denied, or send forth influences with which the conscious mind must come to terms, whether it wills or no."[8]

Jung's psychology has a tendency to associate God and the unconscious. He has stated:

> It would be blasphemy to assert that God can manifest Himself everywhere save only in the human soul. Indeed the very intimacy of the relationship between God and the soul automatically precludes any devaluation of the latter. It would be going perhaps too far to speak of an affinity; but at all events the soul must contain in itself the faculty of relation to God, i.e. a correspondence, otherwise a connection could never come about. This correspondence is, in psychological terms, the archetype of the God-image.[9]

He speaks even more pointedly when he says:

> It is only through the psyche that we can establish that God acts upon us, but we are unable to

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[7]Ibid., p. 46.

[8]The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, CW VIII, p. 370.

[9]C. G. Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, CW XII, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), p. 10.

> distinguish whether these actions emanate from God or from the unconscious. We cannot tell whether God and the unconscious are two different entities. Both are border-line concepts for transcendental contents. . . . The God-image does not coincide with the unconscious as such, but with a special content of it, namely the archetype of the self. It is this archetype from which we can no longer distinguish the God-image empirically.[10] (Italics mine.)

On yet another occasion Jung has said:

> Hence I prefer the term "the unconscious," knowing that I might equally well speak of "God" or "daimon" if I wished to express myself in mythic language. When I do use such mythic language, I am aware that "mana," "daimon," and "God" are synonyms for the unconscious--that is to say, we know just as much or just as little about them as about the latter.[11]

Although Jung, in contrast to Freud, stresses the positive aspects of the unconscious and even goes so far as to associate God and the unconscious, he does not neglect the evil content found therein. In fact, he sees that which is "abysmally evil" originating not in man's wickedness or sinful heart but in his "stupidity and unconsciousness. . . ." "One of the toughest roots of all evil," he observes, "is unconsciousness."[12] The

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[10]C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, CW XI (1958), p. 468. See, also, Victor White, God and the Unconscious (London: Collins, 1960), "God" and "God-image" in Jungian thought are not identical. Cf. Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. xi.

[11]Memories, Dreams, Reflections, pp. 336-37.

[12]Psychology and Religion: West and East, p. 197.

subject of evil and the unconscious will be referred to later in connection with the Jungian concept of the "shadow." Let it simply be noted at this point that in Jung's psychology the unconscious "is a complexio oppositorum precisely because there can be no reality without polarity."[13]

Analytical psychology distinguishes the "personal unconscious" from the "collective unconscious." It goes even further as it speaks of a part of the collective unconscious that can never be raised to consciousness and distinguishes this from the rest of the collective unconscious. By "personal unconscious" Jung means that part of the psyche that contains disaggreeable repressions, things that one would like to forget and have been set aside. The personal unconscious is specifically related to one's individual ego. The collective unconscious--peculiar to Jungian psychology, while parallels to the personal unconscious are found in Freudian theory--is defined by Jung as "a certain psychic disposition shaped by the forces of heredity";[14] and an "uncon-

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[13]C. G. Jung, Aion, CW IX, Part 2, trans, R.F.C. Hull (New York: Pantheon Books, Bollingen Series XX, 1959), p. 267.

[14]C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W. S. Dell & Cary F. Baynes (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1933), p. 165.

scious psychic activity present in all human beings which not only gives rise to symbolical pictures today, but was the source of all similar products of the past."[15]

The contents of the collective unconscious include what Jung refers to as "archetypes." Jung first referred to these as "primordial images" or "dominants of the collective unconscious." Later they became known as "archetypes," due to the influence of Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite, Saint Augustine, and the Corpus Hermeticum.[16] Among the archetypes in analytical psychology are the "shadow," the "animus" and "anima," the "wise old man," the "great mother," and others.

It is exceedingly difficult to imagine what sort of hull would remain if symbols and myths were removed from analytical psychology. The whole theoretical and therapeutic approach of this psychology is based fundamentally on the importance of symbols and myths and

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[15]Ibid., pp. 71-72. For a more complete, yet concise, discussion of the "collective unconscious" see Jolande Jacobi's The Psychology of C. G. Jung, pp. 8ff. and 30ff.

[16]Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, p. 39ff. The concepts of archetypes and the collective unconscious are peculiarly Jungian and not without difficulty to understand. For further reading concerning these subjects see The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, CW IX, Part 1 (1959). To understand Jung's thesis on religion one cannot neglect his archetypes.

their interpretation, as well as their primary mode of expression--the dream. As Jung defines "symbol" he distinguishes it from "sign": "The sign is always less than the concept it represents, while a symbol always stands for something more than its obvious and immediate meaning. Symbols, moreover, are natural and spontaneous products."[17]

Jung's emphasis on the symbolic has brought forth from other "scientists" the charge of "mysticism." But he stoutly maintains the importance of symbols and myths:

> What we are to our inward vision, and what man appears to be sub specie aeternitatis, can only be expressed by way of myth. Myth is more individual and expresses life more precisely than does science. Science works with concepts of averages which are far too general to do justice to the subjective variety of an individual life.[18]

Joseph Henderson, a noted Jungian analyst in the United States, points to the difficulty that modern man

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[17] Man and His Symbols, p. 55. Jung's definition of "symbol" appears to have something of a sacramental character about it. See also Edwyn Bevan, Symbolism and Belief (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1938).

[18] Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 3. This is an important point. Preverbalization is an obvious state in infancy. Dreams at this time and at others take the form of pictures and not words. Should this not be taken into account in the realm of science? Are there not thoughts and experiences which cannot be verbalized in scientific terms? Does Bultmann err at this point with his demythologizing?

has with symbolism:

> It is not easy for modern man to grasp the significance of the symbols that come down to us from the past or that appear in our dreams. Nor is it easy to see how the ancient conflict between symbols of containment and liberation relates to our own predicament. Yet it becomes easier when we realize it is only the specific forms of the archaic patterns that change, not their psychic meaning.[19]

Jungians hold that it is out of the collective unconscious that common symbols and myths have arisen, and that these are pregnant with meaning for modern man. Fairy tales and mythologies of all cultures and ages often bear remarkable similarities that are due--not to cultural intercourse that might have overcome geographical barriers but--to a common origin out of the depths of mankind's collective unconscious. The primary medium for the communication of these symbols is the dream. In this sense then the dream is a "road to the unconscious," but it is more. It is, as Jacobi puts it, "a function through which the unconscious carries on the greater part of its regulative activity. For dreams express the 'other side,' the counterpart of the conscious attitude."[20] For the Jungian analyst the dream is of critical importance. Jung himself estimates

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[19]Man and His Symbols, pp. 156-157.

[20]The Psychology of C. G. Jung, p. 69.

that he has interpreted at least 80,000 dreams.[21] This speaks clearly of the importance attributed to dreams in analytical psychology.

Analytical psychology teaches that through dreams the unconscious attempts to maintain a psychic equilibrium. In fact, Jung states that "the general function of dreams is to try to restore our psychological balance by producing dream material that re-establishes, in a subtle way, the total psychic equilibrium."[22] But, contrary to Freud's view, Jung's dream analysis "is not so much a technique that can be learned and applied according to the rules as it is a dialectical exchange between two personalities."[23]

Schäer, somewhat optimistically, comments on the positive function of dreams as they pertain to religion:

> Many who, as far as their consciousness goes, have effected a complete break with religion, have dreams with an obviously religious content. . . . Thus one can never say in advance exactly what the unconscious is going to set functioning, though whatever it does set functioning will always have meaning, and will tend to protect the individual from extremes or one-sidedness. In other words,

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[21] Man and His Symbols, p. 160. While attending a term of lectures at the Jung Institute in Zürich I was impressed by the great stress placed upon dreams, dream material, and the symbolic and mythologic amplification and interpretation of them.

[22] Ibid., p. 50. [23] Ibid., p. 57.

> the unconscious functions in such a manner as to establish the individual's wholeness. It thus makes an important contribution to personality.[24]

The above quotation reflects analytical psychology's emphasis on polarity and the balance of opposites which leads to the Jungian view of the problem of evil and specifically to a consideration of the "persona" and "shadow." The term "persona" refers to that outer mask of every man--his reputation, his role, or whatever else it might be that he chooses to show to the world and to be known as. This has been the subject of psychological and, in some cases, even theological consideration for some time now.[25] According to Jung:

> The persona . . . is the individual's system of adaptation to, or the manner he assumes in dealing with, the world. Every calling or profession, for example, has its own characteristic persona. . . . Only, the danger is that people become identical with their personas--the professor with his textbook, the tenor with his voice. . . . One could say, with a little exaggeration, that the persona is that which in reality one is not, but which oneself as well as others think one is.[26]

The "persona" is that which the emerging adult adopts. In the child naïveté and unconsciousness are

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[24] Op. cit., p. 45.

[25] E.g., see Paul Tournier's treatment of this subject in The Meaning of Persons, trans. Edwin Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

[26] The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, pp. 122ff.

characteristic. Here we see the real person in his wholeness and openness, without the mask of the "persona." The child refreshingly, is who he is. He is not anxious about "impressing people" or "acting a part"--except in play. He does not concern himself with wearing a "mask," hiding behind a "wall," or withdrawing into a "safe shell." He is open, simple, uncomplicated, straightforward, honest--not consciously but unconsciously. As he grows, however, and is influenced by the significant adults in his life his naïveté and unconscious openness are encrusted over by a growing "persona" which is concerned, increasingly, with the exhibition of an "acceptable mask" for the world to see and approve.

Surely it was the original, open personhood, the honest, unpretentious childlikeness contrasting sharply with the mask of the "persona" that Jesus had in mind when he set the child before the adults and said this is the example of the Kingdom citizen. Jesus seems to hold out before us the hope that childlikeness can be regained (Matthew 18:3). From time to time the true person breaks through the shackles of the "persona" and glimpses of the Kingdom citizen are seen.

When a person becomes confused to the point of equating his "persona" and personality, then one of two

things usually takes place. As Schäer states:

> Then the persona either stifles his personality and the man becomes a psychic husk that is nothing more than the role he plays, or--a healthier but more painful proceeding--the tension between persona and personality leads to psychic suffering, sometimes verging on a neurosis, which can be resolved only by coming to terms with the persona and the counter-self, the shadow.[27]

It is apparent that part of the unfortunate function of the "persona" is to stifle the wholeness of man and in so doing to create an unbalanced and incomplete person who consciously, and to a certain extent unconsciously, lives a life of relative deceit. In Jungian theory the "shadow" that Schäer refers to above--at least the "personal shadow"--is an unconscious part of the personality, which serves as a complement to the conscious personality in order to form a relative totality. It represents those characteristics that the conscious personality does not wish to admit.

Jung believes that examples of the "shadow" are to be found in the literary realm and elsewhere. He refers to Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Goethe's Faust, Shelley's Frankenstein and others. One might expect this archetype to be totally negative; but in keeping with his view of polarity and wholeness Jung does

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[27]Schäer, op. cit., p. 50.

not consider this to be true: "Every personification of the unconscious--the shadow, the anima, the animus, and the Self--has both a light and a dark aspect."[28] If this is so, then it is possible for the "shadow" to be of great value. This can be illustrated by the person who consciously lives a life that is quite negative, characterized by greed, cruelty, dishonesty, and so forth. In this case the positive side of the personality is repressed into the unconscious, therefore, creating a positive "shadow" whose function is to compensate for negative consciousness. It is to be granted that one would first have to assume, as Jung does, that there is a positive side present in order for it to be repressed. Analytical psychology's position is that this has to be true, otherwise there is no totality, no wholeness. Jung argues that God, Himself, is not without his "shadow." In speaking of John's Revelation, he states: "This apocalyptic 'Christ' behaves rather like a bad-tempered, power-conscious 'boss' who very much resembles the 'shadow' of a love-preaching bishop."[29] His Answer to Job is a concrete expression of his view of the

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[28]Man and His Symbols, p. 216.

[29]C. G. Jung, Answer to Job, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 123.

problem of evil and the nature of God--a concept that is clearly radical.

It would far exceed the possibilities of this chapter to attempt a full discussion of Jung's views on the problem of evil and the relationship of evil and good. Liliane Frey presents an acceptable summary of the Jungian point of view:

> The polarity of good and evil belongs to human life. Whenever good is experienced, evil is also present. Self-development of the individual, therefore, also includes evil. Evil can even have great significance for the process of self-realization, since it is indeed a part of the creative primal cause. To attempt to destroy evil for rational reasons would be to destroy the very source of life. On the other hand, giving free rein to evil would lead to the same result. Coming to terms with evil is therefore a moral task which calls for the highest exertions on the part of the ego. It means consciousness, sacrifice, and a constant relationship to the center of the self. When such an attitude is maintained, even the paradox that evil can create good may become a reality. As Jung expresses it: "Just as the conscious mind can put the question, 'Why is there this frightful conflict between good and evil?,' so the unconscious can reply, 'Look closer! Each needs the other. The best, just because it is the best, holds the seed of evil, and there is nothing so bad but good can come of it.'"[30] [This quotation from Jung is from Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, CW VII (1953), p. 181]

Although there are many points of view shared by Jung, Freud, and Adler, there are contributions made to

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[30]Liliane Frey, "Evil from the Psychological Point of View," Spring 1965 (Publ. by the Analytical Psychology Club of New York Inc.), p. 46.

psychological theory that are peculiarly Jungian. Among them are the following, not all of which are considered in these few pages: (1) his theory of archetypes arising from a creative collective unconscious; (2) his idea and scope of amplification in contrast to Freudian reductionism; (3) his theory of synchronicity and timelessness; (4) his emphasis on the suprapersonal; (5) his view of paradox, polarity, opposites and enantiodromia;[31] (6) his intense study of and use of symbolism; (7) his concept of one's being unable to stand outside of self in order to view one's self in totality; (8) his acknowledgement of a self-regulating function in the psyche; (9) his strong sense of history; (10) his concept of complementarity; and (11) his theory of the value of the negative in which evil is integrated instead of destroyed.[32]

The above pages admittedly do not touch upon all of Jungian theory--for example, the important concept of the "individuation process" has not been discussed.

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[31]"Enantiodromia" is a fundamental law of life according to Jung. It is conversion into the opposite; and he thinks of it especially in relation to good and evil. See Psychology & Religion: West & East, pp. 342, 399, 433, 444, 447.

[32]These emphases are found either explicitly or implicitly throughout Jung's writings; e.g. his CW.

However, it is hoped that this brief introduction to the theory of analytical psychology will serve a valid function in our consideration of Jung's contribution, especially as it relates to the ecclesiogenic neuroses and the cure of souls.

Jung's practice of therapy is, of course, a direct result of his theory. But to think that there has developed a certain therapeutic technique in Jungian psychology is to be mistaken. Jung has said:

> Therapy is different in every case. . . . The cure ought to grow naturally out of the patient himself. Psychotherapy and analysis are as varied as are human individuals. I treat every patient as individually as possible, because the solution of the problem is always an individual one. . . . To my mind, in dealing with individuals, only individual understanding will do. We need a different language for every patient. In one analysis I can be heard talking the Adlerian dialect, in another the Freudian.
>
> The crucial point is that I confront the patient as one human being to another. Analysis is a dialogue demanding two partners. Analyst and patient sit facing one another, eye to eye; the doctor has something to say, but so has the patient.[33]

Jung's healthy appreciation for the personal and individual is never more apparent.

Although, in Jungian analysis, catharsis, explanation, education and transformation are more often present than not, the emphasis is upon the interpersonal rela-

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[33] *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 131.

tionship and not upon making sure that these therapeutic stages of development are realized.[34] It is of the utmost importance that the analyst "be human," deny a condescendingly fatherly role, and admit the limits of his own understanding. In respect to the counselor who always "understands," Jung has this to say: "Nothing is more unbearable for the patient than to be always understood."[35] The interpersonal relationship between doctor and patient or analyst and analysand that leads to therapeutic success should be characterized by an unprejudiced, objective, accepting attitude on the part of the doctor or analyst--an attitude difficult to obtain and maintain. "We have learned to place in the foreground the personality of the doctor himself as a curative or harmful factor."[36]

Jung's conviction of the sine qua non importance of the interpersonal relationship and his view that "the great healing factor in psychotherapy is the doctor's personality"[37] rightly leads him to conclude that "analysis makes for higher demands on the mental and

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[34] Modern Man in Search of a Soul, pp. 46ff.

[35] Ibid., p. 9. [36] Ibid., p. 53.

[37] C. G. Jung, The Practice of Psychotherapy, CW XVI (1954), p. 88.

moral stature of the doctor than the mere application of a routine technique, and also that his therapeutic influence lies primarily in the more personal direction."[38] It is to his lasting credit that for Jung:

> The touchstone of every analysis that has not stopped short at partial success, or come to a standstill with no success at all, is always this person to person relationship, a psychological situation where the patient confronts the doctor upon equal terms, and with the same ruthless criticism that he must inevitably learn from the doctor in the course of his treatment.[39]

Jung's psychotherapy--which he estimates as providing cures in one-third of the cases, considerable improvement in another one-third, and leaving the final one-third essentially uninfluenced[40]--interprets neurosis usually as a "pathological, one-sided development of the personality."[41] The neurotic is one who is demoralized, who has lost self-confidence and is suffering a humiliating defeat. Neurosis, which is "a substitute for legitimate suffering,"[42] demands the risk of something. For the religionless neurotic this risk could be interpreted as a new and magnificent obsession--with religious faith!

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[38] Ibid., p. 138. [39] Ibid., p. 137.

[40] Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 143.

[41] The Practice of Psychotherapy, p. 129.

[42] C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1938), p. 92.

For the ecclesiogenically neurotic it could mean the risk of losing an old childish concept of religion in the hope of discovering a new, more mature and more healthy faith.

Analytical psychology, unlike many other psychological theories, does not shy away from religion but, on the contrary, recognizes it as critically important in therapy. From an empirical standpoint Jung observed that "all the contemporary problems, all the philosophical and religious questionings of our day, are raked up" in therapy.[43] Weltanschauung and discussion of the same could not be avoided; "for sooner or later it was bound to become clear that one cannot treat the psyche without touching on man and life as a whole, including the ultimate and deepest issues. . . ."[44]

Jung's basically positive view towards Christianity specifically and religion generally, especially in relation to therapy, is reflected in his appreciation of the Christian doctrine of original sin, and of the meaning and value of suffering, as well as belief in immortality.[45] Neither does he neglect the therapeutic value of Christian and other religious symbolism.

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[43] The Practice of Psychotherapy, p. 78.

[44] Ibid., p. 76. [45] Ibid., pp. 81-82.

Christianity has given to each individual the dignity of an immortal soul. It is not the enemy of the sick as Freud indicates, but is actually a system of psychic healing--as Jung believes is apparent in the use of the Christian term "cure of souls."[46] Aniela Jaffé, the recorder of Jung's autobiography, states that Jung:

> . . . was well aware that the patient's religious attitude plays a crucial part in the therapy of psychic illnessos. . . . It also became apparent to him that numerous neuroses spring from a disregard for this fundamental characteristic [religious] of the psyche. . . ."[47]

The generally positive position of Jung in respect to religion is welcomed, especially in contrast to Freud's anti-religious stance. However, despite the fact that Jung recognized the tremendously important role of the spiritual in the psychic economy one cannot be convinced fully that in his thought Christianity was any more than an expression of psychotherapy. In an attempt to understand more clearly Jungian psychology let us take cognizance, in a little more detail, of the relationship of it to Christianity.

II. CHRISTIANITY AND ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Jung was an empiricist. In his investigation of

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[46] Ibid., p. 105. [47] Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. x.

the unconscious he recognized more and more clearly the importance of living religion. Therefore, he increasingly drew religion into the field of his endeavors. Schäer claims that, "no matter where you open Jung's psychology, you will always find flashes of insight and ideas that touch on the religious side of things. . . ."[48] Jung, who has identified his own religious position as being "on the extreme left wing of the congress of Protestant opinion,"[49] has stated his belief that there are four great "gifts of grace" that man needs in order to live--these are "faith, hope, love and insight."[50] Apparently the alleged gnostic element in Jung's thought has made the one addition of "insight" to the Apostle Paul's familiar trilogy.

Analytical psychology's rapport with Christianity is stronger with the more liberal elements of the Christian faith. In fact, from a historical perspective much of Jung's thought has much in common with divergent streams of the faith that have been stamped as "heretical" by the orthodox Church of the past. Both Jung's friction

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[48] Op. cit., p. 8.

[49] Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 243.

[50] Ibid., p. 226.

with traditional, dogmatic Christianity and his openness to the faith are indicated in the following statement:

> Not only do I leave the door open for the Christian message, but I consider it of central importance for Western man. It needs, however, to be seen in a new light, in accordance with the changes wrought by the contemporary spirit. Otherwise, it stands apart from the times, and has no effect on man's wholeness.[51]

The reality of religious experience, as viewed by Jungian psychology, is indisputable. No matter what those who do not share a religious experience might think, the one who has it has a "great treasure." He has "pistis and peace."[52] Experience is the *sine qua non* for which intellectual insight or anything else cannot be substituted--it is a gift of grace which makes for wholeness and unity. It has been said that Jung's religious position magnifies the role of the Holy Spirit while minimizing the historical Christ.

Jung equates unity and totality with the *imago dei* and says, "hence all statements about the God-image apply also to the empirical symbols of totality."[53]

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[51] *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 210.

[52] Jung, *Psychology and Religion*, p. 113.

[53] *Aion*, p. 31.

From this point it is but a short step to identify evil as well as good with God, as he does. In Aion, he discusses at length the doctrine of privatio boni, and develops his theory of polarity and the necessity of compensation.[54] Good and evil then--at least in this world--more or less cancel each other out. This, of course, is not orthodox theology. But, according to Schäer, Jung is aware of what is considered the cleavage between orthodox religion and personal religious experience. However, if he agrees with Schäer's statement that "membership in the Church gives you a religious creed, but if you belong to the Church you must renounce personal religious experience," he subscribes to a rash generalization.[55]

One of the most interesting empirical observations Jung has made is in regard to the "Christian God-image" arising from modern man's unconscious. Jung was strongly influenced by Nietzsche, especially by his Thus Spoke Zarathustra.[56] Aniela Jaffé, speaking of Nietzsche's concept of the "death of God," says:

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[54] Ibid., pp. 41ff. [55] Op. cit., p. 217.

[56] See Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964).

> Dr. Jung also came to realize that this strange and mysterious phenomenon of the death of God is a psychic fact of our time. In 1937 he wrote: "I know--and here I am expressing what countless other people know--that the present time is the time of God's disappearance and death." For years he had observed the Christian God-image fading in his patient's dreams--that is in the unconscious of modern men. The loss of that image is the loss of the supreme factor that gives life a meaning.[57]

Jaffé, anticipating a theological reaction to such a statement, goes on to say that Jung's deductions have "nothing final to say about the reality and existence of God or of a transcendental being or not being." She interprets them as human assertions describing a psychic phenomenon and concludes that "the origin of these contents, and the cause of such a transformation (from a living to a dead God) must remain unknown, on the frontier of mystery."[58] Jaffé's anticipatory defense of Jung's deductions are consistent with Jung's feeling that he was more often than not misunderstood:

> I am always coming up against the misunderstanding that a psychological treatment or explanation reduces God to "nothing but" psychology. It is not a question of God at all, but of man's ideas of God, as I have repeatedly emphasized."[59]

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[57] Man and His Symbols, p. 255. Cf. the contemporary "God is dead" theology. See Time, LXXXVII (April 8, 1966), 50-55.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Psychology and Religion: West and East, p. 163, n. 16.

Jung, like many others, felt that Freudian psychoanalysis was inadequate and in need of correction. In this respect, he states:

> The Weltanschauung of psychoanalysis is a rationalistic materialism, the Weltanschauung of an essentially practical science--and this view we feel to be inadequate. When we trace a poem of Goethe's to his mother-complex, when we seek to explain Napoleon as a case of masculine protest, or Saint Francis as a case of sexual repression, a sense of profound dissatisfaction comes over us. The explanation is insufficient and does not do justice to the reality and meaning of things. What becomes of beauty, greatness and holiness? These are vital realities without which human existence would be superlatively stupid.[60]

In spite of some exceptions it remains true that analytical psychology's relationship to religion is basically positive. It recognizes the essential role of religion in the life of man and the ensuing meaninglessness and even neuroses that develop when this is neglected, denied, or perverted. It is a psychology that freely lends support to an individual's involvement in religion if this--according to the judgment of the analyst--seems to be prescribed. It has done much to rediscover the meaning of religious symbolism. However, its appeal to pay attention to the "religious" and the "spiritual" is in no sense identical with the

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[60] The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 367.

Church's call to do the same. Jung and analytical psychology are a long way from the main stream of traditional Christianity.

Some consider analytical psychology to be a modern Christian "heresy," while others act as if it were their "church." In personal communication with Jungians, one often senses their conviction that the traditional churches of today might have their places; but their places are for those who are not capable or willing to travel the "higher" road of the Jungian "individuation process." Jacobi, somewhat condescendingly, speaks of those whose consciousnesses are "still sheltered in faith and the symbolism of dogma."[61] And Jung comments:

> I am firmly convinced that a vast number of people belong to the fold of the Catholic Church and no where else, because they are most suitably housed there. I am as much persuaded of this as of the fact, which I have myself observed, that a primitive religion is better suited to primitive people than Christianity, which is so incomprehensible to them and so foreign to their blood that they can only ape it in a disgusting way. I believe, too, that there must be protestants against the Catholic Church, and also protestants against Protestantism--for the manifestations of the spirit are truly wondrous, and as varied as Creation itself.[62]

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[61] The Psychology of C. G. Jung, p. 129.

[62] Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 244. Jung's comment in respect to "primitive religion for primitive

Jung's attitude, and consequently that of analytical psychology, towards religion was grounded--like everyone else's--in his own personal religious experience, which is pertinent and enlightening.

III. JUNG'S PERSONAL RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

One cannot but admire the honesty and the openness that characterize Jung's autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections. It is in this book that we catch a glimpse into the developing religious convictions of Carl Jung. Aniela Jaffé states that:

> This book is the only place in his extensive writings in which Jung speaks of God and his personal experience of God. . . . In his scientific works Jung seldom speaks of God; there he is at pains to use the term "the God-image in the human psyche." This is no contradiction. In the one case his language is subjective, based upon inner experience; in the other it is the objective language of scientific inquiry. In the first case he is speaking as an individual, whose thoughts are influenced by passionate, powerful feelings, intuitions, and experiences of a long and unusually rich life; in the second he is speaking as a scientist who consciously restricts himself to what may be demonstrated and supported by evidence. As a scientist Jung is an empiricist.[63]

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people" is certainly open to refutation if we are considering authentic Christianity and not the superficial trappings of a neurotic perversion. The opinions of many others, who have spent more time than Jung among primitive people, are contrary to Jung's. Cf. Donald Fraser, Winning a Primitive People (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Ltd., 1914), chap. xxv.

[63] Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. xi.

Jung was reared in a home of Swiss Protestants, his father being a parish minister in northern Switzerland. He also had eight uncles who were pastors. In keeping with the custom and culture of the day, they all wore "black frock coats and shiny black boots" which reminded Jung as a young boy of funerals. For many years the simple remembrance of this type of dress and the negative experiences he associated with it was enough to create in him an inner fear.[64]

Jung's relationship to organized Christianity seems to have been anything but creative and positive from the start. This relationship was intertwined with his relationship to his pastor-father, towards whom his feelings as a young boy were strongly ambivalent. He speaks of a time when there arose in him "profound doubts about everything my father said." He continues, "what he said [about grace] sounded stale and hollow, like a tale told by someone who knows it only by hearsay and cannot quite believe it himself."[65] One senses a feeling both of pity and of disdain towards his father, a feeling--if interpreted correctly--born out of his

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[64]Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 13.

[65]Ibid., p. 43.

father's submission to the theological thinking and demands of the contemporary Church. Jung comments acidly:

> Once I heard him praying. He struggled desperately to keep his faith. I was shaken and outraged at once, because I saw how hopelessly he was entrapped by the Church and its theological thinking. They had blocked all avenues by which he might have reached God directly, and then faithlessly abandoned him. Now I understood the deepest meaning of my earlier experience: God Himself had disavowed theology and the Church founded upon it. On the other hand God condoned this theology, as He condoned so much else.[66]

What Jung experienced and interpreted as grace he believed his father had never experienced; and what he dared to think as a young boy and man he felt his father had never dared to think. He reflects:

> Not until several years later did I come to understand that my poor father did not dare to think, because he was consumed by inward doubts. He was taking refuge from himself and therefore insisted on blind faith. He could not receive it as a grace because he wanted to "win it by struggle," forcing it to come with convulsive efforts.[67]

The defensive and obscurantist moralism that Jung experienced--if his observations of what he felt was taking place are correct--made an indelible mark on him during those years of maturation. At six years of age he had an experience that he described in his autobio-

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[66] Ibid., p. 93. [67] Ibid., p. 73.

graphy almost seventy-five years later. He had been visiting a museum with his Aunt where he became fascinated by sculpture that he describes as "marvelous figures." Suddenly, his Aunt began pulling him by the hand to the exit, all the time crying out "disgusting boy, shut your eyes; disgusting boy, shut your eyes"! Jung states: "Only then did I see that the figures were naked and wore fig leaves. I hadn't noticed it at all before."[68]

For Jung the concept of "religious community" meant nothing at all. The habitual church-goers impressed him as being far less a community than many of the "worldly" folk. "The latter," he says, "may have been less virtuous, but on the other hand they were much nicer people, with natural emotions, more sociable and cheerful, warmer-hearted and more sincere."[69]

Understanding and obeying the will of God became of primary importance to young Carl; but it seemed to him that religious precepts were often being substituted

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[68] Ibid., p. 16. It is impossible to estimate the importance of the influence of such early encounters with the ecclesiogenic neurosis--as illustrated in this museum visit with his Aunt--upon Jung's later psychological and theological development. But these experiences cannot be ignored nor completely discounted.

[69] Ibid., p. 75. Cf. Bonhoeffer's feelings, supra, p.94.

for the will of God. He suspected that the reason for this substitution was to spare the people the necessity of understanding the will of God, which could be "so unexpected and so alarming."[70] Despite his distaste for the organized church and theological dogmatism, he attempted to conform. "In later years and until my confirmation, I made every effort to force myself to take the required positive attitude to Christ. But I could never succeed in overcoming my secret distrust."[71]

To attempt to conform to one's group and, at the same time, to pursue an individual goal is to flirt with neurosis. Just how neurotic the experiences that Jung describes in his autobiography were or were not is not our concern. Jung felt that he had experienced the grace of God--illumination, a sense of relief, an unutterable bliss, and a sense of healing. His orthodox father had not experienced this; therefore, reasoned Jung, he could not possibly understand that which his son now understood. Speaking again of his father, Jung observes:

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[70] Ibid., p. 46.

[71] Ibid., pp. 13-14. Cf. young Luther's concept of Christ before he came to know God as the God of grace. Supra, pp. 112ff.

> He had taken the Bible's commandments as his guide; he believed in God as the Bible prescribed and as his forefathers had taught him. But he did not know the immediate living God who stands, omnipotent and free, above His Bible and His Church, who calls upon man to partake of His freedom, and can force him to renounce his own views and convictions in order to fulfil without reserve the command of God. In His trial of human courage God refuses to abide by traditions, no matter how sacred. In His omnipotence He will see to it that nothing really evil comes of such tests of courage. If one fulfils the will of God one can be sure of going the right way.[72]

Jung felt that it was obedience, utter abandonment to God, that brought him the grace he experienced. His obedience he considered productive, while that of his father was sterile. Both pledged their allegiance to Christianity, but how different a definition they gave to that term! Jung stressed the necessity of understanding and reflecting, as over and against the demand for faith. He distinguished sharply between a psychological and theological approach, and quite unabashedly declared his bias to the former. Nowhere does he differ more markedly with traditional Christianity than in his answer to the problem of evil and his concept of a God who is not totally good and kind. For Jung, the metaphor that God is in heaven was inferior to the concept of God in the soul. He advocated revelation that can

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[72] Ibid., p. 40.

be experienced now, and charged that theology teaches a concept of revelation that is complete and static.

Against this background of Jung's personal religious experience, his psychological theory and therapy, and the relationship of analytical psychology and Christianity, let us now turn our attention toward the ecclesiogenic neuroses. It should be remembered, however, that in Jung's own words "every psychology--my own included--has the character of a subjective confession."[73]

IV. JUNG AND THE ECCLESIOGENIC NEUROSES

Jung's personal religious experience led him to a position for all practical purposes outside of the Church. He observes:

> Great saints were, as we know, sometimes great heretics, so it is probable that anyone who has immediate experience of God is a little bit outside the organization one calls the Church. The Church itself would have been in a pretty pass if the Son of God had remained a law-abiding Pharisee, a point one tends to forget."[74]

From his vantage point, "a little bit outside the organization one calls the Church," Jung makes a worthy contribution to our understanding of the ecclesiogenic neuroses and our concern with the cure of souls.

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[73] Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 118.

[74] Psychology and Religion: West and East, p. 321.

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His pertinent observations at the point of ecclesiogenic neuroses lend themselves to a categorization that includes ten major divisions. I shall make reference in a synoptic fashion to each of these and then evaluate Jung's contribution at that specific point.

(1) It is Jung's opinion that most of contemporary Christianity is little more than a substitute for what he calls "immediate religious experience." It is characterized by religiosity and is, in Jacobi's words, a "moral tower. . . not a natural growth but an artificial scaffolding."[75] This type of religion, which Jung prefers to call a "creed," has the purpose of replacing "immediate experience" by a choice of suitable symbols "invested in a solidly organized dogma and ritual."[76] As long as Protestants, he argues, successfully insist upon faith and the evangelical message then people will be, in a sense, inoculated against taking "real religion" through the "immediate experience." Speaking of one of his patients Jung has stated: "He understood that religion can be a substitute for certain awkward emotional demands which one might circumvent by going

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[75] The Psychology of C. G. Jung, p. 109.

[76] Psychology and Religion, pp. 52-53.

to church."[77] Jung interprets his own "awkward emotional" experiences as "real religion," and orthodox religion, such as his father's, as an invalid substitute.

This idea of Jung's, that present-day religious faith in the form of dogma and creed, is a substitute for and defense against "real religion," is valid to a certain extent. No doubt this has been true to some degree in every age. The immediate and personal experience is essential to a vital religious faith. This is first and foremost. However, as individuals seek to express and share their faith, there is the natural development of creed and dogma which seems unavoidable, even ifundesirable. The difficulty arises in allowing the latter to become so prominent as to over-shadow and smother the former; or imposing the credal faith on persons who have not yet had the immediate personal religious experience.

(2) It appears as if Jung leaves very little room for the function of an organized Church in his thought. Although he himself held church membership, paid his church "tax," and occasionally attended the services of worship, his experiences in childhood--

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[77] Ibid., p. 51.

predominantly of a negative nature when associated with organized religion---apparently helped to create a view that he maintained throughout life. He did not deny the value of the Church for those who found her necessary and meaningful. However, there was always the implication that she was not necessary and, at times, even interposed herself between God and man in an obscurantist manner.

To recognize the problem of ecclesiasticism and institutionalism is one thing, but to reject the institutional church in toto is something else. This borders on the nonsensical. Some form, some structure, is a necessity that cannot be denied. The solution here is not to be found in what seems to be Jung's total rejection of organized Christianity, but rather in the continued and constant healing of that which is unhealthy by the therapy of humility and self-examination.

(3) Jung's concept of the archetype, which he refers to as the "shadow," is a significant concept in our consideration of the ecclesiogenic neuroses. For Jung as well as Freud religion is associated with repression, although, admittedly, in a different degree and manner. In Jungian psychology the most righteous man is often one whose "shadow" has been repressed to an almost

intolerable degree---compensation must result. This theory is his attempt to explain what we all have observed empirically at times and what he refers to as "classical symptoms of chronic virtuousness," which are irritability, bad moods, and outbursts of affect.[78] Speaking of the author of the New Testament book of Revelation he says:

> The "revelation" was experienced by an early Christian who, as a leading light of the community, presumably had to live an exemplary life and demonstrate to his flock the Christian virtues of true faith, humility, patience, devotion, selfless love, and denial of all worldly desires. In the long run this can become too much, even for the most righteous. Irritability, bad moods, and outbursts of affect are the classical symptoms of chronic virtuousness.[79]

Empirically, it is not hard to believe that the "shadow" often is projected. We reproach others about characteristics and failings that we most often possess ourselves---although we either deny that we have ever had them or believe that we have successfully mastered them. We can conceive of a person who is striving for perfection exhibiting a repressed, and then, projected "shadow." Long pent-up negative feelings insist on some mode of expression. Empirical observation of markedly "pious" persons demonstrates Jung's theory of compensa-

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[78] Answer to Job, p. 143. [79] Ibid.

tion at work. Repression resulting in a desired pious exterior or "persona" often is balanced by unconscious moods, dreams, and fantasies quite demonical. As Samuel Butler has phrased it:

> Compound for sins they are inclin'd to;
> By damning those they have no mind to;

He also refers to those "whose chief Devotion lies in odd perverse Antipathies."[80]

Probably one of the most notable illustrations of the process of "shadow" repression, projection and unconscious compensation is that of religious fanaticism, especially as exemplified in heresy hunts. In these cases the fanaticism and zeal for the "faith" are often a determined defense against unacceptable personal doubt. Jung maintains that "fanaticism, after all, is merely over-compensated doubt."[81] Schäer adds:

> Heresy-hunts and inquisitions in any form are invariably a sign of one's own unconscious doubt. Torquemada had all the heretics he could lay hands on inquisited and condemned, but the one aim he never reached was the conquest of the --unconscious-- doubt in his own soul.[82]

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[80]Samuel Butler, Hudibras, ed. A. R. Waller (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1905), pp. 8-9.

[81]C. G. Jung, Psychological Types, trans. H. Godwin Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1923), p. 41.

[82]Op. cit., p. 85.

Analytical psychology's assistance in understanding the "shadow," the "persona," repression, projection, and unconscious compensation is a most valuable aid towards comprehending and meeting the challenge of ecclesiogenic neuroses.

(4) Theology is attacked by Jung for its obscurantism and dogmatic assertions. He charges that it is guilty of proclaiming doctrines no one can understand and demanding a faith that no one can fabricate. Jung believes that analytical psychology distinguishes between healthy and pathological psychic life in the field of religion, and admonishes theology to do the same instead of acting "as though every manifestation of religious feelings were intrinsically sublime."[83]

One of his most incisive observations is that:

> . . . Despite every effort the modern mind no longer understands our two-thousand-year-old

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[83] Ibid., p. 133. It seems that Jung's criterion for his distinction between healthy and pathological religion is identified basically with the distinction he makes between personal religious experience and traditional institutional religion. It is not unfair to state that, on the basis of his autobiographical work, he indicates that his religious experience was "healthy" and that of his father was "pathological." See, also, Edgar P. Dickie, Revelation and Response (Edinburgh: T. &.T. Clark, 1938), pp. 32-41; and B. H. Streeter, Reality (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1929), pp. 266-68, and 276-78.

> theological language unless it "accords with reason!" As a result, the danger that lack of understanding will be replaced by lip-service, affectation, and forced belief or else by resignation and indifference has long since come to pass.[84]

Jung is convinced that the world, long ago, stopped wanting to "hear a message," but would much rather be told just what that message means. He asserts that "the words that resound from the pulpit are incomprehensible and cry for an explanation."[85]

Part of this incrimination is at the point of communication. What has theology communicated to the world? Has the message proclaimed by the Church grown hollow and meaningless? If so, then why? Is the flaw intrinsic in the message? This is hardly likely; for that which was life and liberty, salvation and security, peace and promise, health and hope to our forefathers should mean the same to modern man. If it does not, as Jung seems to indicate, then the problem must be one of communication. A message that is proclaimed without meaning can only create meaninglessness. Problems of communication, semantics, and symbolism warrant increased interest and investigation.

Jung also charges that Protestantism today is guilty of demanding a faith that no one can manufacture.

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[84] Aion, pp. 165-166. [85] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

Of course, faith is that which can be neither demanded nor manufactured. It is that personal encounter with the living God that results in a free and positive response in personal commitment. It is that dedication to obedience to the will of God that was so important to Jung himself in his own religious pilgrimage. Only a perversion of religion, tainted by ecclesiogenic neuroses, demands faith.

(5) While speaking of extreme cases of a personality type which he describes as the "extraverted sensation type," Jung has said:

> More acute cases develop every sort of phobia, and especially compulsive symptoms. The pathological contents have a remarkable air of unreality, with a frequent moral or religious colouring. A petti-fogging captiousness often develops, or an absurdly scrupulous morality coupled with a primitive, superstitious and "magical" religiosity, harking back to abstruse rites. . . . Reason is hair-splitting sophistry--morality is dreary moralizing and palpable Pharisaism--religion is absurd superstition. . . .[86]

The moralistic and activistic perversion which he refers to here is at the heart of many contemporary Christian deformations. The central conflict, as I have said, in respect to moralism and activism is that conflict between law and grace, works and faith. It is the unresolved problem evident in the history of

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[86]Psychological Types, p. 460.

Christianity from the time of Jesus's confrontation with the Pharisees to the present day. "Our Christian religion," says Jung, "is permeated by the idea that special acts or a special kind of action can influence God--for example, through certain rites or by prayer, or by a morality pleasing to the Divinity."[87]

Jung's childhood experiences introduced him at an early age to the ecclesiogenic neurosis. Unfortunately, his appraisal that this type of mentality is characteristic of much of today's organized religion is far too accurate to ignore.

(6) Theological, spiritual, and experiential petrification is also an aspect of the modern Christian Church, argues Jung. He quotes H. Heine from Deutschland who said:

> Plato and Aristotle! These are not merely two systems; they are also types of two distinct natures. . . . Enthusiastic, mystical, Platonic natures reveal Christian ideas and their corresponding symbols from the bottomless depths of their souls. Practical, ordering, Aristotelian natures build up from these ideas and symbols a solid system, a dogma and a cult. The Church eventually embraces both natures--one of them sheltering among the clergy, while the other finds refuge in monasticism; yet both incessantly at feud.[88]

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[87] Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 253.

[88] Psychological Types, p. 9.

Jung indicates his view that the "Aristotelian nature" is the dominant nature of present day Christianity. A "fateful stasis" has taken place in the evolution of the Christian idea, with the Imitatio Christi as the precursor of this stasis that replaced the dynamic spirit of earlier Christianity. In this sense, then, he sees the Imitatio Christi as an unfortunate detour from one's "own destined road to wholeness."[89] To copy, in an outer or ritualistic behaviour, the religious experience of Christ, to act out the pattern of his "individuation process" is not desirable. To follow in the steps of Christ, according to Jung, is to "try with a sincerity and devotion equal to his to live our own lives."[90]

The Church's emphasis has been upon the Christ of history--One who has been seen, heard, and touched. This has been to the neglect of the Christ within, Jung believes; and he warns:

> The advocates of Christianity squander their energies in the mere preservation of what has come down to

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[89] Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 280.

[90] Man and His Symbols, p. 217. Cf. Charles M. Sheldon, In His Steps (London: Henry E. Walter Ltd., 1962). Jung's position at this point seems to be more accurate than Sheldon's. Surely our task as Christians is to answer the question "What would Christ have me to do?" rather than the question "What would Jesus do?"

> them, with no thought of building on to their house and making it roomier. Stagnation in these matters is threatened in the long run with a lethal end."[91]

The trouble with the Church today, according to Jung, is its misoneism. The Christian places a petrified Church and Bible between himself and his unconscious, forgetting "the age-old fact that God speaks chiefly through dreams and visions."[92] In our ultra-civilized age of technology and rationalism, faith and dogma have frozen into empty forms.

The reaction of the traditional Christian to Jung's attack on this front is to point out that his error lies in confusing Christianity with myth, and the historical Christ with a mystical experience. Despite the fact that this is a valid counter-charge Jung does stimulate a deeper self-examination, a self-appraisal that is critically needed. Has not our modern expression of the Faith lost much of its earlier dynamic? Are there not evidences of stagnation and petrification? Surely all revelation has not ended!

(7) Closely related to the preceding evaluation is the ethical problem of the Christian moral code.

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[91] Aion, p. 109.

[92] Man and His Symbols, p. 102.

Jung's consideration of this problem is expressed in the following statement:

> . . . Good and evil are no longer so self-evident. We have to realize that each represents a judgment. In view of the fallibility of all human judgment, we cannot believe that we will always judge rightly. . . . Nevertheless we have to make ethical decisions. The relativity of "good" and "evil" by no means signifies that these categories are invalid, or do not exist. . . . Moral evaluation is always founded upon the apparent certitudes of a moral code which pretends to know precisely what is good and what evil. But once we know how uncertain the foundation is, ethical decision becomes a subjective, creative act.[93]

The above quotation is an excellent statement of an everlastingly difficult problem. Much has been said in recent years about the "new morality." From early indications, however, there is no assurance that the "new morality" will be any improvement upon the old. But it is, at least, a sign of concern, interest and new life.

A moralism based upon "the apparent certitudes of a moral code which pretends to know precisely what is good and what evil" has long been a basic factor in the ecclesiogenic neuroses. This precise but impossible certainty was characteristic of Pharisaism in the day of Jesus and Pharisaism's historical progeny through

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[93] Ibid., pp. 329-30.

the centuries to the present. To have convictions is commendable and desirable; but it should not be overlooked, as Jung declares, that . . .

> conviction easily turns into self-defense and is seduced into rigidity, and this is inimical to life. The test of a firm conviction is its elasticity and flexibility; like every other exalted truth it thrives best on the admission of its errors.[94]

Ethical decision conceived of as a subjective, existential, creative act is far more Christlike than a compulsive, moralistic rigidity based upon an assumed but false inerrancy.

(8) Very often a perverted moralism leads the "pious" into a compartmentalization of life. An honest observer of life today is keenly aware of this fact. Jung expresses it thusly:

> Modern man protects himself against seeing his own split state by a system of compartments. Certain areas of outer life and of his own behaviour are kept, as it were, in separate drawers and are never confronted with one another.[95]

Whether man's "split state" has contributed to the compartmentalization of life or vice versa is debatable. What this state of affairs is capable of doing to man's wholeness and holiness should be obvious.

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[94] The Practice of Psychotherapy, p. 79.

[95] Man and His Symbols, p. 83. Cf. supra, p. 196f.

Neurosis is a personal civil war that often results in disintegration. The Church contributes actively to man's dilemma when she demands what is in reality an unethical ethic.

(9) In respect to the contemporary problem of meaninglessness, Jung has said:

> About a third of my cases are suffering from no clinically definable neurosis, but from the senselessness and emptiness of their lives. It seems to me, however, that this can well be described as the general neurosis of our time.[96]

Meaninglessness is due to the lack of a religious orientation and the loss of spiritual values. Its presence often means a veritable inner paralysis. It is begotten by a neurotic restlessness, a malady only too evident in our day. The full extent and import of this lack of meaning, which is a soul-sickness of the first magnitude, has not begun to be comprehended, Jung maintains.[97]

Jung lays a heavy part of the responsibility for this aspect of the ecclesiogenic neuroses at the door of ecclesiastical leaders. Speaking of our loss of spiritual values he states:

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[96] Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 61. Cf. infra, chap. X.

[97] The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 415.

> But we have never really understood what we have lost, for our spiritual leaders unfortunately were more interested in protecting their institutions than in understanding the mystery that symbols present.[98]

Rationalistic materialism has infiltrated the thinking of large numbers of today's churchmen to an alarming degree. The modern churchman is not unaware of the benefits of science, technology, and organization. But neither should he be unaware of how inadequate and catastrophic they can be. The presence of meaninglessness in the quantities observable is testimony to that fact--and a powerful indictment of organized, traditional Christianity.

(10) Protestantism, according to Jung, is at one and the same time the greatest risk and the most promising opportunity in the face of contemporary man's crises. As has already been indicated, Jung sees the modern Protestant as a man who questions traditional religion and the Christian creed, and in an increasing number of cases, even finds it inoperative. This is both a bane and a blessing. Negatively, it can easily result in the loss of the essentials of the Faith. It is a blessing in the sense that it can force man to come to terms

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[98] *Man and His Symbols*, p. 94.

with his religious predicament in some more personal way. He has a unique opportunity to realize sin to a degree hardly attainable by the Catholic mentality, for confession and absolution are always ready to relieve too much tension.[99] Jung concludes that the Protestant who is left to his tension can expect a sharpened conscience; and conscience--especially bad conscience--if used for self-criticism, can be a genuine grace, a gift from heaven. This, then, gives the protesting Protestant, in Jung's words, a "unique spiritual chance of immediate religious experience."[100]

Jung sees hope arising out of man's neurotic condition. The Protestant's neurosis, even if it is ecclesiogenic, can serve a positive function by pushing him toward a deeper and more personal and meaningful religious experience. If Jung is right, and if modern Protestantism can grasp the significance of these events and avail itself of the opportunities inherent in the same, then a giant stride will be taken towards the answering of the critical call to the cure of souls.

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[99]See Psychology and Religion, p. 61.

[100]Ibid., p. 62.

V. POSTSCRIPT

I have attempted to present a synopsis of Jung's theory and therapy in such a way that what was pertinent to the problem of the ecclesiogenic neurosis and cure of souls was emphasized and applied. In relating analytical psychology and Protestant Christianity, it has not been my purpose in any sense to indicate that the two are altogether compatible. Unfortunately, recent years have seen too many attempts to wed psychology and religion in such a manner that neither psychology nor religion remain true to themselves. Dialogue is important and should be encouraged; but amalgamation can be disastrous. Jung has an important contribution to make to Protestantism, especially in respect to the cure of souls. At the same time there are important distinctions that separate analytical psychology and healthy, relevant Christian theology.

Jung's preoccupation with mythology apparently has caused him to miss the strategic importance of the historical event of Christ. Because of this, there is a tendency to confuse Christianity with myth. Those that claim that mysticism and gnosticism are elements too much in evidence in Jungian thought are not mistaken.

A Jungian analyst has commented that "Jung is between the purely individualistic view of the person and the 'greater self.'"[101] The former is expressive of Christianity and the latter of Buddhism. There is something of the Christian personal that is missing--this is much more evident in theory than in therapy--and in its place one senses an impersonal "world soul," a cosmic collectivity that is not personified. There is also a type of fatalism that arises from the unconscious generally and dreams specifically. The Jungian claims that dreams have meaning for the future. As one attempts to ascertain just what is meant by this he encounters a touch of "destiny" that seems to be unavoidable.

To accept the Jungian solution to the problem of evil--which is to attribute evil to God--is to swim against the current of orthodox Christian thought which for centuries has defined the nature of God in a diametrically opposed fashion. Differences are also accented in Jung's rejection of the established views of Christian revelation and the grace of God. Although he uses the term "grace" to speak of his own religious experience,

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[101]Priv. Doz. Peter Horsch, Ph. D., in a lecture at the Jung-Institute, Zürich, June 15, 1965.

"salvation" depends not upon grace but upon insight or gnosis.

Finally, Jung's antipathy to theology and the organized Church emphasizes his choice of a "higher road" to "salvation." This is the "individuation process." Analytical psychology fulfils a religious function in the lives of many people. Whether it was meant to do that or not is irrelevant. Jung's type of "Christianity" is open to the charge of "heresy." But despite that fact, if one's choice is narrowed--as often seems to be the case today--to adamant atheism, petrified traditionalism, and a dynamic "heresy" is there not a certain attractiveness in the last?

My purpose in these last few paragraphs has not been to attack a psychology, which I continue to maintain has a basically positive attitude towards religion, but to warn those that too hastily seek to identify--far too closely--Christian theology with a worthy but not necessarily Christian psychology.

Carl G. Jung, great man that he was, has said much that will exert influence on Christianity for decades to come. Not the least of his contributions are those that are pertinent to the ecclesiogenic neuroses and the critical call to the cure of souls.

CHAPTER IX

PAUL TOURNIER: "MÉDECINE DE LA PERSONNE"

Paul Tournier, also a Swiss psychotherapist, is a specialist in internal medicine and a "practising" psychologist-theologian, but not a trained psychiatrist. His open espousal of the Christian faith is unlike Jung's position--"on the extreme left wing of the congress of Protestant opinion"--and his synthesis of religion and medicine is far different from Jung's empirically and scientifically oriented discussion of the inter-relationships of the two disciplines. But Tournier, like Jung, has an important contribution to make to our understanding of the ecclesiogenic neuroses and the practice of the cure of souls.

The personal is so much a part of Tournier's thought and life that it would ill become any appraisal of his work to omit a sketch of the man himself. To describe Tournier as a person is not to accumulate facts and figures and a curriculum vitae. Instead, it is to make his acquaintance more on the "feeling" level than

on the intellectual. This can be done personally and through the medium of his writing. The latter, of course, is our primary source; the former was but a brief encounter that tended to verify the personal warmth and genuineness of spirit apparent in his writings.

In addition to the introduction one has to him through his written work there are several personal references of a more direct nature that sketch for us an outline of his personality. On one occasion he confesses: "Though I never admitted it to myself I was terribly lonely; I was afraid of other people." He continues by describing his attempt to win acceptance by excelling intellectually.[1] Speaking of one of his own "subtle sins" he says: "I prefer helping others to accepting their help. It is with great difficulty that I let myself be indebted for some kindness, because I am more covetous of others' esteem than of their kindnesses."[2] He describes his childhood--he was orphaned quite young--as being "lonely," "withdrawn," "isolated"; and his concept of himself is noted in the words "no

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[1]Paul Tournier, The Strong and The Weak, trans. Edwin Hudson (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p. 131.

[2]Paul Tournier, Escape from Loneliness, trans. John S. Gilmour (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p. 103.

importance to anyone."[3] In his choice of medicine as a vocation he sees an attempt, at least in part, to combat the "overpowering sense of loneliness" that he felt. But in his early years as a doctor he remained "aloof, impersonal, inscrutable."[4]

Fairly early in his career, however, Tournier experienced a personal "spiritual evolution" as a result of his contact with the Oxford Group and the influence of Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman, the founder of this movement. Tournier, Dr. Alphonse Maeder of Zürich, a prominent psychiatrist at one time closely associated with Jung, and Professor Emil Brunner, the renowned theologian, all were participants in the Group until its change of course and nome to Moral Rearmament, when all three men quietly disassociated themselves from it.[5] Tournier, however, openly expresses his gratitude to the Oxford Group and Buchman as he states in his own words: "I was already a Christian before this, but my

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[3]Ibid., p. 45. Tournier's father was seventy when Paul was born. See Paul Tournier, A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible, trans. Edwin Hudson (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 154.

[4]Ibid., p. 46.

[5]Personal communication from Dr. Alphonse Maeder, Zürich. Tournier, in a personal interview, speaks of Maeder as "the greatest Christian psychotherapist of Europe."

contact with the Group had helped me to apply my faith to my practical, personal, family, and professional life."[6] The dedication of his first book, The Healing of Persons, reads: "To Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman, whose teaching has had a profound influence on my personal life and has obliged me to reflect upon the true meaning of my vocation, I dedicate this book."[7] The influence of the Oxford Group is readily apparent in Tournier's earlier writing.

Apparently Tournier had had an active but almost meaningless association with the Church prior to his "spiritual evolution."

> After I had for years, in the bosom of my Church, put all my ardour into violent but practically fruitless arguments, God called me to myself and showed me that charity is more fruitful than strife, and entrusted me with a veritable spiritual ministry."[8]

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[6]Paul Tournier, The Healing of Persons, trans. Edwin Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. xiii. It does not seem improbable that much of Tournier's admitted "loneliness" was compensated for in his association with the Oxford Group, which would certainly have strong appeal for those that felt "isolated," "withdrawn" and "lonely." See, also, Emil Brunner, The Church and the Oxford Group, trans. David Cairns (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1937). This book by Brunner was written before he disassociated himself from the Group.

[7]Ibid., p. v.

[8]A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible, p. 55.

In his own opinion he is by nature, upbringing, and his Calvinist environment a person of extreme reserve.[9] In spite of this, his psychology and theology testify to an outgoing spirit--a synthesis between natural reserve and a paradoxical but equally natural desire to reach out to people in need. This is illustrated in his words, "Love always means going to others, not demanding that they come to us."[10] Also, in his observation concerning one of his patients, he recalls:

> "I admire your patience," he [the patient] tells me, "listening to all this, when much of it must seem to you pointless."
> The remark astonishes me. To call it patience is to suppose an effort on my part, whereas the truth is that it is far more interesting to understand one man thoroughly than to examine a hundred superficially.[11]

The love that motivates this psychotherapist pushes him out towards those who need assistance and succour. His natural reserve aids in making him a good listener, an empathetic confidant and confessor.

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[9]Ibid., p. 176. Cf. Karen Horney's discussion concerning moving towards people, against them, or away from them. Karen Horney, Our Inner Conflicts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1946), pp. 42ff.

[10]Escape from Loneliness, p. 109.

[11]Paul Tournier, The Meaning of Persons, trans. Edwin Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 21.

Synthesis appears to have promoted personal, spiritual and vocational meaning for Tournier. Therefore, synthesis and meaning command prominent and distinctive places in his thought. Syntheses of religion and medicine, spirit and science, faith and technique, religious experience and self-analysis are all extremely important to him.[12] He believes that there is a movement toward a synthesis of the positions of the psychoanalysts and the organicists; and that this in itself is "returning to the views of Christianity, the religion of the incarnation."[13] There seems to be a parallel between Tournier's "synthesis" and Jung's concern for "wholeness," in spite of clear-cut distinctions between the two men.

I. A DOCTOR VIEWS THE NATURE OF MAN

Basically, Tournier conceives of man as a whole person in the traditional Judeo-Christian view. He supports his argument for wholeness by pointing to

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[12]See Heinrich C. Rohrbach, "Paul Tournier's Synthesis of Spirit and Science," Pastoral Psychology, VIII (Nov., 1957), 47-54.

[13]Paul Tournier, The Whole Person in a Broken World, trans. John and Helen Doberstein (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 65.

experiments in the artificial culture of living tissues:

> Previously, it had been thought that, from the scientific point of view, we should die because we were made of organic tissues that were destined to die, that it was the death of the parts that brought about the death of the organism as a whole. Such is by no means the case, since these parts, suitably cultivated, can continue to live indefinitely beyond the time that they would have died if left in the organism. It is therefore the destiny of the organism as a whole that governs the death of the parts.[14]

In The Healing of Persons, the English translation of his first book Médecine de La Personne, he pleads for a ministry to the needs of people as whole persons. Man is a synthesis and can be truly comprehended only as a unified whole. Tournier's "medicine of the person" is not to be equated, however, with psychosomatic medicine. It is not a specialty and is much more simple and universal. "It does not require so much a scientific psychological training, . . . as a certain inner maturity in the doctor himself, the result of laying himself open to the action of grace."[15] His argument, of course, includes the proposition that rebellion against God can result in physiological and psychical consequences. Medicine of the person calls for two diagnoses, "one

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[14]A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible, p. 168.

[15]The Healing of Persons, p. xiv.

scientific, nosological and causal, and the other spiritual, a diagnosis of its meaning and purpose."[16]

Jungian psychology speaks of the "persona"--the mask, the camouflage that one presents to the world. Tournier's discussion of the "person" and the "personage" accepts and integrates the contributions of Jung, Freud and others at this point, but goes beyond the theory toward a practical exposition that is especially relevant. Although, recognizing the impossibility of ever truly grasping the reality of the "person" behind the "personage," it is still critically important to try to discover and understand this reality that exists beyond the deceptive appearances of the masquerade. The "personage" is created by one's own self and/or others who have imposed it upon one. In the light of our earlier discussion concerning the role and image of the minister today, this is especially interesting.[17] While the "person" is the original creation, the "personage" is the "automatic routine." But, man in his complex and contradictory character is not always aware of his own masquerade. What he often believes to be authentic

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[16] A Doctor's Casebook In the Light of the Bible, p. 13.

[17] Supra, pp. 271-94.

about his own personhood very often is not. When for one reason or another he is faced with reality that turns into dust some personal preconceptions to which he has held, he staggers from the impact.

Tournier reminds us--and this complicates the matter even more--that throughout our lives we do not expose only one "personage" to the world but many.[18] We show ourselves in a different light to different people at different times. It is not uncommon for the same man to be a benevolent office manager, a dictatorial husband, a considerate citizen, an insensitive father, a serious thinker at work and a compulsive wag with his fellow social club members. Not only are we different "personages" at different times, but we are even different "personages" at the same time. One can be a serious student, exhibiting a calm confidence, and yet a time-waster within whom springs of anxiety bubble forth. A preacher who proclaims is also a counsellor who listens. A husband who is irritable may be a pastor with the patience of Job. And yet, this is not all. As the seasons of life rhythmically unfold we are new "personages" in new situations. The "personage"

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[18] The Meaning of Persons, p. 73.

is ever changing. As the Greek tragedians would drop one mask and quickly don another, so do we exchange our "personages."

The "person" behind the "personage," however, is not a prisoner who never escapes. He is never completely free; but neither is he held totally incommunicado. A sudden moistening of the eye, a spontaneous touch of the hand, an unconscious brief mellowing in the tone of voice, a tender feminine action or reaction by the rough masculine character, all illustrate the breaking through of the "person." Quickly composure is regained, the harsh tone is re-employed, the brief and spontaneous rebellion is suppressed. Yet, in that instant, the "person" behind the "personage" has been glimpsed.

I remember on one occasion listening to a fellow pastor whom I knew quite well address a group of young married couples. I thought of him as a capable, but abrupt person, tactless at times, yet demanding attention and respect. He spoke authoritatively and, too often, acted insensitively. He was quick, business-like, and had a reputation for egotistical behaviour. But, in the course of this informal address, an amazing thing happened. Suddenly, I was aware of a change in tone of voice, a relaxing of his usual stiffly-erect posture.

He was communicating warmth, sensitivity, concern, compassion. I found myself experiencing a part of his personality completely unknown to me until that moment. Just as quickly as this phenomenon had appeared, it was gone. The "personage," deposed for a moment by the upsurge of the "person," had reestablished its control.[19]

Is this to say that our goal, then, is really to bring about a coup d' état, to replace the "personage" with the real "person"? Tournier thinks not. "The ground of our problem has shifted," he says. "We turn our backs on the utopian dream of living nakedly, of shedding the personage from the person. We recognize that they are inseparable."[20] It is not a matter of replacing the "personage" with the "person," but of harmonizing and integrating the two. "It is a case of being in accord with oneself."[21]

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[19]Cf. Edgar P. Dickie and his discussion of the thought of Martin Buber and Karl Heim in The Obedience of a Christian Man (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1944), chap. iii; and H. J. Paton, The Modern Predicament (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), chap. xi, especially pp. 166 & 168, also an appraisal of Buber's "I-Thou" concept. Buber himself has said: Each of us is encased in an armour which we soon, out of familiarity, no longer notice. There are only moments which penetrate it and stir the soul to sensibility." Martin Buber, Between Man & Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), pp. 10-11.

[20]Ibid., p. 80. [21]Ibid., p. 81.

The frustrating impossibility of ever consciously, or even unconsciously, eliminating the "personage" is apparent. God alone is wholly Person and even upon Him we project "personages." Life has its automatic, routine aspects (the "personage") and its creative, spontaneous aspects (the "person"); and it appears that there is a type of rhythm between the two.

> It would seem then that there is a sort of rhythm of life between its stereotyped forms, which are alone observable, and the intangible pulsations which save it from imprisonment within them. The person is manifested in these intermittent flashes, whereas all that is continuous in us is personage.[22]

It would also seem utopian to believe that there ever would be a time when the "personage" and the "person" would reach the goal of complete harmony, integration and accord. If possible, it is doubtful if full accord would be desirable. In such a state, polarity and creative tension--the dynamism of life--would be offered up on the altar of peaceful, but probably sterile, harmony.

Tournier, in a warning, speaks of one of the inherent dangers of psychoanalysis.[23] When psychoanalysis

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[22]Ibid., p. 99.

[23]Ibid., p. 113. One of the dangers of psychoanalytic dogma is the denial of that which James Seth

indulges in excessive generalization to the extent that it believes that through its doctrines and techniques it can offer a complete explanation of man, then it is guilty of treating persons only on the level of automatisms, the level of the "personage." This is to deny the "person," recognizing only the conscious and unconscious functions of the "personage." A parallel can be drawn to the weaknesses of Pavlovian psychology with its over-emphasis on mechanistic reactions.

The "person" is not analyzed, is not scientifically measured, is not fully comprehended by introspection. He has learned the value of a secret,[24] and is characterized by responsibility and ability to communicate. In respect to communication Tournier says: "The whole difference between an individual and a person is that the individual associates, whereas the person communicates."[25] A sense of shame, closely associated with

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has called "the Christian discovery of the significance of personality." A Study of Ethical Principles (9th ed. rev.; Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, MCMVII), pp. 16-18.

[24] Ibid., pp. 125-28, 138-39, 150-51, 155, 159, 181. Cf. C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, record. & ed. Aniela Jaffé, trans. Richard & Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon Books, Random House, 1961), pp. 34-35, 52, 235, 315f. The importance of the secret is emphasized by both Tournier and Jung.

[25] The Meaning of Persons, p. 129. Cf. Buber's distinction of a man's relation to others. He can either be "bundles" or "bound." Buber, op. cit., p. 64.

the concept of the importance of the secret, is also a sign of personhood.

> The appearance of this sense of shame is, in fact, the sign of the birth of the person. And later the supreme affirmation of the person, the great engagement of life, self-determination, will be marked by the handing over of the secret, the gift of the self, the disappearance of shame.[26]

For Tournier the "person" is also more than one's nature. He states that ". . . it is a supernatural power in us which rules our nature according to the choice it makes."[27] It is the sincerity of that choice which makes man a person. The "person" asserts itself indirectly in the choice that one makes of his "personage," but then too often falls prey to limitations imposed by the "personage" it chooses. The "personage" is a static state, while the "person" is dynamic movement--movement that appears spontaneously and then is gone and must be rediscovered. Tournier concludes his discussion of the "person" by saying:

> It is a mysterious spiritual reality, mysteriously linked to God, mysteriously linked with our fellows. We are aware of these links at those privileged moments when there springs up a fresh current of life, bursting the fatal fetters of the personage, asserting its freedom and breaking out into love.[28]

In his concept of the whole person and his theory of the "person" and the "personage," Tournier does not

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[26]Ibid., p. 139. [27]Ibid., p. 213. [28]Ibid., p. 234.

claim originality. Both Christianity and psychotherapy have advocated much of what he is saying. His contribution is basically a synthetic one; and he is a master at blending psychology, existentialism, medicine and a living Christian faith. The product, for the most part, is a healthy and constructive contribution to our understanding of, and empathy with, modern man. Tournier is not primarily a theroretician in his view of man, but more of a "therapist." In his evangelical zeal he goes far beyond Freud, Jung and the others and stresses his conviction that the understanding of man--though important--is not enough. If the authentic "person" is to be freed or brought into a healthy harmony with the "personage" then real interpersonal communion and communication must be realized in both the vertical and the horizontal planes.

II. THE PLIGHT OF MODERN MAN

Tournier, like many others, is concerned with the plight of modern man. In his view, the man of today is burdened and suffering under the weight of guilt, repression, and meaninglessness. His counterattack on these three fronts is depicted throughout his writings; and one of his most valuable psychological-theological

contributions is his treatment of the problem of guilt. To this we turn our attention.

The Ever-present Guilt. Ours is an age of criticism. Mutual criticism is rampant in the world of politics, international relations, inter-racial and inter-class relations, the world of society, of science, of education, of religion. The television programs majoring on satire are growing rapidly in number and popularity. The press--once concerned with objectively reporting the news--seems now to be more and more concerned with criticism of those persons and policies at variance with its editorial positions. But, nowhere is the critical spirit more evident than in the world of religion. The Church judges the secular and the secular criticizes the Church. Denominations and sects engage in mutual recriminations. Those holding differing theological positions participate in lengthy critical evaluations of one another. The churches, especially in recent years, seem to have turned in upon themselves. Some cry for a "new reformation" to deal with the contemporary problem of "irrelevance." Others speak of the "death of God" as a necessary radical solution to the churches' sickness. And still others think that it would be best simply to "stop talking about God" for a

while. The implication is that He needs a change of name--maybe "the ground of our being" or "the man for others." The air of criticism is breathed still closer to home. As I write these lines I recognize that this thesis is concerned largely with criticism. I am writing what I hope to be--at least in part--a constructive critique of twentieth century Protestantism. Part of my purpose is to distinguish the true from the false, the healthy from the ill, the perversion from the whole, and in so doing to strengthen Christianity after the spirit of Christ. But, even as I write, I have a sense of guilt simply because I am being critical. What is more, I experience more guilt when I hear someone say that the Church today needs to sound the note of optimism and be done with its critics and their criticisms. This is the point: criticism, whether mutual or one-sided, produces guilt.

Tournier is keenly aware of the guilt produced by mutual accusations made by all men.[29] Social suggestion is a major source of guilt feelings; and no one escapes the feelings of guilt on this level. But, there are other sources of guilt--guilt that arises from

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[29]Paul Tournier, Guilt and Grace, trans. Arthur W. Heathcote, assist. J. J. Henry & P. J. Allcock (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 17f.

faults we recognize and also from those we are sure we have but do not recognize. In a sense, this is existential guilt. There is guilt for what we have done and for what we have not done, for what we are and for what we are not. The extent of guilt is great, as this physician emphasizes.[30]

"True" and "false" guilt are defined by Tournier. In respect to true guilt he states:

> Thus the true guilt of men comes from the things with which they are reproached by God in their innermost hearts. Only they can discover what these things are. And they are usually very different from the things with which they are reproached by men. . . . "False guilt" is that which comes as a result of the judgments and suggestions of men. "True guilt" is that which results from divine judgment. In fact, the guilt towards oneself of the Jung School is indeed at the same time a guilt towards God, since it is a refusal to accept oneself as God wishes us to be; and the guilt towards others of Martin Buber is also a guilt towards God since it is a refusal of the divine order of human relationships.[31]

Speaking of false guilt he says: "Indeed, any guilt suggested by the judgment of men is a false guilt if it does not receive inner support by a judgment of God." He concludes, "God's thoughts and man's thoughts; judgments of God and judgments of men; that is a clear formulation of the opposition between true guilt and false guilt."[32]

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[30] Ibid., p. 60. [31] Ibid., p. 67. [32] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

Tournier's definitions are helpful. It should be added, however, that the primary medium for making the discovery of true guilt is another person. Divine revelation is usually realized, not in a vacuum, but in relationship. "I" meets the "Eternal Thou" most often as "I" meets "Thou" on the horizontal plane. True guilt can be conveyed by the judgments and appraisals of men. Time and again in the biblical record true guilt, the result of divine judgment, is conveyed by men--especially the prophets, as for example, Nathan's confrontation of David. On the other hand, guilt towards oneself and guilt towards others can be not only "guilt towards God," which is true guilt (as Tournier suggests), but also false guilt--guilt created by the judgments of men which are not the judgments of God. Such a guilt would be a perversion of the thought of Jung and Buber at this point, admittedly; but this is no impossibility.

Modern secular as well as religious man experiences guilt in large doses. "Today," says Tournier, "the atheists have an acute sense of guilt, and they are more pessimistic about man than the Calvinists."[33] The

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[33] Ibid., p. 79.

French atheistic, existential philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre and his writings lend strong support to Tournier's observation. This is not to say that modern man is rushing to confess guilt and to seek absolution from the Church. He is not. However, beneath the all too common mask of self-sufficiency and disdain for admitting any sense of "sin," there appears to be a powerful mixture of true and false guilt in the heart of contemporary man. From time to time it comes to the surface and is visible--especially in the context of a one-to-one relationship. He might begin by denying any "spiritual" concern whatsoever; but almost invariably, unless blocked by the one who listens--psychotherapist, minister, or friend--he returns time and again to the spiritual problem of guilt. Contemporary man, burdened and suffering from true and false guilt, is not finding relief.

The Repression of Christianity. Tournier suggests that humanity today is similar in many respects to an adolescent in the throes of emerging independence.[34] Antiquity was the childhood of mankind and the Middle Ages were his school years. In the latter he accepted obediently the teachings and admonishments of his

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[34]The Whole Person in a Broken World, p. 2f.

teacher, the Church. This acceptance, for the most part, was uncritical. Not noticing that his teacher was imperfect, he accepted faith and morals as presented, "authoritatively."

Then the day of adolescence arrived, possibly beginning with the Reformation and Renaissance. It was characterized by a deluge of new knowledge and a drive for independence. Man rose in revolt against his teacher and sat in judgment upon her. Today he continues to question her and, at times, pronounces her authority no longer valid. To prove his new found freedom and independence, he reacts strongly to that which he so docilely accepted in his school years. His reaction becomes violent, and he sees in his teacher (the Church) the great obstacle that keeps him in slavery and prevents him from realizing his fulfillment in independence and freedom. He is prone to disparage her and her values, which in reality have become his. Often, he lashes out at her in fits of rage as if to prove to himself that he really is free of her domination.

To a certain degree all of this is normal. Before adulthood a young man experiences the storms of adolescence with its ethos of rebellion. Eventually, however, the day comes when he returns to the treasures

of his childhood, provided they were valuable originally. In this return, there is a qualitative difference; for now the treasures are his not only by inheritance from an outside authoritative source, but because they have been adopted through personal choice and first-hand experience.

What happens if this last stage of development is not reached, if there is a fixation on the adolescent period? Tournier says when this happens the proportions of an illness emerge, an illness called by the psychiatrists, the "neurosis of defiance."[35] If this is the case, and modern man is fixated in a period of adolescent rebellion, the object of the wrath of that rebellion is Christianity. Man has snatched at his "freedom" from the moral and spiritual values proclaimed by the Church. He does not accept the fact that the Church is a mixture of true and false, good and bad, righteousness and evil. When her negative profile has been shown he rejects her in toto, not attempting to distinguish the negative from the positive. All that he can see are her inadequacies, defeats, errors, divisions and perverted expressions.

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[35] Ibid., p. 5.

In his adolescent haste to dispose of this "task master," modern man attempts to suppress all the values and feelings that have been inculcated in him through centuries of the Church's tutelage--many of these values are permeated with divine truth. But this suppression fails; instead a repression of these values into the unconscious takes place. "A person is neurotic," says Tournier, "when he has repressed something without having really eliminated it."[36]

Thus, modern man is suffering from a more or less unconscious conflict. Repressed, but not eliminated, Christianity becomes the crux of his plight. He lives, on the surface, as if he has "come of age" and no longer needs the Christian faith; but in his innermost being he is impregnated with Christianity. No matter how violently he bucks in the midst of his adolescent rebellion he cannot rid himself of the rider in the saddle. The poet, Francis Thompson, made the same discovery by his own characteristic approach:

> I fled Him, down the nights and down
> the days;
> I fled Him, down the arches of the years;
> I fled Him down the labyrinthine ways
> Of my own mind; and in the midst of tears
> I hid from Him, and under running laughter.

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[36] Ibid., p. 11.

Up vistaed hopes I sped;
And shot, precipitated,
Adown Titanic glooms of chasmèd fears,
From those strong Feet that followed, followed after.
. . . . . .
Nigh and nigh draws the chase,
With unperturbèd pace,
Deliberate speed, majestic instancy;
And past those noisèd Feet
A voice comes yet more fleet--
"Lo! naught contents thee, who content'st not Me."[37]

The man of today, believing himself to have suppressed and eliminated Christianity but unconsciously clinging to it and ceaselessly pursued by its values, is not content and never will be. How ironic it is that there are those within the Church who perpetuate the farce that man has "come of age"--that he has reached maturity--and that the Church must now recognize his adulthood! Modern man, immature and suffering from fixation in the adolescent period, needs to broaden his field of consciousness. Is not consciousness of the nature of his difficulties a prerequisite to the solution of his problems of guilt and repression? He must become aware of the repression of the Christian Faith and respond affirmatively to the claims of that Faith on him, and then confess his desperate need and longing

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[37]Francis Thompson, "The Hound of Heaven," The Works of Francis Thompson Poems: Volume I (London: Burns & Oates Ltd., 1913), pp. 107 & 110.

for it. He must recognize that he has not silenced the Faith and cannot disregard the voice of conscience that torments him in the deep recesses of his soul. Only when this takes place will the civil war cease; and, in maturity, his struggle with guilt is brought out into the open. Accepting the power of the grace of God to deal with it, he will experience meaning and purpose in life instead of anxiety, conflict and neurosis.

The Search for Meaning. One of the direct results of the repression of Christianity is the loss of meaning. Although this is the major theme of the logotherapy of Viktor Frankl which shall be examined in the next chapter, it is also an important issue in the thought of Tournier. In fact, it can be said that the realization of meaning is important in any sound psychotherapy. "God has a purpose for every man," proclaims Tournier; "to live in accordance with this purpose is man's normal life."[38] He continues: "The fact is that apart from faith, man's life has no meaning, and there is no standard for society."[39] "It is the pressing need," he believes, "to find meaning for one's life, to

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[38]The Healing of Persons, p. 64.

[39]Escape from Loneliness, p. 169.

subordinate the whole of life to that meaning. It is this need, this inner aspiration, which is from God."[40] Both the aspiration to seek meaning, as well as meaning itself, have their source in God. "To know God, his grace, his salvation---this is the meaning of life."[41]

It is obvious that Tournier's answer to the search for meaning is a religious one. This is because he sees the scientific Weltanschauung as "a stupid one."[42] From the standpoint of science nothing has meaning. Science describes phenomena. It does not explain the meaning or purpose behind them nor the ultimate goal before them. "Of the meaning of things, the meaning of sickness and cure, of life and death, of the world, man, and history, science tells us nothing; here it is the Bible that speaks to us."[43] In relation to the God of the Scriptures everything takes on meaning, everything has value--either positive or negative. Therefore, Tournier is preoccupied with the meaning of life, death, disease, persons, nature, things, sex, dreams, events,

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[40]Paul Tournier, The Seasons of Life, trans. John S. Gilmour (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1964), p. 59.

[41]Ibid., p. 61.

[42]A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible, p. 14.

[43]Ibid., p. 16.

healing, medicine, affliction, and so forth. The following case illustrates his view concerning the answer to man's meaninglessness:

> . . . A man who was the victim of a serious motor-cycling accident . . . has not yet recovered, even after months in hospital and several operations. He was brought up in a Christian home. The day came when he rebelled against the narrowness and formalism of his upbringing. He threw everything over, God included. But one day as he lay in bed in hospital he suddenly saw his accident as a sort of Damascus Road. It was God who had stopped him in the mad career that his life had become, the same God whom he had learned to know in his childhood, in spite of the errors of his Church, and to whom he unconsciously longed to return. Now he has found Him again, and is preparing to undergo yet another operation in quite a different state of mind from before.[44]

Some might question the evangelical simplicity of this answer to meaninglessness. Tournier simply says ". . . he [the patient] has found Him again. . . ." The implication is that meaning and purpose resulted from this new encounter. Is it not true that there does come a point when, rationally and intellectually, one has explained all that is explainable--and yet mystery remains? Is this not the case of the divine-human encounter? According to the patient's interpretation as stated above, it was the quickening of his re-

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[44] Ibid., p. 183.

lationship with God that provided meaning in the experience of suffering. Tournier is convinced that meaning in life is not known apart from the grace of God. It is in relationship on both the vertical and the horizontal planes that this is experienced.

Unresolved guilt, the unconscious repression of Christianity, and life void of meaning are the characteristics of contemporary man's plight. Tournier points to God as the answer to man's dilemma, and indicates the need for man to return to the true values of the Christian faith. There are serious road-blocks, however, that plague any movement that contemporary man might make in this direction--barriers erected by the very churches that were meant to be vehicles for transmitting God's love and grace.

III. THE STATE OF THE CHURCH

Paul Tournier, reared in the Calvinist tradition in the Reformer's own city of Geneva, and active in, loyal to, and sympathetic with the Church has much to say about her condition. In the spirit and tradition of a good doctor he diagnoses her ills, not in order to pronounce her expiration, but to prescribe for her health and return to strength.

Numerous signs of aberrations, deformations and perversions in the life of the churches already have been considered. Undoubtedly, the authentic faith has become encrusted with attitudes and practices foreign to the spirit of Jesus Christ. In his writings Tournier examines, through the microscope of analysis and diagnosis, the disease-carrying bacteria that are operating within the body of the Church. Although symptoms of disorder already have been discussed in preceding chapters, Tournier's concern about the "disincarnation of the Church" demands more attention.[45] That which he describes is, in reality, the modern danger of irrelevance tenaciously stalking the churches. In face of the complex conflicts of this age, the churches have retreated into an unrealistic and irrelevant position. They have aided and abetted the creation of a "Uriah Syndrome" discernible in modern man by leaving him spiritually isolated. This spiritual isolation produces a deep and terrible loneliness which is felt by those inside as well as those outside the churches.[46] The relevance of the gospel, however, to the world today

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[45] The Whole Person in a Broken World, p. 159.

[46] Escape from Loneliness, pp. 22-23.

and to life in every sphere is asserted by Tournier when he says:

> Ours is the religion of incarnation. . . . The good news of the Gospel is not only a spiritual message; nor is it only good news for the Beyond. It does indeed concern our eternal destiny, but it also concerns our life here and now.[47]

In spite of the truth in this statement, there seems to be abroad in the churches today a certain defeatist view. It is primarily in the traditional churches of Protestantism--more so than in the sects and the denominations not long past their own "sect-hood"--that talk of the "death of God," the "post-Christian era," and so forth is heard. Relating this alleged defeatist spirit to the "disincarnation of the Church," Tournier warns:

> But we must recognize that in general the traditional Christian Churches are more inclined in our day to the defeatist view; and it is for this reason that they have so little influence on a world which scarcely looks any longer to religion for an answer to the ills that beset it, for a remedy for its psychological weakness and its social disorder.[48]

However, Tournier seems to be sounding a note of optimism when he expresses his conviction that "the hour of the church has come."[49] To be an optimist and not a

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[47]The Strong and the Weak, p. 208.

[48]Ibid., pp. 212-213.

[49]The Whole Person in a Broken World, p. 145f. Tournier also has made the statement that "the churches

defeatist in respect to the Church is not, of course, to cease advocating the need for self-examination and repentance. To gloss over signs of illness and speak in glowing words that refuse to recognize reality is not a sign of strength. To speak optimistically of the Church is to analyse and define her strengths and her weaknesses. It is to study her perversions in order to meet them and deal with them openly and courageously. It is always to remember that as she recognizes, accepts, and repents of her deviations from the will of God, He is quick to forgive and to restore her strength. This is true Christian optimism--not an unhealthy and destructive spirit of criticism, pessimistic resignation, or sheer bravado.

In speaking of the present condition of the churches, Tournier reminds us that for many persons Christianity is little more than an escape mechanism. That there is such a thing as an invalid "flight into religion" must be readily apparent. Of course, the responsibility for this does not lie fully at the door of the Church. People meet their personal emotional

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of today are the prisoners of their traditions and forms. They must die before they can be resurrected in a form in which they will be able to respond to the needs of modern man." (Personal interview, June 17, 1965. Permission to quote secured.)

needs in many different ways. If one is attempting to escape from an unbearable life situation, it could be that religion would serve as that exit. However, the churches share in the responsibility if they allow themselves to be so used, knowingly. If they are guilty, for example, in feeding this type of perversion by creating the illusion that religious activism is synonymous with the "abundant life" of which Jesus spoke, then responsibility and guilt are theirs.

Neither are the churches free from a desire to dominate. There is such a thing as "spiritual imperialism"--a real lust for power in the realm of religion which is closely related to the drive-to-succeed.[50] When this becomes the controlling factor the theology of the cross is replaced by a theology of success. Tournier identifies spiritual imperialism with the inherent danger in "being right." "I have noticed more and more," he states, "how dangerous it is for us to be right. The most fruitful hours in life are those of our humiliation, when we see our sins and wrongs, and when we are upset by them."[51] He continues by reminding us:

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[50] Supra, pp. 200ff.

[51] Escape from Loneliness, p. 141.

> Being in the right has always been a source of all kinds of intolerance. When we are right, we do not want to give in at all. We persuade ourselves that we are defenders of the truth. This is crystal clear throughout the church's history; the darkest pages of its history are those of its battles against heresy.[52]

It is not the churches' privilege, however, to countenance the compromising of truth. Truth and righteousness must be held aloft as a standard, not to be willfully or knowingly scarred by the ingrafting of falsehood and unrighteousness. But the point that Tournier makes is well taken--the danger in just "being right." The Pharisees were "right" as far as the letter of the Law was concerned. The Inquisitors were "right" in their zealous espousal and defense of orthodox doctrines. Luther was "right" in urging the suppression of the Peasant Revolt. Calvin was "right" in condemning Servetus and his doctrine. But, when "being right" is interpreted as providing an unlimited license for spiritual, intellectual or physical domination, imposition of the religion of law, or intolerance, then "sin lieth at the door." The attitude of heart in which truth and righteousness are proclaimed is of the utmost importance. To be right in fact but wrong in spirit is no uncommon

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[52] Ibid., p. 143.

phenomenon; and the churches of today are not free of this deviation from the spirit of Christ. Is it not true that, as individuals, we often confuse our own psychical reactions--based upon our fluctuating emotional state--with a genuine desire to be found faithful? Tournier observes:

> If they [the strong personalities] become authoritarian and intransigent and try to use force on men's souls . . . they run the risk of forgetting how much of their attitude is due to their individual make-up, and persuading themselves that it is inspired only by their desire to serve God better.[53]

To confuse one's emotional difficulties with the will of God can be a devastating error which is compounded when one is technically "right." "However sincere our zeal for a person's conversion, there slips into it an insidious satisfaction at exercising a prophetic role in his life, at being able to dominate him."[54] Even the most noble of purposes can experience perversion.

There is also abroad among the churches a spirit of false asceticism whose motif is amputation. Faith is verified only in "self-denial." Usually this is confused in one of the most perverse ways, with the idea of "bearing one's cross." The distorted view of sex

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[53] The Strong and the Weak, p. 217.

[54] Ibid., p. 141.

often associated with "Christian morality" is an apt illustration. Many psychotherapists have accused the churches of propagating a fear of sex. Although they may be guilty of generalization at this point, it must be admitted that the charge is often true. Negative thinking in respect to sex is in turn but a part of the false asceticism to which I refer.

Tournier also speaks of the lack of real community and brotherhood in the churches: "I recognize that Protestantism, not indeed in the mind of the Reformers, but later on, has tended to lose sight of the meaning of the community and of the Church."[55] Two things should be kept in mind in respect to this view. The first is that the present day has witnessed on a massive scale the depersonalization of modern man, his isolation and his deep loneliness.[56] The churches not only have failed to escape this phenomenon but have contributed to it.

There is a second fact that should be remembered. That is, that Tournier himself did not find the meaning-

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[55] Ibid., p. 217. He also states historically that "the thing that attracted so many people to the French Revolution, with its Freemasonry and its totalitarianism, was that they found in it the brotherhood that was no longer to be found in the church."(Escape from Loneliness, p. 188.).

[56] Supra, pp. 205ff.

ful community that he sought in the traditional church of which he was an active member. Rather, he discovered it in the fellowship of the Oxford Group. However, for us to assume today that true Christian fellowship cannot be found within the traditional churches is errant thinking. Certainly it is not being realized to the extent that it should be in contemporary churches; but this does not mean that it cannot be experienced there. Where it is absent or has been lost, the need is to re-instate true and qualitative koinonia.

Finally, Tournier has something to say rather directly to the ministry. This Christian psychotherapist, who believes that "the pathological feeling of guilt" is "one of the gravest problems in religious psychology,"[57] indicates that the ministry and theological education are not adequately dealing with this problem.

> I think it most important that theological colleges should include in their courses instruction in the differential diagnosis of true and false guilt. . . . The teaching of pastoral theology is defective in this respect, and the available literature is scanty.[58]

Although much has been done in recent years to amend this situation, Tournier's appraisal is still true. The

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[57] The Strong and the Weak, p. 220.

[58] Ibid., p. 221.

results of this omission have been witnessed time and again in the parish minister's inability to cope adequately with the complex problem of the intertwining of true and false, healthy and pathological guilt.

This leads to another area of ministerial weakness brought into focus by Tournier. He claims that the ministry today has lost the sense of the individual cure of souls. Certainly by now the validity of this accusation has become general knowledge. The phenomenal growth of psychotherapy seems to indicate that the clergy are not dealing with the deeper needs and problems of their parishioners in an adequate way. Pastoral care too often has degenerated into a social call and a superficial repetition of time-worn platitudes in the way of pastoral "advice." It is encouraging, however, that in recent years the Christian practice of the cure of souls has been receiving much needed re-examination. No mean source of stimulation has been the influence of depth psychology and the clinical pastoral education movement. But Tournier, himself, indicates some confusion in his own thinking in respect to the role of the minister in the cure of souls, when he states:

> I can understand that a minister of religion, whose vocation it is to speak in God's name, should practice the direction of conscience, that is to say that he should prescribe a line of conduct for the

> faithful who consult him. But the more I practice "soul-healing" the more convinced I become that a doctor such as myself--usually a layman--must carefully avoid taking the place of priest or pastor.[59]

What is it to "prescribe a line of conduct" if it is not to continue practising the very same type of superficial pastoral care that fails to meet man's deeper needs? When a minister is practising the cure of souls it is inconceivable that he is relating to the parishioner in any depth if he is only "prescribing a line of conduct."

What does "the priesthood of believers" mean in the light of Tournier's second statement--to "carefully avoid taking the place of priest or pastor"? I affirm Tournier's right and responsibility to engage in "soul-healing," but certainly in so doing he functions to some extent in the role of pastor or priest to the patient that seeks his help. This is not wrong, for those who confess belief in the priesthood of all believers. On the other hand, let it be emphasized that the pastoral care by ordained ministers is not simply "prescribing a line of conduct." When faithfully practised, it is "soul-healing" in the deepest sense.

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[59] Ibid., p. 191.

IV. "SOUL-HEALING"

Exactly what does Tournier mean by "soul-healing"? He has written, "Soul-healing consists essentially in bringing souls into personal contact with Christ. From that contact come experiences which have psychic and physical consequences, and which are thus the domain of medicine."[60] He also asserts that "a synthesized medicine will aim at treating the body, the mind, and the soul simultaneously, without omitting any one of these three aspects of man."[61] It is quite clear that "soul-healing" goes beyond the realm of psychotherapy. He does not, quite obviously, devalue psychotherapy. But, when he defines his practice as "bringing souls into personal contact with Christ," his definition as such becomes too vague. This statement means many different things to many different people. For an understanding, then, of Tournier's "soul-healing" one must by-pass his definition and study his practice and the values he stresses in his particular approach to extended psychotherapy or soul cure.

As far as methodology is concerned, he does not advocate any particular technique of counselling as a

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[60] The Healing of Persons, p. 135. [61] Ibid., p. 137.

"Christian method" over and against "non-Christian methods." There is no one "Christian method" of problem solving or counselling. He comments:

> Not what he [the counsellor] does in an interview or any other form of counseling is important in the last resort, but what he himself is in that moment is that which will determine the result of the counseling as far as he is concerned."[62]

Tournier emphasizes the critical role of the counsellor; and not so much his role as his very personhood. To believe that the counsellor, whether physician, psychotherapist or minister, can maintain a purely objective view and practise moral neutrality in the counselling relationship is, in Tournier's thought, nothing but myth. His philosophy of life and Weltanschauung cannot be divorced from the "I-Thou" relationship of meaningful personal encounter.

> The psychotherapist who suggests, naively enough, that as part of his therapeutic treatment his patient should indulge in a "sexual adventure" outside marriage, is not at that point engaging in psychotherapy, but in soul-healing--a soul-healing inspired by his own theology, which makes a god of the instincts. To those doctors and theologians who ask me whether it is right for the doctor to enter the domain of the spiritual, foreign to medicine in their view, I must reply with another question: "What soul-healing is he practising? On what theology, on what conception of the world and of man is it based"?[63]

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[62] Rohrbach, op. cit., p. 49. Cf. Jung, supra, pp. 350-51.

[63] The Meaning of Persons, p. 110. Cf. Tournier's statement about the medical man not "taking the place of priest or pastor." Supra, p. 424.

If the concept of man's wholeness is valid, and man is not a dichotomy or trichotomy, then Tournier's emphasis is pertinent. The counsellor cannot relate in a true person to person relationship and restrict his contribution to "just the spiritual" or "just the psychical." To say that scientific treatment is the province of the physician and the cure of souls the province of the minister is to be guilty of generalization and over-simplification, and to ignore the implications of man's wholeness. On the other hand, neither should the minister function primarily as an unlicensed physician, nor the physician as a trained theologian. This is a complex relationship with subtle ramifications that demand the very best in synthesis and continuing inter-professional dialogue.

"For me as a doctor to become a person," writes Tournier, "to attain completeness as a human being, the road is the same as for my patients, and I must commit myself to it before I can hope to lead them along it."[64] His stress of the importance of the personhood of the counsellor leads to the consideration of the interpersonal relationship itself. Relationship is the sine qua non of any soul-healing, counselling or psychotherapy. Until doctor and patient or minister and parishioner

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[64] Ibid., p. 188.

are in true relationship no progress can be expected--as there is no communication, no interaction. Jean-Paul Sartre has said, "I cannot know myself except through the intermediary of another person."[65] And Tournier insists that God reveals Himself to us in human contact: "I do not say that that other person actually speaks with the voice of God, but I do say that through this human contact God is showing us what it is that he has personally to say to us."[66] He claims that outside of a "true personal relationship" there is no foundation for "effective psychotherapy."[67]

Certainly this is true; but how difficult it is to secure and maintain a genuine "I-Thou" relationship! The temptation to judge is a constant pitfall for the counsellor. In the most subtle and unconscious ways he is in danger of destroying the relationship, or perverting it into an "I-It" relationship through an air of criticism or superiority. In respect to the doctor-patient encounter Tournier states:

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[65]Quoted by Tournier in The Meaning of Persons, p. 130, from Jean-Paul Sartre, L'être et le néant, N.R.F., Paris, 1943. See the Eng. trans. by Hazel E. Barnes, Being and Nothingness (London: Methuen & Co.Ltd., 1957).

[66]The Meaning of Persons, pp. 161-162.

[67]The Strong and the Weak, p. 173.

> Human contact is possible only in so far as we feel our deep equality as men. The patient often feels himself inferior to the doctor, and the doctor quite as frequently has a false feeling of superiority. . . . It is never as a scientist that the doctor establishes real contact with his patient, but only as a man who feels himself, in spite of his science, as wretched a creature as his patient, sympathizing with him in the true sense of the word: suffering with him.[68]

The relevance of these words to the minister-parishioner relationship is obvious. If anything the feeling of superiority on the part of the minister and the feeling of inferiority in the parishioner would be more acute.

On one occasion a counsellee, on the spur of the moment, led me to make a statement that seemed to contrast my "virtue" with his "immorality." For all practical purposes that total relationship ended with my response. I had judged him. His "inferiority" and my "superiority" had been demonstrated, as far as he was concerned, and the relationship was broken. This is not to imply that there is no place for judgment in soul-healing. But, divine judgment, and this is all that is true and proper, comes from God, not the lips of the counsellor. The counsellor's task is to help the counsellee to listen to God himself and to hear God's judgment, but never to usurp the Divine prerogative.

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[68] A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible, p. 27.

Tournier makes a valuable contribution when he points out to those who would be soul-healers that "no one can get rid of the spirit of judgment by an effort of will." "The spirit of judgment evaporates," he continues, "as soon as I become conscious of my own faults and speak freely of them to my friend, as he speaks to me of those which make him reproach himself."[69] The giving of advice--especially when not requested--is illustrative of this problem as it presupposes a superior-inferior relationship. "Advice touches the surface of personality, not the center. It calls for an effort of the will, whereas the true cure of souls aims at the renewal of the inner affections."[70]

Listening is an essential ingredient in the counselling practised by Tournier:

> When a man speaks in order to express an idea, discussion is legitimate--not to discuss the idea he puts forward would be not to take him seriously. . . . But when a man speaks in order to give vent to his feelings, it is necessary to listen and not discuss, for in such a case discussion leads to misapprehensions, and gives the man the feeling that he is not being understood.[71]

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[69] Guilt and Grace, p. 85. See infra, pp. 530ff.

[70] Escape from Loneliness, pp. 166-67.

[71] The Strong and the Weak, p. 127. Cf. Martin Buber's reference to an unknown young man who he says, "had come to me not casually, but borne by destiny, not

Knowing when to listen and when to speak is a valuable gift; and to err at this point can be personally disastrous. Certainly, at least in the context of the interpersonal relationship, we err more frequently in speaking when we should be listening. The doctor and the minister, especially the latter, have a proclivity for this type of error.

In fact, listening is a part of the broader concept of "giving oneself." We commonly speak of "giving attention" to one another. However, speaking can also be a part of "giving oneself" if it is the meaningful sharing of one's life and experiences. Tournier optimistically refers to a deep-seated and universal desire to "give oneself."[72] To "give oneself" is to "commit oneself." In a world seemingly characterized by blatant self-centeredness, the need to give oneself appears naïve. Yet, the desire to do so--even if unconscious--is to be hoped for.

Love and giving are intimately intertwined; and in Tournier's thought the former is not valid only as

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for a chat but for a decision." Buber sadly reflects: "I conversed attentively and openly with him--only I omitted to guess the questions which he did not put." Between Man and Man, p. 14.

[72]Paul Tournier, The Meaning of Gifts, trans. John S. Gilmour (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p. 56.

an abstraction. "It needs to be demonstrated, to find expression in gifts, both personal and ritual gifts."[73] Giving and receiving symbolize the joy of loving and being loved. "There is in the human heart," he says, "an inexhaustible need to be loved, and a continual fear of not being loved."[74] Is there any need that man experiences deeper than the need to be loved? And, conversely, is there any task of man that is greater than the task of loving? In respect to the giving of oneself in the "I-Thou" relationship of "soul-healing" Tournier remarks:

> To love is to give one's time. We never give the impression that we care when we are in a hurry. Too many social and pastoral counselors are people in a hurry. Hence, people admire their devotion and doubt their love.[75]

The influence of the Oxford Group is notable in several of Tournier's emphases. The stress upon honesty, confession and prayer are illustrative. It is quite likely that others--both medical and clerical--who practise the cure of souls would not use prayer and the virtue of honesty in the context of counselling in quite the same manner that he does. But, this does not negate the value of both as practised by Tournier.

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[73] Ibid., p. 50.

[74] Escape from Loneliness, p.133. [75] Ibid., p.116.

In respect to confession he writes:

> I have at times been accused of over-emphasizing the importance of confession, as if the whole cure of souls were contained in it. I speak from my own experience as a doctor. Without neglecting the good effects of sympathy, exhortation, advice, and doctrinal teaching, I am convinced that, from the medical point of view, none of these can be compared in importance with confession.[76]

In this statement he speaks of the value of confession "from the medical point of view." Empirically he has observed the healing wrought by confession in both the physical and psychical dimensions, but has not been unaware of the spiritual implications of confession. On the contrary, committed to the concept of man's wholeness, this is of great importance in his theory and practice of soul-healing.

Not only does confession have cathartic and abreactive value, but it is a preliminary aspect of the process of repentance and forgiveness. Confession of sin to oneself, others, and God leads the way toward the experience of forgiveness which has implications for the whole person. The Psalmist, aware of physical implications of unconfessed sin, writes:

> Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered.
> Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity, and in whose spirit there is no guile.

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[76] A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible, p. 209.

> When I kept silence, my bones waxed old through my roaring all the day long.
> For day and night thy hand was heavy upon me: my moisture is turned into the drought of summer.
> I acknowledged my sin unto thee, and mine iniquity have I not hid. I said, I will confess my transgressions unto the Lord; and thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin.[77]

Does confession require the verbalizing of one's guilt to another person--someone else besides oneself and God?[78] On the other hand, has confession before oneself and God really taken place if there is an unwillingness to confess before one's neighbor? Without pain and humiliation there is no repentance. The temptation to spare oneself pain and humiliation via a "secret confession" before God testifies to the presence of an unrepentant element. However, most people today, weary of bearing alone their load of unresolved guilt are consciously or unconsciously seeking their confessor--God's instrument in their healing.

Finally, there are two elements in the "soul-healing" of Paul Tournier that are of critical importance. The first is the element of personalism. His respect for personality in an epoch of depersonalization is refreshing. Speaking of the patient to whom

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[77]Psalm 32:1-5 (A. V.).

[78]Cf. O. H. Mowrer's emphasis on openness to "significant others." Infra, pp. 567-68.

he ministers he states: "By treating him as a person, I help him to become one."[79] And this--the helping of people to become persons--is a primary goal of his psychotherapy. Rightly enough he identifies respect for personhood with the authentic Christian faith:

> It is characteristic of Christianity that choice is made not of principles but of a person, of the living God, of Christ. It does indeed bring with it all the moral principles that can be discovered by reason. But it makes us something more than mere machines applying principles: it makes us persons. It brings us much more than a code of ethics. It brings us a personal relationship, a current of life springing from the very source of all life and true liberty.[80]

The second of these last two critical elements in "soul-healing" is, in reality, the basic presupposition out of which all of Tournier's theory and practice grow--that is, the dynamic power, relevancy and primacy of the grace of God. "This is the crux of the matter," he says; "either we expect to win life through our own efforts or else we recognize our incapacity and look only to grace."[81] For this physician it is the grace of

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[79] A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible, p. 124.

[80] The Meaning of Persons, pp. 215-16. Cf. Mowrer's view that principles should transcend persons. Supra, pp. 140-42.

[81] A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible, p. 232.

God that convicts of sin, that prompts confession, that blots out conscious guilt and raises to consciousness repressed guilt. It is this grace that saves one from pharisaical judgments and turns him to behold his own sin as a prelude to the gracious act of divine forgiveness. On the other hand, it is the grace of God that one is deprived of when he glories in his "successes" and his own "righteousness." It is the grace of God that is missed when personal fellowship and communion are sacrificed to religious formalism and the spirit of doctrinairism. The only road to grace, according to the "soul-healing" of Tournier, is the road that leads through the valley of the shadow of confession and repentance.

It is true that Tournier's syntheses--especially that of Christianity and medicine--may have problematic aspects that have not been fully considered. And it appears that at times he is guilty of over-simplification, generalization, and possibly that which some might consider a naïve piety. The marks of the controversial Oxford Group, admittedly, are to be found in much of his work. But, in spite of this, Tournier is a most valuable contributor to our understanding of the ecclesiogenic neuroses and the practice of the cure of souls. His spirit is warm, humble, and sympathetic. There is

no mark of detached superiority. From every indication he, himself, has grasped the secret of being a person and helping others to realize their own personhood under the Lordship of Jesus Christ. One certainly does not sense, as so often is the case with zealous evangelicals, a spirit of judgment, otherworldliness, or irrelevance. He speaks meaningfully to the personal needs of people, as the popularity of his writings testify. In respect to the churches, he is a sensitive and keen observer of the contemporary scene--honest in his criticism but refusing to succumb to the sardonic spirit notable in the writings of many present day church critics. Tournier's "médecine de la personne" is not an unwise prescription for the ills of the churches and the world to which they would minister.

CHAPTER X

VIKTOR E. FRANKL: LOGOTHERAPY

Vienna is the unchallenged center of the new psychology of the twentieth century. It was the home of Sigmund Freud's "psychoanalysis," and the "individual psychology" of Alfred Adler. In the years since World War II a third Viennese school of depth psychology has arisen. This is the "existential analysis" or "logotherapy" of Viktor E. Frankl. Described as the "Benjamin" of Adler's group, Frankl was a close follower of Adler until he differed and broke with him, even as Adler had done previously with Freud.[1] Frankl, like Freud a Jew, developed his logotherapy out of the matrix of his experiences in Nazi concentration camps. In these camps his young wife, parents, and other relatives died. In the midst of these harrowing years of imprison-

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[1]Robert C. Leslie, Prof. of pastoral psychology and counseling at Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley, Calif., speaks of Frankl as the "Benjamin" of Adler's group, in a tape recording of a lecture by Leslie. This tape was made available through the courtesy of Prof. Frankl from his own tape library. The separation of Jung and Adler from Freud is common knowledge in the developmental history of psychoanalysis.

ment and uncertainty, this psychiatrist not only observed human personality subjected to all kinds of inconceivable stress situations, but he, himself, entered into the very same fearful experiences. Logotherapy, which he translates as the therapy of meaning, recognizes the fact that every psychotherapy is built on a certain view of the nature of man. Each psychotherapy, although not always recognized or admitted, has its own distinctive anthropology, and from this basis proceeds to build its theory and practice.

I. THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN LOGOTHERAPY

Frankl's concept of man seems to be based on three pillars: (1) the freedom of will, (2) the will to meaning, and (3) the meaning of life. These points are set in a counter position to (1) pan-determinism, (2) the homeostasis theory, and (3) reductionism.[2] Logotherapy stresses man's inherent ability to choose and decide. He is not a defenseless victim of his instinctual drives or environmental influences. On the

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[2]From a tape recording of a lecture entitled "The Concept of Man in Logotherapy," presented by Prof. Frankl at Georgetown Univ., Washington, D. C., Feb. 27, 1964. Also see James C. Crumbaugh & Leonard T. Maholick, "The Case for Frankl's 'Will to Meaning,'" Journal of Existential Psychiatry, IV (1963), 44-46. "Homeostasis" appears to be a "manufactured" word from ὁμοιόστασις It is loosely translated as "correctly balanced."

contrary, man is able to transcend these factors. Even in the most difficult of life's situations--situations in which it might seem that he has no choice, no alternative--he still has the freedom to choose his attitude, if nothing else, towards the most tragic of dilemmas.[3]

Logotherapy also views man as a being in search of meaning and not just seeking homeostasis. To be "well-balanced" is not nearly as important as living a life characterized by meaning. In fact, it can be argued that the homeostasis principle tries to avoid real confrontation with meaning. Thirdly, there is meaning in life that is there to be discovered. Reductionism, in Frankl's thought, is a cardinal error of Freudianism. Human phenomenon is not explained by reducing it to sub-human phenomenon; nor is meaning in life compatible with sheer reductionism.

"Dimensional ontology" is the name Frankl gives to his anthropological theory, which takes into account man's wholeness and diversity. The concept of the whole person is not violated, but neither are man's differing expressions neglected. Frankl's three dimensions are the familiar triad of physical, psychical and spiritual. "Man lives in three dimensions," he says, "the somatic,

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[3]Cf. Pascal's well known descriptive phrase of man as "un roseau pensant."

the mental, and the spiritual."[4] But to the third he gives a new name and an unusual emphasis, for a psychotherapist. The spiritual dimension, Frankl refers to as the "noetic." He states:

> The noetic forms a specific class among the psychic processes, i.e. that class which is not accessible to animals, but only to man. Man is the only being which is able to transcend himself, to emerge above the level of his own psychic and physical conditions. Thus, man is also enabled to objectify and even to oppose himself. By this very fact man enters, nay, he even creates a new dimension, the dimension of noetic processes--call them spiritual groping or moral decisions--in contrast to psychic processes in general.[5]

His concept of "spiritual," however, is allegedly one without religious connotations. "Spiritual" in Frankl's use refers to the specifically human dimension. "A psychotherapy which not only recognizes man's spirit, but actually starts from it may be termed logotherapy. In this connection, logos is intended to signify 'the spiritual' and beyond that, 'the meaning.'"[6] His foot-

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[4]Viktor E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (2d ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p.x.

[5]Viktor E. Frankl, From Death-Camp to Existentialism, trans. Ilse Lasch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p.102.

[6]The Doctor and the Soul, p. xi. It is necessary for the Christian to keep in mind the distinction between the Christian concept of "Logos" derived from John's Gospel, and Frankl's use of the term as "meaning." Apparently his use of "logos" as meaning is based on a translation of the word as "reason." See Henry George

note to this statement reads: "It must be kept in mind, however, that within the frame of logotherapy 'spiritual' does not have a religious connotation but refers to the specifically human dimension."[7]

How close Frankl stays to his "non-religious" use of the term "spiritual" is open to debate; but it cannot be denied that the emphasis of logotherapy is upon the spiritual dimension of man. This dimension is "the core or nucleus of the personality."[8] Freud and his successors, according to Frankl, have neglected this nucleus of man.

> Man has been presented as constrained by biological, by psychological, by sociological factors. Inherent human freedom, which obtains in spite of all these constraints, the freedom of the spirit in spite of nature, has been overlooked. Yet it is this freedom that truly constitutes the essence of man.[9]

If this aspect of man has been overlooked by the preceding psychotherapies, then Frankl intends to supplement

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Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (8th ed. rev.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1897), p. 901. Under λογος they refer to the "B. Lat. ratio, the power of the mind which is manifested in speech, reason. . . ."

[7]Ibid. Frankl reminds the reader that the German has two words for "spiritual": (1) geistig is spiritual, non-ecclesiastical, and (2) geistlich is spiritual, ecclesiastical.

[8]Ibid., p. 8. Cf. Jung's concept of the "Self."

[9]Ibid., p. 20.

and correct the picture and present man in his wholeness by emphasizing the critical importance of the spiritual.

Logotherapy envisions man as a being in three dimensions who is ever reaching out for meaning. Meaning always precedes being, believes Frankl, who illustrates this by referring to the cloud that preceded the Israelites in the wilderness. If the cloud had not preceded them it would have engulfed them, leaving them in confusion. Man's concern, therefore, is not the "will to pleasure," nor the "will to power," but instead the "will to meaning"--and this is the theme of logotherapy.

"Conscience" is freely considered in logotherapy. Referring to Frankl's view of it, Donald F. Tweedie, Jr. says: "Conscience is immediate, intuitive and absolute. It is basically unconscious and non-rational. . . . It is non-rational because it is pre-logical, that is to say, it is prior to any rational reflection."[10] Tweedie continues: "Frankl posits as the only plausible ground for the conscience, a personal structure, a personalissimum--God."[11] But as Frankl himself has said, "Man is free even to say 'Yes' or 'No' to God. So he can say

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[10]Donald F. Tweedie, Jr., Logotherapy and the Christian Faith (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1961), p. 62.

[11]Ibid.

the same to conscience."[12] There is nothing that can take away, in the final analysis, man's free choice.

Contemporary man's problem of meaninglessness is referred to in logotherapy as "existential frustration" or the "existential vacuum." Frankl claims that there is to be found in our day an existential neurosis which he calls "noögenic neurosis." This is a new type of neurosis that is seen alongside the classical clinical neuroses. He estimates that approximately 20% of today's neuroses are "noögenic" in nature and origin.[13]

The existential vacuum which Frankl believes to be particularly prevalent in the modern day is complicated by such things as automation and barren leisure time. Although existential frustration is not necessarily pathological in itself, it can cause pathology which is not of the classical clinical kind. Frankl, who asserts that one of the reasons for the present meaning-

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[12]From a tape recorded lecture by Frankl entitled "Man's Need and Search for Values." (In his library.)

[13]The Doctor and the Soul, p. xii. See James C. Crumbaugh and Leonard T. Maholick, "An Experimental Study in Existentialism: The Psychometric Approach to Frankl's Concept of Noögenic Neurosis," Journal of Clinical Psychology, XX (April, 1964), 200-07. Also see Viktor E. Frankl, "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapism," Journal of Existential Psychiatry, IV (1963), 27. Jung has said: "About a third of my cases are not suffering from any clinically definable neurosis, but from the senselessness and aimlessness of their lives." "The Aims of Psychotherapy," The Practice of Psychotherapy, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 41.

lessness seems to be man's loss of those traditions which governed his life in former times, says ". . . spiritual agony may have very little connection with a disease of the psyche."[14] The "collective neuroses" of today, according to Frankl, manifest themselves in four major symptoms: (1) an ephemeral attitude toward life which is dominant in the West, (2) a fatalistic attitudein life which is world-wide, (3) collectivist thinking and (4) fanaticism, which are both dominant in the East.[15]

In addition to the problem of the existential vacuum, modern man is subjected to the disease of determinism. Freudian psychoanalysis, Frankl believes, is primarily responsible for this cancerous growth. Arnold and Gasson say:

> Psychological determinism has been emphasized especially by psychoanalysts who see man as driven and controlled not only by the id but by the super-ego. In contrast, Existential Analysis repudiates any conception which would make the self the plaything or the product of any kind of forces.[16]

Logotherapy refuses to accept the subjection of man to instincts, drives, traditions, environment, the uncon-

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[14]"Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapism," op. cit., p. 27; and The Doctor and the Soul, p. x.

[15]See Tweedie, op. cit., pp. 97ff.

[16]Magda B. Arnold and John A. Gasson, "Logotherapy and Existential Analysis," The Human Person (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1954), p. 469.

scious or any other power that would make of him a by-product or a thing to be manipulated.

In logotherapy man is a person and not a reflex mechanism or a mere biological specimen. The following ten theses illustrate the basic nature of Frankl's anthropology: (1) A person is an individual and as such is an indivisible unity. (2) A person is totally complete in himself. (3) A person is unique, an absolute novelty. (4) A person is a spiritual being with worth which is independent of his usefulness. (5) A person is an existential being with the power of decision and choice. (6) A person is an ego and not a mere id. He is not propelled by an unconscious instinct but rather is empowered by a spiritual unconscious. (7) Not only is a person a unity and complete in himself but he also establishes the same in the physical, psychological, spiritual, unity which depicts the whole person. (8) A person is a dynamic, unfolding being, ever in the process of "Becoming." (9) An animal is not a person. (10) A person is only understood when viewed as made in the image of God. The voice of transcendence is in his conscience.[17]

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[17]These summarizing theses are from Tweedie, op. cit., pp. 69-70. He has drawn them from Frankl's Logos und Existenz (Wien: Amandus-Verlag, 1951), chap. II.

The above theses demonstrate the affinity of logotherapy and Christianity in their view of the nature of man. Frankl's anthropology helps in the rediscovery of the dignity of man--in the midst of a depersonalized age--even the living hell of a concentration camp. Arnold and Gasson mention the following as positive contributions made by Frankl to the understanding of human nature:

> [(1) He] . . . portrays the human being as a rational creature--not as an animal whose natural condition is neurosis. [(2) He maintains that the] . . . patient is capable of self-control and direction--not the complete and abject victim of The Unconscious. [(3) He holds that] . . . proper perfection of the human being is to be found in the realm of the spirit, not within the confines of instinct or reflex muscle twitches.[18]

If it is true that a psychotherapist's view of the nature of man will tend to mould his psychotherapeutic theory and practice--and this seems almost irrefutable--then logotherapy's position seems to be a welcome and corrective addition to much that has preceded it. There are many who believe they detect in the basic theories of psychoanalysis, analytical psychology, and behaviourism, for example, fundamental views of man that are not compatible with Christian anthropology.

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[18] Op. cit., p. 481.

II. THE WILL TO MEANING

The presupposition of man's need of and search for meaning is the heart of logotherapy's theory and practice. This search has ontological and cosmological implications. Frankl affirms that man is a free being who is in search of meaning--meaning that is not within him but outside of him, and can be discovered. Describing life in the Nazi death-camps he has said:

> Nietzsche's words, "He who has a why to live for can bear with almost any how," could be the guiding motto for all psychotherapeutic and psychohygenic efforts regarding prisoners. Whenever there was an opportunity for it, one had to give them [the other prisoners] a why--an aim--for their lives, in order to strengthen them to bear the terrible how of their existence. Woe to him who saw no more sense in his life, no aim, no purpose, and therefore no point in carrying on. He was soon lost.[19]

Although it might seem on first impression that Frankl's idea of "giving" meaning is highly superficial--as if it were just a matter of intellectualization or exhortation--this is not the case. In Frankl's thought, meaning "cannot be grasped by merely intellectual means. . . . It is rather accessible to an act of commitment which emerges out of the depth and center of man's personality."[20]

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[19] From Death-Camp to Existentialism, p. 76.

[20] Viktor E. Frankl, "Logotherapy and the Challenge of Suffering," Pastoral Psychology, XIII (June, 1962), 27.

Neither is the most important thing the meaning of man's life in general. The search must be directed for concrete and specific meaning. Frankl theorizes:

> To look for the general meaning of man's life would be comparable to the question put to a chess player: "What is the best move?" There is no move at all, irrespective of the concrete situation of a special game. The same holds for human existence inasmuch as one can search only for the concrete meaning of personal existence, a meaning which changes from man to man, from day to day, from hour to hour.[21]

Is this not fundamentally the position Jesus held? The Pharisees fostered the generalities, the pre-eminence of the principle. Jesus was concerned primarily with the personal and the contextual experience of each unique human being. To the rich young ruler He spoke one word, to the woman at the well another. There was no tyranny of the stereotype in the ministry of Christ. This healthy approach to persons, meaning, and life is sensed in logotherapy. Such a position contrasts sharply, for example, with Mowrer's emphasis on principles.[22]

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Cf. supra, pp. 140-42. Robert C. Leslie says: "It is this concern for more ultimate values that characterizes Frankl's logotherapy. The most distinctive aspect of logotherapy lies in its insistence on a personal responsibility that means far more than the development of self-potential; it is a sense of responsibility that recognizes different kinds of values and chooses a relationship with the highest values. In this emphasis

According to Frankl, meaning is always available for discovery; and it is to be ". . . found in the world rather than within man or his own psyche, as though it were a closed system."[23] It can be discovered only by the individual himself. But how do men discover meaning? How do they give meaning to their lives? Logotherapy proposes that meaning is realized by the actualization of values on at least one of three different levels. Man experiences meaning by realizing (1) creative values, (2) experiential values, or (3) attitudinal values.

Creative values are realized by the man or woman who successfully achieves the task he sets out to do. These values, of course, can be realized on many differ-

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Frankl underscores the characteristic approach of Jesus." Jesus and Logotherapy (New York: Abingdon Press, 1965), p. 72. Also see Edgar P. Dickie, "Theologians of Our Time XVI. Karl Heim," The Expository Times, LXXV (July, 1964), 307. In speaking of Karl Heim's interest in the cura animarum Dickie says in part, ". . . Jesus never storms the citadel of the personality. Men must come to Him of their own free will (the rich young ruler goes sadly away, and Jesus does not follow him). When we ask further what were the methods employed by Jesus, we discover that He had no method, or rather that He had a different method for each soul."

[23]Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, Part I, trans. Ilse Lasch (rev. & enlarged ed.; New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1965), p. 175. Cf. Jung's stress on the "Holy Spirit" and neglect of the historical Christ.

ent levels. The brilliant surgeon who time and again is able to provide hope and continued life for the ill and suffering through the skill of his surgery experiences creative values. The mother who rejoices in the opportunities and daily tasks of motherhood realizes the same. The brickmason who interprets his work as a meaningful contribution to life, people, and culture knows the value of creativity. But what about those who for some reason or reasons find it impossible to realize this kind of value? In our age of automation and assembly lines it is increasingly likely that there will be many who do not discover real meaning on the creative level. The inability to "put one's soul" into this type of labour is not uncommon. In that case Frankl believes meaning can be experienced on yet another level.

Experiential values can be actualized both by those who do realize and those who do not realize creative values. One discovers experiential meaning "by experiencing the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. . . ."[24] The person who experiences the sense of the presence of God discovers meaning. Experiential meaning can be realized in the hearing of a symphony or the reading of

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[24]The Doctor and the Soul, p. xiii.

a good book. It can be experienced as one person comes to know another human being in all of his uniqueness. Love is the path that leads to this type of meaning. Frankl writes:

> Love is the only way to grasp another human being in the innermost core of his personality. No one can become fully aware of the very essence of another human being unless he loves him. By the spiritual act of love he is enabled to see the essential traits and features in the beloved person; and even more, he sees that which is potential in him, that which is not yet actualized but yet ought to be actualized. Furthermore, by his love, the loving person enables the beloved person to actualize these potentialities.[25]

Meaning can be discovered by all those who are capable of realizing experiential values such as those mentioned above. But even the man who, in great distress, is unable to experience meaning on either the creative or experiential level can retreat to another level--the attitudinal--upon which meaning can be discovered. Attitudinal values are actualized in the midst of the most hopeless suffering. They are realized by the very attitude one takes toward his condition--no matter how pathetic and unchangeable that condition might be. (Surely at this point Frankl is speaking from the matrix of his war-time death-camp experiences.)

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[25] Man's Search for Meaning, pp. 176-77.

The person suffering from terminal cancer, for example, is not necessarily subjected to the void of meaninglessness if meaning on the attitudinal level can be discovered. ". . . Just then is one given a last chance to actualize the highest value, to fulfill the deepest meaning, the meaning of suffering."[26] An illustration is the account of an elderly general practitioner who was deeply depressed. He had not been able to deal with his grief from the death of his wife which took place two years earlier. "What would have happened, Doctor, if you had died first, and your wife would have had to survive you?" asked Frankl. "Oh," he said, "for her this would have been terrible; how she would have suffered"! Frankl replied, "You see, Doctor, such a suffering has been spared her, and it is you who have spared her this suffering; but now, you have to pay for it by surviving and mourning her." The bereaved said not a word but warmly shook Frankl's hand and left the office.[27] "Man is ready and willing to shoulder any

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[26]Ibid., p. 178.

[27]Ibid., pp. 178-79. This is an oft used illustration in Frankl's writings and lectures. Could it be that Jesus' refusal of the anodyne on the cross is related to "meaningful suffering"?

suffering as soon and as long as he can see a meaning in it."[28]

Neither does logotherapy accept the argument that death does away with meaning. "Finality, temporality," rejoins Frankl, "is therefore not only an essential characteristic of human life, but also a real factor in its meaningfulness."[29] This is true because it places a man under the imperative of utilizing life now! It is the quality and not the quantity of life that is essential. "It is not from the length of its span that we can ever draw conclusions as to a life's meaningfulness."[30] "Having-been" is of the utmost importance. That which has been actualized by living cannot be taken away. It belongs always and forever to that person who has experienced it.

Frankl is seen to be in agreement with Tillich when he asserts that meaninglessness is one of the

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[28]"Logotherapy and the Challenge of Suffering," op. cit., p. 27. Leslie sees Frankl's assertion that meaning in life is discoverable in the very attitude taken toward suffering as one of his major contributions. (On. cit., p. 97).

[29]The Doctor and the Soul, p. 64.

[30]Ibid., p. 66. Cf. Shakespeare's lines: "His years but young, but his experiences old: His head unmellowed, but his judgement ripe:" William Shakespeare, The Two Gentlemen of Verona, ed. Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch and John Dover Wilson (Cambridge: At the Univ. Press, 1921) ii, 4; p. 26.

greatest contemporary problems of mankind. His answer appears to be: "No matter how desperate your plight, no matter how bogged down you may be, there is meaning for you if you can but find it." He also argues that meaning can be discovered in "doing," as is illustrated in his emphasis on creative values. This type of "doing" advocated by Frankl and producing creative meaning is not the empty activism that I have alluded to elsewhere. There is a qualitative difference between an activism that is little more than an escape mechanism, and an activity that is creatively meaningful. Existential analysis recognizes a positive activism. It is not irrelevant to question Frankl at the point of the relativity of meanings--that is, whether or not some meanings are more valuable than others. When this is done his response has included the following emphases: (1) He stresses objectivity and states, "In my opinion there is only one answer to each question--the true answer, the right answer; only one meaning inherent in each situation--its true meaning." (2) He emphasizes uniqueness; that is, unique meaning for each unique person in each unique situation. (3) He states emphatically that his task as a therapist is not to "show what is the meaning" for a person, but "to enable the patient to

get hold of this meaning." The patient must find it; it cannot be given to him. (4) He says, "What I decide for is very essential! I may decide for or against truth. I may decide for or against fulfilling the true meaning of the situation."[31]

Despite Frankl's declaration for objectivity it appears that often he is quite subjective. This is not necessarily detrimental. It is refreshing to catch glimpses of an openness that does not always hide behind the impossible "neutrality" and "objectivity" claimed by most scientists, including the psychotherapists. Although he denies "absolutely binding values," he does admit that "meanings which are shared by many people and are valid throughout whole periods of history should be called values."[32] However, in his latest writings he no longer speaks of "values," because he claims they are generalized meanings.

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[31]A statement from a tape recorded interview with Professor Frankl in Vienna on June 29, 1965. Permission to quote secured.

[32]From a tape recorded lecture by Viktor Frankl entitled "Man's Need and Search for Values." This tape was made available through the courtesy of Prof. Frankl from his own tape library in Vienna.

III. DISTINCTIVE LOGOTHERAPY

Is logotherapy really distinctive, or is Frankl simply presenting familiar psychotherapeutic theory in a new guise? Frankl, himself, seems to view logotherapy as a supplement, correction, and completion of the earlier psychotherapies. He admits his debt to Freud and the others, but in no sense accepts their infallibility. On the contrary, he is quick to note their deficiencies. Edith Weisskopf-Joelson has commented:

> It is obvious that Frankl's ideas represent a psychological school very different from the commonly known schools. Most of the latter at least try to maintain a certain pretence of empiricism and objectivity. In contrast, in Frankl's thinking, subjective values are openly and undisguisedly expressed.[33]

An affinity for subjective values, however, does not appear to be the only distinctive aspect of logotherapy. Frankl charges that Freud, Adler and Jung "have not overcome the psychologism in Husserlian terms."[34] He claims that in their systems they have ignored or

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[33] Edith Weisskopf-Joelson, "Some Comments on a Viennese School of Psychiatry," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI (1955), 703.

[34] From a tape recorded personal interview with Professor Frankl in Vienna on June 29, 1965. Permission to quote secured. See, also, The Doctor and the Soul, pp. 19 & 22.

treated as a derivative of the instinctual the specifically human dimension that he calls the noölogical--the spiritual. Frankl writes:

> Freud once declared in conversation: "Humanity has always known that it possesses a spirit; it was my task to show that it has instincts as well." But, I myself feel that humanity has demonstrated ad nauseam in recent years that it has instincts, drives. Today it appears more important to remind man that he has a spirit, that he is a spiritual being.[35]

Freudianism, suggests Frankl, is the source of much of the fatalism, determinism, and de-personalization plaguing modern man. As VanderVeldt and Odenwald say, "Because of his mechanistic view, Freud depersonalized the unitary human being: he atomized it."[36] Man becomes a victim of his unconscious drives and instincts; and every human experience is explained away by psychologism, so that a distorted view of man is inevitable.

Freud, on one occasion, wrote in a letter to Princess Bonaparte: "The moment a man questions the meaning and value of life, he is sick."[37] Frankl rejoins:

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[35] *The Doctor and the Soul*, p. xviii.

[36] James H. VanderVeldt and Robert P. Odenwald, *Psychiatry and Catholicism* (1st ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952), p. 130.

[37] *Letters of Sigmund Freud*, ed. Ernest L. Freud (New York: Basic Books, 1960), p. 436.

> . . . Man's concern about a meaning in life which would be worthy of life is in itself not a sign of disease. It is rather the truest expression of the human nature in man. Existential frustration is spiritual distress but not a psychic disease. . . . Now just as there is truth in spite of sickness so there is suffering in spite of health. For example, despair need not necessarily be pathological.[38]

Frankl speaks of "narrow psychotherapy" in sharp terms:

> For if a man's problem is on the one hand plain hunger and on the other hand the meaning of his existence, the content or lack of content in his life, he cannot help but be outraged when somebody comes to him with psychological detective stories and starts hunting hidden complexes.[39]

Here again he has put his finger on the sore of psychologism in the body of psychotherapy. Psychologism tends to create the inability to accept anything at face value. But Frankl in a more generous moment has remarked humorously that even Freud would admit that there were times when a cigar was really a cigar.[40]

The task of logotherapy goes beyond the task generally envisioned by psychotherapy. "We no longer stand where classical psychotherapy stands"; says Frankl,

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[38] From Death-Camp to Existentialism, p. 101.

[39] The Doctor and the Soul, p. 126.

[40] From a tape recording of a lecture entitled "The Concept of Man," delivered by Frankl at the Wartburg Theological Seminary, Dubuque, Iowa, Feb. 11, 1965. A copy of this tape is to be found in the Seminary Library.

"we no longer view the task of psychotherapy to make men merely able to work . . . and to enjoy themselves: at least to some degree we must also make them capable of suffering."[41] Logotherapy's constructive and positive attitude toward the problem of suffering and death and man's God-given ability to transcend even this is an important distinctive that is not generally shared by other psychotherapies. The physicians and ministers whose ministries carry them to the bedsides of the suffering ask questions, for example, about the indiscriminate use of medication which can deprive a human being of his "right" to his own suffering. And surely the mother who refuses medication at childbirth and insists on actualizing this "right" has the privilege of so doing.

Another point at which logotherapy and psychoanalysis contrast is the chronological emphasis. The emphasis of Freud's method was to relate past to present. Frankl accepts the importance of understanding the present in terms of the past, but he stresses that the future is not pre-determined by the past. Instead, decision in the present moulds the future. This greatly influences the comparable length of the therapeutic

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[41]Cited by Tweedie in Logotherapy and the Christian Faith, pp. 140-41.

relationship in each of the systems. This will be discussed in more detail below.

Weisskopf-Joelson believes that there are similarities between logotherapy and the thinking of Mowrer and Jung.[42] One point of similarity she notes between Mowrer and Frankl is in respect to the etiology of neuroses.

> Frankl states that neuroses are caused by repression of the patient's sense of responsibility. . . . Phobias, for example, are seen as caused by a displacement to irrelevant stimuli of the qualms and fears of a repressed conscience.[43]

This seems to be akin to Mowrer's view concerning the repression of guilt and, also, to Tournier's theory in respect to the repression of Christianity.[44] However, the transcendental nature of the conscience in logotherapy is a distinguishing feature between the psychology of Mowrer and that of Frankl. As far as Jung is concerned, it does seem that his thought and that of Frankl share much of the same spirit.[45] There is one

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[42] Op. cit., p. 702. [43] Ibid.

[44] Cf. supra, pp. 142ff. & pp. 406ff. Frankl criticizes Tournier for "mixing up religion and psychotherapy . . . essentially different dimensions." (Personal interview. Permission to quote secured.)

[45] VanderVeldt and Odenwald agree that Frankl appears to be closer to Jung than to Freud, but goes beyond Jung. See op. cit., p. 130.

basic difference in respect to the "geographical" location of God. God, in Jung's analytical psychology, is always found within. This is not the case with Frankl. He believes he corrects Jung at this point when he accepts a position that approximates the Judaic-Christian view of God as wholly Other.

As far as psychoanalysis (Freud) and individual psychology (Adler) are concerned, Frankl himself summarizes logotherapy's basic distinction from these schools:

> When we look upon human life without the blinkers of preconception, we must conclude that both consciousness [Freud] and responsibleness [Adler] play the basic roles in the drama of existence. One might in fact state it as a basic theorem that being human means being conscious and being responsible. Both psychoanalysis and individual psychology err in that each sees only one aspect of human existence--whereas the two aspects must be taken jointly to yield a true picture of man.[46]

Frankl, of course, believes that this is accomplished in logotherapy. Arnold and Gasson appear to agree with him, at least in part, when they observe: "Existential analysis has philosophical foundations which are more acceptable than are the foundations of Freud's or Adler's system, because here the human being is considered in his basically human functions."[47] Frankl claims then

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[46]The Doctor and the Soul, p. 5.

[47]Op. cit., p. 491.

that ". . . existential analysis is psychotherapy whose starting-point is consciousness of responsibility."[48] In this phrase rests the key to the understanding of his thought. This also leads to the point of distinction that delineates Frankl's existential philosophy from that of Sartre, Camus and others. For Frankl, man is "free"; but he is free to something, not from something. He is free to be consciously responsible! As an existentialist, Frankl is indebted to Kierkegaard and Heidegger in particular.

IV. LOGOTHERAPY: ITS PRACTICE

In respect to logotherapeutic practice Frankl states:

> Logotherapy attempts to orient and direct the patient toward a concrete, personal meaning. But, it is not its purpose to give a meaning to the patient's existence; its concern is only to enable the patient to find such a meaning, to broaden, so to speak, his field of vision, so that he will become aware of the full spectrum of possibilities for personal and concrete meanings and values.[49]

In the context of a personal interview Frankl was asked the following questions: "How would you appraise the

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[48] The Doctor and the Soul, p. 25.

[49] Viktor E. Frankl, "The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis and Logotherapy," Journal of Individual Psychology, XV (1959), 164.

'client-centered' therapy of Carl Rogers in contrast with logotherapy? Are you not much more directive in logotherapy"? His reply in part was:

> It might well be that logotherapy is more directive. . . . In principle the doctor should not take off from the shoulders of his patient the responsibility to make decisions; but he does not even need to do so simply due to the fact that truth in my opinion is something so objective that I may trust that truth will impose itself upon the patient. And so truth does not need the intervention of a therapist.[50]

Logotherapy is considerably more directive than the "client-centered" or "non-directive" approach to therapy. Despite Frankl's protestations that he does not "impose" truth upon his patients it is clear that the role of the therapist in logotherapy is much more active than the role of the average therapist today, especially on the American scene. The technique of paradoxical intention, which is discussed below, is a concrete example of this more directive approach. As so often happens, the non-directive approach itself was a corrective to the dogmatic, advice-giving counselling that preceded it. Its reaction in many cases, however, turned into an over-reaction and the pendulum swung to

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[50]From a tape recording of a personal interview with Professor Frankl in Vienna on June 29, 1965. Permission to quote secured.

the opposite extreme. Many cartoonists have capitalized on the caricatured counsellor who passively sits back and "uh-huh's" his way through a counselling hour, occasionally adding a sterile "reflection" of the patient's last statement. Frankl speaks of the "obsession of American psychiatrists not to become directive."[51] There are signs, in fairness to Rogers and those that practise "client-centered therapy," that non-directive counselling is itself becoming more balanced and less extreme in its application. We should be indebted to Rogers for his correction to the "advice-giving" of earlier years; we should also be indebted to Frankl and others who have warned of the dangers of a too passive role for the counsellor. Although quite "directive," logotherapy still recognizes the necessity of the patient assuming conscious responsibility in the relationship.[52]

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[51] Ibid. See also "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapism," op. cit., p. 29, where Frankl suggests that in this age of the existential vacuum there is more danger in not being confronted and challenged (non-directive) than there is in a more directive approach.

[52] Cf. Tweedie, op. cit., p. 106. The following statement by Frankl demonstrates the directive element in logotherapy. He says, in speaking of convincing a potential suicidal person that suicide is categorically contrary to reason: "We believe this can be done by objective argument and analysis of the problem on its own terms--by the methods of logotherapy, that is." (The Doctor and the Soul, p. 51.

It would not be true to say that logotherapy in any sense advocates "handing a ready-made solution" to the counsellee.

Freudian psychoanalysis is a methodology mechanistic enough to be extremely attractive to those who are prone to pragmatism or feel strongly the urge to simplicity. I believe that this explains, at least in part, its great popularity in the United States, a country that cannot deny its preoccupation with the pragmatic. For the most part, however, logotherapy is a methodology that depends on improvisation. Each situation is "played by ear." Uniqueness, a primary emphasis of logotherapy, demands this. To a certain extent the ability to do this, as a therapist, is a gift, an art; and not all are so gifted. It is a gift, however, that can be cultivated.

Logotherapy, although it has its specific techniques, as we shall see, is aware of the danger involved in stressing techniques. As Aaron Ungersma says:

> Frankl holds that too great an emphasis upon technique produces technicians, not therapists, and then the patient becomes a machine to be manipulated in accordance with prescribed techniques.[53]

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[53] A. J. Ungersma, The Search for Meaning (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), p. 34. The importance of this observation cannot be over-stressed. Technical manipulation is always inferior to true therapy.

This is a charge that Frankl often levels at psychoanalysis. He contends that the existential relationship of counsellor and counsellee never should be made secondary to technical idolatry. With this said let us examine two specific techniques used in logotherapy.

"Paradoxical intention" is the name Frankl gives to one of logotherapy's most interesting and apparently most successful approaches to therapy. This technique is based upon the "twofold fact," according to Frankl, that (1) fear makes come true that which one fears, and that (2) hyper-intention makes impossible that which one wishes. The approach is simply to make a paradoxical wish for the very thing which one fears.[54] Frankl writes:

> Such a procedure, however, must make use of the specifically human capacity for self-detachment inherent in a sense of humor. This basic capacity to detach one from oneself is actualized whenever the logotherapeutic technique called "paradoxical intention" is applied. At the same time, the patient is enabled to put himself at a distance from his own neurosis.[55]

This technique seems to be especially successful in treating anxiety neurosis and obsessional neurosis.

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[54] Man's Search for Meaning, pp. 195-96.

[55] Ibid., p. 197. Cf. Gordon W. Allport, The Individual and His Religion (London: Constable, 1951), p. 103. Allport states, "The neurotic who learns to laugh at himself may be on the way to self-management, perhaps to cure." See also Elton Trueblood, The Humor of Christ (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

Both are not uncommon among ministers, as I have indicated above.[56] Sometimes persuasion is used as a preliminary to paradoxical intention. Frankl illustrates:

> This holds true, for instance, for cases of blasphemous obsessions as they are so often to be met in priests and ministers. My procedure in such cases is as follows: I tell them: "This is obviously a full-fledged case of obsessive neurosis. Do you agree?" When they answer "Yes," I go on to ask: "Then what about God? Will not his diagnostic skills infinitely exceed my own?" "Of course," they answer. So I go on: "Now, if God knows that all these blasphemous ideas are of an obsessive-neurotic nature, he certainly will not make you accountable or hold you responsible for these ideas. By the same token, however, there is no need to fight them; on the contrary, your fighting them would rather be the only real blasphemy you run the risk of committing, inasmuch as thereby you would implicitly declare that God cannot differentiate between what is only an obsession and, on the other hand, a real blasphemy. So stop fighting your obsession if you don't want to offend God." From this moment on the priest or minister can apply paradoxical intention.[57]

Frankl describes the use of paradoxical intention with numerous cases scattered throughout his writings. Although this is over-simplification, the basic idea is that if a person is suffering from anticipatory anxiety--for example, fear of fainting in some public place--

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[56] Supra, chap. VII.

[57] The Doctor and the Soul, p. 239. It is quite possible that clergymen would be more receptive to this approach of rational persuasion employed by Frankl than others; especially others who might be less educated, reflective, and open to reason.

then he says to himself, "I am really going to have a good faint today. I think I'll do it three or four times and in the most prominent public place I can find." The humor employed helps put distance between the patient and his neurosis; and the anxiety is successfully dealt with. Actually the patient is ridiculing his symptoms rather than fleeing from them or fighting them. The immediate goal seems not to be the removal of symptoms, per se, but the altering of one's attitude toward them.

The length of the logotherapeutic relationships when paradoxical intention is employed is dramatically shorter than the classical psychoanalytic relationship. Frankl says "the average sessions were in my hospital six to eight in duration."[58] The length of the therapeutic "hour" was only ten to forty minutes. "And the outcome [of those cases studied in the Vienna Polyclinic] was 75.7% of cures or improvement to the extent that no further treatment was needed."[59] These are encouraging

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[58]From a personal interview with Frankl in Vienna on June 29, 1965. Permission to quote secured.

[59]Ibid. See also Hans O. Gerz, "The Treatment of the Phobic and the Obsessive Compulsive Patient using Paradoxical Intention Sec. Viktor E. Frankl," Journal of Neuropsychiatry, III (July-August, 1962), 375-87. Gerz, Clinical Dir. of the Connecticut State Hosp.,USA, reports a good response to the use of paradoxical intention.

statistics indeed in the light of some of the staggering problems of mental health today.

"De-reflection" is the term Frankl uses to describe another logotherapeutic technique. The goal of de-reflection is to counteract the "compulsive inclination to self-observation."[60] Frankl proposes that:

> Through de-reflection the patient is enabled to "ignore" his neurosis by focusing his attention away from himself. This is possible, however, only to the extent to which he becomes reoriented to the unique meaning of his life. And to enable him to find that meaning is precisely the task of existential analysis.[61]

One of the liabilities of psychoanalysis is that the process often can turn into an unhealthy, intensive, pre-occupation with one's self. Logotherapy attempts to meet this problem by redirecting one's concern towards transcendent meaning and value.

Most of the contemporary psychotherapies seem to be concerned primarily with "self-actualization." At this point Frankl remarks:

> Self-actualization is of course a desideratum. But man can actualize himself only insofar as he fulfills meaning, in which case self-actualization occurs by itself--automatically, as it were. Like

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[60] The Doctor and the Soul, p. 255.

[61] Ibid., p. 259.

> pleasure, self-actualization is contravened when deliberately sought after or made an end in itself.[62]

Again, in Frankl's words, one ". . . finds identity to the extent to which he commits himself to something beyond himself, to a cause greater than himself."[63] The compatibility of this view with the New Testament teachings of Christ is apparent.

Logotherapy, however, would not deny the importance of self-understanding; but, it seeks to counter the unhealthy, intensive, self-centeredness that threatens the validity of psychotherapy--especially psychotherapy that lends itself to a lengthy introspective process. Neuroses often involve a vicious circle of some description. "It is not the neurotic's self-concern, whether

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[62]Viktor E. Frankl, "The Will to Meaning," The Christian Century, LXXXI (April 22, 1964), 516. Frankl indicates that inordinate concern with self-actualization is a result of meaninglessness. He uses the analogy of a boomerang. Only the boomerang that has missed its target, the prey, returns to the hunter. The man that dwells upon himself is the man that has not realized meaning in life--he has missed his goal. (Frankl, "The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis," op. cit., p. 161.) There is continuity of thought in logotherapy with aspects of classical psychology. The "law of reversed effort" has long been recognized, and the "hedonistic paradox" has been conceded even by the psychological hedonist. Frankl's "paradoxical intention" and "dereflection" appear to be in basic agreement with both of the above. Cf. supra, p. 467, and James Seth, A Study of Ethical Principles (12th ed. rev.; Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1911), pp. 66-67.

[63]Ibid.

pity or contempt," says Frankl, "which breaks the vicious circle; the cue to cure is self-commitment."[64] By the use of de-reflection logotherapy attempts to break the vicious circle of neurosis and point the patient toward self-commitment and subsequent meaning.

Finally, in discussing the practice of logotherapy, Frankl's concept of Aerztliche Seelsorge or "medical ministry" should not be omitted. The following quotation provides us insight into this aspect of logotherapy.

> But, after all, medical ministry is not primarily concerned with the treatment of neuroses. Medical ministry belongs in the work of every physician. The surgeon should have recourse to it as much and as often as the neurologist or psychiatrist. It is only that the goal of medical ministry is different and goes deeper than that of the surgeon. When the surgeon has completed an amputation, he takes off his rubber gloves and appears to have done his duty as a physician. But if the patient then commits suicide because he cannot bear living as a cripple of what use has the surgical therapy been? Is it not also part of the physician's work to do something about the patient's attitude toward his illness--an attitude which constitutes a philosophy of life, though this may not be formulated in so many words? Where actual surgery comes to an end, the work of medical ministry begins. For something must follow after the surgeon has laid aside his scalpel, or where surgical work is ruled out--as, for example, in an inoperable case.[65]

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[64] The Doctor and the Soul, p. 258.

[65] Ibid., p. 281. The importance, for example,

One cannot ignore what might be called the "pastoral care dimension" of Frankl's "medical ministry." Here, again, we enter that border-land between medicine and religion in which regions both physician and clergyman move and labour. Frankl protests that he is not intending any substitute for religion; that he is not attempting to "compete" with the clergy. He admits the therapeutic value of confession and realizes, as evidenced in the above quotation, that a mere mechanical approach to the practice of medicine is sterile in many cases. He is aware that psychotherapy cannot assume some pose of neutrality and be oblivious to questions of value.

With this said, however, it seems that the following distinction made by Frankl is a bit obscure and ambiguous:

> Medical ministry is not ultimately concerned with the "soul's salvation." This could not and should not be its business. Rather, it is concerned with the health of man's soul. And man's soul is healthy so long as he remains what he intrinsically is: namely, a being conscious of his responsibility--in fact, the very vessel of consciousness and responsibility.[66]

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of a pre-surgical visit to the patient by the surgeon is caught in the poetic lines of William Ernest Henley:

> . . . His wise, rare smile is sweet with certainties,
> And seems in all his patients to compel
> Such love and faith as failure cannot quell. . . .

"The Chief," A Book of Verses (London: Publ. by David Nutt in the Strand, 1888), p. 26.

[66] Ibid., p. 277.

This distinction between concern for "the soul's salvation" and concern for "the health of man's soul" is either superficial or lacking in precision. We shall return to this shortly.

V. LOGOTHERAPY AND CHRISTIANITY

Robert C. Leslie says that Frankl, who comes from an orthodox Jewish background but attends the synagogue only twice a year--Yom Kippur and the anniversary of his release from the Nazis--is a deeply religious man.[67] This is also the conclusion one arrives at after studying his writings. He himself describes the following experience which took place a few days after his liberation from the last concentration camp in which he was interned, as he walked through the country near the camp:

> I stopped, looked around, and up to the sky--and then I went down on my knees. At that moment there was very little I knew of myself or of the world--I had but one sentence in mind--always the same: "I called to the Lord from my narrow prison and He answered me in the freedom of space."
> How long I knelt there and repeated this sentence memory can no longer recall. But I know that on that day, in that hour, my new life started.[68]

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[67]From a tape recording of a lecture by Prof. Robert C. Leslie. This tape was made available through the courtesy of Prof. Frankl from his library.

[68]Man's Search for Meaning, p. 142.

But Frankl, unlike Tournier, does not openly blend his medical practice and his religious faith. One might say that logotherapy is implicitly religious while Tournier's "médecine de la personne" is explicitly religious. Although he recognizes the myth of the "neutral" psychotherapist in respect to value judgments, he himself verbally draws a clear-cut line of demarcation separating the goals of psychotherapy and religion:

> What is the relation between psychotherapy and religion? In my view, the answer is simple: the goal of psychotherapy is to heal the soul, to make it healthy; the aim of religion is something essentially different--to save the soul. But the side-effect of religion is an eminently psychohygenic one. Religion provides man with a spiritual anchor, with a feeling of security such as he can find nowhere else. But, to our surprise, psychotherapy can produce an analogous, unintended side-effect. For although the psychotherapist is not concerned with helping his patient to achieve a capacity for faith, in certain felicitous cases the patient regains his capacity for faith.[69]

Frankl's distinction between the goal of psychotherapy and the goal of religion is too simple and too clear-cut. The New Testament word σώζειν, translated "to save," also means "to heal" or "to make whole." In

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[69] The Doctor and the Soul, p. xv. However, Ungersma says that Frankl "feels that the aim of the psychotherapist should not be mere health and 'adjustment,' but it should be to bring out the ultimate possibilities of the patient or client, to help him realize his latent values." Op. cit., p. 53.

fact, in Tyndale's translation of the New Testament the word "health" at times replaces "salvation."[70] The close relationship of these two terms causes one to feel that Frankl's delineation is too superficial. If the goal of psychotherapy is "to heal the soul, to make it healthy," it is incorrect to say that the goal of religion--more specifically the Christian faith--is "something essentially different." Jesus, Himself, described his task as that of a physician who came to heal the sick. Salvation is not just "otherworldly," as Frankl seems to imply; but it is "this-worldly" as well. It can mean more than the healing of souls; but it means that too. The phrase, "cure of souls," a prominent element in ecclesiastical terminology for centuries, testifies to Christianity's concern for the total health of persons.

On the other hand, it is not the goal of most psychotherapies to enable the patient to quicken his

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[70]See, e.g., the account of Jesus's encounter with Zacchaeus in Luke 19:9. "This day is salvation come to this house, . . ." is the most commonly found translation. However, Tyndale, as long ago as 1534, translated the same passage: "This daye is healthe come unto this housse. . . ." The New Testament, trans. William Tyndale (a reprint of the ed. of 1534 with the trans. prefaces and notes and the variants of the ed. of 1525, ed. N. Hardy Wallis; Cambridge: University Press, 1938), p. 171.

faith in God. However, as Frankl admits, there are cases in which the patient's psychotherapeutic "healing" includes the regaining of his capacity for faith. From the Christian perspective, only this latter type of cure is a complete cure of the whole person. That therapy which ignores this dimension of health leaves the patient, however physically and psychically whole he may be, short of the "abundant life" of which Christ speaks. Frankl's reference to the psychohygenic side-effect of religion needs no comment other than the reminder that he is speaking, obviously, of authentic, healthy, religion and not a perversion of the real thing.

It appears that in his ardor to be sure that psychotherapy and religion are not taken to be synonymous or to be seen in pursuit of identical goals, Frankl has fallen into the trap of over-simplification. But his "simple" answer to the relationship of psychotherapy and religion does not mean that he is unaware of the borderland between psychotherapy and religion, a land of over-lapping goals and endeavors. Elsewhere he says:

> If then it should be construed that medical ministry is being offered as a surrogate for religion, we can only say that nothing could be further from our intention. When we practice logotherapy or existential analysis, we are medical men and wish to remain so. We have no thought of competing

> with the clergy. But we do want to extend the sphere of medical activity and avail ourselves of the full possibilities of medical treatment.[71]

Certainly, Frankl's medical ministry is no substitute for religion. But, whether or not it performs a function that has traditionally been a religious function is another matter and one that is open to debate. His desire "to extend the sphere of medical activity" is, in my opinion, a commendable and constructive move. I do not believe that medical men or clergy desire to lose their identity in a blur of role confusion; but neither do they need to fear the overlapping of their ministries in this borderland between psychotherapy and religion. What is important and needful is honestly to recognize that there is a great deal held in common by the two disciplines when both are at their best. Despite some statements to the contrary, Frankl generally does this. At the same time Weisskopf-Joelson's statement that Frankl's "teachings have become a philosophy of life, or perhaps a religion, for many people,"[72] is undoubtedly true; but the same thing

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[71] The Doctor and the Soul, p. 271. See also "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapism," op. cit., p. 38, where Frankl writes: "There is common ground enough to warrant mutual rapprochement. Bridging, however, does not mean merging."

[72] Op. cit., p. 701.

can be said about Freudianism, Jungian psychology, humanism, and many other systems of thought. This was not the intention of Frankl, and is no peculiar liability attached only to logotherapy.

Logotherapy, in a sense, is concerned with the same problem that pre-occupies the thought of the Christian faith--the whole man as a living soul who is in need of cure. The therapist is faced with ultimate questions arising out of the depths of man's existence. This, too, is the realm of Christianity and the experience of the minister. Logotherapy's view of man holds much in common with a Christian view of man's nature. It recognizes the importance of love in relationships; it speaks of conscience, grace, and transcendence; it emphasizes man's capacity to transcend any type of determinism, and refers to this as "the defiant power of man's spirit";[73] it acknowledges man's search for God, even though this may be an unconscious search.[74] These positions have led one American theologian to remark: "Logotherapy offers a philosophy of life and a method of counseling which is more consistent with a basically

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[73]"The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis," op. cit., p. 158.

[74]See VanderVeldt and Odenwald, op.cit., p. 195.

Christian view of life than any other existing system in the current therapeutic world."[75] Frankl, himself, while disclaiming that logotherapy is a religious therapy, does see it as a therapy that opens the door to religion. The religious person seems to be one who has gone a bit further than the non-religious person, through the "open door"--and is conscious, not only of a life's task, but of the Taskmaster as well.[76]

Logotherapy makes another important emphasis in respect to religion that is of special interest in the light of this overall study. Frankl speaks of the "unconscious God."[77] What he refers to apparently is unconscious religion--an unconscious relationship to God--that he believes he has witnessed in decidedly irreligious people. VanderVeldt and Odenwald say:

> The existential analysts are convinced that in many cases mental disturbances are due precisely to unconscious or repressed religion. . . . They

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[75]Leslie, op. cit., p. 9. In "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapism," op. cit., pp. 35-36, Frankl discusses "divine grace." In an apparent attempt to refrain from mixing psychology and theology he speaks of grace dwelling in the supra-human dimension, and appearing on the human plane "only as a projection."

[76]See The Doctor and the Soul, p. xv; pp. 275-76, n.; and p. 59, n.

[77]See Viktor E. Frankl, Der Unbewusste Gott (Wien: Amandus-Verlag, 1949).

> maintain that compulsive neurosis is often diseased religion. . . ."[78]

Frankl asserts that often the "basis of neurotic existence is in a deficiency of the patient's relationship to transcendence."[79] He has been interpreted as holding the view that:

> . . . Neurosis constitutes a repression of the spiritual needs of the individual. This repression results in "spiritual starvation": because the neurotic's spiritual needs are repressed, he can not find adequate satisfaction for these needs. His repression prevents him from developing a sense of meaning in life.[80]

This theory of the repression of the spiritual or religious is evidenced again in Frankl's comment:

> Freud once said: "Man is not only often much more immoral than he believes, but also often much more moral than he thinks." I should like to add that he is often much more religious than he suspects. These days people see more in man's morality than an introjected father-image, and more in his religion than a projected father-image. To consider religion a general obsession-neurosis of humanity is already old-fashioned.[81]

It is of considerable significance that this concept of repressed spirituality is appearing at an increasing tempo in the psychotherapeutic literature.

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[78] Op. cit., p. 133.

[79] Cited by Leslie, op. cit., p. 120.

[80] Weisskopf-Joelson, op. cit., p. 702.

[81] The Doctor and the Soul, p. xx.

This is a theme with Tournier, who suggests that within man there is a repressed desire for Christianity.[82] It is referred to by Gordon Allport, who observes that "during the past fifty years religion and sex seem to have reversed their positions."[83] It is his contention that contemporary man is suffering from a repressed desire for religious experience rather than a repressed desire for sexual experience. It is a subject of great concern to Hobart Mowrer who argues that in man today a repression of the conscience has taken place.[84] Ira Progoff writes:

> I have found the evidence accumulating that modern man is suffering much more from the repression of his spirit than from the repression of sexuality as Freud once said. It is because traditional beliefs and symbols have lost their inner content, that it has become commonplace for modern persons to feel ashamed of their spiritual feelings and spiritual language. They treat the religious strivings within themselves as throwbacks to primitive times, as superstitions unbecoming to a scientific age.[85]

Progoff's reference to feeling ashamed of spiritual feelings and spiritual language is accentuated again by

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[82] Supra, pp. 406ff.

[83] Gordon Allport, The Individual and His Religion (London: Constable, 1951), p. 1.

[84] Supra, pp. 142ff.

[85] Ira Progoff, "Psychology as a Road to Personal Philosophy," The Journal of Individual Psychology, XVII (May 1961), 47.

Allport who comments: "Today . . . psychologists write with the frankness of Freud or Kinsey on the sexual passions of mankind, but blush and grow silent when the religious passions come into view."[86] It is also supported by Bonhoeffer's confession that he felt extremely ill at ease and oppressed when involved in conversation with "religious" people using "religious jargon." On occasion he could speak of God more openly with the irreligious.[87]

Jung has spoken of the loss of power in the traditional religious symbolism; and has observed that Western man as a result of technology and the idolatry of reason has seemed to lose all contact with his soul. This has taken place in spite of the fact that--as Jung also realizes--man has an innate spiritual and religious need.[88]

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[86] Op. cit., p. 1.

[87] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1953), p. 124.

[88] See Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, trans. Ralph Manheim (6th ed. rev.; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 60 & 147; also, C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, record. & ed. Aniela Jaffé, trans. Richard & Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961), p. x. Also, supra, pp. 356ff. Ungersma, op. cit., p. 34, identifies Jung with logotherapy when he says: "In fact, since Jung early in

Arvid Runestam decades ago suggested:

> Is it not conceivable that the subdued murmur which emerges from the innermost recesses of the souls of men, distorted in every manner, and which in our day especially expresses itself in the much publicized general nervousness and anxiety, finally, however muffled, becomes the threatening language of the enclosed, forgotten, and suppressed religio-moral needs?[89]

If these were views originating with theologians one might suspect some sort of "conspiracy" aimed at the repudiation of Freudianism and the re-establishment of the primacy of the religious in the lives of modern men. These men, however, are not theologians but empirical scientists; and many of them would not be considered "religious"--at least in the traditional sense. Frankl joins the chorus of voices calling for a more serious consideration of the alleged repression of the spiritual.

Logotherapy is also conscious of the person-centeredness of Christianity. ". . . The religious person," says Frankl, "is one who experiences not only what is spoken, but the speaker as well. . . ."[90] This

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the twentieth century defined neurosis as 'the suffering of a soul that has not found its meaning,' we could call Jung the first logotherapist!"

[89]Cited by Tweedie, The Christian and the Couch (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1963), p. 96.

[90]The Doctor and the Soul, p. 62.

person views life not just as a task but as a mission from the ultimate Taskmaster. The Source of his mission is God. In respect to traditional concerns of the Christian Faith, such as the problem of evil, sin, and guilt, logotherapy has relatively little to say.[91] Frankl, for example, does not appear to be as concerned with the problem of evil as Jung, or the problem of guilt as Tournier.

When it comes to ecclesiogenic neuroses, Frankl believes that "this is a good name but the thing in itself is nothing new."[92] He recognizes that the misuse of religion accounts for ecclesiogenic neuroses; but at the same time he expresses his opinion that psychologism is responsible for more neuroses than are created by perversion of the Church and religion.

In respect to the health of clergymen, Paul Tournier claims that the people who choose the ministry, the field of psychology and other like disciplines are

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[91]See Frankl, "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapism," op. cit., pp. 30ff. Here one gains some insight into Frankl's view of guilt. He does say, "What threatens man, is his guilt in the past and his death in the future."(p. 36).

[92]From a tape recording of a personal interview with Frankl in Vienna on June 29, 1965. Permission to quote secured.

often anxious, neurotic people who choose this vocation--at least in part--as a means of healing themselves.[93]

Frankl seems to concur:

> I would say . . . that a certain type of people become pastors, priests, and rabbis. And they are more prone to neuroses. . . . It is exactly the same with psychiatrists--even more it holds true for psychiatrists.[94]

He argues that if a person is to become a good psychiatrist or a good clergyman--that is, one who can exhibit empathy and understanding--then most likely he will be a man prone to neurosis, one who has a "certain labile, fragile, character structure." He seems to accept the view that neurosis is more common among clergymen than among the rest of the general population, but that this is not an effect of religious concern and ecclesiastical stress, but instead is the cause--at least in part--of concern with religion.

> To repeat: neurosis is not the effect of concern with religion; it is rather . . . the cause of concern with religion--paralleled by psychiatric vocations. And, second, the concern with religion is

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[93]From a personal interview with Dr. Tournier in Geneva on June 17, 1965.

[94]From a tape recording of a personal interview with Professor Frankl in Vienna on June 29, 1965. Permission to quote secured.

> no cause of neurosis, but rather in the life of a priest, rabbi, or pastor, it may well be a means to a cure.[95]

If modern clergymen should object to Frankl's allegation that they are in the ministry, at least in part, because of a neurotic proclivity, they ought to reflect on the lives of the prophets, John the Baptist, Jesus---who was described as being "beside himself" (Mark 3:21),---Luther, John Bunyan, Kierkegaard, and a host of others. The presence of neurotic traits has long been claimed in the lives of these men; but what a company in which to be numbered!

The following words of Frankl depict, to a large extent, his summary view of the relationship of logotherapy and Christianity:

> . . . The unique achievement of Mosaic monotheism may well consist in its conveying to the human race the permanent consciousness of a divine authority. Man is seen as a being standing before God, thereby intensifying man's consciousness of responsibility by presenting his life task to him as an assignment from the Divine. But we must not forget that the moral urge springing from this view was chiefly concerned with what we have called creative values. It must therefore appear all the more remarkable to us

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95Ibid. Cf. B. H. Streeter, Reality (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1929), pp. 276-77; and Edgar P. Dickie, Revelation and Response (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1938), p. 34. Whereas Frankl speaks of a "certain labile, fragile, character structure," Streeter observes: "A razor is more easily notched than an axe, and enhanced sensitiveness cannot but be accompanied by increased liability to injury."

> when we realize that Christianity has placed in the foreground of man's moral consciousness the kind of values we have called attitudinal--the third of the three main categories of possible values. For the Christian existence, taken in the perspective of the cross, of the Crucified One, becomes ultimately and essentially a freely chosen imitation of Christ, a "passion." It remained for Protestantism to install the further element; by emphasizing the concept of grace, Protestantism deepened man's sense of responsibility in regard to the second category of values, experiential values. For in terms of the idea of grace, which is so cardinal a point in Protestant theology, all of man's encounters with valuational experiences constitute receiving a gift of God (grace). . . . All this, it seems to us, suggests a coherent relationship between the three categories of values on the one hand and the three principal branches of Occidental religion on the other.[96]

If there is a need to single out the one major contribution of Viktor Frankl's logotherapy to this age, then it must be its correction of psychotherapy's picture of man. To the somatic and psychical dimensions, Frankl has addeded emphatically the spiritual dimension; and in so doing presents the most accurate psychotherapeutic concept of man to date. A subsequent bonus has been a giant stride toward the humanizing of psychiatry as well as the stimulation of the dialogue between psychotherapy and religion.[97]

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[96] The Doctor and the Soul, pp. 59-60 n.

[97] See Earl A. Grollman, "Viktor E. Frankl: A Bridge Between Psychiatry and Religion," Conservative Judaism, XIX (Fall 1964), 19-23; Viktor E. Frankl, "Religion & Existential Psychotherapy," Gordon Review, VI (1961), 2-10; Paul E. Johnson, "Logotherapy: A Corrective for Determinism," Christian Advocate, V (Nov. 23, 1961), 12-13.

SUMMARY

Carl Jung, Paul Tournier, and Viktor Frankl, although distinctively different in their psychology, theology, and Weltanschauung, are making a significant contribution to our understanding of modern man, the Church of today, the ecclesiogenic neuroses, and the practice of the cure of souls.

Jung, the last of the three great psychological pioneers of the first half of this century, died in 1961. His analytical psychology, like Freud's psychoanalysis, is a psychology of the unconscious. However, unlike psychoanalysis, Jung's concept of the unconscious is that it is more than a cesspool of repressions; it includes within it positive aspects of great value. Also differing with Freud, Jung's attitude toward religion is generally positive. He seems to identify God and the unconscious, although he denies any attempt to equate them. Nevertheless, it has been said that he magnifies the "Holy Spirit" while minimizing the historical Christ. His emphasis is upon the "God within"--a position not in keeping with the more orthodox

Christian concept of God as wholly Other, or, at least, both immanent and transcendent.

In his stress on wholeness, Jung proclaims the need to integrate evil--not destroy it. Even God has His "shadow side," he argues. There cannot be good without evil; and polarity is a pre-requisite for reality. At this point Jung's radical theology is most obvious.

One of analytical psychology's unique features is the concept of "archetypes." Archetypes compose the contents of the collective unconscious; and the "shadow" is one of the most significant. It is in the "shadow" that we see a complement to the conscious personality. The function of the "shadow" is to form a relative totality. The religious person who is exceedingly scrupulous, moralistically perfectionistic, and rabidly pietistic, often expresses fits of bad temper and other spontaneous attitudes and actions that are contrary to his desired public image or "persona." This is the eruption of the "shadow" as it breaks forth from its repression in an attempt to provide wholeness to the total personality. The "shadow" is an important concept for consideration in respect to the ecclesiogenic neuroses.

Symbolism and dream interpretation are of great consequence in the psychology of Jung. Dreams are con-

sidered the "royal road" to the unconscious; and symbolism, both in dream content and in the outside world, is man's expression of the inexpressible. Modern man, according to Jung, is having great difficulty with the symbolic; and much of the religious symbolism has become meaningless. Dream analysis in Jungian thought is more of a dialectical exchange between counsellor and counsellee than it is in Freud's more mechanistic practice.

As far as therapy is concerned, analytical psychology seems at times to be healthily person-centered, and at other times enamoured with some cosmic collectivity or world-soul. Great emphasis is placed on the role of the counsellor as a person. There is also, however, a less healthy ethos that seems to do homage to the grinding forward of the irrepressible wheels of destiny. Although more implicit than explicit, a fatalistic element seems to be present.

Religion is recognized as of critical importance in therapy. Original sin, meaning and value in suffering, belief in immortality, the dignity of the human soul, the importance of religious symbolism, are all acknowledged as of great import. The reality of religious experience is undeniable, in Jung's psychology; and experience is a sine qua non. Meaninglessness and

neuroses ensue when spirituality is ignored or denied. In spite of this, there is the danger that Christianity may be viewed simply as another expression of psychotherapy. While some disciples of Jung are actively engaged in the life of the traditional churches, many seem to have their religious needs met in analytical psychology which is their "religion." Jung's "individuation process," for many, becomes a road to "salvation."

Carl Jung, the son of a Swiss Protestant pastor, also had uncles (eight), who were parsons. In spite of this family tie with Reformed Christianity--or because of it--Jung's contact with organized Christianity was basically negative. He felt a strained relationship with his father, and charges that his father was obscurantist in respect to theology and knew the grace of God only in a second-hand manner. To young Carl, his father was entrapped by the Church and theological thinking.

The superficial moralism of the Church also repelled Jung. "Religious community" meant absolutely nothing to him. Nevertheless, he attempted to conform but was unsuccessful; and his secret distrust of organized Christianity grew. In the personal dimension, however, he had experiences that he interpreted as decidedly spiritual. As a boy he saw his "obedience" to God

of a quality more real than that of the organized Faith.

As a man, Jung--from his position that could be described as being "a little bit outside the organization one calls the Church"--points to expressions of ecclesiogenic neuroses, and in some cases prescribes for their cure. He charges that most of organized Christianity is a substitute for "immediate religious experience." In so doing he seems to dismiss institutional Christianity almost in toto. He also indicates that religion has contributed to the repression and projection of the "shadow." His insight at this point is valuable. Theology is attacked for its obscurantist and dogmatic positions which, in turn, create meaninglessness and hollow "lip-service." He recognizes moralistic and activistic perversions of Christianity as well as theological, spiritual, and experiential petrification. He also challenges Christian ethics at the point of relativity, arguing that a moral code that pretends to know precisely what is good and what is evil is exceedingly suspect. Recognizing the compartmentalization of modern life, he suggests that religious demand for an unethical ethic contributes to it. Finally, Jung speaks prophetically of the problem of meaninglessness and lays

much responsibility for this at the door of the Church. Protestantism, he believes, holds within it both the greatest risk and the greatest promise for the spiritual future of modern man.

Paul Tournier and Carl Jung exhibit the uniqueness of human personality. If Jung was left of center in the Christian spectrum, Tournier is to the right. But, he also, from his perspective, contributes valuably to the understanding of the ecclesiogenic neuroses and the positive practice of the cure of souls.

The "personal" is heart and soul of Tournier's thought and medical practice. Early in his career he was influenced by the Oxford Group which apparently did much to create his person-centered approach to medicine and Christianity. Prior to his contact with the Oxford Group he had been involved actively but almost meaninglessly in the life of the Reformed Church in Switzerland.

The view of the nature of man is of singular importance in all psychotherapies. Tournier's practice of the "médecine de la personne" emphasizes the wholeness and holiness of man. His concept of wholeness is compatible with the traditional Judeo-Christian view and denies the Platonic dichotomy. In his treatment of the "personage" and the "person" he accepts Jung's

contributions, but then goes beyond them with an exposition grounded in his own evangelical Christianity. The value of his contribution at this point is not so much in the originality of what he says, but rather in his ability to synthesize. He is a master at blending psychology, existentialism, medicine, and a living Christian faith.

Tournier, like Jung, Frankl, and others, is well aware of the plight of modern man. Guilt, meaninglessness, and repression, in his opinion, are the sources of man's present-day dilemma. Unresolved guilt, both true and false, is rife. True guilt is guilt before God, while false guilt is guilt before man that is not guilt before God also. All men today experience guilt in large doses--even the atheists.

Repression is a second theme of Tournier's; but it is neither the repression of sexual needs (Freud), nor the repression of guilt (Mowrer). Guilt, for the most part, is quite conscious. Tournier speaks of the repression in modern man of the need for the Christian faith. Today man is fixated in a period of adolescent rebellion against the Church. The Church has not been free of sin herself; man has rebelled at this and, subsequently, repression of his need for the Faith has set

in. He is neurotic because he has neither met his need nor eliminated it. Since he cannot eliminate this need, his only alternative is to bring it to consciousness and accept it and the cure that is to be found in a healthy response to authentic Faith.

A direct result of the repression of man's need for Christianity is the loss of meaning--meaning, to Tournier, is to know God, His grace, and His salvation. His answer to meaninglessness is a religious one. Apart from the grace of God there is no meaning; and purpose in life is found only in proper relation to God.

The state of the Protestant Church is seriously noted by this psychotherapist. Authentic faith is present in the organized churches, but it has become encrusted with perversions. Aspects of unhealthy legalism are pronounced; and the danger of irrelevance Tournier refers to as the "disincarnation of the Church." Organized Christianity has contributed to the creation of a "Uriah syndrome" in modern man--who fears and senses spiritual isolation in a hostile world. A pessimistic view of the Church has been engendered.

The churches, although not directly responsible for the use of religion as an escape mechanism by many people, share some guilt at this point for allowing

themselves to be so used. In a more direct way they are guilty of spiritual imperialism when they glory in "being right," and fail to see the inherent danger in so doing. There is also abroad among the churches a spirit of false asceticism whose motif is amputation. This seems to be based on a perverted view of Jesus's teaching to deny oneself. An example is the negative attitude toward sex, especially as evidenced in many churches of the more pietistic tradition.

The lack of real community and brotherhood is another diagnosis Tournier makes in respect to sickness in contemporary church life. It must be remembered, however, that Tournier's experience of true community came in the Oxford Group and not the organized Church. To indicate that Christian "koinonia" cannot be found in contemporary churches is to make the error of overstatement. Tournier does not make this mistake and his critique is valid.

Concerning the ministry this medical doctor observes that a modern sense of the individual cure of souls appears, to a large extent, to be lost. He also urges theological educators to take more seriously the task of helping the ministerial student to learn to differentiate between false and true guilt. Tournier

himself, however, exhibits some confusion in his discussion of the role of the minister in the cure of souls.

"Soul-healing" is a term this Swiss physician employs to describe his practice of the "médecine de la personne." By this, he means "bringing souls into personal contact with Christ" which, in turn, means many different things to many different people. He does not advocate any "Christian method" of therapy; instead he stresses what the counsellor is more than what he does. Scientific neutrality in the intense interpersonal relationship of "soul-healing" is a myth, as far as Tournier is concerned. God uses the other person, he believes, as an instrument of grace to reveal His Word. The sense of personal equality between counsellor and counsellee is sincerely sought. This denies the right of one to sit in judgment on the other, because God alone judges. The art of listening in "soul-healing" is an essential ingredient; it, in fact, is an aspect of "giving oneself." Prayer and confession by both doctor and patient are encouraged. Finally, the person-centeredness and grace of the Christian faith form the foundation upon which "soul-healing" is built.

Paul Tournier's "médecine de la personne" is not without its weaknesses. Among them are the dangers of

over-simplification, generalization, and naïve piety. Nevertheless, Tournier is a most helpful source in our understanding of the ecclesiogenic neuroses and the practice of an effective cure of souls. Personally, he appears to be a man who has grasped the secret of being a person, and has learned to help others discover personhood and meaning under the Lordship of Jesus Christ. He is relevant, honest, and non-judgmental. The "médecine de la personne" is not an unwise prescription for the ills of the modern world.

Viktor Frankl, though sharing some things in common with both Jung and Tournier, is making his own distinctive contribution to modern thought. Logotherapy--the therapeutic practice of his existential analysis--begins with a rather unusual view of man, for a psychotherapy. It emphasizes: (1) the freedom of will, (2) the will to meaning, and (3) the meaning of life. These emphases, in turn, counter pan-determinism, the concept of homeostasis, and reductionism, which long have been a part of psychoanalysis and other psychotherapies. Frankl stresses the "noetic" or "spiritual" dimension of man--that is, the specifically human dimension. Although claiming to use this term in a "non-religious" sense, there are many religious implications.

Meaninglessness, Frankl calls the "existential vacuum." It is a dominant source of difficulty for contemporary man, and is revealed dramatically in the occurrence of a new neurosis--the "noögenic neurosis"--appearing along side of the classical clinical neuroses. Determinism, largely due to man's wholesale capitulation to Freudianism, is another modern problem of great seriousness.

Like Tournier, Frankl emphasizes the personhood of man. His anthropology not only aids in the rediscovery of the dignity of man and acts as a corrective for determinism, but it has an over-all affinity for a Judeo-Christian view of the nature of man. Frankl himself comes from an orthodox Jewish Background.

Logotherapy replaces "the will to pleasure" (Freud) and "the will to power" (Adler) with "the will to meaning." This, Frankl argues, is the psychotherapy for modern man. To experience meaning is man's greatest need--and this has ontological and cosmological implications. But how does it take place? According to logotherapy, meaning can be realized by actualizing values on one or all of three different levels: (1) creative values, (2) experiential values, and (3) attitudinal values. There is meaning in life for everyone, waiting

to be discovered. It is not subjective but is to be found outside of oneself. (Here Frankl believes he corrects Jung.) Positive meaning is available even in the most tragic and, apparently, most meaningless of life situations.

As far as the relative value of meanings is concerned, Frankl attempts to maintain objectivity. He stresses the uniqueness of meaning. There is unique meaning for each unique person in each unique life situation. He admits, however, that "what I decide for is very essential"! Although attempting to maintain objectivity, Frankl is considerably subjective. Many times subjective values are openly and unashamedly expressed; and he is not defensively compulsive at this point of proving his objectivity. Edith Weisskopf-Joelson of Purdue University believes that logotherapy differs from the other psychological "schools" markedly at the very point of subjective values which Frankl seems to embrace from time to time.

Frankl believes that he differs with Freud, Adler, and Jung especially in respect to the human dimension of man--the spiritual. The others, he charges, fell prey to psychologism and failed to recognize, appropriately, the spiritual dimension--either ignoring it or treating

it as a derivative of the instinctual. Logotherapy's anthropology is basically different from the views of man maintained by most of the other psychologies. It is also apparent that Frankl not only attempts to "correct" the other "schools," but he goes beyond them. His concept of "medical ministry" is illustrative. Here Frankl openly ventures into the borderland between medicine and ministry. Though distinctive in many ways, logotherapy shares some things in common with most of the commonly known psychotherapies--especially Jung's analytical psychology, and, to a certain degree, O. H. Mowrer's thought. Whereas Freud emphasized consciousness and Adler stressed responsibleness, Frankl synthesizes both and states his theorem that "being human means being conscious and responsible."

As far as therapeutic practice is concerned, logotherapy is more directive, emphasizes the present and future more than the past, and is more given to improvisation than most of the present-day therapies. It recognizes the uniqueness of personality and refuses to submit this to the tyranny of the technical. This is not to say that Frankl does not have his own therapeutic techniques. He does; and two of them--"paradoxical intention" and "de-reflection"--have been developed

in logotherapy. "Paradoxical intention" is based upon the "twofold fact," according to Frankl, that (1) fear makes come true that which one fears, and (2) hyper-intention makes impossible that which one wishes. This technique employs humour and ridicule to deal with problems, especially of an obsessive-compulsive nature, and appears to be unusually successful.

"De-reflection" as a technique is meant to counteract the "compulsive inclination to self-observation." Through "de-reflection" attention is focused away from one's self. Self-appraisal and evaluation are important, but too often degenerate into an unhealthy, intensive, self-centeredness. The cure to this neurotic, vicious circle is not self-concern, says Frankl, but self-commitment.

Frankl recognizes that, at times, logotherapy and the cure of souls operate on common ground. Nevertheless, he attempts to delineate the goals of psychotherapy and religion. When he says the answer is simple, however, and identifies the goal of religion as salvation, and the goal of psychotherapy as health, he falls into the trap of over-simplification. In spite of this, he is well aware that when he practises "medical ministry" he is nigh to the domain of the cure of souls.

Logotherapy shares with Christianity concern for the whole person who is in need of healing. It is Robert Leslie's opinion that "logotherapy offers a philosophy of life and a method of counseling which is more consistent with a basically Christian view of life than any other existing system in the current therapeutic world."

Frankl seems to share with Tournier, Jung, Mowrer, Allport, and others the view that a certain repression of the spiritual has taken place in contemporary man. He believes that often this is the root of neurotic existence in today's world--man is deficient in his relationship to transcendence. The ecclesiogenic neuroses, Frankl says, are the result of the misuse of religion and not of authentic faith. Generally, logotherapy is more congenial with the Christian faith than any of the other psychotherapies.

In regard to the health of the ministry, he seems to agree with Tournier when he indicates that if neurosis is more common among ministers than among laymen, then it is because men with a neurotic proclivity are attracted to the ministry in the first place; and not because their identification with religion has made them neurotic. The same thing, he claims, is true with psychiatrists.

Jung, Tournier, and Frankl have been of considerable assistance in two ways. First of all, they have aided us in our understanding of the ecclesiogenic neuroses, the nature of man, and his problems in this particular age. Secondly, their contribution to the practice of the cure of souls by the modern Christian ministry is of unusual significance. This is true, however, only if the ministry in turn employs its ears to hear. "He who has ears let him hear." There is truth inherent in the work of these three psychotherapists that must be considered by today's Christian pastor if he is to function relevantly and effectively in his role as practitioner of the cure of souls.

PART IV. THE CURE OF SOULS:

THE MINISTER'S TASK

CHAPTER XI

ONE-TO-ONE RELATIONSHIPS

This fourth and final part, like Part III, is concerned with the cure of souls. Whereas, the subject of discussion in Part III was the cure of souls in the light of contributions from three modern psychotherapists, in this part the main consideration is the cure of souls as the practical task of every minister. This is a task which I have divided arbitrarily on the basis of relationships: (1) a one-to-one relationship (Chapter XI), and (2) a one-to-many relationship (Chapter XII). Chapter XIII, the concluding chapter, is dealing with the role of clinical pastoral education and its bearing on the minister's practice of the cure of souls.

I. THE INESCAPABLE ONE-TO-ONE RELATIONSHIP

For a minister today--especially a pastor--to believe that he need not be concerned with his role as a counsellor is the nadir of obscurantist thinking.

The Protestant minister is continually confronted with the inescapable one-to-one relationship, the realm of the "I-Thou."

The position of the modern minister in this respect, however, is not in any way different from that of those called to the task of Christian shepherding in centuries past. Certainly the cure of souls is as old as Christianity; and the one-to-one relationship has always been a primary aspect of this pastoral function. Although a strong case can be made for evidences of pastoral care in the Old Testament, it is in the ministry of Jesus and the witness of the New Testament that the one-to-one relationship is so pronounced.

Sometimes a clergyman is heard to say: "My task is the ministry of Word and Sacrament. I have not the time nor the inclination for this counselling business. Leave the psychology to the psychologists. I have been called to preach"! The obvious response is that these men like all others in the Christian ministry simply do not have the choice that they seem to think they have. The minister cannot escape being a counsellor. It might not be a pre-arranged hour in the pastor's study, or a conscious problem brought by one seeking help. Instead, it could very well be a hasty plea for a listening ear

after a committee meeting, or a casual remark at a dinner table, cloaking something of great personal importance. Wherever it might be--in the study, a hospital corridor, on Main Street, in the stands at a football match, or riding along in an automobile--the minister is confronted time and again with the inescapable one-to-one relationship in which needs are expressed and he is called upon to minister to those needs. His choice is not whether he will be a counsellor or not. It is whether or not he will be an effective one.

By not realizing the inevitability of the one-to-one encounter or by deliberately attempting to deny it, the minister contributes to the creation of an inadequate and inferior practice of the cure of souls. The ethos of the last one hundred years testifies to a growing superficiality, irrelevance, and lack of understanding on the part of the clerical practitioners of the cure of souls.

Concurrent with a seemingly growing inadequacy on the part of the minister to function effectively in his traditional role as a shepherd and counsellor, there seems to be an increase in the demands of twentieth century man for help in depth to meet his personal and spiritual needs. Modern man living through life's

personal critical moments of marriage, parenthood, spiritual seeking, suffering, the changing seasons of life, death, and bereavement--not to mention the increasing complexities of a technological society--is in desperate need of insight, love and meaning. But, the churches and their ministers, plagued by the ecclesiogenic neuroses, have not responded to his needs in a meaningful manner. This is especially true in the one-to-one relationship. Superficial moralism, sterile activism, obscurantist irrelevance, and insensitive isolation have been offered in lieu of the "spiritual meat" needed to nourish the flagging spirit. The twentieth century minister has "fumbled the ball"--to borrow a phrase from the world of sport--in respect to the one-to-one relationship. This does not mean that "his team" has lost it--to push the analogy a bit further. At the present time, however, the ball seems to be "loose," and who recovers the "fumble" is open to debate.

II. THE "NEW CLERGY"

To some it appears that a "new clergy" has arisen--those to whom Paul Halmos refers as "The Counsellors." These are the psychiatrists, psychologists, psychotherapists, social-workers, marriage counsellors,

and all the others who are now engaged in functions in which they attempt to minister to people in need through the medium of the one-to-one relationship.[1]

There can be little doubt that the "new clergy" have assumed much of that which traditionally has been the function of ministers. Gordon Allport asks: "Why is the cure of souls gravitating more and more out of the hands of the Church and into the hands of psychiatrists"?[2] And Viktor Frankl asserts: "I don't <u>believe</u> it to be so. . . . I know and watch and witness it to be so"![3]

The list of those who testify to the reality of this phenomenon includes theologians, psychotherapists, sociologists and others. Apparently Freud's psychoanalysis and its progeny filled a vacuum that was not being filled by a healthily functioning pastoral care. C. G. Jung has made an observation both perceptive and indicting:

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[1]See Paul Halmos, <u>The Faith of the Counsellors</u> (London: Constable, 1965). See also Crayton Walker and Perry London, "Psychotherapists: The New Clergy," <u>The Christian Century</u>, LXXVIII (April 26, 1961), 515-16, & 534.

[2]Gordon Allport, <u>The Individual and His Religion</u> (London: Constable, 1951), p. 87.

[3]From a personal interview in Vienna on June 29, 1965. Permission to quote secured.

> There are . . . not a few patients who, although they have no clinically recognizable neurosis, come to consult the doctor on account of psychic conflicts and various other difficulties in their lives, laying before him problems whose answer inevitably involves a discussion of fundamental questions. Such people often know very well--what the neurotic seldom or never knows--that their conflicts have to do with the fundamental problem of their own attitude, and that this is bound up with certain principles or general ideas, in a word with their religious, ethical, or philosophical beliefs. It is precisely because of such cases that psychotherapy has to spread far beyond the confines of somatic medicine and psychiatry into regions that were formerly the province of priests and philosophers. From the degree to which priests and philosophers no longer discharge any duties in this respect or their competence to do so has been denied by the public, we can see what an enormous gap the psychotherapist is sometimes called upon to fill, and how remote religion on the one hand and philosophy on the other has become from the actualities of life. The parson is blamed because one always knows in advance what he is going to say; the philosopher because he never says anything of the slightest practical value.[4]

However, the ancestry of the "new clergy" is undeniably found in the spiritual counsellors that preceded them. They have borrowed heavily from the minister's practice of the cure of souls. This is often confessed by the "new clergy" themselves. Allport says:

> But for the most part psychotherapists employ implements borrowed from the clergy. . . . The borrowed devices include listening, encouragement,

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[4]C. G. Jung, The Practice of Psychotherapy, trans. R. F.C. Hull (New York: Pantheon Books, 1954), pp. 121-22.

> advice, and the relationship of transference wherein the applicant finds security in dependence upon his counsellor.[5]

It is significant that at the point of listening, to which Allport alludes, the "new clergy" have borrowed and reinstated that which had been largely lost in the one-to-one counselling of the traditional clergy. To a great extent pastoral counsellors had resorted to advice and exhortation without having first listened. Therefore, the advice or exhortation often was irrelevant. Allport also observes, in a comment on a survey, that "complaints regarding the clergy generally have one principal basis--their alleged ineptness in handling human relationships."[6]

Paul Halmos, a sociologist, also notes the indebtedness of all the modern non-clerical counsellors to the ordained physicians of the soul of the past:

> Basically and essentially all the practitioners of counselling . . . have a common origin and a common aim: their common ancestor is the giver of spiritual solace and their common aim is health, sanity, a state of unspecified virtue, even a state of grace, or merely a return to the virtues of the community, adjustment.[7]

Although the concept of a common aim is open to serious challenge, Halmos's assertion of a common origin is not.

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[5]Op. cit., pp. 86-87. [6]Ibid., p.55. [7]Op. cit., p. 2.

The ordained ancestry of the "new clergy" is never more apparent than when a senior psychoanalyst and training analyst apologizes to his medical trainees "for borrowing so many terms from theology." His excuse is that "they describe exactly what I have in mind."[8] And the coup de grâce for those who deny the indebtedness of the psychotherapists and the other lay counsellors to their spiritual forefathers comes in the words of Allport:

> It would be difficult, I suspect, to find any proposition in modern mental hygiene that has not been expressed with venerable symbols in some portion of the world's religious literature.[9]

It seems incongruous, therefore, in the light of the "new clergy's" origin, that some modern ministers should be so loath to learn--or actually re-learn--something in respect to the one-to-one relationship from the psychotherapists, psychologists, and others. For ministers today to be hesitant to "re-borrow" valid and refined contributions relevant to the practice of the cure of souls is absurd. Perhaps, however, the hesitance, when it is present, is due to the sensing of some inherent weakness in the philosophical posture of the unordained counsellors. If this is so, it is highly possible that the following appraisals are pertinent:

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[8] Ibid., p. 137f. [9] Op. cit., p. 96.

(1) For the most part the "new clergy" are compulsively scientific. From Freud to the present day they have worshipped at the altar of the empirical and objective, while denying validity to the metaphysical and the subjective. To be sure there have been exceptions; but these have been exceptions and not the rule. This obsession to be identified as scientific undoubtedly has a multiple etiology. The ethos of the age is scientific; the culture is massively technological. The "new clergy" want to be scientific like their "cousins," the physical scientists. Also, there is a likely reaction to their "black-sheep" ancestry, the spiritual counsellors, who were, of course, highly metaphysical and subjective. The ecclesiogenic neuroses confirmed their fears of that which is metaphysical and subjective; and their reaction took the form of idolatry of the scientific. Neither should it be forgotten that many of the "new clergy," especially the psychiatrists, are medical or paramedical people and, therefore, closely tied to the scientific from that perspective.

(2) The modern unordained counsellors, probably because of their compulsion to be proved scientific, have inflated the myth of neutrality and pure objectiv-

ity in the one-to-one relationship out of all proportion. They enter into the one-to-one counselling relation under the delusion that they can remain entirely neutral and objective, and not influence the counsellee by their own presuppositions or Weltanschauung. This is nonsense. Halmos correctly asserts:

> The real bias is to think that we can care and remain unbiased, that we ought to be unbiased even in the "I and Thou" relationship of persons, or that counselling does not need that kind of relationship.[10]

The counsellor who believes that he does not personally influence the counsellee's attitudes and decisions deceives himself. Yet, this myth of scientific neutrality prevails among the "new clergy"; and, therefore, they practise an "inverted hypocrisy."[11]

(3) The new counsellors, as I have indicated above, have borrowed heavily from their spiritual ancestors, the clergy. To illustrate this point, consider the matter of love in the one-to-one relationship. It matters little whether they speak of "counter-transference," "support," "acceptance," "empathy," or "rapport": the subject is something, not identical with love (especially

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[10] Halmos, op. cit., p. 104.

[11] Ibid., p. 88. Here Halmos identifies "inverted hypocrites" as counsellors who refuse to confess what they in fact believe.

ἀγάπη), but very close to it. Halmos argues that the "non-spiritual" counsellors are giving love to their patients or clients but refuse to admit it; instead, they attempt to camouflage it.[12] Thus, an inverted hypocrisy is created.

So it is that the "Achilles heel" of the "new clergy" seems to be in their compulsion to be scientific, their espousal of the myth of neutrality, and their practice of inverted hypocrisy. It should be apparent, however, that if the "new clergy" have recovered our analogical "loose ball" fumbled by the traditional clergy, then it is quite possible that they are other members of "our team" and not the opposition. This can be said in spite of their "Achilles heel." Increasing interprofessional conversation and collaboration, with discarded pretence, is desirable.

12"Professionalization," writes Halmos, "has proved an excellent camouflage for the counsellors' 'agape' and the formal-technological jargon, the impersonal clinical manners, the social science collaterals, and so on, have all helped to reassure the counsellor that he was doing a job of work and no more." Ibid., p. 20. H. J. Paton, in his Gifford Lectures, has made the penetrating observation that "perhaps in love and loyal co-operation and art we are in contact with the concrete and the real--not with abstractions like universals and laws and measurements and physical objects." H. J. Paton, The Modern Predicament (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), p. 167.

III. THE PRIMACY OF THE PERSONAL

Although it is certainly not a great tragedy that unordained counsellors are now attempting to meet the personal needs of people in the one-to-one relationship, it will be a tragedy if modern ministers refuse to assume their responsibility to practise the cure of souls in a more effective manner. One of the most urgent needs is for today's physicians of the soul to reassert the primacy of the personal. Karl Heim has remarked that "communion with a living person takes the place of all philosophies."[13] Unfortunately this truth often has been overlooked. In the wake of the ecclesiogenic neuroses many protestant pastors have neglected the basically personal nature of their pastoral care.

Professor James A. Whyte of St. Andrews comments:

> Among theologians who do not accept that the only alternatives before us today are the radical objectivism of Barth or the radical subjectivism of Bultmann, there are some who believe that the way forward for Theology as for Philosophy lies in the investigation of the concept of "the personal."[14]

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[13]Karl Heim, Jesus The World's Perfecter, trans. D. H. vanDaalen (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1959), p. 227. Here Heim has in mind specifically communion with Christ.

[14]James A. Whyte, "The Context and Content of Christian Teaching in a Technological Society," Teaching Christianity in a Technological Age (Edinburgh: The Church of Scotland Comm. on Educ., 1965), pp. 71-72.

If this is true for theology and philosophy, then it is even more relevant that pastoral care has the potential to rediscover--in the concept of "the personal"--its vitality and move forward towards a more adequate cure of souls.

If the modern protestant minister is to reassert the primacy of the personal in this age of depersonalization and the mass-man, he must first of all meet several basic demands. The first of these is to cultivate his own personal sensitivity. Although it is obvious that a minister who suffers acutely from neurosis is not the best risk to provide adequate pastoral care for people in need; it is not nearly so obvious, but nevertheless just as true, that a man "perfectly balanced" is not the best physician of souls either. "Great serenity and exceptional freedom from neurotic symptoms may preclude understanding of, and sensitivity to, those who have many such symptoms."[15] From this perspective then, it is not illogical to reason that if it is true that the clergy have a greater proclivity for neurosis (as some claim), then this, paradoxically, could augur well for the future of pastoral care. Nevertheless, in the one-to-one relationship there can be no

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[15]Halmos, op. cit., p. 129.

substitute for sensitivity. The effective pastoral counsellor is a man keenly tuned to the "Thou" with whom he is confronted.

A second demand facing the practitioner of the cure of souls is involvement. The counselling minister must be a person in relationship. He cannot remain detached and aloof, and minister adequately to those he would serve. "To stand wholly outside a phenomenon," says Allport, "is to understand it less well than by entering in."[16] At this point the pastoral counsellor has an advantage not openly shared by the secular counsellor. The latter, preoccupied with maintaining his scientific posture, is more reticent to get involved. Needless to say, the involvement must be a judicious involvement for the welfare of both counsellee and counsellor.

Relationship in depth is a third demand that faces the modern minister who seriously approaches the cure of souls. The pastoral care characterized by social calls, platitudes, "pats-on-the-back," and irrelevant warnings or assurances is not sufficient for contemporary Christian shepherding. Although superficiality is always the easier road to travel; it is only the road

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[16]Op. cit., p. 127.

of depth that proceeds to a worthwhile destination. The valid one-to-one relationship is always "I-Thou"; the superficial is "I-It."

Relationship in depth between pastoral counsellor and counsellee means the experiencing of that which Karl Jaspers often refers to as "existential communication." This non-verbalized interpersonal communication is a sign of sensitivity and involvement on the part of the counsellor, as well as depth in the relationship. "It is the individual which is the bearer of values," says Dickie.[17] Only as this is recognized, and the concept of the personal reinstated in the place of primacy in the cure of souls, will the pastoral counsellor of today become the medium of God's revelation in his fullest potential. This leads to the consideration of the place of revelation in one-to-one relationships.

IV. REVELATION AND THE ONE-TO-ONE RELATIONSHIP

If the essence of the Christian faith is the person to person relationship--and this I maintain--then Christian revelation is the disclosure of subject to subject. The concept of revelation as the communication of facts and information, instead of a personal

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[17]Edgar P. Dickie, The Obedience of a Christian Man (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1944), p. 30.

disclosure, is a misconception. God has disclosed to man, Himself. He invites man to know Him. He enters into fellowship and communion with man; because, in reality, there is no knowing of a person without fellowship and communion.

God's primary medium of revelation always has been human personality. The prophets and apostles were media of divine revalation. The zenith of that progressive personality-mediated revelation was reached in the person of Jesus Christ. No Christian revelation surpasses that disclosure in Christ. However, God is still using personality to reveal Himself to man. Barth's appraisal of the prophets and apostles as "journeymen of revelation" is also appropriate for ministers of Christ today, who allow themselves to be servants of God in this sense.[18]

When this train of thought is applied to our consideration of the one-to-one relationship in pastoral care, the conclusion is obvious. God does use the pastoral counsellor as a medium of His self-revelation.

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[18]Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Church Dogmatics Vol. I, Part I, trans. G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936), p. 129. Cf. Edgar P. Dickie's poem, "The Makers," in which he refers to Jesus as "a journeyman of souls." Edgar P. Dickie, The Father Everlasting (Wallington, Surrey: The Religious Education Press Ltd., 1964), p. 70.

It is true, as Professor Dickie warns, that: "What appears to be personal encounter may not necessarily be encounter with God. It may be no more than an uprush from the unconscious self."[19] But, on the other hand, it may very well be encounter with God. Which it is can only be confirmed by the encounter itself. It also should be stated at this point that the pastoral counsellors are not the only media that God may choose to reveal Himself. The "new clergy" referred to above, whether consciously or unconsciously, are used also of God in His act of revelation. God's revelation of Himself through a counsellor is not dependent on that counsellor speaking in traditional religious jargon. "Existential communication" (Jaspers) may reveal more than that which is verbal, but also that which counters verbal negations or affirmations.

To illustrate the point of discussion, consider the following case. Mrs. S. is a twenty-seven year old housewife, the mother of three children and the spouse of an attentive and kind husband. She came to the pastoral counselling clinic in a large denominational hospital with the complaint that she did not love her

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[19]Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), p. 16.

husband, resented her children, could not "get through to God" in prayer, and felt she had no contact with Him. In spite of this, she was quite regular in church attendance and extremely conscientious in her domestic duties. She had been referred by her pastor to the clinic and, in turn, was asked to see me in a counselling relationship. My role at that time was that of a hospital chaplain.

The one-to-one relationship continued for almost one year, meeting on an average of once a week for a period of an hour. Concurrently Mrs. S. was under medical observation; and on two occasions, at my suggestion, underwent psychiatric evaluations--although therapy was not felt necessary. She was quite depressed during the early stages of the counselling and had some somatic complaints.

Fairly early in the counselling Mrs. S. shared, with the expression of much feeling, that she as a girl of fourteen had been sexually assaulted by her father while he was intoxicated. From this point on there were no evidences of a sound relationship with any member of the opposite sex, not even the man she married, who from all indications was attempting to be a loving and sensitive husband. With this in mind my primary

goal in the counselling became that of attempting to provide Mrs. S. with a relationship characterized by honesty, acceptance, trust, and Christian love. As time passed, the relationship deepened and trust grew. "I and Thou" became a reality. Her dreams seemed to speak of healing and progress. One particular dream series underwent a transformation. She had dreamed quite often of a bear of which she was very frightened. Soon this bear, at times, became her father and then turned again into the bear. The third step--after about ten months of counselling--took place when the bear changed into her father and then did not turn again into the bear. This seemed all the more significant when it was realized that up until that time she did not dream of her father at all.

About the same time in the counselling process Mrs. S. began to be able to feel and to express love for her husband. The negative feelings toward her children were not as intense; and for the first time in years the interpersonal relationship with her father seemed to be improving. Concurrently her spiritual life took on more meaning, her prayer life deepened, and her church activities became more than empty ritual. In spite of these signs of hope, Mrs. S. was not "cured."

From time to time her problems were still severe. However, she knew, even as I did, that personal progress was a reality. Her basic attitudes were changing and her "dark night of the soul" was lifting.

The psychoanalyst might speak of Mrs. S. as having "gained insight." I suggest that a major part of the explanation of this case is to be found in the concept of Christian revelation. If genuine personal growth was realized in the case of Mrs. S.--and I do not believe that this can be denied--then it was due to revelation, at least in part, through the medium of the counsellor. God had used human personality to assist in guiding Mrs. S. out of the forest of despair and isolation back to the path of meaningful interpersonal living. Instead of speaking of repressions, depressions, and insight, is it too näive to venture that God had revealed something to this young woman: that all men were not untrustworthy as her father had been; and more than that, God, Himself, was One who was accessible, loving, and competent of fulfilling the greatest trust placed in Him--even one's life?

If this is a valid, although partial, explanation of what took place in the above one-to-one relationship, then the role of the minister in this type of confronta-

tion and encounter is certainly describable in terms such as "journeyman of revelation" (Barth) and "medium of revelation." The pastoral counsellor who is able to "keep himself out of the way" has the potential of becoming a vessel that is used of God to reveal Himself to those in desperate need of light. The adequacy of this revelation for all of the shadowy experiences and relationships of life should be apparent when it is remembered, as Professor Dickie asserts, that "God is Light."[20] The revelation of God is illumination.

N. H. G. Robinson of St. Andrews claims that, "revelation creates a situation and restores a broken relationship, broken from man's side and not God's."[21] The relationship of which Professor Robinson speaks is the vertical one--the one between God and man. Is it not also true that relationships on the other plane, the horizontal one, are also restored? Mrs. S. did experience the restoration of relationship to her Heavenly Father. The dividing wall was breached. But, she also experienced healing in the relationship between

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[20]This is the title of Edgar P. Dickie's studies in revelation and personal conviction. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953).

[21]N. H. G. Robinson, Christ and Conscience (London: James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1956), p. 193.

herself and her earthly father, and with her husband. In fact, there seemed to be a restoration of fellowship with mankind in general. The illumination experienced in relationship to God overflows into all relationships; and the result of revelation is healing in all dimensions.

One fact that must be realized by the pastoral counsellor is that there is no specific psychotherapeutic dogma or counselling technique that guarantees Christian revelation in the one-to-one relationship. Buber has declared that dogma--and I feel that he would have agreed that this was true of psychotherapeutic dogma as well as religious--has become "the most exalted form of invulnerability against revelation."[22] Important as technique can be to the counselling minister, especially in helping to keep him from unnecessary blunders in the relationship, the emphasis on the uniqueness of each relationship, Frankl's claim, is valid. This means there can be no stereotyped procedure, no printed "musical score"; each relationship must be "played by ear." The

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[22]Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), p. 18. C. G. Jung appears to agree as he contends, especially in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, record. & ed. Aniela Jaffe, trans. Richard & Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon Books, Random House, 1961) that theological thinking often gets in the way of immediate religious experience.

Holy Spirit cannot be computed;and testimonies to the role of the Holy Spirit in the one-to-one relationship do not lend themselves to any neat categorization. No psychotherapeutic incantation will evoke the Holy Spirit. Only the humble desire to be used of God, and a fervent agape-love for the "Thou" who sits before the ministerial "I," promise the presence of the Holy Spirit in the counselling room.

In respect to revelation and the one-to-one relationship, the following four statements deserve emphasis: (1) Christian revelation and pastoral counselling are specifically related; because it is very often in the context of pastoral counselling that revelation of the Person of God takes place. (2) God uses human personality, the counsellor, as a medium to reveal Himself to others. (3) Insight into the true Person of God during the counselling relationship is Christian revelation. (4) The result of this revelation in the context of pastoral counselling is the same as at any other time or in any other context--it is health-giving and redemptive.

V. JUDGMENT AND THE ONE-TO-ONE RELATIONSHIP

It has often been said that one of the most difficult problems confronting the modern minister is that of playing the role of prophet on Sunday from the pulpit (judgment), and then becoming the accepting, non-judgmental counsellor on Monday in his study (love). If this is a problem, then it must be either because one's concept of "prophetic preaching" is inaccurate, or one's concept of "non-judgmental" counselling is misunderstood. Possibly both are confused. This, however, does raise the question of the place of judgment in pastoral counselling.

There are two types of pastoral counsellors who exhibit the opposing extreme positions in respect to this subject. First of all, there is "the legalist" who seems to take a sadistic pleasure in denouncing the "sins" of those who might be brave enough to bare their heart to him. Needless to say, this man does not do a great deal of counselling. He prides himself on "calling sin, sin," come what may. Some things are "right" and some are "wrong," and he has no difficulty in distinguishing between the two. The counsellee who has sought this man's help usually finds himself either en-

meshed in a hell of unrelieved guilt that seems to have no answer, or in a state of rebellion by which he covers his guilt with a veneer of church-directed hostility. Although this is an acknowledged generalization, it is usually true that this type of counsellor proclaims law without grace. About the only counselling he is called upon to do is with extremely dependent persons who accept his pronouncements ex cathedra and live lives that are not only perverse and immature, but idolatrous as well.

The second type of pastoral counsellor is also an extremist. He is the one who is quite sophisticated, but has "sold out" to some modern psychotherapeutic dogma that he interprets (many of the psychotherapies are falsely interpreted) as advocating "complete acceptance," which most often means the condoning of anything. This man is so pre-occupied with "non-directive" therapy (carried to ridiculous extremes) and with "keeping the relationship," that there is not the remotest possibility of any type of meaningful confrontation taking place in the relationship. Unfortunately, his attitude is often interpreted by the counsellee either as approval or, more often still, as disinterest or lack of understanding. This counsellor will do more counselling

than "the legalist" because he does provide a ministry of listening; but he becomes little more than a sounding board. The lack of confrontation, however, begets a sterility that is a poor reward for selling one's birth-right for a mess of psychoanalytic porridge.

Obviously, the two caricatures above do not describe the most effective and adequate pastoral counsellor. But, one can see examples of what not to do and be. This still leaves us, however, with the problem of the place of judgment in the one-to-one relationship.

There are two presuppositions with which I begin. The first is the "relativity" of morality. By this I mean that laying down the "right" and the "wrong," the "good" and the "evil" in clear-cut and distinct categories is not something accomplished with the ease that some seem to indicate.[23] Existential decision can be more appropriate than the superimposition of irrelevant

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[23]"Love, as the ultimate principle of morality, is always the same. Love entering the unique situation, in the power of the spirit, is always different. Therefore love liberates us from the bondage to absolute ethical traditions, to conventional morals, and to authorities that claim to know the right decision perhaps without having listened to the demand of the unique moment." Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond, Vol. IX of "Religious Perspectives," ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 43.

principles or laws, no matter how theoretically valuable those laws may be. Uniqueness of personality and life situations must be kept in perspective.

Secondly, grace, not law, must govern every one-to-one relationship. This is not the advocacy of grace without law, but law subservient to grace. Too often the opposite is the case, and law rules omnipotent. The primary function of law in the pastoral counselling relationship is the creation of conviction which, in turn, becomes the first step on the path to redemptive reconciliation with God and man.

Seward Hiltner speaks of judgment "in the ordinary sense" and judgment as "shared appraisal."[24] By the former, he means judgment imposed from without. This type of judgment, Hiltner suggests, creates alienation between minister and counsellee, and the erection of defensive walls by the counsellee. By "shared appraisal," Hiltner refers to a "conservative risk" that the pastor takes by pushing an appraisal--not to the point of imposing a judgment--but past the realm of the sure-thing into the realm of the not-so-certain. Apparently Hiltner would agree that "shared appraisal," or judgment in a

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[24]Seward Hiltner, "Judgment and Appraisal in Pastoral Care," Pastoral Psychology, XVI (Dec., 1965), 41-47.

positive sense, is judgment that is shared by both counsellor and counsellee. The counsellee accepts and assimilates the judgment that has been ventured.[25]

To illustrate this distinction, consider the case of Nathan and David (II Samuel 12). Nathan, obviously, practised "directive counselling" in spite of the fact that he employed circumlocution. His judgment, however, became a "shared appraisal" in the sense that David emphatically agreed with Nathan's uncloaked judgment of the "rich man." When confronted with his own identification with the "rich man" David did not deny or rescind his own judgment, but accepted it and assimilated it. Nathan's ventured judgment became a "shared appraisal" by both counsellor and counsellee--prophet and king.[26]

There is a place for judgment in pastoral care, and that place is not just the "prophetic" sermon.

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[25]In another context Hiltner has said: ". . . It is entirely unjustified to think that because counseling proceeds through acceptance and understanding it is devoid of the stern aspects of the gospel." Seward Hiltner, "Pastoral Counseling and the Ministry," Making the Ministry Relevant, ed. Hans Hofmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), p. 128.

[26]See Psalm 51 in which it is clear that David openly accepts his personal guilt. "For I acknowledge my transgressions and my sin is ever before me." (vs.3).

Judgment, or confrontation, in the one-to-one relationship must take place; but it should not be judgment "in the ordinary sense." It should be confrontation that is void of Pharisaism, on the one hand, and sterile sentimentality on the other. As Dickie says, "Love that is not austere is not love, but sentiment: it cannot offer forgiveness: it can only condone."[27]

The distinction between false and true guilt (Tournier) is relevant. Judgment that leads to true guilt, that is, guilt before God, is a necessity. This might be the judgment of men; but it is always the judgment of God. Such was the case with Nathan. He was expressing judgment; but it was not just his judgment. It was, first of all, the judgment of God. Judgment that leads to false guilt, that is, guilt before man but not guilt before God, is to be avoided. This is pharisaical judgment, judgment that engenders alienation and defensiveness. The pastoral counsellor who participates in judgment in this sense neither understands his own relationship to God nor to his fellowman. He, himself, stands under judgment; and this must not be forgotten. Furthermore, the "Thou" that confronts him in

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[27]The Obedience of a Christian Man, p. 55.

the pastoral counselling relationship is used of God to communicate this judgment to the ministerial "I" at the very moment that he judges. The function of valid judgment is the creation of true guilt, which in turn is the reality through which one must pass in order to accept and experience the healing forgiveness of God. "In the world of the Gospel, guilt is not deadweight but building material. In that context, the problem of guilt is the problem of love."[28]

VI. LOVE AND THE ONE-TO-ONE RELATIONSHIP

The problem of judgment rightfully demands the consideration of love in the one-to-one relationship. Judgment without love bears the seeds of ecclesiogenic neurosis. Agape in the "I and Thou" encounter provides the security in which healthy "shared appraisals" and accepted judgment can be redemptively realized. The pastoral counsellor is first and foremost a "vehicle for transmitting agape."[29] Of all the truths he must keep ever before him none is more critically important

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[28]James A. Knight, "Confrontation in Counseling with Special Emphasis on the Student Setting," Pastoral Psychology, XVI (Dec., 1965), 49.

[29]Seward Hiltner, The Christian Shepherd (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959), p. 34.

than the realization that man's greatest need is to be loved. In turn, the pastoral counsellor's most strategic function is to provide healing love. One of the most promising signs of this impersonal age is that other unordained counsellors appear to be accepting this truth and, in some instances, putting it to more effective use than their ordained co-labourers.

Sandor Ferenczi, a disciple of Sigmund Freud, was one of the earliest non-clerical advocates of "loving" a patient back to health. Izette de Forest, a practising analyst and one time disciple of Ferenczi, has this to say in respect to Ferenczi's psychoanalytic theory:

> His last therapeutic theory, the contribution of his full maturity, can be summarized in a sentence or two. Like many of the "late" works of genius in all fields, it shows a radical and absolute simplicity: The indispensable healing power in the therapeutic gift is love. When this love is offered with openness and honesty, in the service of expert skill, it works as leaven: a leaven which lightens and effectively dissipates the burden of neurotic suffering and brings renewal of integrity and health.[30]

Ferenczi was not afflicted with that "inverted hypocrisy" that prompts one to refuse to confess what he in fact believes. "He freely voiced for the patient his affectionate regards and beneficent hopes. Psycho-

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[30]Izette de Forest, The Leaven of Love (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954), p. 6.

analytic treatment, he thought should take place as a natural, concerned, personal relationship. . . ."[31] His conclusion was that the patient needed love and only love. The problem was how to provide it.

The theological terminology used by Izette de Forest in her development of Ferenczi's theory is notable. She goes so far as to relate psychotherapeutic love to love in the Judaeo-Christian sense. Ferenczi's contribution is spoken of as "redemption by love."[32] In The Leaven of Love she speaks at length about the two great commandments given by Jesus and observes that love is the core of both. She concludes: "Whatever the psychotherapist may accomplish with his patient, he accomplishes because of who and what he is."[33] It is obvious that the "who" and "what" is a loving person!

Ferenczi and de Forest, though two of the earliest and most open exponents of "redemption by love" in psychotherapy, are not alone in their emphasis. Gordon

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[31] Ibid., p. 8.

[32] Ibid., p. 179. Otto Rank also has emphasized love as a chief therapeutic agent. He does not hesitate to identify this as agape. See Otto Rank, Beyond Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958).

[33] Ibid., p. 188.

Allport of Harvard acknowledges that love is "incomparably the greatest psychotherapeutic agent. . . ."[34] It is his opinion, however, that psychological science, in which psychotherapy is rooted, is at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to actually entering into loving relationships. He agrees with Ian D. Suttie, a Scottish psychiatrist, who maintained that modern science indulged in a "taboo on tenderness"; and because of this, psychotherapists found it difficult to enter into a loving relationship.[35] This is especially interesting in the light of our discussion above concerning the "new clergy's" desperate attempt to maintain their "scientific" identification. If love is "the greatest psychotherapeutic agent," and if the unordained counsellors of today with a scientific orientation feel compelled to disown it, then they are in a most serious dilemma. There appears to be a growing number, however, who more or less openly are practising and proclaiming redemption by love.

Paul Halmos, the Welsh sociologist, is convinced that love must be expressed in all counselling if counsel-

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[34] Op. cit., p. 89.

[35] Ian D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963), p. 22 and chap. vi.

ling is to be successful or make any difference to the patient.[36] As much as any other contemporary non-clerical writer on the subject, he emphasizes the "faith" of the secular counsellors which includes the preeminence of love. In his opinion they "express themselves in sustained professional caring for others without much reference . . . to God. . . ."[37]

The modern minister should be aware of the fact that love, and at times Christian love, is being expressed--possibly at an increasing tempo--in the one-to-one relationships of the secular counsellors or "new clergy." For this he ought to be grateful and see it as a part of his own task to help the non-clerical counsellors to accept the fact openly that they <u>are</u> providing a loving relationship for people in need, and that they should not be ashamed of it. The minister of today should be keenly aware, also, of the fact that more than ever he is required to be found faithful in his stewardship of love and that this talent is not to be buried but put to productive use. He has preached love for centuries. Now, again, it is being demanded of him that he live it--in interpersonal relationship.

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[36] <u>Op. cit.</u>, p. 51. [37] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 36.

It is undeniably more safe to preach love than it is to live it in the "I and Thou" encounter. Professor Dickie observes:

> Love is vulnerable: to commit itself to another is to expose itself to possible injury, shame, or suffering. Faith alone can give the certainty that the "risk" involved in personal relations is a proper risk, because it is one which is freely taken by the love of God Himself in creating free personalities with power to defy and to wound the creative love which has formed them.[38]

The pastoral counsellor who is unwilling to take the risk of love in the one-to-one relationship will never move from the plateau of superficiality into the depths of meaningful encounter. His offer of Christian love might be rejected, misunderstood, or perverted by the recipient in such a way that it is used as a weapon against the counsellor. But, if the risk is not taken, there is no hope.

How many lonely and unmarried people are there today who are lonely and unmarried because they could never bring themselves to the point of taking the risk of commitment in love? They feared rejection, shame, and hurt too much to hope for fulfillment, companionship and love. It could be that in the relationship of husband and wife there is a basic pattern that, to a certain

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[38]The Obedience of a Christian Man, p. 51.

extent, is applicable to all one-to-one relationships. The mature union of two committed individuals is characterized by the primacy of the personal, self-revelation conveyed by radical openness, judgment as shared appraisal, and love describable in the terms of I Corinthians 13. The deep but mature inter-dependence of husband and wife, and the steadfast sustaining of the one by the other testify to commitment that glories only in the matchless joy of the mutual outpouring of "I" for "Thou." But the partner who refuses to take the risk of total commitment cannot experience the fullness of realized love.

"Nothing risked, nothing gained," is applicable to the pastoral counsellor. If he is not willing to commit himself in love to the "Thou" needing love, then he had best leave the counselling to someone else. Tillich adds: "He who cannot relate himself as an 'I' to a 'thou' cannot relate himself to the true and the good and to the ground of being in which they are rooted."[39]

Being "a vehicle for transmitting agape" (Hiltner), however, does not mean being a "yes man" for every manipulative counsellee. Love rightly transmitted is not

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[39]Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 31.

sticky sentimentality. It is at this point that the pastoral counsellor is often prone to err. It is amazing to what extremes a minister at times will go in order to express what he thinks is love, but in reality is not love at all. It is to the credit of the psychotherapists at this point that they are much more definitive in respect to the nature of love, recognizing that what is paraded as such might be anything but love. Love embraces severity and discipline. It makes its demands. The pastoral counsellor who is not secure enough himself to experience and even to initiate meaningful confrontation in the one-to-one relationship will have great difficulty in really loving. "An indication--and perhaps the most searching test--of a true and satisfactory personal relation is the right intermingling of severity and love."[40]

Love in an existential sense is also demanded of today's pastoral counsellor. I have said that love in the "I and Thou" relationship is a risk. An important aspect of that risk is the unknown variable always present in love. Premeditated love often is not love because it has degenerated into calculation or manipu-

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[40]Dickie, The Obedience of a Christian Man, p. 53.

lation. The spontaneous, fresh, impulse very often is much more genuine, as Dickie indicates. "It is often the impulsive action of love which is the true and the right action. Subsequent reflection opens a door to the entrance of selfishness, sophistication, rationalization. . . ."[41] The ecclesiogenic neurosis that insists upon a dogmatic frame of reference for life is a major deterrent of love in the existential sense. If love is agape, then Augustine's words to "love and do what you please" should be taken as excellent advice.

Allport has commented: "In most human beings the capacity to love is great and the desire for love is insatiable."[42] Dickie adds: "Love is implanted in man: it is there to be evoked, and, being evoked, to respond to the love that is in God."[43] These statements testify to truth that must not be ignored by the counselling minister. The capacity to give and receive love is inherent in the imago Dei. Man is created in the image of God. To deny love, to frustrate love, to suppress love, is the opposite of evoking it. Love, which is both gift to man and need of man, is meant to

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[41] Ibid., p. 83. [42] Op. cit., p. 10.

[43] The Obedience of a Christian Man, pp. 70-71.

be actualized. As the pastoral counsellor loves with agape love, he activates that love inherent in the "Thou" he encounters, who in turn is enabled to love in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. It is a chain reaction that takes place, continuing on and on in creative and sustaining mutuality called in New Testament terms koinonia. Agape presses toward the reunion of the separated; and in this sense the pastoral counsellor becomes a minister of reconciliation.

VII. THE CHALLENGE OF THE ONE-TO-ONE RELATIONSHIP

O. Hobart Mowrer, in an article entitled "The Almighty's Unmighty Ministers," ridicules the modern clergy who seem to believe that any deep interest in interpersonal relations is tantamount to professional treason.[44] He also chides those who are fearful of being thought "moralistic." Mowrer advocates the rediscovery of the power that once was in the ministry. "I believe there is a way," he says, "for them [the clergy] to recapture, for themselves and others, a great power which has been all but lost."[45] The way, according to

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[44]O. Hobart Mowrer, "The Almighty's Unmighty Ministers," The Christian Century, LXXIX (Oct. 17, 1962), 1252-54.

[45]Ibid., p. 1254.

this psychologist, is through the horizontal, man-to-man dimension. Although I cannot arrive at the same conclusions that Mowrer does--especially in respect to his apparent emphasis on "works" as a means of "salvation" in place of the grace of God; and his reference to forgiveness as a "questionable commodity"--there are some worth-while emphases made by him that are pertinent to our discussion. Among these emphases are: (1) the need for the minister to get actively involved in the interpersonal encounter and to assume his rightful role in the cure of souls; (2) the need to beware of dispensing "cheap grace" (Bonhoeffer); and (3) the need to recognize the intertwining of human and divine reconciliation, that is, reconciliation between man and man and reconciliation between man and God.

The challenge of the one-to-one relationship calls the pastoral counsellor to preventive and remedial involvement in the battle with the religious pathology I have described as the "ecclesiogenic neuroses." He cannot remain aloof, hoping to carry on a ministry <u>in absentia</u>. Neither should he step aside and abdicate his role to the "new clergy"; for as a minister of Jesus Christ he brings something distinctive to the "I-Thou" meeting that is not duplicated by the professional ,

secular counsellors. In the one-to-one relation, Christianity is inherently superior to any other religious or secular tradition--despite the fact that this innate superiority is often never realized or is perverted. The minister should appreciate the function of the "new clergy" and work in cooperation with them, at times making appropriate referrals to specialists whose specialty he does not share. He must not retire from the encounter, however, nor refuse to pass through the valley of the shadow as a companion of the one who has sought shepherding, by suggesting that someone else assume this task and privilege.[46] When he does, he and his message become irrelevant.

For the would-be pastoral counsellor to be guilty of pious platitudes or the meaningless dispensing of

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[46]C. G. Jung writes: "But the Protestant clergyman cannot, in my opinion, wash his hands in innocence; he must accompany the soul of the person who confides in him on its dark journey." "Psychoanalysis and the Cure of Souls," Psychology and Religion: West and East, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 352. Also Hiltner, who maintains that there are two kinds of depth--(1) in the psychological sense and (2) in the ultimate or religious sense--affirms his conviction that: "Even if we may say ideally, that all serious psychoneuroses ought to be dealt with by a psychiatrist, it hardly follows that the pastor should gallop in the other direction the minute he smells a neurosis." He continues: "I am not at all prepared to admit that the pastor deals with superficial problems while the 'deeper' problems are referred to other specialists." "Pastoral Counseling and the Ministry," Making the Ministry Relevant, p. 121.

"cheap grace" in a superficial and casual relationship, without entering into the suffering of the one in need of Christian love, is not to overcome the ecclesiogenic neuroses; but on the contrary, it is to feed them and contribute to their propagation. Such practice not only results in the desertion and isolation of the counsellee, but also prostitutes the minister's calling and responsibility in the cure of souls.

Finally, the pastoral counsellor must be cognizant of the truth that is present in the words "that he who loves God should love his brother also" (I John 4:21b RSV). Love is not uni-dimensional, but permeates all of the dimensions of life. The minister who gives himself wholly in agape love in the person to person relation, not only contributes to redemptive reconciliation between man and man, but also strategically assists in reconciliation in the ultimate relationship--that of God and man. Is not this the inescapable task and the matchless privilege of a minister of Jesus Christ?

> The man who is my Lazarus, . . . the man lying at my doorstep, who is wounded and needs my help, the man who has been waiting . . . I am simply driven to go to him. It is inevitable as that fire gives out heat that I should take his burden on my heart.[47]

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[47]Karl Heim, The Power of God, trans. L. M. Stalker (London: The Lutterworth Press, 1937), p. 144.

CHAPTER XII

ONE-TO-MANY RELATIONSHIPS

One-to-one relationships form an essential part of the Protestant minister's task in the cure of souls. One-to-many relationships, in no sense inferior, complete the picture. This relationship lends itself to a further division: the interaction between (1) the minister and small groups, and (2) the minister and larger groups--such as the Sunday morning congregation. Practical matters are foremost in this chapter with our main concern being the place and function of small groups in the church and the minister's task in this context. The relationship of pulpit and pastoral care also is considered.

I. SMALL GROUPS AND THE CURE OF SOULS

The rising interest in small groups. The last three decades have witnessed a great upsurge of interest in the nature and function of small groups of persons. This has been ignited in a large part by the "Group Dynamics Movement," begun in the United States in the

1940's when Kurt Lewin, a German social scientist, left Germany during the Nazi era and began a "Group Dynamics Institute" in Massachusetts.[1] Since then there has been growing interest in group dynamics. Psychotherapy's contribution to the discovery of the importance of group life and its bearing on the interpersonal relationships, especially from a therapeutic perspective, has been of great significance also. S. H. Foulkes and E. J. Anthony, for example, published in 1957 a study of the group therapeutic process from a Freudian position, illustrating therapy-group theory and practice.[2]

Taking their cue from the "Group Dynamics Movement" and psychotherapeutic groups, the churches have begun to rediscover the importance of small groups. Throughout the history of the Christian Church small groups have been of great significance. Jesus chose to labour primarily within the context of a group of twelve; and the early Church itself was a movement of small groups of Christians whose spirit of community

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[1]See Theodore O. Wedel, "The Group Dynamics Movement and the Church," Theology Today, X (April, 1953 - Jan., 1954), 511.

[2]S. H. Foulkes and E. J. Anthony, Group Psychotherapy (2d ed.; Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1965). There are other and earlier group psychotherapeutic publications, but this one is illustrative of the general approach to the subject.

and fellowship was a distinguishing feature. The Christian koinonia encompassed power that transformed the world. The churches of today, however, perplexed by their ecclesiogenic neuroses, have lost in large measure the power of the small groups. To be sure there have been churches whose institutional organization has included many small groups; but for the most part these groups have not been particularly meaningful either to their own members or to those they were meant to serve. The note of fellowship and community has been missing. Wedel claims:

> . . . On few issues is the conscience of the Churches more stirred today than on that of its loss of the note of fellowship, of a common life in the Body of Christ, of social witness, and social unity.[3]

The Protestant churches in many instances have fostered an impersonal individualism that is contrary to the spirit of community exhibited in the New Testament Church. Thus, many fellowship-starved individuals have sought community elsewhere than in the institutional church. Some have found it in the Oxford Group, and like communities, while others have sought it in various psychotherapeutic schools. Wedel says:

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[3] Op. cit., p. 516.

> Clearly these new disciples of Group Dynamics [social scientists] had failed to find in their Church contacts the satisfactions which the Church, when true to her nature, should have offered them in abundance and which can meet human needs far more basic than any for which even the best secular movements can provide a cure.[4]

The churches have the potential of meeting basic human needs in a far more effective manner than any secular movement, no matter how worthy that movement may be. But, the truth of the matter is that the ecclesiogenic neuroses have sapped the strength of the churches and left unrealized their potential in the modern day. The failure of the churches to provide meaningful group experiences and deep, abiding fellowship has resulted, at least in part, in the upsurge of groups like the "Group Dynamics Movement," Alcoholics Anonymous, the Oxford Group and others. Many persons are finding their "religious experiences" in these groups and not in the churches.

It appears that while the churches have maintained a sacred structure they have succumbed often to a secular content. On the other hand, groups have arisen that are secular in structure but appear to have

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[4] Ibid., p. 513.

aspects of a sacred content.[5] It is encouraging, however, that in recent years the churches have shown signs of willingness to learn in this area from their secular friends. Noting the contributions of group dynamics and psychotherapy groups in particular, the churches have exhibited signs of a rediscovery of their own small group life. It is to be hoped that this rediscovery will not take the form of simple wholesale borrowing from the secular groups; but that it will be characterized by an attempt to develop a unique group life peculiar to the needs and purpose of the contemporary Church.

What is the role of the contemporary Protestant minister in small group life, and its bearing on the cure of souls? The minister's role is that of close involvement. He cannot isolate himself from involvement in some form of the one-to-many relationship. His choice, therefore, is qualitative. Will he contribute constructively and creatively to the life and purpose of the Church through his involvement in the small groups of his parish; or will he perpetuate aspects of

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[5]See James B. Ashbrook, "Theological Dimensions of Renewal Through Small Groups," Pastoral Psychology, XV (June, 1964), pp. 23ff.

the ecclesiogenic neuroses by not realizing and actualizing the power to be found in these creative units within the Church? His function as a physician of the soul will be decided to a large extent by his relationship to the small groups of his church and community.

The nature and purposes of small groups in the church. It appears that three basic types of small groups are identifiable.[6] There is (1) the task-centered group, (2) the study-centered group, and (3) the person-centered group. By the first group I refer to the group whose primary function is to perform a certain task, for example, church committees and official boards of the church. The study-centered group obviously meets for purposes of study, for example, a Bible-study class. A person-centered group is a group whose primary purpose is to contribute to the personal needs of the individuals in that group. To illustrate: a number of married couples, meeting with the acknow-

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[6] Otis A. Maxfield and Donald E. Smith, in "Therapeutic Dimensions in Church Groups," Pastoral Psychology, op. cit. pp45-51 refer to more than ten different types of small groups which they call by names such as "group psychotherapy," "prayer group," "couple circle," "Lay Academy," "Research Groups," "Discovery Groups," etc. I believe, however, that the three basic groups I refer to above compose a suitable frame of reference for all of these.

ledged purpose to seek solutions to marital conflict, would compose a person-centered group. A meeting of alcoholics seeking to deal with their common problem would be another example. There is some over-lapping in the three-fold classification; but it seems to be as adequate a division as any other. There are other groups that are outside of the Church which at times, undeniably, appear to carry on a sacred function. These groups also can be identified within the typology I have suggested.

What are the goals or purposes of small groups in the churches? Ultimately, they must be redemptive. They should be service-oriented in respect to the world, proclaiming the message of reconciliation between man and man, and between man and God. Their goal is to enable the Church to become the servant and minister that Christ meant her to be--minister to the world as well as to her own. At the same time, if the Church is to reach out to the world, those that compose the Body of Christ must experience illumination and power from their participation in the company of those committed to Christ, the koinonia.

There are, however, more immediate goals and purposes of small groups in the church. One immediate

goal of small groups, especially person-centered groups, is to "grow in the skills of living."[7] This usually means learning, through interpersonal interaction, to become persons who are more understanding, accepting, forgiving and genuinely loving. A subsidiary goal which facilitates the above is to learn the art of listening to other people--really hearing what they say on the deeper levels of communication.

A second immediate goal of some church-sponsored small groups is group psychotherapy. In most of these cases, professional psychotherapists are invited by the church sponsoring the group to lead the group as they see fit. The minister assumes no responsibility in the group and often dissociates himself completely from it. The role of the church and minister is that of sponsor--a "silent partner," so to speak. However, both church and minister cannot deny the responsibility they have assumed in their explicit or implicit approval of that which transpires under the leadership of the secular psychotherapists. The statement made by Bernard Bosanquet to the effect that he who wills a will, wills the detail, is applicable here.

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[7]See Robert A. Edgar, "The Listening Structured Group," Pastoral Psychology, op. cit., p. 7.

A third purpose of some small groups is group pastoral counselling. If the minister has been involved heavily in the pastoral counselling of individuals, he has the opportunity through group pastoral counselling not only to serve more widely as a physician of the soul to those in need, but also to solve some of his own problems, schedule-wise. He will find, also, that after a certain point in the one-to-one relationship (especially in the case of persons with certain types of problems), group pastoral counselling is, if not a desirable replacement, at least a beneficial supplement to the one-to-one counselling. In this type of group the minister's goal and that of the group is not to provide psychological therapy, as in group psychotherapy, but to bring to bear, relevantly, the power of the Christian cure of souls on the problems of persons. On the other hand, neither the minister nor the group should fearfully avoid or attempt to stifle the dynamics that do take place. It is not always an easy task to distinguish the moving of the Holy Spirit from the upsurge of unconscious forces. However, a person does not learn to know one from the other if he smothers the expression of that which could be either.

A fourth immediate goal of small groups in the church is to provide the structure for the confrontation of personal experience and not just the exchange of ideas and presuppositions. It is at this point that the Church has the opportunity of rediscovering koinonia and overcoming the superficial "clubbiness" which is often passed off as Christian community. As long as church members never enter into interpersonal, experiential confrontation and sharing, but continue to operate superficially on the level of intellectualizations, there can never be koinonia. There are people within the churches today who are eagerly seeking authentic Christian fellowship, and are willing to drop their various socially acceptable "masks" (Tournier's "personages") and enter into the confrontation of the personal dimension. One of the most meaningful ministries the pastor can provide is to help create the opportunity for this type of experience.

A fifth immediate purpose of some small church groups is to serve in a preventive role. Whereas there are many who might benefit from group pastoral counselling, there are many more who, not in need of remedial counselling, would greatly profit from group learning experiences. It seems quite appropriate, for example,

for the minister to conduct from time to time small groups especially designed for engaged couples approaching marriage, or for young married couples. He could provide a valuable ministry, also, by suggesting the creation of a small group for those members of his parish who were facing the adjustments of retirement.

The five immediate goals suggested above are not meant in any way to exhaust valid purposes for creative groups. Whatever the immediate purposes of group life, the ultimate goals of redemption and meaningful service must be kept in sight. This, of course, means that a small group to be creative in a Christian sense must be permeated with a sense of commitment to the task at hand, to the "Thous" that compose the group, to the Church which is the Body of Christ, and to Christ Himself, the Head of the Church. The immediate goals might be the accomplishment of specific tasks, the successful grasping of Biblical truths, or personal interaction on a deeper level. However, if there is not an underlying sense of commitment to the ultimate goals, the attainment of immediate goals (if possible) is hollow and meaningless. The five goals referred to are more applicable to a person-centered group, but may be realized in other creative and committed fellowships.

The structure of small groups. A word should be said about the structure of these groups which seem to promise a certain measure of renewal in the life of the Church. The traditional structure of task-centered and study-centered groups is well known. However, in recent years these groups, not to mention the person-centered groups, have been affected by influences from group dynamics, group learning, and group psychotherapeutic sources. The following description of small group structure attempts to take into account the variety of non-traditional structure now being utilized in different churches.

The place of meeting of a group may vary from the church building (church parlour, pastor's study, or classroom) to the homes of the group members, or to some "neutral" site (a civic building) where the church's influence would be more subtle. The location ought to be governed by the purpose of the specific group and by the nature of the membership of the group. If, for example, there are members who are antagonistic to institutionalized Christianity, and the purpose of the group is to provide meaningful and relevant Bible study for all group members, then it might be wise to meet on "neutral" ground in order to avoid "threatening" some

of those less "secure." After all, the Church of Jesus Christ is not a geographically fixated institution.

What types of approach will the group employ? Some person-centered groups employ a strictly unstructured approach. There is no agenda as such, no book to be studied or no planned program. The group members might take something of a "Quaker view" of the meeting and speak as they desire or "feel led" on subjects of personal concern. In other unstructured groups, the leader might suggest that they go from member to member asking each person to suggest a topic for discussion. This continues until the group decides on a subject of mutual concern.

The study-centered groups will almost invariably begin their sessions with the use of subject material; and the task-centered groups have before them their specific tasks. The groups might be "closed" or "open." In the case of the person-centered groups, some group leaders advocate a selection or screening of potential group members. This would seem especially helpful in groups that are concerned with emotionally charged problems. Groups, of course, can also be structured according to age levels, sex, and marital status, if this seems to be desirable.

The leadership of the group should depend on the goal of the group. It is obvious that one minister cannot and should not attempt to be the group leader of every small group operating in the church. In fact, there are some groups in which his absence would be his most positive contribution. However, it is essential that the minister be actively involved in the group life of his parish. To be too willing to pass the responsibility of leadership to someome else can indicate an unhealthy attitude.

Whoever the group leader may be--minister, a trained professional, or layman--he ought to be the most capable person available for the task of group leadership. He should be knowledgeable in respect to the dynamics of groups; and he should be emotionally stable himself in order to be able to deal with any situations that may arise. This is especially true in person-centered groups. Simply to rotate leadership among the group members is to ask for trouble. This does not mean that the leader must be authoritarian, either in general knowledge or in his function in the group. It does mean, however, that he ought to be able to discern accurately what is taking place in the group process and handle it capably.

Generally speaking, the minister--sensitive and trained--is the logical person to serve as leader of a small group in a church. If this is not possible, and it will not be possible in every case, then a capable layman (who also is sensitive and trained) can serve equally effectively. The two ever-present elements that should determine the decision as to leadership are: (1) the purpose and goal of the specific group and (2) the nature of its membership.

In person-centered groups the best length of time for each group session is probably one and one-half hours. Less would hardly provide sufficient time for real involvement while more would tend to be fatiguing. The number of sessions could vary from weeks to years. This would depend on the specific group, each having a unique life expectance. When the group appears to have come to the end of its "natural life," it should be allowed to die. New life will emerge. Nothing will be gained by holding on to a "dead group" and trying to resuscitate "dry bones."

A good practice exercised by some leaders is to structure a group initially so that at the conclusion of, say four sessions, the members of the group can evaluate what has taken place thus far and decide

whether to continue or not. This provides a "way out" if the group members desire it. Most small groups meet at least weekly, or at the minimum, fortnightly. To spread the meetings further apart would lose the continuity of content and feeling.

Finally, in our consideration of the group structure, the size of the group should not be overlooked. Some psychotherapists argue that a small group should never exceed seven or eight members.[8] Small groups in the church are not basically psychotherapeutic groups; and this concept of an arbitrary optimum of eight is not valid. I have known small church groups of ten and twelve that have had valuable experiences as companies of the koinonia, not to forget that Group of Twelve in which the Lord was the thirteenth member. The main danger is a group so large that its number inhibits free interaction. Ten or twelve are good arbitrary figures, but must not be taken as binding.

Significant characteristics and contributions of small groups. Robert Leslie writes:

> The churches that are most spiritually alive and that are contributing most to the personal lives of their members and to the wider life of the community

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[8]Foulkes and Anthony, op. cit., p. 64.

> are churches with creative groups operating within the larger organization as a leavening influence.[9]

If this is so, what is this leaven produced by creative groups within the organizational churches? What, if any, significant contributions are being made by the small groups in the church? On this hangs the validity of the small group movement and its hopeful promises. A study of the literature describing the contributions of small groups in the churches promotes optimism. The following significant characteristics and contributions are noted:

1. Community. A growing number of persons who have had experience with small person-centered church groups which are cognizant of contributions from the "Group Dynamics Movement" and other group learning sources testify to the renewal of a real sense of mutual support and fellowship (koinonia). In this period of institutionalism, the organizational church, depersonalization (secular and sacred), and personal isolation in the midst of religiosity, the hope of the renewal of the Christian koinonia is exhilarating. Contemporary men are hungering for genuine community; and there is

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[9]Cited by Clyde H. Reid in "Small Groups are Here to Stay," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XVIII (May, 1963), p. 403.

no community that transcends Christian community in its authentic expression. The rediscovery of this appears to be a major contribution of the small groups.

2. Understanding. Personal and interpersonal understanding, often unknown in the larger church organization, is an important part of the group experience. The psychotherapists might call this "insight." However, when persons in the security of a small group in which the Holy Spirit is at work come out from behind their "masks," more than just "insight" is realized. Understanding often "makes straight the path" for genuine love. In this day the question "Who am I?" has become a swelling chorus. As "I" meets "Thou" in the fertile meaningfulness of the group experience, this urgent question is answered; and understanding and love of both "I" and "Thou" becomes a reality. Revelation, not merely "insight," often is involved; and spiritual growth towards Christian maturity becomes a gracious bonus.

3. Agape. It has been said that to understand is to love. Understanding of oneself and others in the small group contributes to the permeation of most groups by a genuine spirit of agape love. There could not be authentic koinonia and mutual understanding without

agape resulting. This is more than mere acceptance--important as acceptance is. Agape includes the spirit of acceptance (spoken of by the psychotherapists) but supersedes it. Yet, agape is not only the result of koinonia and understanding; it is agape that makes both of these possible. Without an atmosphere of accepting love no person is likely to reveal himself so that it is possible for him to be understood by the "Thous" with whom he is interacting. It can be argued whether or not man is ever really capable of agape. Nevertheless, if this is not the real thing, it is probably as close as men can get.[10]

4. "Radical Openness." Mowrer speaks of a"new group therapy" which is characterized by "radical open-

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[10]One of the most familiar and important works on the nature of agape is Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros Part I, trans. A. G. Hebert (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1932). Nygren effectively emphasizes the distinction between the Greek eros and the New Testament agape. However, there is value in the criticism of this made by E. T. Ramsdell, who states: ". . . The contrast as defined by Nygren does not sufficiently take account of eros as characteristic of man as God has created him; that it is therefore presupposed by Agape even as law is presupposed by grace; that the unconditional character of God's love has unique reference to man as distinct from the rest of animal creation; and that it does presuppose faith as man's response to it." Edward T. Ramsdell, The Christian Perspective (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950), p. 96, n. 1.

ness."[11] The self-disclosure of one who is willing to open himself completely to "significant others" (Harry Stack Sullivan) and not just to a therapist is, in Mowrer's opinion, the means to good health. In so doing, deceit is eliminated and confession of guilt is made, followed by active retribution. Person-centered groups in the church increasingly are experiencing "radical openness." Although it is not without its dangers, these seem to be far offset by the positive good of openness, honesty and confession. As the person emerges from behind "persona" (Jung) or "personage" (Tournier) the act of "being oneself" promotes healing of the whole person. Perhaps it is in the husband-wife relationship, where "radical openness" is a reality, that we witness the ideal group--a pattern for all.[12]

5. Healing. Small groups can provide the pastoral counsellor with the means of carrying on a broader and, at the same time, a more effective cure of souls. A serious mistake is made, however, if all church groups are made into psychical therapy groups.

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[11]O. Hobart Mowrer, The New Group Therapy (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1964).

[12]Cf. Buber's discussion of "the 'community' of marriage" as "part of the great community." Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), pp. 60ff. Also cf. supra, p.54f.

As John Casteel warns: "The group is not meant to perform the psychological functions of a trained therapist."[13] On the other hand the group *can* rightfully and appropriately perform the task of the cure of souls. Healing, whether called "therapy" or not, cannot help but take place if a group is characterized by *koinonia*, understanding, *agape*, and "radical openness."

6. *Confession*. Although "radical openness" would include confession of guilt, to list confession on its own as a contribution of the small group movement in the church is not to be redundant. Mowrer's stress on confessing guilt to significant others is worthy of considered study. The Roman Catholic Church has its confessional; and Protestantism has developed something of a "confessional" in its pastoral counselling--the one-to-one relationship. To be able to confess guilt, significant guilt, to a group of important "others," and to experience acceptance, love and forgiveness in an atmosphere of *koinonia* possibly can do more to communicate the grace of God than any singular pronouncement of absolution. It would appear that this

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[13]John L. Casteel (ed.), *Spiritual Renewal Through Personal Groups* (New York: Association Press, 1957), p. 204.

type of group confessional is more in keeping with the spirit and practice of the New Testament Church, and supersedes confession as experienced in the one-to-one relationship. Let the one who would argue that it is a characteristic principle of Protestantism that man receives forgiveness directly from God with no "priest" intervening, remember that God's primary medium of revelation has been and still is human personality.

7. Commitment. From a Christian perspective any group whose ultimate loyalty and commitment does not exceed the confines of the group--no matter how significant that group may be to each member--is guilty of a non-Christian self-centeredness. This is one of the deadliest charges leveled at psychoanalysis (personal or group); that is, the preoccupation with self that often degenerates into a morbid and sinful self-concern. Pharisaism is ever a danger. There are testimonies, however, that indicate the development of a higher commitment taking place as a result of small groups in the church.

Maxfield and Smith, speaking of their experience with small groups in the church say: "If action and commitment to specific external goals did not eventually

occur, we would question the whole group process."[14] Leslie has spoken of the "leavening influence" of the small groups on the larger church organization.[15] And Philip A. Anderson has traced the pilgrimage of one group member who moved from concern with self to concern for others and God in the context of a group experience.[16]

It is, as Leslie asserts, this affirmation of a "higher loyalty" that is the distinguishing feature between the small church group and other groups, such as the psychotherapy groups.[17] Commitment first to others in the group, then to a widening circle of others, and ultimately and maturely to Jesus Christ is often the path of responsible growth in commitment that is followed in the small groups. The "company of the committed" becomes a living reality and not an empty hope.[18]

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[14] Op. cit., p. 49. [15] Supra, pp. 564-65.

[16] Philip A. Anderson, "The Group Member Becomes a Servant," Pastoral Psychology, op. cit., pp. 14-22.

[17] Robert C. Leslie, "The Uniqueness of Small Groups in the Church," Pastoral Psychology, op. cit., p. 37.

[18] D. Elton Trueblood, The Company of the Committed (New York: Harper & Row, 1961). The problem of the relationship of a sub-group to the church as a whole is ever-present. Each has something to contribute to the other--the sub-group to the congregation and the congregation to the sub-group. When this is not recognized, a serious problem exists.

8. Motivation. One of the characteristics of the ecclesiogenic neuroses is the willingness to do the right thing for the wrong reason. However, in Christianity, the end never justifies the means. The re-examination of motivation, then, is another apparent contribution of small person-centered groups in the church. V. V. Sisney and K. L. Shewmaker, both clinical psychologists, have had experience in conducting groups in church settings. In an appraisal of one of these experiences they have said:

> One effect at which some ministers might be appalled was the increased ability of some of the members to decline when asked to volunteer for some church duty. When this occurred, it reflected the member's discovery that his volunteering in the past had come from an unrealistic sense of guilt, a neurotic desire to win personal approval, or fear of disapproval. One member missed church one Sunday, reporting she had discovered that she did not have to go to church. These positions in each instance represented milestones toward being able to choose freely to participate and to work within the church. When these people now volunteer to serve in some capacity the chances are much better that they will not do so with secret begrudging or out of fear, but as an act of self-expression and genuine personal involvement. In no instance did a member appear to become less religious, but the participants did become interested and concerned with their motives in all spheres, including religion. Several members, in fact, interpreted the group meetings themselves as a concrete expression of Christian love which, as one member put it, "helped me to accept acceptance."[19]

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[19]V. V. Sisney & K. L. Shewmaker, "Group Psychotherapy in a Church Setting," Pastoral Psychology, XV (Sept., 1964), 39-40.

Not only are there many tasks left incomplete in the life of the church because the "labourers are few," but there also are many responsibilities accepted by persons operating from a base of unworthy motivation. If the small groups enable some churchmen to assume responsibility in a more mature manner for healthier reasons, then a significant contribution will be made to the church life of this epoch.

9. Relevance of Faith. "Irrelevant" has become the brand affixed to much that bears the "Christian" label today. Often speaking in out-moded terminology and meaningless abstractions, the churches have failed in many respects to provide a concrete witness to a relevant faith. Love is proclaimed but not practised. Christian community is desired but not offered, or not recognized and accepted when offered. Redemption is equated with man's sophistication. Yet, it has been demonstrated that in the context of an intensive small group the relevance of the Christian faith can be "brought home" with an impressive impact. Many groups and individuals have discovered that the Church and religion are much more a part of their lives than they had previously realized or admitted.[20]

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[20]James B. Ashbrook, op.cit., p.30. Cf. supra, pp. 481ff.

In the "I-Thou" encounters within small groups, there are numerous opportunities for concrete expressions of a relevant Faith to be actualized. There love, forgiveness, redemption and fellowship can all become realities again as they were in the New Testament churches.

The nine specific characteristics and contributions of small groups discussed above do not include by any means all of the positive aspects potentially present in small person-centered church groups. Neither do they mention the risks that must be taken in group work. A word in this respect is relevant.

Risks involved in the small group ministry. There are at least three risks involved in the operation of small groups in the church that should be recognized and considered. However, potential threats posed by these "dangers" are so impotent in comparison with the positive promises of small group life that only a passing acknowledgement is paid to their reality.

(1) First of all there is the risk of creating "in-group" rivalry or a modern pharisaism. If the "in-group" were indiscreet in its behaviour towards the rest of the church this could be a problem. It is, however, at this point that a responsible and capable group

leader will be able to lead the group away from such a danger. In fact, all of our churches today are composed of various and sundry sub-divisions: Bible classes, men's organizations, women's groups, and so forth. If small groups are made available to all who really desire to participate, and if the behaviour of the group towards the rest of the organizational church is discreet, there should not develop any "in-group" problems of serious proportions. Even Jesus and the Twelve appear to have had sub-grouping of their company.

(2) A second risk is in respect to whether or not one can participate in self-disclosure to his neighbours, fellow churchmen and minister and still live and work with them. On one occasion a young business man sought me out for counsel. He had a personal problem that from every indication called for at least several hours of counselling. When this was indicated in the first interview he stated that he was willing to pursue the counselling but wanted me to find him a way "to secure his anonymity." He did not want to come to my study (I was an associate pastor in a large urban church) because he feared that some of his 2,500 fellow church members would ascertain that he was seeking counsel. I obliged by referring him to a clinically

trained hospital chaplain in one of the local hospitals. He entered into a counselling relationship that continued for several months and apparently secured not only personal help but his "anonymity," as well.

Mowrer asserts, in respect to confession and guilt, that unless "radical openness" involves confession to "significant others" (Sullivan) it is meaningless. Confession, especially to a paid confessor such as a psychotherapist, and not to one's family, friends, and colleagues can be only "cheap grace" (Bonhoeffer).[21] Sisney and Shewmaker seem to agree:

> We are not expressing a unanimous professional position . . . in assuming that a therapeutic community can be established among acquaintances, and that concurrent social contacts will not necessarily subvert but may actually implement therapeutic objectives. Our position involves an answer to the embarrassing question: "Can we really know one another, minus the usual pretenses, and still live with one another."[22]

If the answer to the above question is "No," then there is a serious risk involved in group work in the church because one of two things will take place: (1) the group will never really "open up" but continue to operate behind individual personages; or (2) if it does

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[21] Op. cit.; this theme is found throughout Mowrer's writings.

[22] Op. cit., p. 37.

practise "radical openness" the membership of the group will sooner or later "migrate" to other communities and churches where they are relatively unknown.

(3) A third danger involved in small group work in the church is the risk that, as a result of intense emotional interpersonal interaction, a case of severe mental illness might erupt. This is a risk, however, that must be accepted in any group experience where significant learning or meaningful growth is taking place. Leslie observes that "there is a growing conviction that no real learning takes place where there is not a good deal of emotional investment."[23] Again, the alertness of a capable and sensitive group leader (especially at the point of screening group participants) will do much to abate the seriousness of this danger. Open lines of communication with local mental health resources and personnel will provide the security of immediate professional assistance if needed. The risks involved in small group work in the churches, although not to be ignored, should not deter the churches from attempting to actualize the positive promises of group experiences.

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[23]"The Uniqueness of Small Groups in the Church," Pastoral Psychology, op. cit., p. 34.

The role and function of the minister in small groups. The pastoral minister is placed in a highly strategic position in respect to providing meaningful care-in-depth to the members of his congregation and others as well. Task-centered and study-centered groups are already an integral part of the modern church. Through his own understanding of group dynamics and the nature of personal interaction in groups the minister has the opportunity to lead these groups into vital spiritual renewal. Task-centered groups can discover visions of meaning and committed service that they never expected; and study-centered groups can experience the "coming alive" of the written Word of God and other subject matter in a refreshing and exhilarating way. In both groups, "the personal" can assume new dimensions, although the "task" and the "study" are primary.

It is in the person-centered groups, however, that the minister has one of his greatest challenges and opportunities to provide an extremely effective cure of souls. Person-centered groups, at present, are not normally a part of the organizational church's existing structure. Neither can meaningful groups be manufactured as a result of a minister's arbitrary decision to create them. Groups of this nature usually

arise spontaneously out of a matrix of influences existing in the local church situation. The minister's role, as far as the genesis of a group is concerned, is to be aware of the currents of thought and feeling within the congregation and to capitalize on the expressed need of individuals by challenging them to involvement in group life.

On one occasion a half dozen university students who were members of a larger study-centered church group in a church I served became critical of the "depth" of the programs in the weekly meetings. These students were not a "reactionary clique," but were genuinely seeking more than they were finding in the larger fellowship. They came to me individually and in couples expressing their desire for something more--not knowing exactly what it was they sought. I reminded them that there was a majority in the study-centered group which was finding the group meaningful; therefore, we did not want to disband it or drastically alter it--but at the same time I was sympathetic to their request. I suggested that I would be willing to meet with them one afternoon a week in a person-centered group, the nature of which I attempted to describe for them, if they were so inclined. They responded unani-

mously that they would like to "experiment" in such a group. This group met weekly for the rest of the school term and proved to be--in the opinion of all involved--their most meaningful church experience of that school year.

The great majority of creative person-centered groups will arise in a spontaneous manner--which could very well mean an active participation on the part of the Holy Spirit. The minister's critical task at this point is to be sensitive to the needs of those he serves and respond appropriately to their initial expressions of need and interest.

As I have indicated already some ministers have discovered that successful person-centered group meetings can take place in the church without their involvement.[24] This is certainly possible; but it is the exception and not the rule. Sensitivity and pertinent training are necessary requirements for the group leader if a group is to avoid pitfalls present in group experience, and move towards maturity. The minister of a

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[24]The indication is that most of the instances of church-sponsored group work in which the pastor has little or no involvement are cases in which psychotherapists are invited to conduct groups in a church setting. E.g., J. Raymond Cope, "The Church Studies its Emerging Function," Pastoral Psychology, XIV (Nov.,1963), 23-30.

congregation is one (although not the only one) of the individuals most likely to meet these requirements for a logical choice as leader. This is obviously true if the purpose of the group, for example, is to secure group pastoral counselling.

If the minister is the group leader, what kind of leader should he be? First of all, there are certain basic premises which should govern his relationship to every group. He should realize that a person is a person only in relationship to other persons. As Tillich has said, "there is no person without an encounter with other persons."[25] He should be willing to climb down from any "pious pedestal" he might occupy in his own opinion or the opinion of others, and place himself with the rest of the group as a sinful man under the judgment of God. He should accept the fact that a group experience can be spiritually redemptive. It is not that man saves man but, rather, that creative interchange is the means of grace through which God saves man.[26] He should not be fearful of the group becoming

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[25]Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 177.

[26]See Henry Nelson Wieman, Man's Ultimate Commitment (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1958), pp. 16, 178. Cf. O. H. Mowrer, op. cit.

"therapeutic." Although psychotherapy should not be the group goal, it is true that "a religious congregation worthy of the name ought to be a 'therapeutic community.'"[27] He should accept the truth in Leslie's affirmation that "the Gospel can be read largely as a matter of relationships," and that a "meaningful affirmation of a higher loyalty may well depend upon significant depth encounter with other human beings."[28] Finally, the minister group-leader must recognize that group work is not just a matter of technique, important as knowledge in respect to group dynamics may be. When "I" meets "Thou" in the group experience, technique is emphatically of secondary importance.

Unless the group is meeting for pastoral counselling, the goal of the minister should not be to function in any of his pastoral roles but to attempt to be his "genuine self." In the former case, of course, he cannot escape his role as counsellor--a more "fatherly" role. However, in most of the other person-centered groups his image can be more "brotherly." He and the other group members are brothers under the Fatherhood

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[27]Mowrer, op. cit., p. iv.

[28]"The Uniqueness of Small Groups in the Church," Pastoral Psychology, op. cit., p. 38.

of God,[29] all standing in need of the forgiveness and reconciliation wrought by the Divine Grace.

One of the most serious mistakes a minister group-leader can make is to attempt to assume an "objective" stance within the group. To attempt this almost invariably results in lack of involvement on his part and alienation from the group--who, in turn, will feel that he is "not operating on our level." The minister should not fear exercising leadership. He can be "directive" in his leadership or more "non-directive" (although never completely so), but he must not be authoritarian. If he functions authoritatively in the group, one of two things usually occurs. The group, if strong enough personally, will rise in open revolt and challenge his leadership; or the group will succumb to the authority and "smother." In the first case, the group still can be redeemed if the minister is capable of "growth" himself. In the second, the group experience probably will result in meaninglessness.

The minister who is willing to commit himself in agape and personal involvement to the other group members

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[29]See Wayne Oates, Protestant Pastoral Counseling (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962). Oates speaks of the Protestant heritage in terms of the Brother-man image as opposed to the Freudian Father-man image.

and share from his own personhood in the group process will discover that this avenue of service takes on creative meaning for him personally as well as for those to whom he would minister. Plagued not so much by an unbearable work load, but more by tasks that have become unbearably meaningless, he will discover deep meaning in small groups--meaning that dissipates much of the superficiality that threatens him vocationally. Thus, the minister becomes ministered to by those to whom he would be minister. So it should be if every man is a priest.

Martin Marty is of the opinion that: "If the parish best illustrates what is wrong [with the religious life] it should serve also as the best instance for seeking progress. . . ."[30] Through the life of the parish the ecclesiogenic neuroses appear bold and vivid. Mowrer comments:

> . . . All too often the Church is today a place where people hide behind Biblicism and dogma and theology and liturgy. Does the Church really want to be taken seriously when it speaks of itself as a "company of sinners"?[31]

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[30]Martin Marty, The New Shape of American Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 143.

[31]Mowrer, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

The parish minister is an essential medium through which the Church can recover true community; and the small group has the potential of serving as the context for that recovery. The minister does not have to be insensitive, inadequate and impotent.[32] His role can be that of the spark that ignites the blazing warmth of koinonia. As Wedel says:

> Our problem today is the reverse of that confronting our forefathers. For us the problem consists in recreating, within and alongside the Church's institutional activities, the Christian community which formerly could be taken for granted and which once was the soil in which Christian charity and Christian neighborliness could bring to men and women the gift of "the glorious liberty of the children of God. . . ." (Rom. 8:21)[33]

II. THE PULPIT AND THE CURE OF SOULS

Promising as the small groups may be in respect to an effective context for meaningful pastoral care, the pulpit ministry in the Protestant tradition is still of central importance, even in the realm of the cure of souls. It seems necessary to underline the importance of the deep interaction of what may at first glance seem to be two totally different aspects of the minister's task--pastoral care and the pulpit ministry.

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[32]See Ibid., p. 84. [33]Op. cit., p. 524.

The interrelation of preaching and pastoral care. From the perspective of pastoral care, preaching is of critical importance. The proclamation of the good news of Jesus Christ is meant to heal. The fact, however, that it also can wound has been demonstrated much too often. One illustration of this type of ecclesiogenic neurosis is guilt-producing preaching which fails to present the whole gospel by not proclaiming the answer to guilt. We can be thankful, in cases such as this, that Jung's disparaging remark is often true. Speaking of sermons, he said: ". . . though it reaches the ears, [it] seldom penetrates to the heart, much less to the soul. . . ."[34]

Harry Emerson Fosdick claims that he judged the worth of his sermons by the number who sought him out for personal counsel after hearing him preach.[35] Most of those who seek out a minister for counsel will do so because of what they have heard, or sensed, in his pulpit ministry. The converse is also true. Fosdick states:

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[34]Carl G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 351.

[35]Harry Emerson Fosdick, "What is the Matter with Preaching?," a pamphlet in The Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary Library, Wake Forest, North Carolina, p. 7.

> Anyone accustomed to hearing preaching must be aware of two diverse effects commonly produced. One type of minister plays "Sir Oracle." He is dogmatic, assertive, uncompromising. He flings out his dicta as though to say to all hearers, take it or leave it. He has settled the matter concerning which he is speaking and is not asking our opinion; he is telling us. . . . The future, I think, belongs to a type of sermon which can best be described as an adventure in co-operative thinking between the preacher and his congregation. . . . The preacher takes hold of a real problem in our lives and stating it better than we could state it, goes on to deal with it fairly, frankly, helpfully.[36]

The interaction of preaching and pastoral care is illustrated in Fosdick's words: "The preacher takes hold of a real problem in our lives. . . ." A fair question is how does he know what that "real problem" is? The answer, of course, is through his pastoral care. In his one-to-one relationships and his intimate involvement in the small group work of his church, the minister discovers quite accurately "where his people are." He comes to know their problems, concerns, anxieties and weaknesses. Armed with this knowledge, his sermon takes on characteristics more accurately described as those of a rifle rather than a shotgun. His preaching is, in other words, pointed, pertinent and relevant, and not merely scattered in the general direction of the congregation. (The late Dean Inge of St. Paul's has

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[36] Ibid., p. 4.

compared some preaching to a man standing in front of a long row of test-tubes and throwing a bucket of water over them.) This is not to say that he betrays any confidences, personal or group confidences, from the pulpit. He must not and need not. He does, however, speak with a healthy authority, with a sensitive awareness, and with a message that proclaims the right spiritual "prescription" because the "diagnosis" has been accurate. Thus a "circle" has been formed. The minister's pastoral care has contributed to the power, relevance, and curative effect of his pulpit work. His pulpit ministry, in turn, contributes to a more meaningful practice of the cure of souls as members of the congregation become aware of the fact that he is a man with a message that speaks relevantly to them in their life situation and seek him out for personal dialogue.

The problem of communication. Preaching is basically an attempt to communicate. A visible symbol, old but still needed, that speaks of the difficulty often encountered when the preacher attempts to communicate are the long sticks still on display in the Old North Church in Boston which were wielded by the deacons to prod awake those who found it too tedious to respond

to the "communication" from the pulpit. The nature of that which is communicated and the lack of communication are problems especially relevant to the relation of preaching and the cure of souls.

One fact the modern minister does not seem to be aware of fully is that as a preacher he communicates with the congregation on at least two levels: (1) the conscious level and (2) the unconscious--or the "verbal" and "non-verbal," or the "thinking" and the "feeling." James T. Hall has attempted to measure the communication of feeling during worship services.[37] Using a questionnaire he developed, and experimenting with two different congregations, he arrived at the following conclusions: (1) Definite, even somewhat measurable, communication takes place during preaching. This remains true in spite of the tendency in some quarters to downgrade the effectiveness of pulpit communication. (2) The preacher communicates not one but two messages to the congregation; and the messages may differ greatly. He may preach love verbally and communicate hostility non-verbally. He may proclaim the security that is to be found in God

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[37]James T. Hall, "Measuring the Communication of Feeling During Worship," Pastoral Psychology, XIV (Oct., 1963), 50-58.

consciously, and expose his own insecurity unconsciously. (3) The feeling tones communicated are related to his emotional involvement in his subject material. This means he may communicate love one Sunday and hostility the next, depending on his subject material.

One main aspect of Hall's study is the emphasis on the preacher's inability to pretend successfully that he is what he is not, and to succeed in duping the congregation into accepting this mask as reality. If preaching is communication through human personality, then it must be accepted that more than just sermon subject matter is being heard by a congregation that truly listens. This has definite pastoral care implications. A man may verbally proclaim his accessibility to the people he serves while, at the same time non-verbally, he maintains a steadfast aloofness which supersedes any verbal proclamation. He may preach a non-judgmental approach to persons with certain social problems and yet, unconsciously, speak so loudly in pharisaical judgment that his preached message is never heard. On the other hand, this non-verbal communication may be to his advantage. He may, for example, speak often of the stern holiness of God but at the same time, through his "existential communication", testify to the forgiving love of that same Holy God.

This hypocrisy, or "inverted hypocrisy" in the latter case, is usually quite unconscious. At this point the interrelations of small groups and preaching becomes important. If the minister is involved in small group work and has been able to experience a "radical openness" himself, chances are that the group will aid him in becoming conscious of that which has been unconscious. Subsequently, the preaching and the cure of souls that he practises are bound to be positively affected. The unconscious or non-verbal level of communication in preaching demands much more attention than it has received. It could very well be that the minister should spend at least as much time studying this as he does mastering the technique of sermon construction and delivery. As a result, not only his preaching but his pastoral care would profit greatly.

The second major problem in pulpit communication is not the nature of that which is communicated but the actual lack of communication itself. In spite of Hall's claim that definite and even measurable communication takes place during preaching, there are times--at least on the verbal level--when communication simply does not exist. Barriers arise and separate the partners

(preacher and congregation) in communication.[38] Thanks to both "inside" and "outside" critics the Church by now is aware of the problem of language and symbols. Abstractions, hackneyed phrases, and ancient terminology do not serve as the best vehicles for communication in the twentieth century. Some symbols are completely meaningless to some people.

The preacher who truly wishes to communicate the gospel assumes the responsibility of overcoming the barriers to communication whatever they may be. However, before this can be accomplished he must learn to recognize the failure of communication and the location of the "break-down." This again calls for the resources available to the preacher in his one-to-one relationships, and in his involvement with small groups in the church. It is true that there are times when he will be able to sense or know by the attention, expressions, and silent attitudes portrayed by members of the congregation during the sermon whether or not he is communicating with them. But compared to the resources for diagnoses available to him through his counselling and small

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[38]See Reuel L. Howe, "Overcoming the Barriers to Communication," Pastoral Psychology, XIV (Oct., 1963), 26-29.

group work, this mode of diagnosis is very primitive, indirect, and inaccurate. Counsellees and members of small groups will reveal to the sensitive minister in an invaluable way those weak points in communication between pulpit and pew which are in need of his serious attention.

The necessity of dialogue. "Lazarus Sprengel," says T. M. Lindsay, "delighted to tell his friends how Luther's . . . sermons were bringing back to a living Christianity numbers . . . who had been perplexed and driven from the faith by the trivialities common in ordinary sermons."[39] What was it that made Luther's preaching so effective? One thing was his knowledge of those to whom he preached which allowed him to enter into dialogue with them from the pulpit. He did not create "straw men" and heroically dispatch them. He knew the problems, concerns, and needs of those in the congregation, and spoke pointedly and effectively, cutting through to the perplexities and difficulties that weighed upon the people of his day.

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[39]Thomas M. Lindsay, A History of the Reformation, Vol. I (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1906), p. 256.

There is only one kind of authentic preaching--that which is directed to human need. We can talk of fine homiletical points, of textual preaching, and topical preaching; but preaching that does not meet the needs of people is useless jargon. The proclamation of the Word of God is to meet the need of man. This is the testimony of the Scripture.

Authentic preaching demands dialogue. "Perhaps it is because we have not really addressed ourselves to the actual feelings of men that preaching has seemed so pedestrian and repetitious," comments Gene Bartlett.[40] As creative pastoral care sensitizes the minister to the needs of the persons in the Sunday congregation, he is enabled to enter into meaningful dialogue with them and cease from acting as a "performer" before an "audience." Fosdick's concept of preaching as an "adventure in co-operative thinking" becomes a reality. A. B. Macaulay once said that the typical Scottish preacher of his time paid the congregation the compliment of summoning them to think along with him. There is a give and take between preacher and listener; and the congre-

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[40]Gene E. Bartlett, "When Preaching Becomes Real," Pastoral Psychology, XIV (Oct., 1963), 22-23. Also see Martin Buber's philosophical treatment of the subject of dialogue. Buber, op. cit., pp. 1-39.

gation's listening becomes active listening. The preacher's questions are the congregations questions. Answers arrived at arise out of the confrontation of real life situations and the relevant Word of God, as both preacher and congregation kneel before their Maker. In this type of experience "something happens." The cure of souls through the preached Word becomes actual fact and not an idealized hope.

One practical suggestion for maintaining dialogical preaching is the use of a small group whose primary concern would be sermon discussion. The goal of such a group would be to react as honestly as possible to the sermon of the previous Sunday. The reactions would be communicated to the minister, directly or indirectly as the situation seemed to warrant; and he would take them into consideration in subsequent preaching. In time past in Scotland, for example, the subject of conversation at Sunday lunch used to be the morning sermon. (I am told by Professor E. P. Dickie, Chaplain to Her Majesty the Queen in Scotland, that this is still the practice at the Queen's table when she is at Balmoral.)[41]

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[41]A small group such as this could take a number of forms. It could be a new group created with this specific task; a mid-week group, such as the traditional Wednesday night "prayer meeting"; or a panel discussion immediately following the worship service.

Another suggestion is the "sermon clinic idea" referred to by Clyde H. Reid. The minister meets with a small group of laymen prior to the preaching of his next sermon. He shares his basic message and is attentive to their reactions and criticisms, and listens to any pertinent ideas or illustrations to increase its relevancy. He then modifies his message as he deems appropriate. The people who helped "give birth" to this message can be expected to listen considerably more closely and eagerly when the sermon is delivered.[42] Dialogical preaching, creatively meeting the needs of real people and profiting from the contributions of a sensitive pastoral care, will do much to counter "the trivialities common in ordinary sermons."

The man behind the sermon. Effective preaching, enlightened by pastoral care and concerned with the cure of souls, is dependent upon the man who occupies the pulpit. God has chosen to reveal Himself through

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[42]See Clyde H. Reid, "Preaching and the Nature of Communication," Pastoral Psychology, XIV (Oct., 1963), 44. It might possibly be more beneficial to discuss the sermon subject, rather than the sermon itself. Discussion of the subject prior to the actual preparation of the sermon would save the minister the time involved in preparing a sermon and then modifying it. Another danger that must be guarded against in this "sermon clinic" practice is that of the minister becoming too self-conscious and preaching only to "the group."

human personality; and the personality that delivers the preached Word cannot be ignored. Although it is often true that God uses a man in spite of himself, it is more often true that God works through a person who is openly committed to Him, and sensitive to the task of growing in Christian maturity.

If the preacher communicating is basically an "unloving personality," then this cannot be kept from the congregation he addresses from week to week.[43] If he has a tendency toward paranoia, or if he is a strongly prejudiced individual, he will become known. In Lincoln's well-known quip, it is true one cannot fool all of the people all of the time. If his approach to preaching is authoritarian, dictatorial, the congregation will first resent and finally pity the personality for whom this approach has become an emotional need. If the preacher compulsively talks about himself from the pulpit, it soon becomes apparent that he has not succeeded in dealing with his own personality problems to the extent that he can be an effective instrument in mediating the love of God.

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[43]See Bonaro Overstreet, "The Unloving Personality and the Religion of Love," Pastoral Psychology, IV (1953), 14-20.

All of this is pointedly relevant in respect to the cure of souls. The man behind the sermon most often *is* the sermon. Mowrer suggests that "ultimately we *are* our secrets."[44] If those secrets are fundamentally negative, as I have indicated above, then assistance is desperately needed by many ministers in order that their preaching and their pastoral care may be truly curative. This leads us to the relevance of our final chapter which is a consideration of Clinical Pastoral Education.

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[44] *Op. cit.*, p. 71.

CHAPTER XIII

CLINICAL PASTORAL EDUCATION

The minister's task in the cure of souls in both the one-to-one and the one-to-many relationships has been dramatically influenced in the last thirty years by what is called "Clinical Pastoral Education." This uniquely American movement, begun by Anton T. Boisen in the late 1920's and achieving organizational structure in 1930 with the formation of the "Council for the Clinical Training of Theological Students," also has had an important impact on theological education in general.

C. P. E.--as clinical pastoral education is known by those involved in it--is a method, a movement, and a body of knowledge (or a way of adding to or correcting a body of knowledge).[1] It is a method of professional education; it participates in the world of social insti-

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[1]See Seward Hiltner, "Clinical Pastoral Education: An Appraisal 1960," Trends in Clinical Pastoral Education: Objectives Methods-Standards, Proceedings of the Seventh National Conference on Clinical Pastoral Education, Washington, D. C., 1960 (The Advisory Comm. on Clinical Pastoral Education), pp. 1-30.

tutions as a movement; it becomes a body of knowledge as its method is subjected to systematic probing and recorded reflections are accumulated.

C. P. E. has the character of a research program and of a training laboratory. Research is carried out and skills are learned. The research, theologically speaking, is usually concerned with the doctrine of man, while the skills taught are pastoral. In a certain sense C. P. E. is theological education in the experiential dimension.

Edward F. Dobihal, Jr., Director of Protestant Clinical Pastoral Training at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C., has defined C. P. E. as ". . . an educational process for seminarians or clergymen taking place outside of a seminary, usually within an institutional framework, whereby the student is helped, via the pastoral office, to minister to persons with better understanding."[2]

I. ORIGIN AND OBJECTIVES

Anton Boisen's pioneering work at Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts and at Elgin State Hospital in

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[2]Edward F. Dobihal, Jr., "Methods of Clinical Pastoral Education," Trends in Clinical Pastoral Education: Objectives-Methods-Standards, p. 57.

Illinois was the basis from which C. P. E. developed.[3] His work was with mentally ill patients in institutional settings; and he attracted individuals and small groups of men and women--most of them clergy--who felt that Boisen and the patients had something of theological importance to share with them. Dr. Richard Cabot and the Rev. Russell L. Dicks are also of great importance in the early formative years of C. P. E.: Cabot for his prophetic inter-professional encouragement and support of the movement, and Dicks for his pioneering work in a general hospital setting.[4]

From the beginning Boisen was interested in studying mental disorder--from which he himself suffered--and its relation to religion. "I believe that the paramount human need," he said, "is that for love and that there is a law within which forbids us to be satisfied with any fellowship save that of the best."[5] He felt,

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[3]See Anton T. Boisen, Out of the Depths (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960); The Exploration of the Inner World (Chicago: Willet, Clark & Co., 1937); and "Clinical Training in Theological Education: The Period of Beginnings," The Chicago Theological Seminary Register, LVI (Feb., 1966), 1-4.

[4]See Richard C. Cabot and Russell L. Dicks, The Art of Ministering to the Sick (New York: Macmillan Co., 1936). In 1933 Dicks became the first general hospital chaplain. His salary at the Massachusetts General Hospital was paid by Cabot.

[5]Out of the Depths, p. 197.

apparently, that mental illness was ultimately the result of the lack of love and a sense of estrangement and isolation. The Christian faith has the resources for providing authentic love and fellowship; and the Christian pastor is in a unique and strategic position to minister in the cure of souls to those in desperate need of this ministry.

One of the primary goals of C. P. E. is the discovery of theological truth: truth that is found in the inner recesses of a soul and truth that is found without. The implementation of resources from other disciplines in the search for this truth is characteristic of C. P. E.

A second primary goal of clinical pastoral education is to aid the theological schools in their task of preparing men for the Christian ministry. This is done by the study of persons, in which the student is provided with the opportunity of engaging in supervised interpersonal relationships. Albert L. Meiburg expresses it this way:

> We . . . believe that the minister has a unique symbolic role in presenting the love of God through his interpersonal relationships and as he gives leadership to the church as the beloved community. Hence, the effectiveness of the minister as a channel of redemptive love is conditioned to a great degree by his skill in relating to himself, to others, and to God.

> The purpose of clinical training is to improve the minister's skill in communicating the love of God through these relationships.[6]

The second goal of C. P. E. has subjective as well as objective implications--the nurturing of a man for the Christian ministry cannot remain something entirely objective.

C. P. E., though developed outside of the theological schools, is closely related to traditional theological education. The Niebuhr, Williams, Gustafson report states:

> . . . The close connection between the traditional discipline of "pastoral theology" or "care of souls" and the psychological approach to human personality through firsthand experience of human problems is widely recognized today, and has given rise to one of the most influential movements in theological education, the emphasis on the preparation of the Christian pastor as counselor. The considerable growth of interest in this field is related not only to the increasing demands upon ministers for such preparation but also to the emphasis in the schools upon the importance of the student's discovery of his psychological motivations, his insight into the emotional aspects of his experience, and his achievement of the kind of understanding of people and the problems of mental health which will enable him to serve skillfully at one of the critical points in contemporary man's life.[7]

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[6]Albert L. Meiburg, "Methods of Clinical Pastoral Education," Trends in Clinical Pastoral Education: Objectives-Methods-Standards, p. 79.

[7]H. Richard Niebuhr, Daniel Day Williams, James M. Gustafson, The Advancement of Theological Education (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 122.

According to this mid-century report on theological education there are three needs of the theological student that should be met by "pastoral theology." They are:

> First, an interpretation of the care of souls within the church and his [the minister's] pastoral office; second, an interpretation of the meaning of the data and scientific understanding in this field for Christian faith and theology, and third, growth in self-knowledge both as a person and as one who is to be a channel for the healing promised in the Gospel.[8]

If, fundamentally, the objectives of C. P.E. are (1) the search for theological truth and (2) the nurturing of theological students for the ministry (which encompass, I believe, the contributions requested from "pastoral theology" for the theological student by the Niebuhr, Williams, Gustafson report), then what of the methods used in the attempt to realize these objectives?

II. METHODS IN C. P. E.

Clinical pastoral education methodology can be described best as "interpersonal." The learning experience takes place in interpersonal confrontations on several levels. The setting usually is an institution: a mental or general hospital, a corrective institution,

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[8] Ibid., p. 127.

or some other health and welfare institution. There is the possibility that C. P. E. could take place in other settings such as a parish church. (Some isolated experiments have taken place; but as yet not enough has been done to test this possibility.) The institution offers at least five types of relationship through which this method of experiential education takes place. They are the student's relationship (1) to himself, (2) to the patients or those to whom he would minister, (3) to his fellow-students or co-ministers, (4) to other institutional workers such as the medical personnel in a hospital, and (5) to his supervisor or supervisors.

Seward Hiltner is convinced that ". . . the crucial educational values of C. P. E. have always been <u>specific instances</u> and <u>ruthless scrutiny</u>."[9] Abstractions are kept to a minimum and specifics become the order of the day. To the end of specificity, the verbatim interview and the case history are employed effectively. For example, the student visits a hospital patient and attempts to enter into a meaningful relationship. His visit is written up as nearly verbatim as

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[9]Seward Hiltner, "Pastoral Counseling and the Ministry," <u>Making the Ministry Relevant</u>, ed. Hans Hofmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), p. 126.

possible and then exposed to the scrutiny of the student and his supervisor. They examine it together, sentence by sentence, attempting to understand the personal interaction that has taken place in the visit. The supervisor, and at times the student, is also cognizant of the dynamics of the supervisor-student relationship taking place in the very act of studying the student's relationship to a third person. Most likely some interviews will be shared by the student with his peer group in a seminar. This means that the student exposes himself and his ministry to the examination of eight or ten fellow ministers. It should be added at this point that all ministries to patients, those used for teaching purposes and all others, are treated strictly as professional confidences. All involved in C. P. E., students and supervisors alike, are expected to treat the confidences shared with them with the utmost care, acting at all times in a mature and professional manner, protecting the trust placed in them by those to whom they minister.[10]

Ernest E. Bruder, Chaplain in St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C. states:

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[10]See Pastoral Psychology, XVII (March, 1966). The entire issue is on the subject of "Pastoral Confidentiality and Privileged Communication."

> . . . Pastoral or clinical learning can be achieved only in an interpersonal operation where what both experience <u>with</u> each other, and what both <u>do</u> to each other, and <u>how</u> these things are done, become the fruitful material for careful collaborative investigation between the learner and the supervisor.[11]

The close personal study of what has taken place in an actual attempt at ministry proves to be of great value. If the ministry is directed toward deeply troubled people such as hospitalized persons, and if the student has allowed himself to enter into their anxieties as well as be exposed to his own, then the promise of this type of learning experience is greatly enhanced.

The case history in addition to the verbatim interview has proved to be a very important learning tool. It is a report in depth of a student's complete ministry to one person. Like the verbatim it provides a specific instance; but in addition it contributes an overall perspective. In the process of close scrutiny provided by his supervisor and colleagues the student-minister observes his strengths and weaknesses, helpful attempts at ministry and hurtful mistakes as they are exposed in an extended ministry.

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[11]Ernest E. Bruder, "Present Emphases and Future Trends in Clinical Training for Pastoral Counseling," <u>Pastoral Psychology</u>, XI (April, 1960), 36.

The group seminar is a third learning procedure that has contributed markedly to the nurture of the theological student as a Christian minister. Usually this seminar is composed of eight to ten students plus the group leader who is a trained supervisor. It might meet one and a half hours a day, five days a week for eight to twelve weeks. In addition to the examination of ministries carried on by individual members of the group, the seminar often becomes the seed bed for extremely meaningful personal growth and self-understanding as the individuals experience a sense of community and openness that often appears to be stamped authentically by the presence of the Holy Spirit. It is this learning experience that is most often described by the students as a spiritual experience approaching their conversion or call to the ministry.

Other non-theological professional personnel are employed regularly in C. P. E. learning procedures. Often lectures are given to the theological students by physicians, psychiatrists and representatives of other helping professions. Neither is it uncommon for a group of seminarians and medical students, for example, to discuss together a specific case. This interprofessional dimension adds to this mode of theological educa-

tion something still missing in the traditional approach to theological study. The question, of course, is whether or not other disciplines have anything to add to theological education. Most C. P. E. leaders affirm that other disciplines have much to teach theologians--especially in respect to the doctrine of man.

Although particular group techniques such as role playing, "buzz" groups, "brain-storming" and the like might be used in C. P. E., they are not peculiar to it alone and should not be considered as important aspects of C. P. E. methodology.[12] The methodological base seems to center in the supervisory relationship, the scrutinized interpersonal experiences with fellow students and other professional people, the patient-student relationship and the use of verbatim interviews, case

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[12]"Buzz" groups are small groups formed from the sub-division of a larger group which enter into informal discussion for a short period of designated time working at a prescribed task: e.g. "Discuss for five minutes 'religionless Christianity' and bring a one-minute report of your discussion." These groups also have been referred to humorously as "cogitation clusters." "Brain-storming" takes place when individuals of a group are urged to contribute rapidly and spontaneously to a specified task: e.g. two members of a group might quickly record on a chalk board all of the comments rapidly illicited from the rest of the group who might be urged to "call out all of the descriptive terms of present day church life that come to your mind"! Discussion would follow.

histories and group seminars--all in an institutional setting where the crisis ministry is not uncommon.

III. C. P. E. AND THE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS

What is the relation of clinical pastoral education to the theological schools? Boisen has said:

> From the beginning . . . I had constantly insisted that we were not trying to introduce anything new into the already overcrowded theological curriculum. On the contrary, we were trying to call attention back to the age-old problems of sin, of salvation, of prophetic inspiration. What was new was the approach. . . . We were seeking to make empirical studies of living human documents. . . .[13]

Although originating outside of the theological schools, C. P. E. was intended by Boisen to be tied closely to traditional theological education. He did not want C. P. E. to operate isolated from the theological institutions, and he said that he did not mean to "introduce anything new into the already overcrowded theological curriculum." He does, however, admit desiring to "alter the basic structure of theological education."[14]

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[13] Out of the Depths, p. 187.

[14] Ibid. Boisen also stated: "What is new is the attempt to begin with the study of living human documents rather than with books and to focus attention upon those who are grappling desperately with the issues of spiritual life and death." (all italics) Boisen, "Clinical Training in Theological Education: The Period of Beginnings," op. cit., p. 3.

One charge to which classical theological education has been vulnerable is that it operates on an exclusively rational, abstract and theoretical level. Samuel H. Miller of Harvard writes:

> There [in the theological schools] academic discipline is the discipline of analytical and discursive reason. Everything in the Christian faith is reduced to its rationalistic character. . . . All methods tend to one end, namely communicable facts to furnish the conscious mind. That this should be so is not strange, but that we should be satisfied that it is so is strange.[15]

Miller argues that theological education at its best "is not merely a matter of information or of skill, but the development of a religious personality, whose competence will be determined as much by the maturity of his selfhood as by what he knows."[16]

Hans Hofmann joins the attack on exclusively rational theological education:

> . . . Theological educators should not confuse teaching with mere lecturing. It is an illusion to assume that the theological student is able to concentrate on the solely academic absorption of rational thought and concepts and then, digesting these on his own, become a minister who is able to use his knowledge of the Christian tradition as

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[15]Samuel H. Miller, "Pastoral Experience and Theological Training: The Implications of Depth Psychology for Christian Theology," Making the Ministry Relevant, p. 62.

[16]Ibid., p. 63.

> resource for his pastoral experience and for relevant actions.[17]

It is, of course, impossible to meet the needs of "whole men" on a strictly rational basis. Theological education that is directed towards a student as a "whole person" must take into consideration not only the rational and conscious but also the non-rational and unconscious.

The Niebuhr, Williams, Gustafson report, prior to Hofmann, spoke of the "didactic stance" of traditional theological educators.[18] Niebuhr has said: ". . . True and substantial wisdom consists of three parts: the knowledge of God, of companions, and of the self; and that these three are so intimately related that they cannot be separated."[19] He then proceeds to call for theological students to get "personally involved" in the study of theology. If they are not involved, they are "not yet studying theology at all."[20]

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[17]Hans Hofmann, "Introduction," Making the Ministry Relevant, p. xv. Hofmann also has a word for the ministry: "The Christian ministry can no longer limit itself to proclamations about God and the world from which ethically correct behavior can be easily derived. Teaching and preaching at people on an exclusively rational level and about all that is outside of man is no longer sufficient." Ibid., p. ix.

[18]Op. cit., p. 134.

[19]H. Richard Niebuhr, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), p. 113.

[20]Ibid., p. 118.

The abstract and theoretical emphasis in the theological schools is also the subject of Reuel Howe's concern. "Training for the ministry," he writes, "would be more helpful if it could also be made less abstract and theoretical. Theory is indispensable to thought and action, but the expounding of theory apart from the problem to which it belongs is irresponsible. . . ."[21] It is Howe's conviction that "it is the responsibility of the seminary to teach him [the student] to know himself as a person living in relation to others, by means of such resources as clinical training. . . ."[22] Every theological school, according to Howe, must be both a "center of theological learning" and a "training school for the ministry."[23]

Obviously, theological education which has been almost exclusively rational in its approach to its task

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[21]Reuel Howe, "Theological Education After Ordination," Making the Ministry Relevant, p. 156. Niebuhr, also, has said ". . . Work of theory cannot stand alone because it is a work of abstraction that proceeds from, and must return to, the concrete reality of life." The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, p. 129.

[22]Ibid., p. 160. Carroll A. Wise seems to agree when he says, "The theological school must accept a much greater responsibility for the growth of the student as a person than it has accepted up to this time." "Education of the Pastor for Marriage Counseling," Pastoral Psychology, X (Dec., 1959), 46.

[23]Op. cit., p. 135.

is experiencing pressure, pushing it toward the acceptance of a much greater responsibility for the maturation of the student as a person. Basically, the conflict revolves about the question whether or not theological schools are to be strictly academic communities or communities of faith. Unfortunately, this too often has developed into a rivalry between advocates of the academic approach and promoters of practical training.[24]

C. P. E. does not regard itself as the only means of theological education, but it does profess to be one that is needed. Furthermore, C. P. E. should be judged as a movement <u>within</u> theological education, in spite of the fact that it originated outside the walls of the theological schools. More and more it is becoming related to the traditional theological disciplines, although at the point of seminary-relatedness severe tensions still exist. There is the fear of the perversion of truly clinical pastoral education by the attempt to set up some quasi-clinical program in the theological schools where the authentic "clinical" is swallowed up by the "rational." At the same time many traditional theological educators appear to be threatened by the meaningful

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[24]See Niebuhr, <u>The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry</u>, p. 101.

experiences of theological students in C. P. E.: experiences that, for the most part, are not duplicated in the theological schools. On the other hand, traditional theological education still has questions to ask of C. P. E. Is it academically sound? Is it truly "theological" education or is it something less? What is the theology of pastoral care with which C. P. E. primarily is concerned?

The truth remains, however, that C. P. E. and traditional theological education can no longer serve the needs of students as whole persons if they are isolated one from the other. If C. P. E. and the schools are moving toward each other--and this does seem to be the case--then every effort should be made by both sides to accelerate this process. This is not to advocate an institutional amalgamation, if this were possible; because in certain respects this would frustrate and cancel the effectiveness of both. It is, however, a plea for greater mutual recognition, cooperation, inter-action and supplementation in place of isolated indifference or, worse yet, competitiveness.

IV. SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF C. P. E.

Clinical pastoral education is making contributions of critical importance to students in the process of theological education. Actually, these contributions are C. P. E.'s "reason for being." It can be argued that if traditional theological education had been meeting fully the needs of its students then C. P. E. would never have come into existence--there would have been no need for it. However that may be, it is not possible to ignore the following specific contributions of this mode of theological education.

1. Intensive, specific and scrutinized experience with the "living human document." This is a basic distinction of C. P. E. in contrast to traditional theological education. Boisen's idea of studying the "living human document" in addition to literary sources, and doing this by entering into interpersonal relationships is at the heart of clinical experience. The theological student, or the working pastor who "goes back to school" for clinical training, finds his analyzed, supervised and "ruthlessly scrutinized" (Hiltner) ministry to a particular person in a specific life situation--usually a crisis situation--of great value in increasing the

meaningfulness and effectiveness of his ministry. In this sense C. P. E. is more an experience than a course of study. It should be added and stressed that actually it is the "living human document"--the person ministered to--who makes one of the greatest contributions to the student; that is, the sharing of his deepest self, his hopes and fears, his problems and concerns. In almost every encounter between "helper" and "helped" the minister profits personally and spiritually as much or more than the one to whom he ministers.

2. An increased body of knowledge in respect to the doctrine of man. Through an intense study of persons and by recording the empirical observations made in the process of ministries, C. P. E. has contributed to the Church's doctrine of man. Relevant truth that is discovered, whatever its source, should be incorporated into this Christian concept. Within C. P. E. there is a willingness to listen to what other non-theological disciplines are saying about the nature of man and his concerns and to accept truth when it is found. Reinhold Niebuhr has said:

> Christian thought has much to learn from modern psychiatry in assessing the human situation. . . . We cannot scorn insights in which truth has been distilled from the half-truths of both Freudianism and

> Neo-Freudianism, particularly when that truth corrects the half-truths of both Christian pessimism and Christian optimism.[25]

3. An increased awareness of the true nature of contemporary man's deepest needs. Much has been said in recent years about the irrelevance of the Church and its ministry. Part of the difficulty is that the ministry too often has been guilty of not really hearing and heeding the basic existential cry of need and despair arising from the heart of contemporary man. Man's deepest need is not always the obvious superficial one he might present. Too often the modern ministry hastily accepts the surface complaint, not really grasping the deeper underlying malady. C. P. E.'s sustained and intensive study of persons has resulted in a more accurate diagnosis of man's present and ultimate needs.

H. Richard Niebuhr adds:

> As it becomes aware of the specific form in which ultimate human problems present themselves in our time, the ministry, and therewith the schools that prepare men for it, begin to understand more sharply what the pastoral function is, in what language the gospel speaks to this need, and what form the Church must take in serving such men in such a time.[26]

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[25]Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Christian Moral Witness and Some Disciplines of Modern Culture," Making the Ministry Relevant, p. 47.

[26]The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, p. 94.

4. Self-understanding and better comprehension of one's role as a minister. The values of clinical pastoral education are both subjective and objective. Although it is education and not therapy, it is experiential education and can be therapeutic. Hiltner states: "It may indeed foster the student's personal as well as his professional self-understanding. This fact, however, does not distinguish it radically from any other good method of procedure in theological education."[27] Any theological education that is concerned with the nurture of whole men for the total ministry ought to have dimensions that are "therapeutic." Personal and unmet needs of the theological student which prevent him from being a "vehicle for transmitting agape" (Hiltner) ought to be recognized, accepted and dealt with. This is a responsibility of responsible theological education.

As he understands the real needs of his parishioners, and as he gains self-understanding, the minister or minister-to-be is in a much stronger position to deal

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[27]"Clinical Pastoral Education: An Appraisal 1960," Trends in Clinical Pastoral Education: Objectives-Methods-Standards, p. 9. See, also, Niebuhr, Williams, Gustafson, The Advancement of Theological Education, p. 128.

with the difficult problem of role confusion.[28] Whether or not he becomes the "pastoral director" described by Niebuhr is not so important as the appearance of "a sense of the relative importance of the activities and a definite idea of the proximate end sought by the minister in all of them."[29] For example, if through understanding of his personal strengths and weaknesses, and through the conviction that what is needed most from the ministry by both the Church and the world today is pastoral care in depth, the minister chooses to be first and foremost a "shepherd," then a giant stride has been taken toward the solution of his personal and professional identity crisis. He will still serve as preacher, administrator and so on; but, basically, he will be a pastor, a shepherd, a practitioner of the cure of souls. In this primary or master-role he will find security from the perplexities of role confusion. To this end C. P. E. can be of great assistance to the "perplexed profession" (Niebuhr).

5. Heightened sensitivity and the ability to enter into depth relationships. Depersonalization and insensitivity to persons as persons is often as much of

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[28] See Chapter VII.

[29] The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, p.63.

a problem within the churches as without. It is not unusual to witness a clergyman consciously attempting to minister sympathetically to another person, while unconsciously relating to that person in a very insensitive manner. C. P. E. with its emphasis on studying the living human document and understanding the dynamics of interpersonal encounter is a strong corrective for personal insensitivity. As the minister listens intently on several levels to the person who is the subject of his ministry and reflects upon the relationship, remembering at all times the sacredness of human personality, his sensitivity to this person as a person heightens. He is not diverted by "content illusion" or any other illusion that seems to demand "right answers" for academic problems in place of the giving of oneself in committed ministry. Instead he responds existentially to the inner needs of the person who confronts him in a truly "I-Thou" relationship of depth, characterized by involvement, relevance and personal commitment.

6. Significant encouragement of theological education to assume more of a "community of faith" character and less of a strictly academic character. If the purpose of theological education is "the increase among men of the love of God and neighbor," then the

theological institution must seek to create an atmosphere of koinonia. It cannot afford any longer to be concerned exclusively with the rational academic.[30] Theology is not just the translating of ancient thought into modern language, but a matter of wrestling with ultimate problems in contemporary form.[31] The crux of the situation is how to bring about the needed remedy.

Charles V. Gerkin of the Council for Clinical Training refers to the opinion of the "vast majority of students" in clinical pastoral education that C. P. E. is " a deeply moving and personal experience."[32] If that to which he refers is wrestling with ultimate problems in the context of koinonia, then it seems that C. P. E. has indicated at least one way in which theological education can move beyond the academic.

7. Improved intra-professional and inter-professional relationships with an increased willingness to converse with the secular (not apologetically or self-defensively but openly and humbly). Another contribution is in the realm of professional relationships. Increased

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[30] Ibid., pp. 31, 34. [31] Ibid., p. 3.

[32] Charles V. Gerkin, "Objectives of Clinical Pastoral Education," Trends in Clinical Pastoral Education: Objectives-Methods-Standards, p. 84.

self-understanding and sensitivity to others naturally contributes to the rediscovery of that sense of authentic brotherhood so often missing, even among ministers of the gospel. Barriers of pettiness, pride, unhealthy competiveness, pretense and prejudice fall as clergymen experience "oneness" as the body of Christ. This goes beyond courses in ecumenicity and ministerial ethics.

It is in the realm of inter-professional relationships that one of C. P. E.'s most important contributions is made. Since C. P. E. originated outside of the theological schools and within institutions in which other professions were as much at home as the ministry (or possibly more at home), the relation of clergyman to physician, for example, was destined to be much more intensive than before. In this setting, the inter-professional interaction that has taken place, for the most part, has proved to be highly constructive; and deeper understanding and appreciation among the professions has resulted. The "healing team"--no longer just an ideal--has become, in many instances, a reality.

The student in clinical education is exposed much more to the secular than the student in the theological schools. Generally speaking this has resulted in a healthy and enlightened dialogue between the clergy and

representatives of the secular. Barriers of fear, misunderstanding, ignorance and prejudice have been eliminated. Instead of entering into fruitless polemics (or, worse yet, ignoring one another), the religious and the secular have begun to converse openly and often humbly. Clinically trained ministers usually are ready to learn truth from their secular brethren. On the other hand, members of the secular professions who have worked closely with ministers have become more receptive to and sympathetic with the cure of souls. Whereas in the past, representatives of the religious and the secular were prone to engage in a never-ending duel, now they are willing increasingly, to listen to one another and to converse in an attitude of mutual respect which promises the advancement of truth without the compromising of conviction. C. P.E. has been one of the factors instrumental in creating this atmosphere.

8. A cure of souls directed more effectively toward whole persons. Samuel Miller writes:

> The minister in our time has a larger task to perform than merely proclaiming the good news. He must somehow resuscitate the very level of consciousness to which he wishes to speak. He must himself be alive at this level. Truth for him must be indeed incarnate, deep in the flesh. The wholeness of man can alone match the wholeness of saving truth.[33]

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[33] Op. cit., p. 68.

A prominent asset of C. P. E. is its concern with truth incarnate in the "living human document" and its emphasis on the wholeness of man. The cure of souls, if it is to be directed toward whole persons must take into consideration man's unconscious and non-verbal dimensions as well as his conscious and verbal dimension. Preoccupation with the rational to the neglect of man's wholeness results in fragmentation. Pastoral care, provided by a minister who has had the experience of clinical pastoral education, is more likely to be characterized by a cognizance of wholeness and directed more effectively toward whole persons.

9. Skills in pastoral care. The parish minister is not primarily a technician. Nevertheless, skills in pastoral care developed to serve and not to manipulate are of considerable importance. An unskilled minister, no matter how sincere or conscientious, is capable of perpetuating serious perversions in the delicate task of the cure of souls. Although, in a certain sense, effectiveness in the cure of souls is an art and some persons appear to be more "gifted" than others, it is also true that much skill can be learned. To be able to listen creatively, to interpret and analyse accurately, to respond effectively, and to communicate love

meaningfully are skills that can be developed and improved. C. P. E. is concerned with the teaching of skills in pastoral care.

Clinical pastoral education, as a method, a movement and a body of knowledge, is a growing force on the contemporary theological scene. It is within theological education and should not isolate itself or be isolated from the theological schools. Integration should take place, with the best of both approaches to the theological education of ministers being retained. It is highly possible that C. P. E. may develop into an effective antidote for many of the ecclesiogenic neuroses in addition to its service as a major factor in the growth of a more relevant and effective cure of souls.

V. RISKS INVOLVED WITH C. P. E.

Obviously C. P. E. has much to contribute to the contemporary theological scene, especially at the point of the minister's practice of the cure of souls. At the same time there are certain dangers associated with clinical pastoral education that must be guarded against. One of these is the ever-present risk that the clinically trained minister will yield to the temptation to

assume a "psychotherapeutic role" instead of integrating C. P. E. insights with a sound theology. I have referred to this elsewhere.[34]

The emotional stress of C. P. E. is more intense than that of education on a strictly rational level. Whereas one theological student might very well meet the academic demands of traditional theological education in the somewhat protected environment of the theological school campus; the same student could possibly experience great distress as a result of his inability to cope with the emotional stress inherent in clinical pastoral education and crisis ministries. Intellectual maturity does not in any sense eliminate the possibility of emotional immaturity.

The possibility of the occurrence of psychical difficulties in the course of clinical pastoral education raises questions that cannot be dealt with in this context except to take cognizance of them. What does this involve in respect to selection for the ministry? Are those who appear to be emotionally unfit rejected, although they prove to be academically adequate? What is the nature of the treatment to be received by students

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[34] Supra, pp. 290-91.

who do experience emotional disturbance, and who is to provide that treatment? If it is possible that psychical difficulties will arise in the course of C. P. E. is it best to "steer clear" of this possibility and keep everything on a "safer level"? Or, does theological education have a distinct responsibility at this point in the sense of discovering these difficulties and dealing with them in order to prevent possibly greater havoc and danger at a later time? These are serious questions that demand considered attention.

Finally, there is the danger that some ardent advocates of C. P. E. will assume that this type of theological education is "all-sufficient" and in so doing fail to recognize and emphasize the irreplaceable contributions of traditional theological education. A balanced perspective must be maintained at all times. Not to consider the above "dangers" along with the multiple positive contributions of C. P. E. is to fail to maintain this balanced perspective.

SUMMARY

The cure of souls is the basic practical task of every Christian minister. Considered in terms of relationships it can be divided into one-to-one and one-to-many relationships. Both are inescapable. The minister's choice is not whether or not he will enter into these relationships, but in what manner.

During this century the clergyman has tended to neglect his task as counsellor; and in the vacuum there has arisen a "new clergy." Paul Halmos identifies these as "the counsellors"--psychiatrists, psychologists, psychotherapists, marriage counsellors, social workers, and others. The ancestry of this "new clergy" is found in the spiritual counsellors who preceded them. They borrow heavily from the ministers' practice of the cure of souls, and often have become more effective than many ordained clergy.

The "new clergy," however, have several inherent weaknesses: (1) They are compulsively "scientific" while denying any validity to the metaphysical. The ecclesiogenic neuroses have contributed to the crystal-

lization of their opposition to the metaphysical and subjective. (2) They have inflated the myth of neutrality and pure objectivity out of all proportion, claiming to believe that they can remain neutral and non-directive in the one-to-one relationship. (3) They have succumbed to an "inverted hypocrisy." That is, many often do provide that which can be described accurately as a ministry of love to people in need. However, they vehemently deny being involved in something as "non-scientific" as love and attempt to camouflage it.

The Protestant ministry of today, grateful for any help that might be realized from the "new clergy" but not willing to abandon their own role as counsellors in the cure of souls, must reassert the primacy of the personal in an age wrapped in the tentacles of depersonalization. Sensitivity, personal involvement and depth relationships are demanded in modern pastoral care. The one-to-one encounter must be, in truth, an "I-Thou" relationship.

Christian revelation, which is personal disclosure and not the communication of facts and information, often takes place in pastoral counselling. Human personality is the primary medium of revelation, and

contemporary ministers can be "journeymen of revelation" (Barth). Professor Dickie warns that: "What appears to be personal encounter may not necessarily be encounter with God. It may be no more than an uprush from the unconscious self." He would not deny, however, that this encounter could be authentic revelation actualized in the one-to-one relationship which, therapeutically, restores broken relationships in both the vertical (Divine) and horizontal (human) dimensions.

Pastoral counselling, a context for the reassertion of the primacy of the personal and the experience of authentic Christian revelation, is also a context for judgment. The counselling minister, however, should be neither a judgmental personality (in the usual sense) nor a "non-directive sponge" who fails to have enough firmness to make meaningful confrontation a possibility. Instead, the clerical counsellor's goal should be that of judgment as a "shared appraisal" (Hiltner), in which the counsellee accepts and assimilates judgment that has not been imposed by the counsellor but has been put forward as an appraisal. The consideration of judgment in personal relationships demands also the consideration of love.

The pastoral counsellor is primarily a "vehicle for transmitting agape" (Hiltner). The place of love in healing is being recognized more and more by unordained counsellors despite a hesitancy to admit this openly. Ferenczi, de Forest, Allport, Suttie, and Halmos are among those non-clerical counsellors, however, who do speak openly of love as "the greatest psychotherapeutic agent" (Allport). The modern minister must take the risk of love in the one-to-one relationship. Love rightly transmitted is, however, neither sticky sentimentality nor simply a psychotherapeutic technique. It is disciplined, existential, spontaneous and self-giving. More fundamental, it is the Christian way of life.

Hobart Mowrer ridicules contemporary clergy who seem to believe that any deep interest in interpersonal relations is professional treason--those who all too willingly pass their responsibility as counsellors on to the "new clergy." The challenge of the one-to-one relationship calls the pastoral counsellor to preventive and remedial involvement in the battle with the religious pathology referred to as the "ecclesiogenic neuroses." As a minister of Jesus Christ he brings something unique to the "I-Thou" meeting. When he retires from the encounter or refuses to get involved, his message is lost.

The cure of souls not only demands the minister's involvement in the one-to-one relationship but also his immersion in the one-to-many task. He must be a more effective practitioner of the cure of souls in his ministry to small groups and the worshipping congregation.

Studies in group dynamics and a rising interest in the nature and function of small groups have received much attention in the last three decades. Social scientists and psychotherapists have been leading this surge of interest; but more recently the churches have begun to rediscover their own small group life. Impersonal individualism and other aspects of ecclesiogenic neurosis in Protestantism had damaged the spirit of community (koinonia), and the power of small group life had been lost. Now, many churches appear to be experiencing again the power of creative small groups.

Small groups in the church are usually one of three types: (1) task-centered, (2) study-centered, and (3) person-centered. Ultimately, the purposes and goals of these groups are redemptive. More specifically, however, their goals include growing in the skills of living, group psychotherapy (in a church-sponsored group led by a professional psychotherapist), pastoral

counselling, "radical openness" (Mowrer) or the confrontation of personal experience, and group learning with an emphasis on prevention.

The structure of small groups in the church depends in large measure on the type of group and its purpose. The place of meeting, the subject material (if any), the group leader, the length of the group session and the number of meetings, and the size of the group all vary--but should be considered carefully by the minister and others responsible.

The rediscovery of meaningful small group life in the churches has led to the realization of significant contributions. Authentic community, personal and interpersonal understanding, creative agape-love, honesty and radical openness, healing, redemptive confession, renewed commitment, more mature motivation, and an increase in the relevance of the faith have all been experienced as a result of creative small groups.

Despite the positive contributions of spiritual renewal through small groups, there are some risks involved. There is always the possibility of "in-group" rivalry--friction between the small group and the larger community of which it is a part. The spirit of Pharisaism must be guarded against vigilantly. There is also

the question whether or not a person who participates in "radical openness" and comes out from behind his "personage" (Tournier) can continue to live, work, and worship with those to whom he has disclosed himself. A third risk is the possibility of the eruption of severe mental illness in person-centered groups where there is a good deal of emotional investment. There are adequate safeguards that can be employed to meet these dangers--and the positive contributions outweigh the risks--but the risks themselves must be considered.

The role and function of the minister in the one-to-many relationship is strategic. As far as the genesis of small groups is concerned, he is in the favoured position to be aware of the currents of thought and feeling within a congregation, and should attempt to meet expressed need by challenging individuals to involvement in group life. He is also a logical choice as group leader and trainer of group leaders. As group leader he should be cognizant of the full implications of "I-Thou," place himself along with the rest of the group under the judgment of God, recognize the redemptive and therapeutic dimensions of groups, assume more of a "brotherly" rather than "fatherly" role, and not attempt to assume an "objective" stance that alienates

him from the rest of the group. Through loving involvement he can ignite the blaze of authentic koinonia and aid the Church in its quest for relevance.

The minister's one-to-many relationship includes not only his work with small groups but also his pulpit ministry. Preaching and pastoral care are closely related. Harry Emerson Fosdick used to judge the value of his sermons by the number who sought him out for personal counsel after hearing him preach. He advocates preaching that is "an adventure in co-operative thinking." Preaching that is most effective in the cure of souls is problem-solving in nature and directed toward human need. The minister's pastoral care will enliven his pulpit ministry, and his preaching will open doors for a more effective practice of the cure of souls.

In preaching, the minister encounters the problems of communication. There are at least two levels of communication, verbal and non-verbal, or conscious and unconscious. When these do not coincide they may present a serious problem. For example, consciously one may preach love but unconsciously communicate hostility. It could very well be that the minister should spend at least as much time studying unconscious communication as he does the technique of sermon construction .

A second major problem in pulpit communication is not the nature of that communicated but the actual lack of any communication. There are times when communication simply does not exist. Recognition of barriers to communication and the overcoming of them are essential to a truly creative one-to-many relationship. This necessitates a dialogical approach to preaching. One practical means for maintaining dialogical preaching is the use of small groups within the church as sermon reactors. Their reactions and suggestions are given to the minister who, in addition, is kept informed as to the relevancy or irrelevancy of his preaching through his pastoral care work. Ultimately, however, the man behind the sermon really is the sermon; and no amount of organizational structure can be a substitute for the quality of life inherent in the preacher himself.

Clinical pastoral education, which is a method, a movement, and a body of knowledge (Hiltner), has greatly influenced the minister's one-to-one and one-to-many relationships. This American phenomenon originated with the work of Anton T. Boisen as a mental hospital chaplain who undertook the clinical training of ministers. It is concerned with the discovery of theo-

logical truth and the full preparation of men for the Christian ministry.

C. P. E.'s methodology can be described best as "interpersonal." In an institutional setting the student's relationships to patients--the "living human document" (Boisen)--to his peers, to other institutional workers, to his supervisor, and to himself are closely scrutinized. Verbatim interviews, case histories, and group seminars are tools used toward this end. Other non-theological professional people contribute heavily to the student's learning experience.

The relationship of C. P. E. to traditional theological education demands serious consideration. Although originating outside of the theological schools, Boisen's idea from the beginning was that C. P. E. would be closely tied to traditional theological education. Many view it as a corrective to the theological schools' preoccupation with the abstract, theoretical and rational. Samuel Miller, for example, argues that theological education at its best is "the development of a religious personality," and not just a matter of information or skill. The "didactic stance" (Niebuhr-Williams-Gustafson report) of traditional theological educators must be confronted and supplanted by theological education

directed more toward the whole person--not just his conscious and rational side. In spite of fears and defensiveness from both clinical educators and traditional educators the times demand that the two approaches to theological education move towards more active cooperation at an accelerated pace.

Clinical pastoral education offers specific contributions to the theological student. (1) There is intensive, specific and scrutinized experience with the "living human document." This, more than any other one thing, makes C. P. E. an experience and not simply a course of study. (2) An increased body of knowledge in respect to the doctrine of man has developed because of C. P. E.'s empirical studies. (3) The student is made more keenly aware of the true nature of contemporary man's deepest needs. (4) His personal self-understanding and comprehension of his role as a Christian minister are emphasized. In this sense the contributions of C. P. E. are both subjective and objective. (5) In clinical training the student's ability to enter into depth relationships, and his sensitivity to persons as persons are strengthened. (6) Another contribution of C. P. E. is its encouragement of the theological schools to assume more of a "community of faith"

character and less that of strict academics. (7) C.P.E. contributes toward improved understanding and cooperative endeavor in the realm of intra-professional and inter-professional relationships. Concurrently, the student who has participated in the clinical pastoral education experience seems more willing to converse with the secular, not apologetically or self-defensively, but openly and humbly. (8) C. P. E. also contributes directly to a cure of souls that is concerned more effectively with man in his wholeness. (9) Finally, C. P. E. has proved to be a laboratory for the development of pastoral care skills.

The cure of souls as the minister's task demands his involvement in the one-to-one and one-to-many relationships. In order to counteract the threat of the ecclesiogenic neuroses this involvement must be relevant and effective. Clinical pastoral education--one valid aspect of theological education in the twentieth century--provides an encouraging means for creating a more qualitative pastoral care.

EPILOGUE

Deformations and perversions of the Christian message--which is the proclamation of the grace of God--by the churches themselves and the subsequent negative results are identifiable as "ecclesiogenic neuroses." Historically and contemporarily this phenomenon can be observed. Coupled with the secular ethos of the present age, which is the primacy of the scientific spirit, the ecclesiogenic neuroses have contributed to another phenomenon which is growing rapidly in the modern period. It is man's pronouncement of the "death of God."

Friedrich Nietzsche's well-known phrase "God is dead" appears to have been resurrected both secularly and theologically in the present epoch. His negative appraisal of the Christianity of his day undoubtedly contributed to the formation of his thought in respect to the "demise of the Divine." In "Of the Priests," for example, it is obvious that he views the clergy and the churches as penetrated by perversion. He remarks: "They [the priests] would have to sing better songs to make me believe in their Redeemer: his disciples would

have to look more redeemed"![1] Undoubtedly ecclesiogenic neuroses presented Nietzsche with ample fuel for his anti-Christian fire.

Carl G. Jung, speaking from the realm of the depth psychologist and heavily influenced by the thought of Nietzsche, claims to have observed empirically the fading of the God-image in the psyche of modern man.[2] And Jean-Paul Sartre, the atheistic existentialist, accepts the Nietzschean theory as a valid statement of fact.[3]

The realm of Christian theology, in which Barth's advocacy of revelation as the abolition of religion and Bonhoeffer's "religionless Christianity" stimulated much discussion that touched rather indirectly upon the "death of God," has now its own outspoken advocates of a "death of God theology." In addition there are those who, a little less radically, suggest that we ought to stop talking about God for a while.

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[1]Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. & introduction by R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 116.

[2]Supra, pp. 356-57.

[3]See Buber's appraisal of Sartre's position in Martin Buber, Eclipse of God (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1953), pp. 88-94.

Martin Buber, discussing the subject of "God's death" in the Eclipse of God, has ascertained correctly that: "The controversial question is therefore this: Is God merely a psychic phenomenon or does He also exist independently of the psyche of men"?[4] His own answer is found in the following statement:

> Man's threefold living relation is, first, his relation to the world and to things, second, his relation to man--both to individuals and to the many--third, his relation to the mystery of being--which is dimly apparent through all this but infinitely transcends it--which the philosopher calls the Absolute and the believer calls God, and which cannot in fact be eliminated from the situation even by a man who rejects both designations.[5]

Nevertheless, it is quite possible that the modern thought concerning the "death of God" reflects authentically a "repression of the spiritual" in contemporary man. Psychotherapists such as Viktor E. Frankl and Ira Progoff refer to the repression of spirituality. Paul Tournier speaks of an unmet repressed desire for the Christian faith. Gordon Allport claims that a reversal of the position of sex and religion has taken place. (While sexuality is now openly discussed

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[4]Op. cit., p. 172.

[5]Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), p. 177. Buber adds (pp. 179-80) that there is also the relation to one's own self but that this differs from the other three because "a real duality is lacking."

religion has undergone repression.) Jung refers to unfulfilled innate spiritual needs; and Mowrer pleads for the recognition of the repressed conscience in modern man.[6]

If Protestant deformations or ecclesiogenic neuroses have contributed, at least in part, to the present rising chorus claiming that "God" no longer "lives"; and if in turn the idea of the "demise of God" has helped to create a "repression of spirituality," or at least bears witness to the reality of such a repression, then one of two futures awaits man over the horizon.

The first is a future of chaos and neurosis--a direct result of the repression of the spiritual. Repression always speaks of division, conflict and sickness. If it were possible for the spiritual to be truly eliminated--for the "death of God" to be an actual fact rather than a human psychical and spiritual condition--then there would not be neurotic conflict. (Of course, the religious man believes, there would be neither Truth, Love or Righteousness as well.) However, with the spiritual neither consciously faced nor success-

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[6]Supra, pp. 480-84.

fully eliminated but instead repressed, the result can be nothing but civil war in the soul of man--and total illness.

The alternate future is one that encompasses the rediscovery of the spiritual in a healthier and more mature form. This is the only alternative because the complete elimination of the spiritual--the actual "killing of God"--is an absurd impossibility. It is possible that out of the neurotic chaos caused by the repression of the spiritual a refined morality and more mature Christianity may emerge--a spiritual Phoenix arising out of the ashes of neurosis. It is a fine line that separates "madness" from "sainthood" and, in the lives of many, extreme emotional and spiritual distress have been a prelude to the symphony of deep spiritual discovery. The "dark night of the soul" often yields to the brilliant dawn of intense, authentic spiritual revelation.

The Christian cura animarum is to be held particularly responsible for the future which contemporary man experiences. There is indeed a critical call to the cure of souls--a cure of souls which promotes the identification and rejection of the ecclesiogenic neuroses and which hastens the rediscovery of authentic

spirituality in a more healthy and mature form. Modern man, "come of age" scientifically, continues to grope for spiritual maturity.

The modern cure of souls includes the delicate and critically important task of making conscious in the soul of man the repressed and unconscious need for the Living God, for the omnipotent Eternal Thou. Means of doing this employed in the past are no longer adequate; and no contemporary prescription can be dogmatically asserted. The answer must be in the context of existential and spontaneous sensitivity, permeated by steadfast love and enlightened by Divine revelation. The Christian minister upon whose shoulders the greatest part of this task will fall, must become a living vehicle of revelation and agape in order to guide and gently lead faltering contemporary man toward the outstretched arms of the Everlasting Father.

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